403. In attack, the desire to open fire when losses are first felt must be repressed. Considerations of time, target, ammunition, and morale make it imperative that the attack withhold its fire and press forward to a first firing position close to the enemy. The attacker"s target will be smaller and fainter than the one he presents to the enemy.
404. In defense, more ammunition is available, ranges are more easily determined, and the enemy usually presents a larger target. The defender may therefore open fire and expect results at longer ranges than the attacker, and particularly if the defenders intend a delaying action only.
If the enemy has a powerful artillery, it will often be best for the defending infantry to withhold its fire until the enemy offers a specially favorable target. Vigorous and well-directed bursts of fire are then employed. The troops should therefore be given as much artificial protection as time and means permit, and at an agreed signal expose themselves as much as necessary and open fire.
405. In unexpected, close encounters a great advantage accrues to the side which first opens rapid and accurate fire with battle sight.
_Use of Ground._
406. The position of the firers must afford a suitable field of fire.
The ground should permit constant observation of the enemy, and yet enable the men to secure some cover when not actually firing.
Troops whose target is for the moment hidden by unfavorable ground, either move forward to better ground or seek to execute cross fire on another target.
407. The likelihood of a target being hit depends to a great extent upon its visibility. By skillful use of ground, a firing line may reduce its visibility without loss of fire power. Sky lines are particularly to be avoided.
_Choice of Target._
408. The target chosen should be the hostile troops most dangerous to the firers. These will usually be the nearest hostile infantry. When no target is specially dangerous, that one should be chosen which promises the most hits.
409. Frequent changes of target impair the fire effect. Random changes to small, unimportant targets impair fire discipline and accomplish nothing. Attention should be confined to the main target until substantial reason for change is apparent.
410. An opportunity to deliver flanking fire, especially against artillery protected in front by shields, is an example warranting change of target and should never be overlooked. Such fire demoralizes the troops subjected to it, even if the losses inflicted are small.
In this manner a relatively small number of rifles can produce important results.
_The Range._
411. Beyond close range, the correct setting of the rear sight is of primary importance, provided the troops are trained and well in hand.
The necessity for correct sight setting increases rapidly with the range. Its importance decreases as the quality of the troops decrease, for the error in sight setting, except possibly at very long ranges, becomes unimportant when compared with the error in holding and aiming.
412. In attack, distances must usually be estimated and corrections made as errors are observed. Mechanical range finders and ranging volleys are practicable at times.
In defense, it is generally practicable to measure more accurately the distances to visible objects and to keep a record of them for future use.
_Distribution of Fire and Target._
413. The purpose of fire superiority is to get hits whenever possible, but at all events to keep down the enemy"s fire and render it harmless. To accomplish this the target must be covered with fire throughout its whole extent. Troops who are not fired upon will fire with nearly peace-time accuracy.
The target is roughly divided and a part is a.s.signed to each unit. No part of the target is neglected. In attack, by a system of overlapping in a.s.signing targets to platoons, the entire hostile line can be kept under fire even during a rush.
_Observation._
414. The correctness of the sight setting and the distribution of fire over the target can be verified only by careful observation of the target, the adjacent ground, and the effect upon the enemy.
415. Observation only can determine whether the fire fight is being properly conducted. If the enemy"s fire is losing in accuracy and effect, the observer realizes that his side is gaining superiority. If the enemy"s fire remains or becomes effective and persistent, he realizes that corrective measures are necessary to increase either volume or accuracy, or both.
_Discipline._
416. Discipline makes good direction and control possible and is the distinguishing mark of trained troops.
417. The discipline necessary in the firing line will be absent unless officers and noncommissioned officers can make their will known to the men. In the company, therefore, communication must be by simple signals which, in the roar of musketry, will attract the attention and convey the correct meaning.
_Expenditure of Ammunition._
418. In attack the supply is more limited than in defense. Better judgment must be exercised in expenditure. Ordinarily, troops in the firing line of an attack can not expect to have that day more ammunition than they carry into the combat, except such additions as come from the distribution of ammunition of dead and wounded and the surplus brought by reinforcements.
419. When a certain fire effect is required, the necessary ammunition must be expended without hesitation. Several hours of firing may be necessary to gain fire superiority. True economy can be practiced only by closing on the enemy before first opening fire and thereafter suspending fire when there is nothing to shoot at.
_Supporting Artillery._
420. Artillery fire is the princ.i.p.al aid to the infantry in gaining and keeping fire superiority, not only by its. .h.i.ts, but by the moral effect it produces on the enemy.
421. In attack, artillery a.s.sists the forward movement of the infantry. It keeps down the fire of the hostile artillery and seeks to neutralize the hostile infantry by inflicting losses upon it, destroying its morale, driving it to cover, and preventing it from using its weapons effectively.
In defense, it ignores the hostile artillery when the enemy"s attack reaches a decisive stage and a.s.sists in checking the attack, joining its fire power to that of the defending infantry.
422. Troops should be accustomed to being fired over by friendly artillery and impressed with the fact that the artillery should continue firing upon the enemy until the last possible moment. The few casualties resulting from shrapnel bursting short are trifling compared with those that would result from the increased effectiveness of the enemy"s infantry fire were the friendly artillery to cease firing.
Casualties inflicted by supporting artillery are not probable until the opposing infantry lines are less than 200 yards apart.
423. When the distance between the hostile infantry lines becomes so short as to render further use of friendly artillery inadvisable, the commander of the infantry firing line, using a preconcerted signal,[3]
informs the artillery commander. The latter usually increases the range in order to impede the strengthening of the enemy"s foremost line.
[Footnote 3: With a 4-foot white and red regimental signal flag.]
_Fire of Position._
424. Infantry is said to execute fire of position when it is posted so as to a.s.sist an attack by firing over the heads, or off the flank, of the attacking troops and is not itself to engage in the advance; or when, in defense, it is similarly posted to augment the fire of the main firing line.
Machine guns serve a like purpose.
In a decisive action, fire of position should be employed whenever the terrain permits and reserve infantry is available.
DEPLOYMENT.