_HOLDING ATTACK._
485. The holding attack must be vigorous enough to hold the enemy in position and must present a front strong enough to conceal the secondary nature of the attack.
The holding attack need have comparatively little strength in rear, but conceals the fact by a firing line not distinguishable from that of a decisive attack.
486. Supports and reserves are kept at short distances. Their strength is less if the object is merely to hold the enemy fast than if the object is, in addition, to compel him to use up reserves.
487. Holding attacks which may later develop into decisive attacks should be correspondingly strong in rear.
488. All feint attacks should employ dense firing lines. Their weakness is in rear and is concealed.
DEFENSE.
_POSITIONS AND INTRENCHMENTS._
489. The first requirement of a good position is a clear field of fire and view to the front and exposed flanks to a distance of 600 to 800 yards or more. The length of front should be suitable to the size of the command and the flanks should be secure. The position should have lateral communication and cover for supports and reserves. It should be one which the enemy can not avoid, but must attack or give up his mission.
A position having all these advantages will rarely, if ever, be found.
The one should be taken which conforms closest to the description.
490. The natural cover of the position should be fully utilized. In addition, it should be strengthened by fieldworks and obstacles.
The best protection is afforded by deep, narrow, inconspicuous trenches. If little time is available, as much as practicable must be done. That the fieldworks may not be needed should not cause their construction to be omitted, and the fact that they have been constructed should not influence the action of a commander, if conditions are found to be other than expected.
491. When time and troops are available the preparations include the necessary communicating and cover trenches, head cover, bombproofs, etc. The fire trenches should be well supplied with ammunition.
The supports are placed close at hand in cover trenches when natural cover is not available.
492. Dummy trenches frequently cause the hostile artillery to waste time and ammunition and to divert its fire.
493. The location, extent, profile, garrison, etc., of fieldworks are matters to be decided by the infantry commanders. Officers must be able to choose ground and properly intrench it. (See Intrenchments.)
494. In combat exercises, when it is impracticable to construct the trenches appropriate to the exercise, their trace may be outlined by bayonets, sticks, or other markers, and the responsible officers required to indicate the profile selected, method and time of construction, garrisons, etc.
_DEPLOYMENT FOR DEFENSE._
495. The density of the whole deployment depends upon the expected severity of the action, the character of the enemy, the condition of the flanks, the field of fire, the terrain, and the available artificial or natural protection for the troops.
496. If exposed, the firing line should be as dense in defense as in attack. If the firing line is well intrenched and has a good field of fire, it may be made thinner.
Weaker supports are permissible. For the same number of troops the front occupied on the defensive may therefore be longer than on the offensive, the battalions placing more companies in the firing line.
497. If it is intended only to delay the enemy, a fairly strong deployment is sufficient, but if decisive results are desired, a change to the offensive must be contemplated and the corresponding strength in rear provided. This strength is in the reserve, which should be as large as the demands of the firing line and supports permit. Even in a pa.s.sive defense the reserve should be as strong as in the attack, unless the flanks are protected by other means.
498. Supports are posted as close to the firing line as practicable and reinforce the latter according to the principles explained in the attack. When natural cover is not sufficient for the purpose, communicating and cover trenches are constructed. If time does not permit their construction, it is better to begin the action with a very dense firing line and no immediate supports than to have supports greatly exposed in rear.
499. The reserve should be posted so as to be entirely free to act as a whole, according to the developments. The distance from firing line to reserve is generally greater than in the attack. By reason of such a location the reserve is best able to meet a hostile enveloping attack; it has a better position from which to make a counter attack; it is in a better position to cover a withdrawal and permit an orderly retreat.
The distance from firing line to reserve increases with the size of the reserve.
500. When the situation is no longer in doubt, the reserve should be held in rear of the flank which is most in danger or offers the best opportunity for counterattack. Usually the same flank best suits both purposes.
501. In exceptional cases, on broad fronts, it may be necessary to detach a part of the reserve to protect the opposite flank. This detachment should be the smallest consistent with its purely protective mission.
502. The commander a.s.signs to subordinates the front to be occupied by them. These, in turn, subdivide the front among their next lower units in the firing line.
503. An extended position is so divided into sections that each has, if practicable, a field of fire naturally made distinct by the terrain.
Unfavorable and unimportant ground will ordinarily cause gaps to exist in the line.
504. The size of the unit occupying each section depends upon the latter"s natural strength, front, and importance. If practicable, battalions should be kept intact and a.s.signed as units to sections or parts of sections.
505. Where important dead s.p.a.ce lies in front of one section, an adjoining section should be instructed to cover it with fire when necessary, or machine guns should be concealed for the like purpose.
506. Advanced posts, or any other form of unnecessary dispersion, should be avoided.
507. Unless the difficulty of moving the troops into the position be great, most of the troops of the firing line are held in rear of it until the infantry attack begins. The position itself is occupied by a small garrison only, with the necessary outguards or patrols in front.
508. Fire alone can not be depended upon to stop the attack. The troops must be determined to resort to the bayonet, if necessary.
509. If a night attack or close approach by the enemy is expected, troops in a prepared position should strengthen the outguards and firing line and construct as numerous and effective obstacles as possible. Supports and local reserves should move close to the firing line and should, with the firing line, keep bayonets fixed. If practicable, the front should be illuminated, preferably from the flanks of the section.
510. Only short range fire is of any value in resisting night attacks.
The bayonet is the chief reliance. (See Night Operations.)
_COUNTERATTACK._
511. The pa.s.sive defense should be a.s.sumed only when circ.u.mstances force it. Only the offensive wins.
512. An active defense seeks a favorable decision. A favorable decision can not be expected without counterattack.
513. A pa.s.sive defense in a position whose flanks are not protected by natural obstacles is generally out of the question.
514. Where the defense is a.s.sumed with a view to making a counterattack, the troops for the counterattack should be held in reserve until the time arrives for such attack. The defensive line should be held by as few troops as possible in order that the force for the offensive may be as large as possible.
The force for the counterattack should be held echeloned in rear of the flank which offers it the greatest advantage for the proposed attack.
515. The counterattack should be made vigorously and at the proper time. It will usually be made:
By launching the reserve against the enemy"s flank when his attack is in full progress. This is the most effective form of counterattack.