[Footnote 22-31: Ltr, DASD (Civil Rights) to Gesell, 30 Apr 64, ASD (M) 291.2.]
[Footnote 22-32: AR 600-21, 2 Jul 64 (superseded by AR 600-21, 18 Mar 65); AFR 35-78, 19 Aug 64 (superseded in May 71); SecNav Instructions 5350.6, Jan 65, 5350.5A, 16 Dec 65, and 5370.7, 4 Mar 65.
See also NAVSO P2483, May 65, "A Commanding Officer"s Guide for Establishing Minority Community Relations."]
There were several reasons for the delay. The first was the protracted congressional debate over the civil rights bill. Some service officials strongly supported the stand that off-base complaints of black servicemen were chiefly the concern of the Justice Department.
On a more practical level, however, the Department of Defense was reluctant to issue new directives while legislation bearing directly on discrimination affecting servicemen was being formulated. Accepting these arguments, Paul postponed the services" submission of new regulations and manuals until the act a.s.sumed final form.
The delayed publication of the service regulations could also be blamed in part on the confusion that surrounded the announcement of a new Defense policy on attendance at segregated meetings. The issue arose in early 1964 when Fitt discovered some defense employees accepting invitations to partic.i.p.ate in segregated affairs while others refused on the basis of the secretary"s equal opportunity directives. Inconsistency on such a delicate subject disturbed the civil rights deputy. The services had fortuitously avoided several (p. 565) potentially embarra.s.sing incidents when officials were invited to attend segregated functions, and Fitt warned Paul that "if we don"t erect a better safeguard than sheer chance, we"re bound somewhere, sometime soon to look foolish and insensitive."[22-33] He wanted McNamara to issue a policy statement on the subject, admittedly a difficult task because it would be hard to write and would require White House clearance that might not be forthcoming. For the short run Fitt wanted to deal with the problem at a regular staff meeting where he could discuss the matter and coordinate his strategy without the delay of publishing new regulations.
[Footnote 22-33: Memo, DASD (CR) for Paul, 10 Feb 64, sub: Official Attendance at Segregated Meetings, ASD (M) 291.2.]
As it turned out, anxiety over White House approval proved groundless.
"The President has on numerous occasions made clear his view that Federal officials should not partic.i.p.ate in segregated meetings,"
White House Counsel Lee C. White informed all department and agency heads, and he suggested that steps be taken in each department to inform all employees.[22-34] The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus R.
Vance, complied on 7 July by issuing a memorandum to the services prohibiting partic.i.p.ation in segregated meetings. Adding to the text prepared in the White House, he ordered that this prohibition be incorporated in regulations then being prepared, a move that necessitated additional staffing of the developing equal opportunity regulations.[22-35]
[Footnote 22-34: Memo, a.s.soc Spec Counsel to President for Heads of Departments and Agencies, 12 Jun 64, sub: Further Partic.i.p.ation at Segregated Meetings, copy in CMH.]
[Footnote 22-35: Memo, Dep SecDef for Secys of Military Departments et al., 7 Jul 64, sub: Federal Partic.i.p.ation at Segregated Meetings, SD 291.2. The Army"s regulation, published on 2 July, five days before Secretary Vance"s memorandum, was republished on 18 May 1965 to include the prohibition against segregated meetings and other new policies. The Navy prepared a special Secretary of Navy instruction (5720.38, 30 Jul 1964) on the subject.]
Objections to the prohibition were forthcoming. Continuing on a tack he had pursued for several years, the Air Force Deputy Special a.s.sistant for Manpower, Personnel, and Organization, James P. Goode, objected to the application of the Vance memorandum to base commanders. These men had to maintain good relations with community leaders, he argued, and good relations were best fostered by the commander"s joining local community organizations such as the Rotary Club and the Chamber of Commerce, which were often segregated. These civic and social organizations offered an effective forum for publicizing the objectives of the Department of Defense, and to forbid the commander"s partic.i.p.ation because of segregation would seriously reduce his local influence. Goode wanted the order "clarified" to exclude local community organizations from its coverage on the grounds that including them would be "detrimental to the best interests of all military personnel and their dependents and would result in a corresponding reduction in military effectiveness."[22-36] The Defense Department would have nothing to do with the idea. Such an exception to the rule, the civil rights deputy declared, would not const.i.tute a (p. 566) clarification, but rather a nullification of the order. The Air Force request was rejected.[22-37]
[Footnote 22-36: Memo, James P. Goode for Dep SecDef, 29 Sep 64, sub: Federal Partic.i.p.ation at Segregated Meetings, copy in CMH.]
[Footnote 22-37: Draft Memo, DASD (Civ Pers, Indus Rels, and CR) for Dep for Manpower, Personnel, and Organization, USAF, 7 Oct 64, sub: Federal Partic.i.p.ation at Segregated Meetings. The memorandum was not actually dispatched, and a note on the original draft discloses that after discussion between the Deputy a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense and the a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower) the rejection of the Air Force request was "handled verbally." Copy of the memo in CMH.]
The confusion surrounding the publication of service regulations suggested that without firm and comprehensive direction from the Office of the Secretary of Defense the services would never develop effective or uniform programs. Service officials argued that commanders had always been allowed to execute racial policy without specific instructions. They feared popular reaction to forceful regulations, and, in truth, they were already being subjected to congressional criticism over minor provisions of the Gesell Committee"s report. Even the innocuous suggestion that officers be appointed to channel black servicemen"s complaints was met with charges of "snooping" and "gestapo" tactics.[22-38]
[Footnote 22-38: Fitt, "Remarks Before Civilian Aides Conference of the Secretary of the Army," 6 Mar 64.]
Although both the Gesell Committee and Secretary McNamara had made clear that careful direction was necessary, the manpower office of the Department of Defense temporized. Instead of issuing detailed guidelines to the services that outlined their responsibilities for enforcing the provision of the secretary"s equal opportunity directive, instead of demanding a strict accounting from commanders of their execution of these responsibilities, Paul asked the services for outline plans and then indiscriminately approved these plans even when they pa.s.sed over real accountability in favor of vaguely stated principles. The result was a lengthy period of bureaucratic confusion.
Protected by the lack of specific instructions the services went through an Alfonse-Gaston routine, each politely refraining from commitment to substantial measures while waiting to see how far the others would go.[22-39]
[Footnote 22-39: Interv, author with Evans, 23 Jul 73, CMH files.]
_Fighting Discrimination Within the Services_
The immediate test for the services" belatedly organized civil rights apparatus was the racial discrimination lingering within the armed forces themselves. The Civil Rights Commission and the Gesell Committee had been concerned with the exceptions to the services"
generally satisfactory equal opportunity record. It was these exceptions, such chronic problems as underrepresentation of Negroes in some services, in the higher military grades, and in skilled military occupations, that continued to concern the Defense Department civil rights organization and the services as they tried to carry out McNamara"s directive. Seemingly minor compared to the discrimination faced by black servicemen outside the military reservation, racial problems within the military family and how the services dealt with them would have direct bearing on the tranquility of the armed forces in the 1970"s.
[Ill.u.s.tration: LISTENING TO THE SQUAD LEADER. _Men of Company D, 21st Infantry, prepare to move out, Quang Tin Province, Vietnam._]
Two pressing needs, and obviously interrelated ones, were to (p. 567) attract a greater number of young blacks to a military career and improve the status of Negroes already in uniform. These were not easy, short-term tasks. In the first place the Negro, ironically in view of the services" now genuine desire to have him, was no longer so interested in joining. As explained by Defense Department civil rights officials, the past att.i.tudes and practices of the services, especially the treatment of Negroes during World War II, had created among black opinion-makers an indifference toward the services as a vocation.[22-40] Lacking encouragement from parents, teachers, and peers, black youths were increasingly reluctant to consider a military career. For their part the services tried to counter this att.i.tude with an energetic public relations program.[22-41] Encouraged by the department"s civil rights experts they tried to establish closer (p. 568) relations with black students. They even reorganized their recruitment programs, and the Secretary of Defense himself initiated a program to attract more black ROTC cadets.[22-42] Service representatives also worked with teachers and school officials to inform students on military career opportunities.
[Footnote 22-40: Paul Memo.]
[Footnote 22-41: For accounts of Navy and Marine Corps attempts to attract more Negroes, see Memos: Smedberg for Under SecNav, 20 May 63, sub: Interim Progress Report on Navy Measures in the Area of Equality of Opportunity in the Armed Forces; Under SecNav for SecNav, 15 Jul 63, sub: First Report of Progress in the Area of Equal Opportunity in the Navy Department; E. Hidalgo, Spec a.s.st to SecNav, for L. Howard Bennett, Princ.i.p.al a.s.st for Civil Rights, OASD (CR), 1 Oct 65, sub: Summary of Steps Deemed Necessary to Increase Number of Qualified Negro Officers and Enlisted Personnel on the Navy/Marine Corps Team, SecNav file 5420 (1179).
All in GenRecsNav. See also Memos, Marine Aide to SecNav for CofS, USMC, 5 Aug 63, sub: Equal Opportunity in the Armed Services, and ACofS, G-1, USMC, for CofS, USMC, 17 Aug 63, same sub, both in MC files. For OSD awareness of the problem, see Stephen N. Shulman, "The Civil Rights Policies of the Department of Defense," 4 May 65, copy in CMH.]
[Footnote 22-42: Memo, SecDef for Educators, 6 Oct 65, sub: Equal Opportunity at the Service Academies of the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force, SD 291.2.]
Enlistment depended not only on a man"s desire to join but also on his ability to qualify. Following the publication of a presidential task force report on the chronic problem of high draft rejection rates, the Army inaugurated in August 1964 a Special Training and Enlistment Program (STEP), an experiment in the "military training, education, and physical rehabilitation of men who cannot meet current mental or medical standards for regular enlistment in the Army."[22-43] Aimed at increasing enlistments by providing special training after induction for those previously rejected as unqualified, the program provided for the enlistment of 8,000 substandard men, which included many Negroes.
Before the men could be enlisted, however, Congress killed the program, citing its cost and duplication of the efforts of the Job Corps. It was not until 1967 that the idea of accepting many young men ineligible for the draft because of mental or educational deficiencies was revived when McNamara launched his Project 100,000.[22-44]
[Footnote 22-43: DOD News Release, 13 Aug 64. See the President"s Task Force on Manpower Conservation, _One-Third of a Nation: A Report on Young Men Found Unqualified for Military Service_ (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964). Kennedy established the task force in September 1963. Its members included the Secretaries of Labor, Defense, and Health, Education and Welfare and the Director of Selective Service.]
[Footnote 22-44: McNamara, _The Essence of Security_, pp. 131-38. See also Bahr, "The Expanding Role of the Department of Defense," ch. V.]
The services were unable to bring off a dramatic change in black enlistment patterns in the 1960"s. With the exception of the Marine Corps, in which the proportion of black enlisted men increased 4 percent, the percentage of Negroes in the services remained relatively stationary between 1962 and 1968 (_Table 24_). In 1968, when Negroes accounted for 11 percent of the American population, their share of the enlisted service population remained at 8.2, with significant differences among the services. Nor did there seem much chance of increasing the number of black servicemen since the percentage of Negroes among draftees and first-time enlistees was rising very (p. 569) slowly while black reenlistment rates, for some twenty years a major factor in holding black strength steady, began to decline (_Table 25_).
Actually, enlistment figures for both whites and blacks declined, a circ.u.mstance usually attributed to the unpopularity of the Vietnam War, although in the midst of the war, in 1967, black first-term reenlistment rates continued to exceed white rates 2 to 1.
Table 24--Black Percentages, 1962-1968
| Army | Navy | Marine Corps | Air Force Year| Enlisted| Enlisted| Enlisted| Enlisted |Officers| Men |Officers| Men |Officers| Men |Officers| Men 1962 3.2 12.2 .2 5.2 .2 7.6 1.2 9.2 1964 3.4 13.4 .3 5.8 .4 8.7 1.5 10.0 1965 3.5 13.9 .3 5.8 .4 9.0 1.6 10.7 1967 3.4 12.1 .3 4.7 .7 10.3 1.8 10.4 1968 3.3 12.6 .4 5.0 .9 11.5 1.8 10.2
_Source_: Records of ASD (M) 291.2.
Table 25--Rates for Reenlistments, 1964-1967
Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force Year | White | Black | White | Black | White | Black | White | Black 1964 18.5 49.3 21.6 41.3 12.9 25.1 27.4 50.3 1965 13.7 49.3 24.2 44.8 18.9 38.9 19.1 39.2 1966 20.0 66.5 17.6 24.7 10.5 19.5 16.0 30.1 1967 12.9 31.7 16.7 22.5 10.7 17.4 17.3 26.9
_Source_: Records of ASD (M) 291.2; see especially Paul Memo.
The low percentage of black officers, a matter of special concern to the Civil Rights Commission and the Gesell Committee as well as the civil rights organizations, remained relatively unchanged in the 1960"s (_see Table 24_). Nor could any dramatic rise in the number of black officers be expected. Between 1963 and 1968 the three service academies graduated just fifty-one black officers, an impressive statistic only in the light of the record of a total of sixty black graduates in the preceding eighty-six years. Furthermore, there were only 116 black cadets in 1968, a vast proportional increase over former years but also an indication of the small number of black officers that could be expected from that source during the next four years (_Table 26_). Since cadets were primarily chosen by congressional nomination and from other special categories, little could be done, many officials a.s.sumed, to increase substantially the number of black cadets and midshipmen. An imaginative effort by Fitt in early 1964, however, proved this a.s.sumption false. Fitt got the academies to agree to take all the qualified Negroes he could find and some senators and congressmen to relinquish some of their appointments to the cause. He then wrote every major school district in the country, seeking black applicants and a.s.suring them that the academies were truly open to all those qualified. Even though halfway through the academic year, Fitt"s "micro-personnel operation," as he later called it, yielded appointments for ten Negroes. Unfortunately, (p. 570) his successor did not continue the effort.[22-45]
[Footnote 22-45: Ltr, Fitt to author, 21 Oct 76, CMH files.]
Table 26--Black Attendance at the Military Academies, July 1968
Cla.s.s Cla.s.s Cla.s.s Cla.s.s Total Total Academy | of 1969 | of 1970 | of 1971 | of 1972 | Negro | Attendance Army 10 7 5 9 31 3,285 Navy 2 8 8 15 33 4,091 Air Force 6 10 13 23 52 3,028 Totals 18 25 26 47 116
_Source_: Office, Deputy a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Rights).
The ROTC program at predominantly black colleges had always been the chief source of black officers, but here, again, there was little hope for immediate improvement. With the exception of a large increase in the number of black Air Force officers graduating from five black colleges, the percentage of officers entering the service from these inst.i.tutions remained essentially unchanged throughout the 1960"s despite the services" new equal opportunity programs (_Table 27_).
Some civil rights leaders had been arguing for years that the establishment of ROTC units at predominantly black schools merely helped perpetuate the nation"s segregated college system. Fitt agreed that as integrated education became more commonplace the number of black ROTC graduates would increase in predominantly white colleges, but meanwhile he considered units at black schools essential. Among the approximately 140 black colleges without ROTC affiliation, some could possibly qualify for units, and in February 1965 Fitt"s successor, Stephen N. Shulman, called for the formation of more (p. 571) ROTC units as an equal opportunity measure.[22-46] The Army responded by creating a unit at Arkansas A&M Normal College, and the Navy opened a unit at Prairie View A&M in the President"s home state of Texas.
Balancing the expectations implied by the formation of these new units were the growing antiwar sentiment among college students and the special compet.i.tion for black college graduates in the private business community, both of which made ROTC commissions less attractive to many black students.
[Footnote 22-46: Fitt left the civil rights office in August 1964 to become the General Counsel of the Army. At his departure the position of Deputy a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Rights was consolidated with that of the Deputy for Civilian Personnel and Industrial Relations. The inc.u.mbent of the latter position, Stephen Shulman, became Deputy a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel, Industrial Relations, and Civil Rights.
Shulman, a graduate of Yale Law School and former Executive a.s.sistant to the Secretary of Labor, had been closely involved in the Defense Department"s equal opportunity program in industrial contracts.]
Table 27--Army and Air Force Commissions Granted at Predominantly Black Schools
Army Commissions Cla.s.s of|Cla.s.s of|Cla.s.s of|Cla.s.s of School 1964 | 1965 | 1966 | 1967 A&T College, N.C. 24 22 10 17 Central State College, Ohio 29 14 26 25 Florida A&M College 29 15 23 15 Hampton University, Va. 29 34 20 19 Lincoln University, Pa. 19 14 16 19 Morgan State College, Md. 21 27 12 16 Prairie View A&M College, Tex. 20 27 31 38 South Carolina State College 16 23 24 24 Southern University, La. 23 37 19 21 Tuskegee Inst.i.tute, Ala. 14 14 20 26 Virginia State College 21 14 18 21 West Virginia State College 22 19 15 14 Howard University, Washington, D.C. 19 37 30 23 Total 286 297 264 278 Percentage of total such commissions granted 2.4 2.7 2.5 2.6
Air Force Commissions
Cla.s.s of Cla.s.s of Cla.s.s of School 1964 | 1965 | 1966 A&T College, N.C. 12 10 33 Howard University, Washington, D.C. 24 31 23 Maryland State College 2 4 4 Tennessee A&I University 13 26 32 Tuskegee Inst.i.tute, Ala. 14 33 41 Total 65 104 133