Conclusion
The Defense Department"s response to the recommendations of the Gesell Committee marked the close of a well-defined chapter in the racial history of the armed forces. Within a single generation, the services had recognized the rights of black Americans to serve freely in the defense of their country, to be racially integrated, and to have, with their dependents, equal treatment and opportunity not only on the military reservation but also in nearby communities. The gradual compliance with Secretary McNamara"s directives in the mid-1960"s marked the crumbling of the last legal and administrative barriers to these goals.
_Why the Services Integrated_
In retrospect, several causes for the elimination of these barriers can be identified. First, if only for the constancy and fervor of its demands, was the civil rights movement. An obvious correlation exists between the development of this movement and the shift in the services" racial att.i.tudes. The civil rights advocates--that is, those spokesmen of the rapidly proliferating civil rights organizations and their allies in Congress, the White House, and the media--formed a pressure group that zealously enlisted political support for equal opportunity measures. Their metier was presidential politics. In several elections they successfully traded their political a.s.sistance, an unknown quant.i.ty, for specific reform. Their influence was crucial, for example, in Roosevelt"s decision to enlist Negroes for general service in the World War II Navy and in all branches of the Army and in Truman"s proclamation of equal treatment and opportunity; it was notable in the adjudication of countless discrimination cases involving individual black servicemen both on and off the military base. Running through all their demands and expressed more and more clearly during this period was the conviction that segregation itself was discrimination. The success of their campaign against segregation in the armed forces can be measured by the extent to which this proposition came to be accepted in the counsels of the White House and the Pentagon.
Because the demands of the civil rights advocates were extremely persistent and widely heard, their direct influence on the integration of the services has sometimes been overstressed. In fact, for much of the period their most important demands were neutralized by the logical-sounding arguments of those defending the racial _status quo_.
More to the point, the civil rights revolution itself swept along some important defense officials. Thus the reforms begun by James Forrestal and Robert McNamara testified to the indirect but important influence of the civil rights movement.
Resisting the pressure for change was a solid bloc of officials (p. 610) in the services which held out for the retention of traditional policies of racial exclusion or segregation. Professed loyalty to military tradition was all too often a cloak for prejudice, and prejudice, of course, was prevalent in all the services just as it was in American society. At the same time traditionalism simply reflected the natural inclination of any large, inbred bureaucracy to preserve the privileges and order of an earlier time. Basically, the military traditionalists--that is, most senior officials and commanders of the armed forces and their allies in Congress--took the position that black servicemen were difficult to train and undependable in battle.
They cited the performance of large black combat units during the world wars as support for their argument. They also rationalized their opposition to integration by saying that the armed forces should not be an instrument of social change and that the services could only reflect the social mores of the society from which they sprang. Thus, in their view, integration not only hindered the services" basic mission by burdening them with undependable units and marginally capable men, but also courted social upheaval in military units.
Eventually reconciled to the integration of military units, many military officials continued to resist the idea that responsibility for equal treatment and opportunity of black servicemen extended beyond the gates of the military reservation. Deeply ingrained in the officer corps was the conviction that the role of the military was to serve, not to change, society. To effect social change, the traditionalist argued, would require an intrusion into politics that was by definition militarism. It was the duty of the Department of Justice and other civilian agencies, not the armed forces, to secure those social changes essential for the protection of the rights of servicemen in the civilian community.[24-1] If these arguments appear to have overlooked the real causes of the services" wartime racial problems and ignored some of the logical implications of Truman"s equal treatment and opportunity order, they were nevertheless in the mainstream of American military thought, ardently supported, and widely proclaimed.
[Footnote 24-1: Speaking at a later date on this subject, former Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins observed that "when we look about us and see the deleterious effects of military interference in civilian governments throughout ...
many other areas of the world, we can be grateful that American military leaders have generally stuck to their proper sphere." See Memo, Collins for OSD Historian, 21 Aug 76, copy in CMH.]
The story of integration in the armed forces has usually, and with some logic, been told in terms of the conflict between the "good"
civil rights advocates and the "bad" traditionalists. In fact, the history of integration goes beyond the dimensions of a morality play and includes a number of other influences both inst.i.tutional and individual.
[Ill.u.s.tration: VIETNAM PATROL. _Men of the 35th Infantry advance during "Operation Baker."_]
The most prominent of these inst.i.tutional factors were federal legislation and executive orders. After World War II most Americans moved slowly toward acceptance of the proposition that equal treatment and opportunity for the nation"s minorities was both just and prudent.[24-2] A drawn-out process, this acceptance was in reality a grudging concession to the promptings of the civil rights movement; translated into federal legislation, it exerted constant pressure (p. 612) on the racial policy of the armed forces. The Selective Service Acts of 1940 and 1948, for example, provided an important reason for integrating when, as interpreted by the executive branch, their racial provisions required each service to accept a quota of Negroes among its draftees. The services could evade the provisions of the acts for only so long before the influx of black draftees in conjunction with other pressures led to alterations in the old racial policies.
Truman"s order calling for equality of treatment and opportunity in the services was also a major factor in the racial changes that took place in the Army in the early 1950"s. To a great extent the dictates of the civil rights laws of 1964 and 1965 exerted similar pressure on the services and account for the success of the Defense Department"s comprehensive response during the mid-1960"s to the discrimination faced by servicemen in the local community.
[Footnote 24-2: For an extended discussion of the moral basis of racial reform, see O"Connor"s interview with Hesburgh, 27 Mar 66.]
Questions concerning the effect of law on social custom, and particularly the issue of whether government should force social change or await the popular will, are of continuing interest to the sociologist and the political scientist. In the case of the armed forces, a sector of society that habitually recognizes the primacy of authority and law, the answer was clear. Ordered to integrate, the members of both races adjusted, though sometimes reluctantly, to a new social relationship. The traditionalists" genuine fear that racial unrest would follow racial mixing proved unfounded. The performance of individual Negroes in the integrated units demonstrated that changed social relationships could also produce rapid improvement in individual and group achievement and thus increase military efficiency. Furthermore, the successful integration of military units in the 1950"s so raised expectations in the black community that the civil rights leaders would use that success to support their successful campaign in the 1960"s to convince the government that it must impose social change on the community at large.[24-3]
[Footnote 24-3: For an extended discussion of the law and racial change, see Greenberg, _Race Relations and American Law_; Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Racial Integration in the Armed Forces," _American Journal of Sociology_ 72 (September 1966): 132-48; Ginzberg, _The Negro Potential_, pp. 127-31.]
Paralleling the influence of the law, the quest for military efficiency was another inst.i.tutional factor that affected the services" racial policies. The need for military efficiency had always been used by the services to rationalize racial exclusion and segregation; later it became the primary consideration in the decision of each service to integrate its units. Reinforcing the efficiency argument was the realization by the military that manpower could no longer be considered an inexhaustible resource. World War II had demonstrated that the federal government dare not ignore the military and industrial potential of any segment of its population. The reality of the limited national manpower pool explained the services"
guarantee that Negroes would be included in the postwar period as cadres for the full wartime mobilization of black manpower. Timing was somewhat dependent on the size and mission of the individual service; integration came to each when it became obvious that black manpower could not be used efficiently in separate organizations. In the case of the largest service, the Army, the Fahy Committee used the (p. 613) failure to train and use eligible Negroes in unfilled jobs to convince senior officials that military efficiency demanded the progressive integration of its black soldiers, beginning with those men eligible for specialist duties. The final demonstration of the connection between efficiency and integration came from those harried commanders who, trying against overwhelming odds to fight a war in Korea with segregated units, finally began integrating their forces. They found that their black soldiers fought better in integrated units.
[Ill.u.s.tration: MARINE ENGINEERS IN VIETNAM. _Men of the 11th Engineer Battalion move culverts into place in a mountain stream during "Operation Pegasus."_]
Later, military efficiency would be the rationale for the Defense Department"s fight against discrimination in the local community. The Gesell Committee was used by Adam Yarmolinsky and others to demonstrate to Secretary McNamara if not to the satisfaction of skeptical military traditionalists and congressional critics that the need to solve a severe morale problem justified the department"s intrusion. Appeals to military efficiency, therefore, became the ultimate justification for integrating the units of the armed forces and providing for equal treatment of its members in the community.
Beyond the demands of the law and military efficiency, the integration of the armed forces was also influenced by certain individuals within the military establishment who personified America"s awakening social conscience. They led the services along the road toward (p. 614) integration not because the law demanded it, nor because activists clamored for it, nor even because military efficiency required it, but because they believed it was right. Complementing the work of these men and women was the opinion of the American serviceman himself.
Between 1940 and 1965 his att.i.tude toward change was constantly discussed and predicted but only rarely solicited by senior officials.
Actually his opinion at that time is still largely unknown; doc.u.mentary evidence is scarce, and his recollections, influenced as they are by the intervening years of the civil rights movement, are unreliable. Yet it was clearly the serviceman"s generally quiet acceptance of new social practices, particularly those of the early 1950"s, that ratified the services" racial reforms. As a perceptive critic of the nation"s racial history described conditions in the services in 1962:
There was a rising tide of tolerance around the nation at that time. I was thrilled to see it working in the services. Whether officers were working for it or not it existed. From time to time you would find an officer imbued with the desire to improve race relations.... It was a marvel to me, in contrast to my recent investigations in the South, to see how well integration worked in the services.[24-4]
[Footnote 24-4: Interv, author with Muse, 2 Mar 73.]
Indeed, it could be argued, American servicemen of the 1950"s became a positive if indirect cause of racial change. By demonstrating that large numbers of blacks and whites could work and live together, they destroyed a fundamental argument of the opponents of integration and made further reforms possible if not imperative.
_How the Services Integrated, 1946-1954_
The interaction of all these factors can be seen when equal treatment and opportunity in the armed forces is considered in two distinct phases, the first culminating in the integration of all active military units in 1954, the second centering around the decision in 1963 to push for equal opportunity for black servicemen outside the gates of the military base.[24-5]
[Footnote 24-5: Portions of the following discussion have been published in somewhat different form under the t.i.tle "Armed Forces Integration--Forced or Free?" in _The Military and Society, Proceedings of the Fifth Military Symposium_ (U.S. Air Force Academy, 1972).]
The Navy was the acknowledged pioneer in integration. Its decision during World War II to a.s.sign black and white sailors to certain ships was not entirely a response to pressures from civil rights advocates, although Secretary James Forrestal relied on his friends in the Urban League, particularly Lester Granger, to teach him the techniques of integrating a large organization. Nor was the decision solely the work of racial reformers in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, although this small group was undoubtedly responsible for drafting the regulations that governed the changes in the wartime Navy. Rather, the Navy began integrating its general service because segregation proved painfully inefficient. The decision was largely the result of the impersonal operation of the 1940 draft law. Although imperfectly applied during the war, the anti-discrimination provision of that law produced a ma.s.sive infusion of black inductees. The Army, with its larger (p. 615) manpower base and expandable black units, could evade the implications of a nondiscrimination clause, but the sheer presence of large numbers of Negroes in the service, more than any other force, breached the walls of segregation in the Navy.
[Ill.u.s.tration: LOADING A ROCKET LAUNCHER. _Crewmen of the USS Carronade partic.i.p.ating in a coordinated gunfire support action near Chu Lai, Vietnam._]
The Navy experiment with an all-black crew had proved unsatisfactory, and only so many sh.o.r.e-based jobs were considered suitable for large segregated units. Bowing to the argument that two navies--one black, one white--were both inefficient and expensive, Secretary Forrestal began to experiment with integration during the last months of the war and finally announced a policy of integration in February 1946. The full application of this new policy would wait for some years while the Navy"s traditional racial att.i.tudes warred with its practical desire for efficiency.
The Air Force was the next to end segregation. Again, immediate outside influences appeared to be slight. Despite the timing of the Air Force integration directive in early 1949 and Secretary Stuart Symington"s discussions of the subject with Truman and the Fahy Committee, plans to drop many racial barriers in the Air Force had already been formulated at the time of the President"s equal opportunity order in 1948. Nor is there any evidence of special concern among Air Force officials about the growing criticism of their segregation policy. The record clearly reveals, however, that by late 1947 the Air staff had become anxious over the manpower requirements of the Gillem Board Report, which enunciated the postwar racial policy that the Air Force shared with the Army.
The Gillem Board Report would hardly be cla.s.sified as progressive by later standards; its provisions for reducing the size of black units and integrating a small number of black specialists were, in a way, an effort to make segregation less wasteful. Nevertheless, with all its shortcomings, this postwar policy contained the germ of integration.
It committed the Army and Air Force to total integration as a long-range objective, and, more important, it made permanent the wartime policy of allotting 10 percent of the Army"s strength to Negroes. Later branded by the civil rights spokesmen as an instrument for limiting black enlistment, the racial quota committed the Army and its offspring, the Air Force, not only to maintaining at least 10 percent black strength but also to a.s.signing black servicemen to all branches and all job categories, thereby significantly weakening (p. 616) the segregated system. Although never filled in either service, the quotas guaranteed that a large number of Negroes would remain in uniform after the war and thus gave both services an incentive to desegregate.
Once again the Army could postpone the logical consequences of its racial policy by the continued proliferation of its segregated combat and service units. But the new Air Force almost immediately felt the full force of the Gillem Board policy, quickly learning that it could not maintain 10 percent black strength separate but equal. It too might have continued indefinitely enlarging the number of service units in order to absorb black airmen. Like the Army, it might even have ignored the injunction to a.s.sign a quota of blacks to every military occupation and to every school. But it was politically impossible for the Air Force to do away with its black flying units, and it became economically impossible in a time of shrinking budgets and manpower cuts to operate separate flying units for the small group of Negroes involved. It was also unfeasible, considering the small number of black rated officers and men, to fill all the positions in the black air units and provide at the same time for the normal rotation and advanced training schedules. Facing these difficulties and mindful of the Navy"s experience with integration, the Air Force began serious discussion of the integration of its black pilots and crews in 1947, some months before Truman issued his order.
Committed to integrating its air units and rated men in 1949, the Air staff quietly enlarged its objectives and broke up all its black units, thereby making the Air Force the first service to achieve total integration. There were several reasons for this rapid escalation in what was to have been a limited program. As devised by General Edwards and Colonel Marr of the Air staff the plan demanded that all black airmen in each command be conscientiously examined so that all might be properly rea.s.signed, further trained, retained in segregated units, or dismissed. The removal of increasing numbers of eligible men from black units only hastened the end of those organizations, a tendency ratified by the trouble-free acceptance of the program by all involved.
The integration of the Army was more protracted. The Truman order in 1948 and the Fahy Committee, the White House group appointed to oversee the execution of that order, focused primarily on the segregated Army. There is little doubt that the President"s action had a political dimension. Given the fact that the Army had become a major target of the President"s own Civil Rights Commission and that it was a highly visible pract.i.tioner of segregation, the equal opportunity order would almost have had to be part of the President"s plan to unite the nation"s minorities behind his 1948 candidacy. The order was also a logical response to the threat of civil disobedience issued by A. Philip Randolph and endorsed by other civil rights advocates. In a matter of weeks after Truman issued his integration order, Randolph dropped his opposition to the 1948 draft law and his call for a boycott of the draft by Negroes.
It remained for the Fahy Committee to translate the President"s order into a working program leading toward integration of the Army. Like Randolph and other activists, the committee quickly concluded that segregation was a denial of equal treatment and opportunity and that the executive order, therefore, was essentially a call for the (p. 617) services to integrate. After lengthy negotiations, the committee won from the Army an agreement to move progressively toward full integration. Gradual integration was disregarded, however, when the Army, fighting in Korea, was forced by a direct threat to the efficiency of its operations to begin wide-scale mixing of the races.
Specifically, the proximate reason for the Army"s integration in the Far East was the fact that General Ridgway faced a severe shortage of replacements for his depleted white units while acc.u.mulating a surplus of black replacements. So pressing was his need that even before permission was received from Washington integration had already begun on the battlefield. The reason for the rapid integration of the rest of the Army was more complicated. The example of Korea was persuasive, as was the need for a uniform policy, but beyond that the rapid modernization of the Army was making obsolete the large-scale labor units traditionally used by the Army to absorb much of its black quota. With these units disappearing, the Army had to find new jobs for the men, a task hopelessly complicated by segregation.
The postwar racial policy of the Marine Corps struck a curious compromise between that of the Army and of the Navy. Adopting the former"s system of segregated units and the latter"s rejection of the 10 percent racial quota, the corps was able to a.s.sign its small contingent of black marines to a few segregated noncombatant duties.
But the policy of the corps was only practicable for its peacetime size, as its mobilization for Korea demonstrated. Even before the Army was forced to change, the Marine Corps, its manpower planners pressed to find trained men and units to fill its divisional commitment to Korea, quietly abandoned the rules on segregated service.
While progressives cited the military efficiency of integration, traditionalists used the efficiency argument to defend the racial _status quo_. In general, senior military officials had concluded on the basis of their World War II experience that large black units were ineffective, undependable in close combat, and best suited for supply a.s.signments. Whatever their motives, the traditionalists had reached the wrong conclusion from their data. They were correct when they charged that, despite competent and even heroic performance on the part of some individuals and units, the large black combat units had, on average, performed poorly during the war. But the traditionalists failed, as they had failed after World War I, to see the reasons for this poor performance. Not the least of these were the benumbing discrimination suffered by black servicemen during training, the humiliations involved in their a.s.signments, and the inept.i.tude of many of their leaders, who were most often white.
Above all, the postwar manpower planners drew the wrong conclusion from the fact that the average General Cla.s.sification Test scores of men in World War II black units fell significantly below that of their white counterparts. The scores were directly related to the two groups" relative educational advantages which depended to a large extent on their economic status and the geographic region from which they came. This mental average of servicemen was a unit problem, for at all times the total number of white individuals who scored in low-apt.i.tude categories IV and V greatly outnumbered black individuals in those categories. This greater number of less gifted white (p. 618) servicemen had been spread thinly throughout the services" thousands of white units where they caused no particular problem. The lesser number of Negroes with low apt.i.tude, however, were concentrated in the relatively few black units, creating a serious handicap to efficient performance. Conversely, the contribution of talented black servicemen was largely negated by their frequent a.s.signment to units with too many low-scoring men. Small units composed in the main of black specialists, such as the black artillery and armor units that served in the European theater during World War II, served with distinction, but these units were special cases where the effect of segregation was tempered by the special qualifications of the carefully chosen men.
Segregation and not mental apt.i.tude was the key to the poor performance of the large black units in World War II.
[Ill.u.s.tration: AMERICAN SAILORS _help evacuate Vietnamese child_.]
Postwar service policies ignored these facts and defended segregation in the name of military efficiency. In short, the armed forces had to make inefficiency seem efficient as they explained in paternalistic fashion that segregation was best for all concerned. "In general, the Negro is less well educated than his brother citizen that is white,"
General Eisenhower told the Senate Armed Forces Committee in 1948, "and if you make a complete amalgamation, what you are going to have is in every company the Negro is going to be relegated to the minor jobs ... because the compet.i.tion is too rough."[24-6]
[Footnote 24-6: Quoted in Senate, Hearings Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, _Universal Military Training_, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948, pp.
995-96.]
Competence in a great many skills became increasingly important for servicemen in the postwar period as the trend toward technical complexity and specialization continued in all the services.
Differences in recruiting gave some services an advantage. The Navy and Air Force, setting stricter standards of enlistment, could fill their ranks with high-scoring volunteers and avoid enlisting large groups of low-scoring men, often black, who were eventually drafted for the Army. While this situation helped reduce the traditional opposition to integration in the Navy and Air Force, it made the Army more determined to retain separate black units to absorb the large number of low-scoring draftees it was obligated to take. A major factor in the eventual integration of the Army--and the single most significant contribution of the Secretary of Defense to that (p. 619) end--was George Marshall"s decision to establish a parity of enlistment standards for the services. On the advice of his manpower a.s.sistant, Anna Rosenberg, Marshall abolished the special advantage enjoyed by the Navy and Air Force, making all the services share in the recruitment of low-scoring men. The common standard undercut the Army"s most persuasive argument for restoring a racial quota and maintaining segregated units.
[Ill.u.s.tration: b.o.o.bY TRAP VICTIM _from Company B, 47th Infantry, resting on buddy"s back, awaits evacuation_.]