Table 5--Racial Composition of Air Force Units
Negroes a.s.signed Negroes a.s.signed Month Black Integrated to Black to Integrated Units Units Units Units[1]
1949 June 106 167 Not available Not available July 89 350 14,609 7,369 August 86 711 11,921 11,977 September 91 863 11,521 13,290 October 88 1,031 9,522 15,980 November 75 1,158 8,038 17,643 December 67 1,253 7,402 18,489
1950 January 59 1,301 6,773 18,929 February 36 1,399 5,511 20,654 March 26 1,476 5,023 20,938 April 24 1,515 4,728 20,793 May 24 1,506 4,675 21,033
[Tablenote 1: Figures extracted from the Marr Report; see also monthly reports on AF integration, for example Memo, Dir, Pers Plng, for Osthagen (SecAF office), 10 Mar 50, sub: Distribution of Negro Personnel, SecAF files.]
Despite the predictions of some a.n.a.lysts, the effect of (p. 405) integration on black recruitment proved to be negligible. In a service whose total strength remained about 415,000 men during the first year of integration, Negroes numbered as follows (_Table 6_):
Table 6--Black Strength in the Air Force
Percentage Officer Enlisted of Air Force Date Strength[1] Strength[1] Strength
December 1948 Not available Not available 6.5 June 1949 319 (47) 21,782 (2,196) 6.0 August 1949 330 (32) 23,568 (2,275) 6.5 December 1949 368 (18) 25,523 (3,072) 7.2 May 1950 341 (8) 25,367 (2,611) 7.1
[Tablenote 1: Includes in parentheses the Special Category Army Personnel with Air Force (SCARWAF), those soldiers a.s.signed for duty in the Air Force but still administratively under the segregated Army, leftovers from the Department of Defense reorganization of 1947. Figures extracted from Marr Report.]
The Air staff explained that the slight surge in black recruits in the early months of integration was related less to the new policy than to the abnormal recruiting conditions of the period. In addition to the backlog of Negroes who for some time had been trying to enlist only to find the Air Force quota filled, there were many black volunteers who had turned to the quota-free Air Force when the Army, its quota of Negroes filled for some time, stopped recruiting Negroes.
With Negroes serving in over 1,500 separate units there was no need to invoke the 10 percent racial quota in individual units as Vandenberg had ordered. One notable exception during the first months of the program was the Air Training Command, where the rapid and unexpected rea.s.signment of many black airmen caused some bases, James Connally in Texas, for example, to acquire a great many Negroes while others received few or none. To prevent a recurrence of the Connally experience and "to effect a smooth operation and proper adjustment of social importance," the commander of the Air Training Command imposed an 8 to 10 percent black quota on his units and established a procedure for staggering the a.s.signment of black airmen in small groups over a period of thirty to sixty days instead of a.s.signing them to any particular base in one large increment. These quotas were not applied to the basic training flights, which were completely integrated. It was not uncommon to find black enlistees in charge of racially mixed training flights.[16-29] Of all Air Force organizations, the Training Command received the greatest number of black airmen as a result of the screening and rea.s.signment. (_Table 7_)
[Footnote 16-29: ATC, "History of ATC, July-December 1949," I:29-31; New York _Times_, September 18, 1949.]
Table 7--Racial Composition of the Training Command, December 1949 (p. 406)
A. Flight Training _Percent_ _White_ _Black_ _Black_ Officers 1,345 11 .8 Enlisted 2,063 22 1.0 Total 3,408 33 .9 B. Technical Training Officers 1,897 37 1.9 Enlisted 25,838 1,819 6.5 Total 27,735 1,856 6.0 C. Indoctrination (Basic) Training White 7,649 Black 1,007 Total 8,656 Percent black 11.6[a]
D. Officers Candidate Training (candidates graduating from 28 November through 26 December 1949) White 225 Black 7 Total 232 Percent black 3.0 E. Course Representation
_Base_ _No. of Courses_[b] _No. of Courses with Blacks_ Chanute 31 21 Warren 11 10 Keesler 16 7 Lowry 23 13 Scott 6 4 Sheppard 4 1
[Tablenote a: In January 1950, probably as a result of a decline in backlog and the raising of enlistment standard to GCT 100, this percentage dropped to 8.8.]
[Tablenote b: Negroes in 61 percent of the courses offered as of 26 Dec 1949.]
_Source_: Kenworthy Report.
At the end of the first year under the new program, the Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, General Nugent, informed Zuckert that integration had progressed "rapidly, smoothly and virtually without incident."[16-30] In view of this fact and at Nugent"s recommendation, the Air Force canceled the monthly headquarters check on the program.
[Footnote 16-30: Memo, Actg DCSPER for Zuckert, 14 Jul 50, USAF file No. 3370, SecAF files.]
To some extent the Air Force"s integration program ran away with itself. Whatever their personal convictions regarding discrimination, senior Air Force officials had agreed that integration would be limited. They were most concerned with managerial problems a.s.sociated with continued segregation of the black flying unit and the black specialists scattered worldwide. Other black units were not considered an immediate problem. a.s.sistant Secretary Zuckert admitted as much in March 1949 when he reported that black service units would be retained since they performed a "necessary Air Force function."[16-31] As originally conceived, the Air Force plan was frankly imitative of the Navy"s postwar program, stressing merit and ability as the limiting factors of change. The Air Force promised to discharge all its substandard men, but those black airmen either ineligible for discharge or for rea.s.signment to specialist duty would remain in segregated units.
[Footnote 16-31: Memo, ASecAF for Symington, 25 Mar 49, sub: Salient Factors of Air Force Policy Regarding Negro Personnel, SecAF files.]
Yet once begun, the integration process quickly became universal. By the end of 1950, for example, the Air Force had reduced the number of black units to nine with 95 percent of its black airmen serving in integrated units. The number of black officers rose to 411, an (p. 407) increase of 10 percent over the previous year, and black airmen to 25,523, an increase of 15 percent, although the proportion of blacks to whites continued to remain between 6 and 7 percent.[16-32] Some eighteen months later only one segregated unit was left, a 98-man outfit, itself more than 26 percent white. Negroes were then serving in 3,466 integrated units.[16-33]
[Footnote 16-32: _Air Force Times_, 10 February 1951.
These figures do not take into account the SCARWAF (Army personnel) who continued to serve in segregated units within the Air Force.]
[Footnote 16-33: Memo, DepSecAF for Manpower and Organizations for ASD/M, 5 Sep 52, SecAF files.]
There were several reasons for the universal application of what was conceived as a limited program. First, the Air Force was in a sense the captive of its own publicity. While Secretary Symington had carefully delineated the limits of his departmental plan for the Personnel Policy Board in January 1949, he was carried considerably beyond these limits when he addressed President Truman in the open forum of the Fahy Committee"s first formal meeting:
As long as you mentioned the Air Force, sir, I just want to report to you that our plan is to completely eliminate segregation in the Air Force. For example, we have a fine group of colored boys. Our plan is to take those boys, break up that fine group, and put them with the other units themselves and go right down the line all through these subdivisions one hundred percent.[16-34]
[Footnote 16-34: Transcript of the Meeting of the President and the Four Service Secretaries With the President"s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, 12 Jan 49, FC file, which reports the President"s response as being "That"s all right."]
Later, Symington told the Fahy Committee that while the new program would probably temporarily reduce Air Force efficiency "we are ready, willing, and anxious to embark on this idea. We want to eliminate the fundamental aspect of cla.s.s in this picture."[16-35] Clearly, the retention of large black units was incompatible with the elimination of cla.s.s distinctions.
[Footnote 16-35: Testimony of the Secretary of the Air Force Before the Fahy Committee, 28 Mar 49, afternoon session, p. 33.]
The more favorable the publicity garnered by the plan in succeeding months, the weaker the distinction became between the limited integration of black specialists and total integration. Reinforcing the favorable publicity were the monthly field reports that registered a steady drop in the number of black units and a corresponding rise in the number of integrated black airmen. This well-publicized progress provided another, almost irresistible reason for completing the task.
More to the point, the success of the program provided its own impetus to total integration. The prediction that a significant number of black officers and men would be ineligible for rea.s.signment or further training proved ill-founded. The Air Force, it turned out, had few untrainable men, and after the screening process and transfer of those eligible was completed, many black units were so severely reduced in strength that their inactivation became inevitable. The fear of white opposition that had inhibited the staff planners and local commanders also proved groundless. According to a Fahy Committee staff report in March 1950, integration had been readily accepted at all levels and the process had been devoid of friction. "The men," E. W. (p. 408) Kenworthy reported, "apparently were more ready for equality of treatment and opportunity than the officer corps had realized."[16-36]
At the same time, Kenworthy noted the effect of successful integration on the local commanders. Freed from the charges of discrimination that had plagued them at every turn, most of the commanders he interviewed remarked on the increased military efficiency of their units and the improved utilization of their manpower that had come with integration.
They liked the idea of a strictly compet.i.tive climate of equal standards rigidly applied, and some expected that the Air Force example would have an effect, eventually, on civilian att.i.tudes.[16-37]
[Footnote 16-36: Kenworthy Report, as quoted and commented on in Memo, Worthington Thompson (Personnel Policy Board staff) for Leva, 9 Mar 50, sub: Some Highlights of Fahy Committee Report on Air Force Racial Integration Program, SD 291.2.]
[Footnote 16-37: Ltr, Kenworthy to Zuckert, 5 Jan 50, SecAF files.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: MUSIC MAKERS _of the U.S. Far East Air Force prepare to celebrate Christmas, Korea, 1950_.]
For the Air Force, it seemed, the problem of segregation was all over but for the celebrating. And there was plenty of that, thanks to the Fahy Committee and the press. In a well-publicized tour of a cross section of Air Force installations in early 1950, Kenworthy surveyed the integration program for the committee. His favorable report won the Air Force laudatory headlines in the national press and formed the core of the Air Force section of the Fahy Committee"s final report, _Freedom to Serve_.[16-38] For its part, the black press covered the program in great detail and gave its almost unanimous approval. As early as July 1949, for example, Dowdal H. Davis, president of the Negro Newspaper Publishers a.s.sociation, reported on the highly encouraging reaction to the breakup of the 332d, and the headlines reflected this att.i.tude: "The Air Force Leads the Way," the Chicago _Defender_ headlined; "Salute to the Air Force," the Minneapolis _Spokesman_ editorialized; and "the swiftest and most amazing upset of racial policy in the history of the U.S. Military," _Ebony_ concluded.
Pointing to the Air Force program as the best, the Pittsburgh _Courier_ called the progress toward total integration "better than most dared hope."[16-39]
[Footnote 16-38: See, for example, the Washington _Post_, March 27, 1950.]
[Footnote 16-39: Press reaction summarized in Memo, James C. Evans for PPB, 19 Jan 50, PPB 291.2. See also, Ltr, Dowdal Davis, Gen Manager of the Kansas City _Call_, to Evans, 9 Jul 49, SD 291.2; Memo, Evans for SecAF, 5 Jul 49; and Memo, Zuckert for SecAF, 2 Aug 49, both in SecAF files; Chicago _Defender_, June 18, 1949; Minneapolis _Spokesman_, January 13, 1950; _Ebony_ Magazine, 4 (September 1949):15; Pittsburgh _Courier_, July 25, 1952; Detroit _Free Press_, May 14, 1953.]
General Vandenberg and his staff were well aware of the rapid and (p. 409) profound change in the Air Force wrought by the integration order.
From the start his personnel chief carefully monitored the program and reviewed the reports from the commands, ready to investigate any racial incidents or differences attributable to the new policy. The staff had expected a certain amount of testing of the new policy by both white and black troops, and with few exceptions the incidents reported turned out to be little more than that. Some arose from attempts by Negroes to win social acceptance at certain Air Force installations, but the majority of cases involved attempts by white airmen to introduce their black comrades into segregated off-base restaurants and theaters. Two examples might stand for all. The first involved a transient black corporal who stopped off at the Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, D.C., to get a haircut in a post exchange barbershop. He was refused service and in the absence of the post exchange officer he returned to the shop to trade words and eventually blows with the barber. The corporal was subsequently court-martialed, but the sentence was set aside by a superior court.[16-40] Another case involved a small group of white airmen who ordered refreshments at a segregated lunch counter in San Antonio, Texas, for themselves "and a friend who would join them later." The friend, of course, was a black airman. The Inspector General reported this incident to be just one of a number of attempts by groups of white and black airmen to integrate lunch counters and restaurants. In each case the commanders concerned cautioned their men against such action, and there were few reoccurrences.[16-41]
[Footnote 16-40: Memo, IG, USAF, for ASecAF, 25 Jul 49, SecAF files.]
[Footnote 16-41: Idem for DCSPER, 7 Sep 49, copy in SecAF files; see also ACofS, G-2, Fourth Army, Ft.
Sam Houston, Summary of Information, 7 Sep 49, copy in SA 291.2.]
The commanders" warnings were understandable because, as any official from Secretary Symington on down would quickly explain, the Air Force did not regard itself as being in the business of forcing changes in American society; it was simply trying to make the best use of its manpower to build military efficiency in keeping with its national defense mission.[16-42] But in the end the integration order proved effective on both counts. Racial feelings, racial incidents, charges of discrimination, and the problems of procurement, training, and a.s.signment always a.s.sociated with racially designated units had been reduced by an appreciable degree or eliminated entirely. The problems antic.i.p.ated from the mingling of blacks and whites in social situations had proved to be largely imaginary. The Air Force adopted a standard formula for dealing with these problems during the next decade. Incidents involving black airmen were treated as individual incidents and dealt with on a personal basis like any ordinary disciplinary case. Only when there was no alternative was an incident labeled "racial" and then the commander was expected to deal speedily and firmly with the troublemakers.[16-43] This sensible procedure freed the Air Force for a decade from the charges of on-base discrimination that had plagued it in the past.
[Footnote 16-42: See, for example, Memo, SecAF for SecDef, 17 Feb 49; Ltr, SecAF to Sen. Burnet R.
Maybank, 21 Jul 49; both in SecAF files.]
[Footnote 16-43: Memo, Evans, OSD, for Worthington Thompson, 18 May 53, sub: Summary of Topics Reviewed in Thompson"s office 15 May 53, SD 291.2.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: MAINTENANCE CREW, _462d Strategic Fighter Squadron, disa.s.sembles aft section of an F-84 Thunderstreak_.]