[Ill.u.s.tration: COLOR GUARD, 160TH INFANTRY, KOREA, 1952.]
_Integration of the European and Continental Commands_ (p. 448)
Since the Army was just 12 percent Negro in September 1951, it should have been possible to solve Ridgway"s problem of black overstrength simply by distributing black soldiers evenly throughout the Army. But this solution was frustrated by the segregation still in force in other commands. Organized black units in the United States were small and few in number, and black recruits who could not be used in them were shipped as replacements to the overseas commands, princ.i.p.ally in the Far East and Europe.[17-68] Consequently, Ridgway"s problem was not an isolated one; his European counterpart was operating a largely segregated command almost 13 percent black. The Army could not prevent black overstrengths so long as Negroes were ordered into the quota-free service by color-blind draft boards, but it could equalize the overstrength by integrating its forces all over the world.
[Footnote 17-68: In 1951 the European Command was the major Army headquarters in the European theater. It was, at the same time, a combined command with some 20,000 members of the Air Force and Navy serving along with 234,000 Army troops. In August 1952 a separate Army command (U.S. Army, Europe) was created within the European Command. Discussion of the European Command and its commander in the following paragraphs applies only to Army troops.]
This course, along with the knowledge that integration was working in the Far East and the training camps, was leading senior Army officials toward full integration. But they wanted certain rea.s.surances.
Believing that integration of the continental commands would create, in the words of the G-1, "obstacles and difficulties vastly greater than those in FECOM," the Army staff wanted these problems (p. 449) thoroughly a.n.a.lyzed before taking additional moves, "experimental or otherwise," to broaden integration.[17-69] General Collins, although personally committed to integration, voiced another widespread concern over extending integration beyond the Far East units. Unlike the Navy and the Air Force, which were able to secure more highly qualified men on a volunteer basis, the Army had long been forced to accept anyone meeting the draft"s minimum standards. This circ.u.mstance was very likely to result, he feared, in an army composed to an unprecedented degree of poorly educated black soldiers, possibly as much as 30 percent in the near future.[17-70]
[Footnote 17-69: Memo, G-1 for DCofS, Admin, 18 Jul 51, G-1 291.2.]
[Footnote 17-70: Ltr, Eli Ginzberg to Lt Col Edward J.
Barta, Hist Div, USAREUR, attached to Ltr, Ginzberg to Carter Burgess, ASD (M&P), 11 Nov 55, SD 291.2 (11 Nov 55).]
The Army"s leaders received the necessary rea.s.surances in the coming months. The Secretary of Defense laid to rest their fear that the draft-dependent Army would become a dumping ground for the ignorant and untrainable when, in April 1951, he directed that troops must be distributed among the services on a qualitative basis. a.s.sistant Secretary of the Army Johnson asked Professor Eli Ginzberg, a social scientist and consultant to the Army, to explain to the Army Policy Council the need for aggressive action to end segregation.[17-71] And once again, but this time with considerable scientific detail to support its recommendations, the Project CLEAR final report told Army leaders that the service should be integrated worldwide. Again the researchers found that the Army"s problem was not primarily racial, but a question of how best to use underqualified men. Refining their earlier figures, they decided that black soldiers were best used in integrated units at a ratio of 15 to 85. Integration on the job was conducive to social integration, they discovered, and social integration, dependent on several variables, was particularly amenable to firm policy guidance and local control. Finally, the report found that integration on military posts was accepted by local civilians as a military policy unlikely to affect their community.[17-72]
[Footnote 17-71: Ltr, Ginzberg to Burgess, 11 Nov 55.]
[Footnote 17-72: ORO-R-11, Rpt, Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army, Project CLEAR, vol. 1; G-1 Summary Sheet for CofSA, 5 Jan 52, sub: Evaluation of ORO-R-11 on Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army, CS 291.2 Negroes (5 Jan 52).]
The Chief of Staff approved the Project CLEAR final report, although his staff had tried to distinguish between the report"s view of on-the-job integration and social integration, accepting the former with little reservation, but considering the latter to be "weak in supporting evidence." The personnel staff continued to stress the need to reimpose a racial quota quickly without waiting for black enrollment to reach 15 percent as the Project CLEAR report suggested.
It also believed that integration should be limited to the active federal service, exempting National Guard units under state control.
General McAuliffe agreed to drop racial statistics but warned that investigation of discrimination charges depended on such statistics.
He also agreed that blacks could be mixed with whites at 10 to 20 percent of the strength of any white unit, but to a.s.sign whites in similar percentages to black units "would undoubtedly present difficulties and place undue burdens on the a.s.signed white personnel."
Finally, McAuliffe stressed that commanders would have flexibility (p. 450) in working out the nonoperational aspects of integration so long as their methods and procedures were consistent with Army policy.[17-73]
[Footnote 17-73: G-1 Summary Sheet for CofSA, 5 Jan 52.]
These reservations aside, McAuliffe concluded that integration was working in enough varied circ.u.mstances to justify its extension to the entire Army. General Collins agreed, and on 29 December 1951 he ordered all major commanders to prepare integration programs for their commands. Integration was the Army"s immediate goal, and, he added, it was to be progressive, in orderly stages, and without publicity.[17-74]
[Footnote 17-74: Ibid., 29 Dec 51, sub: Integration of Negro Enlisted Personnel, G-1 291.2 Negroes.]
The Chief of Staff"s decision was especially timely for the European Command where General Thomas T. Handy faced manpower problems similar to if not so critical as those in the Far East. During 1951 Army strength in Europe had also risen sharply--from 86,000 to 234,000 men.
Black strength had increased even more dramatically, from 8,876 (or 11 percent) to 27,267 (or 13 percent). The majority of black soldiers in Europe served in segregated units, the number of which more than doubled because of the Korean War. From sixty-six units in June 1950, the figure rose to 139 in March 1952. Most of these units were not in divisions but in service organizations; 113 were service units, of which fifty-three were transportation units.
Again as in the Far East, some integration in Europe occurred in response to the influx of new soldiers as well as to Army directives.
Handy integrated his Noncommissioned Officers" Academy in 1950 in an operation involving thousands of enlisted men. After he closed the segregated Kitzingen Training Center in February 1951, black troops were absorbed into other training and replacement centers on an integrated basis. For some time Army commanders in Europe had also been a.s.signing certain black soldiers with specialist training to white units, a practice dramatically accelerated in 1950 when the command began receiving many Negroes with occupation specialties unneeded in black units. In March 1951 Handy directed that, while the a.s.signment of Negroes to black units remained the first priority, Negroes possessing qualifications unusable or in excess of the needs of black units would be a.s.signed where they could be used most effectively.[17-75] Consequently, by the end of 1951 some 7 percent of all black enlisted men, 17 percent of the black officers, and all black soldiers of the Women"s Army Corps in the command were serving in integrated units.
[Footnote 17-75: Ltr, EUCOM to Sub Cmds, 16 Mar 51, sub: Utilization of Negro Personnel, USAREUR SGS 291.2. See also EUCOM Hist Div, "Integration of Negro and White Troops in the U.S. Army, Europe, 1952-1954," p. 4, in CMH. This monograph, prepared by Ronald Sher, will be cited hereafter as Sher Monograph.]
In sharp contrast to the Far East Command, there was little support among senior Army officials in Europe for full integration. Sent by a.s.sistant Secretary Johnson to brief European commanders on the Army"s decision, Eli Ginzberg met with almost universal skepticism. Most commanders were unaware of the Army"s success with integration in the Far East and in the training divisions at home; when so informed they were quick to declare such a move impractical for Europe. They warned of the social problems that would arise with the all-white civilian population and predicted that the Army would be forced to abandon (p. 451) the program in midstream.[17-76]
[Footnote 17-76: Ltr, Ginzberg to Burgess, 11 Nov 55, CMH files.]
There were exceptions. Lt. Gen. Manton S. Eddy, the commander of the Seventh Army, described the serious operational problems caused by segregation in his command. Most of his black units were unsatisfactory, and without minimizing the difficulties he concluded in 1951 that integration was desirable not only for the sake of his own mission but for the Army"s efficiency and the nation"s world leadership. Officers at Headquarters, Supreme Allied Powers, Europe, also recited personnel and training problems caused in their command by segregation, but here, Ginzberg noted, the att.i.tude was one of cautious silence, an att.i.tude that made little difference because General Eisenhower"s command was an international organization having nothing to do with the Army"s race policies. It would, however, be of some interest during the 1952 political campaign when some commentators made the false claim that Eisenhower had integrated American units in Europe.[17-77]
[Footnote 17-77: See, for example, _Pathfinder_ Magazine 58 (May 7, 1952):11. See also Ltr, Philleo Nash to Donald Dawson, 27 May 52, Nash Collection, Truman Library; Ltr, Brig Gen Charles T. Lanham to Evans, 7 Aug 51, CMH files; CINFO Summary Sheet, 12 Jun 52, sub: Query Washington Bureau, NAACP, CSA 291.2.]
Obviously it was going to take more than a visit from Ginzberg to move the European Command"s staff, and later in the year Collins took the matter up personally with Handy. This consultation, and a series of exchanges between McAuliffe and command officials, led Collins to ask Handy to submit an integration plan as quickly as possible.[17-78]
Handy complied with a proposal that failed on the whole to conform to the Army"s current plans for worldwide integration and was quickly amended in Washington. The European Command would not, Collins decreed, conduct a special screening of its black officers and noncoms for fitness for combat duty. The command would not retain segregated service units, although the Army would allow an extension of the program"s timetable to accomplish the integration of these units.
Finally, the command would stage no publicity campaign but would instead proceed quietly and routinely. The program was to begin in April 1952.[17-79]
[Footnote 17-78: Msg, CofSA to CINCEUR, 4 Dec 51, DA 88688.]
[Footnote 17-79: Ltr, AG, EUCOM, to CofSA, 14 Dec 51, sub: Racial Integration in Combat Units; G-1 Summary Sheet, 24 Jan 52, same sub; Ltr, CofSA to Handy, 15 Feb 52; Msg, CINCEUR to CofSA, 22 Mar 52, DA IN 119235; Msg, CofSA to CINCEUR, DA 904459, 24 Mar 52. All in CS 291.2.]
Integration of the European Command proceeded without incident, but the administrative task was complicated and frequently delayed by the problem of black overstrength. Handy directed that Negroes be a.s.signed as individuals in a 1 to 10 ratio in all units although he would tolerate a higher ratio in service and temporary duty units during the early stages of the program.[17-80] This figure was adjusted upward the following year to a maximum of 12 percent black for armor and infantry units, 15 percent for combat engineers and artillery, and 17.5 percent for all other units. During the process of integrating the units, a 25 percent black strength was authorized.[17-81]
[Footnote 17-80: Memo, CINCEUCOM for Commanding Generals et al., 1 Apr 52, sub: Racial Integration of EUCOM Army Units, copy in CS 291.2.]
[Footnote 17-81: Sher Monograph, p. 27.]
The ratios were raised because the percentage of Negroes in the (p. 452) command continued to exceed the 1 to 10 ratio and was still increasing. In September 1953 the new commander, General Alfred M.
Gruenther, tried to slow the rate of increase.[17-82] He got Washington to halt the shipment of black units, and he himself inst.i.tuted stricter reenlistment standards in Europe. Finally, he warned that with fewer segregated units to which black troops might be a.s.signed, the racial imbalance was becoming more critical, and he asked for a deferment of the program"s completion.[17-83] The Army staff promised to try to alleviate the racial disproportions in the replacement stream, but asked Gruenther to proceed as quickly as possible with integration.[17-84]
[Footnote 17-82: As of 1 August 1952 the major joint American command in Europe was designated U.S.
European Command (USEUCOM). The U.S. Army element in this command was designated U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). Gruenther was the commander in chief of the European Command from July 1953 to November 1956. At the same time he occupied the senior position in the NATO Command under the t.i.tle Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR).]
[Footnote 17-83: Memo, USCINCEUR for TAG, 30 Sep 53, sub: Racial Integration of USAREUR Units, AG 291.2 (30 Sep 53); see also Sher Monograph, pp. 24-27.]
[Footnote 17-84: Memos, G-1 for TAG, 30 Oct 53, sub: Negro Overstrength in USAREUR, and TAG for USCINCEUR, 2 Nov 53, same sub; both in AG 291.2 (30 Oct 53).]
There was little the Army staff could do. The continental commands had the same overstrength problem, and the staff considered the European Command an inappropriate place to raise black percentages. By mid-1953 Negroes accounted for some 16 percent of Army personnel in Europe and, more important to the command, the number of Negroes with combat occupation specialties continued to increase at the same rate. As an alternative to the untenable practice of recla.s.sifying combat-trained men for noncombat a.s.signments purely on account of race, Gruenther again raised the acceptable ratio of blacks in combat units. At the same time he directed the Seventh Army commander to treat ratios in the future merely as guidelines, to be adhered to as circ.u.mstances permitted.[17-85] The percentage of Negroes in the command leveled off at this time, but not before the black proportion of the command"s transportation units reached 48.8 percent. Summing up his command"s policy on integration, Gruenther concluded: "I cannot permit the a.s.signment of large numbers of unqualified personnel, regardless of race, to prejudice the operation readiness of our units in an effort to attain 100 percent racial integration, however desirable that goal may be."[17-86] A heavy influx of white replacements with transportation specialties allowed the European Command to finish integrating the elements of the Seventh Army in July 1954.[17-87] The last black unit in the command, the 94th Engineer Battalion, was inactivated in November.
[Footnote 17-85: Ltr, USCINCEUR to CG, Seventh Army, 8 Jul 53, sub: Racial Integration of USAREUR Units, USAREUR AG 291.2 (1953).]
[Footnote 17-86: Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to SACEUR, 10 Apr 53, USAREUR SGS 291.2 (1953), quoted in Sher Monograph, p. 28.]
[Footnote 17-87: Hq USAREUR, "Annual Historical Report, 1 January 1953-30 June 1954," p. 60, in CMH.]
Integration of black troops in Europe proved successful on several counts, with the Army, in a.s.sistant Secretary Fred Korth"s words, "achieving benefits therefrom substantially greater than we had antic.i.p.ated at its inception."[17-88] The command"s combat (p. 453) readiness increased, he claimed, while its racial incidents and disciplinary problems declined. The reaction of the soldiers was, again in Korth"s words, "generally good" with incidents stemming from integration "fewer and much farther between." Moreover, the program had been a definite advantage in counteracting Communist propaganda, with no evidence of problems with civilians arising from social integration. More eloquent testimony to the program"s success appeared in the enthusiasm of the European Command"s senior officials.[17-89]
Their fears and uncertainties eased, they abruptly reversed their att.i.tudes and some even moved from outright opposition to praise for the program as one of their princ.i.p.al achievements.
[Footnote 17-88: Memo, ASA (M&RF) for J. C. Evans, OASD (M), 26 Nov 52, sub: Negro Integration in Europe, SD 291.2.]
[Footnote 17-89: Ltr, Ginzberg to Burgess, 15 Nov 55, CMH files; Ernest Leiser, "For Negroes, It"s a New Army Now," _Sat.u.r.day Evening Post_ 225 (December 13, 1952):26-27, 108-12.]
The smaller overseas commands also submitted plans to Army headquarters for the breakup of their segregated units in 1951, and integration of the Alaskan Command and the rest proceeded during 1952 without incident.[17-90] At the same time the continental Army commands, faced with similar manpower problems, began making exceptions, albeit considerably more timidly than the great overseas commands, to the a.s.signment of Negroes to black units. As early as September 1951 the Army G-1 discovered instances of unauthorized integration in every Army area,[17-91] the result of either unrectified administrative errors or the need to find suitable a.s.signments for black replacements. "The concern shown by you over the press reaction to integrating these men into white units," the Sixth Army commander, Lt. Gen. Joseph M. Swing, reported to the Army staff, "causes me to guess that your people may not realize the extent to which integration has already progressed--at least in the Sixth Army."[17-92] Swing concluded that gradual integration had to be the solution to the Army"s race problems everywhere. McAuliffe agreed with Swing that the continental commands should be gradually integrated, but, as he put it, "the difficulty is that my superiors are not prepared to admit that we are already launched on a progressive integration program" in the United States. The whole problem was a very touchy one, McAuliffe added.[17-93]
[Footnote 17-90: On the integration of these commands, see, for example, G-1 Summary Sheet, 4 Sep 52, sub: Utilization of Negro Personnel; Ltr, CG, USARAL, to DA, 15 Sep 51; Ltr, G-1 to Maj Gen Julian Cunningham, 22 Oct 51. All in G-1 291.2.]
[Footnote 17-91: Memo, Chief, Manpower Control Div, G-1, for Gen Taylor, 6 Sep 51, sub: Negro Integration, G-1 291.2.]
[Footnote 17-92: Ltr, CG, Sixth Army, to ACofS, G-1, 10 Sep 51, G-1 291.2 Negroes.]
[Footnote 17-93: Ltr, G-1 to CG, Sixth Army, 17 Sep 51, G-1 291.2.]