The Army staff had agreed to halt the further integration of units in the United States until the results of the overseas changes had been carefully a.n.a.lyzed. Nevertheless, even while the integration of the Far East forces was proceeding, General McAuliffe"s office prepared a comprehensive two-phase plan for the integration of the continental armies. It would consolidate all temporary units then separated into racial elements, redistributing all Negroes among the organized white units; then, Negroes a.s.signed to black components of larger white units would be absorbed into similar white units through normal attrition or by concentrated levies on the black units. McAuliffe (p. 454) estimated that the whole process would take two years.[17-94]
[Footnote 17-94: G-1 Summary Sheet for CofS, 21 Sep 51, sub: G-1 Att.i.tude Toward Integration of Negroes Into CONUS Units, CS 291.2 Negroes (21 Sep 51). The staff"s decision to halt further integration was announced in Memo, ACofS, G-1, for ACofS, G-3, 18 Jul 51, G-1 291.2.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: VISIT WITH THE COMMANDER. _Soldiers of the Ordnance Branch, Berlin Command, meet with Brig. Gen. Charles F. Craig._]
McAuliffe"s plan was put into effect when General Collins ordered worldwide integration in December 1952. The breakdown of the "10 percent Army" proceeded uneventfully, and the old black units disappeared. The 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments, now converted into the 509th and 510th Tank Battalions (Negro), received white replacements and dropped the racial designation. The 25th Infantry, now broken down into smaller units, was integrated in September 1952.
On 12 October 1953 a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense John Hannah announced that 95 percent of the Army"s Negroes were serving in integrated units with the rest to be so a.s.signed not later than June 1954.[17-95] His estimate was off by several months. The European (p. 455) Command"s 94th Engineer Battalion, the last major all-black unit, was inactivated in November 1954, several weeks after the Secretary of Defense had announced the end of all segregated units.[17-96]
[Footnote 17-95: _U.S. News and World Report_ 35 (October 16, 1953):99-100.]
[Footnote 17-96: Hq USAREUR, "Annual Historical Report, 1 July 1954-30 June 1955," p. 83.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: BROTHERS UNDER THE SKIN, _inductees at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 1953_.]
Like a man who discovers that his profitable deeds are also virtuous, the Army discussed its new racial policy with considerable pride. From company commander to general officer the report was that the Army worked better; integration was desirable, and despite all predictions to the contrary, it was a success. Military commentators in and out of uniform stoutly defended the new system against its few critics.[17-97] Most pointed to Korea as the proving ground for the new policy. a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense Hannah generalized about the change to integration: "Official a.n.a.lyses and reports indicate a definite increase in combat effectiveness in the overseas areas....
From experience in Korea and elsewhere, Army commanders have (p. 456) determined, also, that more economical and effective results accrue from the policies which remove duplicate facilities and operations based upon race."[17-98] The Army, it would seem, had made a complete about-face in its argument from efficiency.
[Footnote 17-97: See, for example, _Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1-June 30, 1933_, p. 24; ibid., January 1-June 30, 1954, pp.
21-22; and annual reports of the Secretary of the Army for same period, as well as CINCUSAREUR"s response to criticisms by General Mark Clark, _Army Times_, May 19, 1956, and S. L. A. Marshall"s devastating rejoinder to General Almond in the Detroit _News_, May 13, 1956. Clark"s views are reported in _U.S. News and World Report_ 40 (May 11, 1956). See also Ltr, Lt Col Gordon Hill, CINFO, to Joan Rosen, WCBS, 17 Apr 64, CMH files; New York _Herald Tribune_, May 14, 1956; New York _Times_ May 6, 1956.]
[Footnote 17-98: Ltr, Hannah, ASD (M), to Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson, 27 Feb 53, ASD (M) 291.2.]
But integration did more than demonstrate a new form of military efficiency. It also stilled several genuine fears long entertained by military leaders. Many thoughtful officials had feared that the social mingling that would inevitably accompany integration in the continental United States might lead to racial incidents and a breakdown in discipline. The new policy seemed to prove this fear groundless.[17-99] A 1953 Army-sponsored survey reported that, with the single major exception of racially separate dances for enlisted men at post-operated service clubs on southern bases, segregation involving uniformed men and women now stopped at the gates of the military reservation.[17-100] Army headquarters, carefully monitoring the progress of social integration, found it without incident.[17-101]
At the same time the survey revealed that some noncommissioned officers" clubs and enlisted men"s clubs tended to segregate themselves, but no official notice was taken of this tendency, and not one such instance was a source of racial complaint in 1953. The survey also discovered that racial att.i.tudes in adjacent communities had surprisingly little influence on the relations between white and black soldiers on post. Nor was there evidence of any appreciable resentment toward integration on the part of white civilian employees, even when they worked with or under black officers and enlisted men.
[Footnote 17-99: One exception was the strong objection in some states to racially mixed marriages contracted by soldiers. Twenty-seven states had some form of miscegenation law. The Army therefore did not a.s.sign to stations in those states soldiers who by reason of their mixed marriages might be subject to criminal penalties.
See Memo, Chief, Cla.s.sification and Standards Branch, DCSPER, for Planning Office, 28 Feb 50, sub: a.s.signment of Personnel; DF, DCSPER to TAG, 4 Jun 54; both in DCSPER 291.2. For further discussion of the matter, see TAGO, Policy Paper, July 1954; New York _Post_, November 13, 1957.]
[Footnote 17-100: HUMRRO, Integration of Social Activities on Nine Army Posts, Aug 53. See also Interv, Nichols with Davis. A DCSPER action officer, Davis was intimately involved with the Army"s integration program during this period.]
[Footnote 17-101: Interv, author with Evans, 4 Dec 73, CMH files.]
The on-post dance, a valuable morale builder, was usually restricted to one race because commanders were afraid of arousing antagonism in nearby communities. But even here restrictions were not uniform.
Mutual use of dance floors by white and black couples was frequent though not commonplace and was accepted in officers" clubs, many noncommissioned officers" clubs, and at special unit affairs. The rules for social integration were flexible, and many adjustments could be made to the sentiments of the community if the commander had the will and the tact. Some commanders, unaware of what was being accomplished by progressive colleagues, were afraid to establish a precedent, and often avoided practices that were common elsewhere.
Social scientists reviewing the situation suggested that the Army should acquaint the commanders with the existing wide range of social possibilities.
Fear of congressional disapproval, another reason often given for deferring integration, was exaggerated, as a meeting between Senator Richard B. Russell and James Evans in early 1952 demonstrated. (p. 457) At the request of the manpower secretary, Evans went to Capitol Hill to inform the chairman of the Armed Services Committee that for reasons of military efficiency the Army was going to integrate.
Senator Russell observed that he had been unable to do some things he wanted to do "because your people [black voters] weren"t strong enough politically to support me." Tell the secretary, Russell added, "that I won"t help him integrate, but I won"t hinder him either--and neither will anyone else."[17-102] The senator was true to his word. News of the Army"s integration program pa.s.sed quietly through the halls of Congress without public or private protest.
[Footnote 17-102: Ibid.]
Much opposition to integration was based on the fear that low-scoring black soldiers, handicapped by deficiencies in schooling and training, would weaken integrated units as they had the all-black units. But integration proved to be the best solution. As one combat commander put it, "Mix "um up and you get a strong line all the way; segregate "um and you have a point of weakness in your line. The enemy hits you there, and it"s bug out."[17-103] Korea taught the Army that an integrated unit was not as weak as its weakest men, but as strong as its leadership and training. Integration not only diluted the impact of the less qualified by distributing them more widely, but also brought about measurable improvement in the performance and standards of a large number of black soldiers.
[Footnote 17-103: Quoted in John B. Spore and Robert F. c.o.c.klin, "Our Negro Soldiers," _Reporter_ 6 (January 22, 1952):6-9.]
Closely related to the concern over the large number of ill-qualified soldiers was the fear of the impact of integration on a quota-free Army. The Project CLEAR team concluded that a maximum of 15 to 20 percent black strength "seems to be an effective interim working level."[17-104] General McAuliffe pointed out in November 1952 that he was trying to maintain a balanced distribution of black troops, not only geographically but also according to combat and service specialties (_see Tables 9 and 10_). Collins decided to retain the ceiling on black combat troops--no more than 12 percent in any combat unit--but he agreed that a substantially higher percentage was acceptable in all other units.[17-105]
[Footnote 17-104: Ltr, Dir, ORO, to ACofS, G-3, 20 Nov 52, G-3 291.2.]
[Footnote 17-105: Memo for Rcd, G-1, 6 Nov 52, ref: ACofS, G-1, Memo for CofS, sub: Distribution of Negro Personnel, 14 Oct 52, G-1 291.2.]
Table 9--Worldwide Distribution of Enlisted Personnel by Race, October 1952
(In Thousands)
European Far East Other Overseas Continental Category Command Command Commands United Total States
White 212.1 293.1 96.0 649.2 1,250.5 Black 35.6 41.5 5.8[a] 110.6 193.4 Total 247.7 334.6 101.8 759.8 1,445.9 Percent black 14.4 12.4 5.7 14.6 13.4
[Tablenote a: Restrictions remained in effect on the a.s.signment of Negroes to certain stations in USARPAC, TRUST, and USARCARIB.]
_Source_: Memo, Chief, Per and Dist Br, G-1, for ACofS, G-1, 8 Oct 52, sub: Distribution of Negro Enlisted Personnel, G-1, 291.2.
Table 10--Distribution of Black Enlisted Personnel by Branch and Rank, 31 October 1952
AUS Regular Branch Total Percent[b] Total Percent[b]
Armor 7,738 13.7 3,565 13.8 Artillery 33,684 16.9 14,854 19.9 Infantry 37,220 14.1 15,713 14.9 Adjutant General"s Corps 1,074 8.8 663 10.8 Chemical Corps 1,504 15.5 633 20.1 Corps of Engineers 18,987 16.4 8,315 17.9 Military Police Corps 3,012 8.1 1,751 9.8 Finance Corps 68 2.4 51 5.3 Army Medical Service 9,896 12.2 4,439 12.9 Ordnance Corps 5,683 10.2 2,598 12.0 Quartermaster Corps 9,690 20.8 4,187 20.6 Signal Corps 6,923 8.2 3,192 8.7 Transportation Corps 16,380 31.2 8,765 38.2 Women"s Army Corps 1,310 13.1 1,283 13.3 No Branch a.s.signment[a] 42,643 11.4 17,779 11.7 Total 195,812[c] 87,788
[Tablenote a: In training.]
[Tablenote b: Figures show black percentage of total Army enlistments.]
[Tablenote c: Discrepancy with Table 9, which is based on September figures.]
_Source_: STM-30, 31 Oct 52.
These percentages were part of a larger concern over the number of Negroes in the Army as a whole. Based on the evidence of draft-swollen enlistment statistics, it seemed likely that the 15 to 20 percent figure would be reached or surpa.s.sed in 1953 or 1954, and there was some discussion in the staff about restoring the quota. But such talk quickly faded as the Korean War wound down and the percentage declined. Negroes const.i.tuted 14.4 percent of enlisted strength in December 1952 and leveled off by the summer of 1955 at 11.9 percent.
Statistics for the European Command ill.u.s.trated the trend. In June 1955, Negroes accounted for 3.6 percent of the command"s officer strength and 11.4 percent of its enlisted strength. The enlisted figure represents a drop from a high of 16.1 percent in June 1953.
The percentage of black troops was down to 11.2 percent of the (p. 458) command"s total strength--officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men--by June 1956. The reduction is explained in part by a policy adopted by all commands in February 1955 of refusing, with certain exceptions, to reenlist three-year veterans who scored less than ninety in the cla.s.sification tests. In Europe alone some 5,300 enlisted men were not permitted to reenlist in 1955. Slightly more than 25 percent were black.[17-106]
[Footnote 17-106: Hq USAREUR, "Annual Historical Report, 1 July 1954-30 June 1955," pp. 76-80, 92; ibid., 1 July 1955-30 June 1956, pp. 65-67.]
The racial quota, in the guise of an "acceptable" percentage of Negroes in individual units, continued to operate long after the Army agreed to abandon it. No one, black or white, appears to have voiced in the early 1950"s the logical observation that the establishment of a racial quota in individual Army units--whatever the percentage and the grounds for that percentage--was in itself a residual form of discrimination. Nor did anyone ask how establishing a race quota, clearly distinct from restricting men according to mental, moral, or professional standards, could achieve the "effective working (p. 459) level" posited by the Army"s scientific advisers.
These questions would still be pertinent years later because the alternative to the racial quota--the enlistment and a.s.signment of men without regard for color--would continue to be unacceptable to many.
They would argue that to abandon the quota, as the services did in the 1960"s, was to violate the concept of racial balance, which is yet another hallmark of an egalitarian society. For example, during the Vietnam War some black Americans complained that too many Negroes were serving in the more dangerous combat arms. Since men were a.s.signed without regard to race, these critics were in effect asking for the quota again, reminding the service that the population of the United States was only some 11 percent black. And during discussions of the all-volunteer Army a decade later, critics would be asking how the white majority would react to an army 30 or even 50 percent black.
These considerations were clearly beyond the ken of the men who integrated the Army in the early 1950"s. They concentrated instead on the perplexities of enlisting and a.s.signing vast numbers of segregated black soldiers during wartime and closely watched the combat performance of black units in Korea. Integration provided the Army with a way to fill its depleted combat units quickly. The shortage of white troops forced local commanders to turn to the growing surplus of black soldiers awaiting a.s.signment to a limited number of black units.
Manpower restrictions did not permit the formation of new black units merely to accommodate the excess, and in any case experience with the 24th Infantry had strengthened the Army staff"s conviction that black combat units did not perform well. However commanders may have felt about the social implications of integration, and whatever they thought of the fighting ability of black units, the only choice left to them was integration. When the Chief of Staff ordered the integration of the Far East Command in 1951, what had begun as a battlefield expedient became official policy.
Segregation became unworkable when the Army lost its power to limit the number of black soldiers. Abandonment of the quota on enlistments, pressed on the Army by the Fahy Committee, proved compatible with segregated units only so long as the need for fighting men was not acute. In Korea the need became acute. Ironically, the Gillem Board, whose work became anathema to the integrationists, accurately predicted the demise of segregation in its final report, which declared that in the event of another major war the Army would use its manpower "without regard to antecedents or race."
CHAPTER 18 (p. 460)