"You will be all right. You will be no longer cowards. The cowardice will have been given up. You will have become men in entrenching yourselves behind the Army. But under your direction they will have become a.s.sa.s.sins."
With these words--memorable in connection with what happened later, but not in Ulster--the Ulster leader left the House, followed by Captain Craig. Friday"s papers were of course full of the debate. At noon on that day, March 20, 1914, General Sir Arthur Paget, Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, held a meeting with the officers at the Curragh and received the intimation that the majority of them would resign their commissions rather than go on duty which was likely to involve a collision with Ulster.
It seems only fair in dealing with this whole incident to print here an account of what happened, written from the soldier"s point of view, by the man who was the spokesman and leader of the resigning officers--Brigadier (now Lieutenant) General Sir Hubert Gough.[2]
""I never refused to obey orders. On the contrary, I obeyed them. I was ordered to make a decision--namely, to leave the Army or "to undertake active operations against Ulster." These were the very words of the terms offered. As I was given a choice, I accepted it, and chose the first alternative, and as a matter of fact I have a letter in existence written the night before the offer was made by Sir A. Paget to my brother, saying: "Something is up" (we had been suddenly ordered to a conference). "What is it? If I receive orders to march North, of course I will go.""
"All the officers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade took the same line"
(continues the correspondent of the _Manchester Guardian_) "and resigned. This decision seems not to have been expected by the authorities, and caused great perturbation. General Gough was urged by Sir Arthur Paget to withdraw the resignation. Sir Arthur Paget told them that the operations against Ulster were to be of a purely defensive nature. Unfortunately, Sir Arthur Paget based his appeal on expediency and private interest, and not sufficiently on the call of public duty. This failed to influence the officers. They persisted in their resignations, and only finally withdrew them on receiving a written undertaking from the War Office that they would not be again presented with the alternative of resigning or attacking Ulster."
The Irish Party had no guess at the inner aspect of the occurrence.
Naturally, but regrettably, we were the section of the House which had least touch with what was thought and felt in barrack-rooms and regimental messes. Naturally, but most regrettably, the opinion of the Army regarded us traditionally as a hostile body; and at this time every effort to accentuate that belief was made by the political party with which the Army had most intercourse and connection.
Writing now, as I hope I may write without offence, of a state of things not far off in time, but divided from us of to-day by the marks of a vast upheaval, it can be said that the old professional Army was a society governed in an extraordinary degree by tradition. Part of that tradition was that the Army had no politics; and as everyone knows, the man who says he has no politics is in practice almost invariably a Conservative. In the Army, usage was at its strongest--stronger even than at a public school; it was almost bad manners, "bad form," to hold political opinions differing from those of your mess. Political discussion was sharply discouraged; but this never meant that a man might not express vehemently the prevailing opinion. On the broad facts it was inevitable that the prevailing opinion should be unfriendly to Irish Nationalists. Irish Nationalists had taken pa.s.sionately the line of opposition to the South African War; they had been sharply critical of all the minor campaigns in which the Army had been engaged for repression or for conquest during the whole period since Parnell began his leadership. In Ireland itself, every man who reflected for a moment saw at the Curragh the very embodiment of that force which had maintained for over a hundred years a Government which had not the consent of the governed; and unless he was one of those who regarded themselves as "England"s faithful garrison in Ireland," protestations of enthusiasm for the armed forces of the Crown could not be the natural expression of his feelings.
Yet mingled with the Nationalists" att.i.tude of estrangement from the forces which upheld a detested system of government there was a deep-seated pride in the exploits of Irish troops; and no man ever felt this more strongly than Redmond. He seldom spoke of the distinguished men he met, but again and again I remember hearing him mention with pleasure some talk over a dinner-table with this or that famous soldier--Sir John French (as he then was), for instance. It was happiness for him to find himself on friendly terms with the service to which so many sentiments bound him. The Curragh incident was to him more than a grave political event; it pained him beyond measure that this opposition should be headed by a representative of one of the Irish families most famous for their military record. In the debates which dealt with all this matter he said no word, and he kept our party silent--a wise course, and one to which every instinct prompted him.
In its political aspect, this action of General Gough and the fifty officers allied with him revealed a new and formidable impediment on the path to Home Rule; yet it was one of those barriers which rally forces rather than weaken them, and in surmounting which, or sweeping them aside, a new impetus may be gained. The incident was first discussed in the House on Monday, March 23rd, and continued to dominate all other questions for several days. From the Labour benches Mr. John Ward (now Colonel), who had been a private soldier, gave the first indication of the volume of resentment. His speech, remarkable in its power both of phrasing and of thought, was delivered quite unexpectedly in a thin House; but its effect was electrical. Later, Mr. J.H. Thomas spoke in the same strain. When a railway strike was threatened, the soldiers had been called out and had come without a murmur. Was the Army to be used against all movements except those under the patronage of the Tory party? If so, he would tell his four hundred thousand railway men to equip themselves to defend their own interests.
These speeches set people thinking very gravely, but their effect was to increase the confidence of Home Rulers--the more so as Sir Edward Grey, in one of his rare moments of emphasis, declared his determination to go as far as either speaker if the case which they foreshadowed should arise. But new occurrences disquieted the public; the bungling which had characterized dealings with the officers at the Curragh was not ended there. General Gough received a doc.u.ment from Colonel Seely, Secretary of State for War, countersigned by Sir John French and Sir Spencer Ewart, the military heads of the War Office; and this doc.u.ment was in part disavowed by the Cabinet. The two Generals resigned and Colonel Seely followed their example. I have never seen the House of Commons so completely surprised as on the afternoon when the Prime Minister announced that he himself would succeed to the vacant office. The surprise pa.s.sed at once into a feeling of immense relief, very widely shared by all parties. The right thing had been done in the right way, and it was clear that Mr. Asquith possessed enormous authority, if he chose to a.s.sert it.
The effect of all these happenings was immediately perceptible in the resumed discussion on the Home Rule Bill. Mr. Dillon, speaking on the second day, said: "Yesterday for the first time I heard this question debated in a spirit of reasonableness and conciliation and with an evident desire on both sides to reach an agreement." A proposal frequently put forward from the Tory side suggested exclusion until a federal arrangement for the United Kingdom could be completed. The official Tory demand was for either a referendum or a general election.
But, as Redmond pointed out when he spoke on the fourth and last day of the debate, any proposal for a settlement must be a settlement which Ulster would accept, and Ulster declared that it would not be influenced by any vote of the British people or by any Act of Parliament. In a pa.s.sage of very genuine feeling he indicated what Ulster might do to a.s.sist him in securing for Ulster the extremest limit of concession:
"Anything which would mean burying the hatchet, anything which would mean the consent of these Ulstermen to shake hands frankly with their fellow-countrymen across the hateful memories of the past, would be welcomed with universal joy in Ireland, and would be gladly purchased by very large sacrifices indeed. If the right honourable and learned gentleman (Sir Edward Carson) would say to me, "We are both Irishmen; we both love our country; we both hate--and I am sure this is absolutely true of both of us--we both hate all the old sectarian animosities, all the old wrongs, all the old memories which have kept Irishmen apart; let us come together and see what we can do for the welfare of our common country, so that we can hand down to those who come after us an Ireland more free, more peaceful, more tolerant, an Ireland less cursed by racial and religious differences"; if an appeal like that were made to me, I say without the smallest hesitation that there are no lengths that Nationalist Ireland would not be willing to go to a.s.suage the fears, allay the anxieties, and remove the prejudices of their Ulster fellow-countrymen.
"But, alas! that is not the position. Even the permanent exclusion of Ulster is not put forward as the price of reconciliation; it is simply put forward as the one and sole condition upon which they will give up their avowed intention of levying war upon their fellow-countrymen."
He dealt with the federal proposal, and once more avowed his desire for that solution. "I have been all my political life preaching in favour of federalism." But he could not consent that the exclusion of Ulster should be prolonged indefinitely pending a settlement on federal lines, nor consent to any "watering down of the powers in the present Home Rule Bill."
What remained then, if Ulster would not accept the offer? Nothing but "to proceed calmly with the Bill." Threats of civil war he discounted.
Disturbances there would probably be; but when the first Home Rule Bill was defeated, there were weeks of the most terrible riots in Belfast.
The House could not afford to be deterred from any course by threats of violence; and he was confident that the Bill would pa.s.s into law and profoundly confident it would never be revoked.
He gave his reasons for that confidence in a pa.s.sage almost autobiographical in character--if only because it made the House realize how completely this man"s whole adult life had been devoted to this one long service, and how far the labours of our party had achieved their purpose.
"In a sense I may say I have lived my whole life within these walls. I came in here little more than a boy, and I have grown old in the House of Commons, and in the long s.p.a.ce of years which have pa.s.sed since then I have witnessed the most extraordinary transformation of the whole public life of this country, and I have witnessed an almost miraculous change in the position and the prospects of the Irish National Cause.
When I came to this House, Irish Nationalist members, in a sense, were almost outcasts. Both the great British parties--there was no Labour party then--divided on everything else, were united in hostility to the national movement and the national ideal. Home Rule seemed hopelessly out of the range of practical politics. There were only a handful of men in this whole House of Commons besides us who were in favour of any measure of Home Rule for Ireland. Outside, the public opinion of this country was ignorant, and it was actively hostile, and we found it impossible to gain the ear of the democracy of England for the voice of Ireland. All that has vanished into thin air. All that has radically changed. The change has been slow and gradual, but it has been continuous and sure. Such a change as that can never be reversed. You might as well talk of the world going back to the days before electricity or petrol as hope to bring back the prejudices and the ignorance of the ma.s.ses of the people in this country about Ireland, as they existed in the past."
His confidence was strong and it communicated itself to Ireland. But whatever could be said to shake confidence was said by Mr. O"Brien and Mr. Healy, who denounced the Bill as worthless when linked to the plan of even temporary part.i.tion, and declared that, whatever the Government might say at present, we had not yet reached the end of their concessions. On the division they and their party abstained, so that the majority dropped to 77.
Up to this point it is still true to say that the Nationalist party were constant to their faith in strictly const.i.tutional action. But a new development was imminent. On the night of Friday to Sat.u.r.day, April 24th-25th, Ulstermen brought off their first overt act of rebellion.
They seized the ports of Larne and Donaghadee, cut off telephone and telegraph, landed a very large quant.i.ty of rifles and ammunition, and despatched them to every quarter of the province by means of a great fleet of motor-cars which had been mobilized for the occasion. It was a clean and excellent piece of staff work, planned by a capable soldier and carried out under military direction: and the Tory Press hailed it with no less enthusiasm than was elicited by the most important victories in the recent war.
One coastguard, running to give the alarm, died of heart failure: otherwise there was no casualty. The police and customs officers were confronted with _force majeure_ and submitted without show of resistance. The Prime Minister, in answering a question as to the action which he proposed to take, used these words:
"In view of this grave and unprecedented outrage the House may be a.s.sured that His Majesty"s Government will take without delay appropriate steps to vindicate the authority of the law and protect officers and servants of the King and His Majesty"s subjects in the exercise of their legal rights."
The Opposition was noticeably silent, and next day some embarra.s.sment was apparent when they proceeded with a previously arranged Vote of Censure on the Government for the military and naval movements in connection with which the Curragh incident had occurred. The sum of these movements amounted to despatching four companies to points in Ulster at which very large stores of arms and ammunition were lying under very small guard--and at one of which there was a battery of field guns with no protecting infantry. It was regarded as at least possible that the stores might be rushed by "evil-disposed persons, not fully under the control of their leaders." It was also regarded as possible that the movement of these companies might be resisted and that much larger operations might be thereby involved. The stationing of the Fleet opposite the Belfast coast was part of the measures taken against this latter contingency.
All this preparation was denounced as a conspiracy organized by Mr.
Churchill with intent to provoke rebellion and put it down by a ma.s.sacre. In view of the important military operation which Ulster had just carried out against the Crown, Mr. Churchill was not without justification in comparing the motion to a vote of censure by the criminal cla.s.ses on the police. Yet, after much hard hitting in speech, he once more led the way in retreat from the Government"s position. Sir Edward Grey had declared, speaking for the Government, that beyond the six years" limit they could not go. Mr. Churchill himself had declared the Government"s offer would be and should be their last word. Yet now, avowedly on his own account, and not speaking for the Cabinet, he proposed that a new negotiation should be opened with Sir Edward Carson.
This proposal elicited no response, and the debate continued that day in a line of violent recrimination. But next day Sir Edward Carson rose and affirmed that he had previously declared his willingness to advise Ulster to close with a proposal giving exclusion until a Federal scheme had been considered, when the whole matter should be reviewed "in the light of the action of the Irish Parliament and how they got on." Now he said:
"I shall try to make an advance on what I said before. I will say this--and I hope the House will believe me, because, though I do not want to be introducing my own personality into it, I am myself a southerner in Ireland--I would say this: That if Home Rule is to pa.s.s, much as I detest it, and little as I will take any responsibility for the pa.s.sing of it, my earnest hope, and indeed I would say my most earnest prayer, would be that the Government of Ireland for the South and West would prove, and might prove, such a success in the future, notwithstanding all our antic.i.p.ations, that it might be even for the interest of Ulster itself to move towards that Government, and come in under it and form one unit in relation to Ireland. May I say something more than that? I would be glad to see such a state of things arising in Ireland, in which you would find that mutual confidence and goodwill between all cla.s.ses in Ireland as would lead to a stronger Ireland as an integral unit in the federal scheme. While I say all that, that depends upon goodwill, and never can be brought about by force."
Redmond remained silent; but months later it became known that he had taken action to foster this new spirit. He advised the Prime Minister not to proceed with the prosecution which had been threatened against the Larne gun-runners. But at the same time he urged upon Government that they should withdraw the proclamation against importing arms: and for this he had good reason. The Larne affair had rendered the movement in support of the Irish Volunteers irresistible, and Redmond had decided to throw himself in with it.
The result was an amazing upward leap in the numbers of the Volunteers.
On June 15th a question brought out that they were estimated at 80,000 against 84,000 of the Ulster force; but the Nationalist body was increasing at the rate of 15,000 a week. By July 9th they were reckoned (on police information) at 132,000, of whom nearly forty thousand were Army reservists.
These facts now dominated the situation. It was now abundantly clear that if pa.s.sing Home Rule meant civil war, so also would the abandonment of Home Rule. On June 16th Lord Robert Cecil raised a debate on the new danger. In that debate words were quoted from Sir Roger Cas.e.m.e.nt, one of the most active promoters of the movement: "When you are challenged on the field of force, it is upon that field you must reply." Mr. Dillon, who exulted in the "splendid demonstration of national sentiment shown in the uprising of the National Volunteers," urged strongly that the growth of a rival body was not a menace to public order but an added security. The armed Ulstermen would be "much slower to break the peace"
when they realized the certainty of formidable resistance--and this, be it said, was no ungrounded observation. Yet at the same time the very success of the Volunteer movement was disquieting Redmond. He was not in the same position as Sir Edward Carson, who from the first had directed, presided over, and controlled the raising and equipment of his force; and unless the force were to be a menace to his leadership, he must secure control. As Mr. Bulmer Hobson puts it in his _History of the Irish Volunteers_:
"The Volunteers had men in their ranks who were political followers of Mr. Redmond"s, and men who were not, and who never had been. The latter were willing to help him if he had been ready to help them; they would have made terms with him, but were not prepared to be merely absorbed into his movement."
The strength of Redmond"s position lay in the fact that the vast majority of the enrolled men looked to him as their leader: his weakness, in that the committees under which enrolment had taken place were largely composed of the extremist section. He now determined to unite the Volunteers with the parliamentary party as the Ulster Volunteers were linked with Sir Edward Carson and his civilian organization.
The men with whom he had to deal were princ.i.p.ally Professor MacNeill and Sir Roger Cas.e.m.e.nt. His first proposal was to replace the existing Provisional Committee by another, consisting of nine members, with Professor MacNeill, who was regarded as a general supporter of Redmond"s, in the chair. Oddly enough, the negotiations broke down because Redmond nominated Michael Davitt"s son along with Mr. Devlin and his own brother to be representatives. The young Davitt had at an early stage expressed dissent from the movement, and this, coming from his father"s son, left bitter resentment. The existing Committee now proposed to call a National Convention of the Volunteers. Such a body would clearly have become a rival, and a powerful rival, to the National Convention of a purely citizen type, and Redmond felt himself forced to take drastic action. In a public letter dated June 9th he wrote:
"I regret to observe the controversy which is now taking place in the Press on the Irish National Volunteer movement. Many of the writers convey the impression that the Volunteer movement is, to some extent at all events, hostile to the objects and policy of the Irish party. I desire to say emphatically that there is no foundation for this idea, and any attempts to create discord between the Volunteer movement and the Irish party are calculated in my opinion to ruin the Volunteer movement, which, properly directed, may be of incalculable service to the National Cause.
"Up to two months ago I felt that the Volunteer movement was somewhat premature, but the effect of Sir Edward Carson"s threats upon public opinion in England, the House of Commons, and the Government; the occurrences at the Curragh Camp, and the successful gun-running in Ulster, have vitally altered the position, and the Irish party took steps about six weeks ago to inform their friends and supporters in the country that in their opinion it was desirable to support the Volunteer movement, with the result that within the last six weeks the movement has spread like a prairie fire, and all the Nationalists of Ireland will shortly be enrolled.
"Within the last fortnight I have had communications from men in all parts of the country, inquiring as to the organization and control of the Volunteer movement, and it has been strongly represented to me that the Governing Body should be reconstructed and placed on a thoroughly representative basis, so as to give confidence to all shades of National opinion."
Redmond"s proposal was that to the existing Committee there should be added twenty-five representative men from different parts of the country, nominated at the instance of the Irish party and in sympathy with its policy and aims. Failing this, he intimated that it would be "necessary to fall back on county control and government until the organization was sufficiently complete to make possible the election of a fully representative Executive by the Volunteers themselves."
The intimation was not at once accepted. An order was issued calling on the Volunteers to elect additional representatives by counties to be added to the Committee. Redmond at once publicly declared that this amounted to refusal of his offer, and he put the issue very plainly. The Provisional Committee was originally self-const.i.tuted and had been increased only by co-option. The majority of its members, he was informed, were not supporters of the Irish party: of the rank and file at least 95 per cent., he said, were supporters of the Irish party and its policy.
"This is a condition of things which plainly cannot continue. The rank and file of the Volunteers and the responsible leaders of the Irish people are ent.i.tled, and indeed are bound, to demand some security that an attempt shall not be made in the name of the Volunteers to dictate policy to the National party who, as the elected representatives of the people, are charged with the responsibility of deciding upon the policy best calculated to bring the National movement to success.
"Moreover, a military organization is of its very nature so grave and serious an undertaking that every responsible Nationalist in the country who supports it is ent.i.tled to the most substantial guarantees against any possible imprudence. The best guarantee to be found is clearly the presence on the Governing Body of men of proved judgment and steadiness."
As a last word he renewed his threat of calling on his supporters to organize separate county committees independent of the Dublin centre.
This was carrying matters with a high hand, and the fact that he succeeded proves the greatness of his prestige at the moment. The Committee in a published manifesto accepted his terms, but accepted them with declared regret, and eight of the original members seceded. Among them was Patrick Pea.r.s.e, with whom went three others who suffered death in Easter week two years later.
All this was a disastrous business, and the worst part of it lay in the public avowal of divided councils. Moreover, a committee so const.i.tuted could not, and did not, operate efficiently. The original members were primarily interested in the Volunteer Force; the added ones primarily in the parliamentary movement. Nearly all of the latter--selected for their "proved judgment and steadiness"--were men past middle age; and of the whole twenty-five Willie Redmond alone subsequently bore arms.
There was indeed an underlying difference of principle. Redmond knew well, and all parliamentarians with him, that under the terms of the Home Rule Bill no army could be raised or maintained in Ireland without the consent of the Imperial Parliament. The original Volunteer Committee laid it down as an axiom that the Volunteer Force should be permanent; they were, as Cas.e.m.e.nt put it, "the beginning of an Irish army." Sir Edward Carson"s policy had produced a new mentality among Irish Nationalists, and it made many take Redmond"s const.i.tutionalism for timidity.
But in the eyes of the world and of Ireland generally, Redmond was just as much as Sir Edward Carson the accredited and accepted leader of his Volunteer organization, and to him the Volunteers looked for provision of arms and equipment. One of his chief preoccupations in those months was with this matter, and it explains his desire to have the proclamation against the import of arms withdrawn. The Larne exploit had proved the futility of it; articles by Colonel Repington in _The Times_ testified to the completeness of the provision which had been made for Ulster. But smuggling is always a costly business, and Nationalists were hampered by the cost. More than that, there was ground for suspicion that the scales were not equally weighted as between Ulster and the rest of the country. On June 30th Redmond wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary repeating his case for withdrawal of the proclamation. It is all memorable, but especially the warning which concludes the following pa.s.sages from it:
"In the South and West of Ireland, not only are the most active measures being taken against the importation of arms, but many owners of vessels are hara.s.sed unnecessarily.
"The effect of this unequal working of the proclamation has been grave amongst our people, and has tended to increase both their exasperation and their apprehensions.