"However, I propose to make no positive finding on this point. I must pay regard to the circ.u.mstance strongly urged upon me by counsel for the airline in their closing submissions, namely, that if the alteration was intentional then it was not accompanied by the normal realignment of the aircraft"s heading so as to join up with the new waypoint. As I say, I think this latter omission is capable of explanation but it is a material fact in favour of the Navigation Section which I cannot disregard, and it is the single reason why I refrain from making a positive finding that the alteration of the waypoint was intentional."
It may be that in speaking of a single reason in the last sentence of the extract the Commissioner put aside his earlier unqualified conclusion that the matter set out in paragraph 230 (e) was also "a valid objection" to the suggestion that the waypoint had been moved deliberately. In any event the eventual and significant finding concerning the matter is contained in the following sub-paragraph 255 (b):
"I believe, however, that the error made by Mr Hewitt was ascertained long before Captain Simpson reported the cross-track distance of 27 miles between the TACAN and the McMurdo waypoint, and I am satisfied that because of the operational utility and logic of the altered waypoint it was thereafter maintained by the Navigation Section as an approved position."
At this point it is necessary to explain the reference in that sub-paragraph to Captain Simpson; and then, if it be a.s.sumed that "the altered waypoint ... was thereafter maintained ... as an approved position", it is necessary to understand the reasons given by the Commissioner for the change back to Williams Field. If the altered waypoint had been adopted as a better position why was it then thought that it had to be discarded?
Correction of co-ordinates
It was not until 14th November 1979 that any question arose about the McMurdo waypoint. On that day Captain Simpson had taken the second November 1979 sightseeing flight to the Antarctic and something persuaded him to raise the matter of the southern waypoint with Captain Johnson, the Flight Manager Line Operations. There is a difference of opinion as to precisely what was said by Captain Simpson to Captain Johnson but according to the evidence of those in the navigation section they thought that when they checked up-to-date records of the co-ordinates at McMurdo Station against the original NV90 flight plan what had been brought forward for notice was the small difference of 10 minutes of longitude to which reference has been made. They said this represented the recent relocation of the tactical air navigation system (the TACAN) at Williams Field. Accordingly Mr Brown of the navigation section wrote into his worksheet a corrected position of 77 52.7" S and 166 58" E and entered those figures into the system on 16th November.
But the amendment was not made in the live flight planning system until the early hours of 28th November. According to the members of the navigation section all this was done without knowledge that the effect of introducing the amended figures would be to override "164 48"" and so alter the co-ordinate by 2 10" rather than 10".
The Commissioner rejected the explanations he had heard to the effect that Captain Simpson"s information seemed to point to quite a minor movement to the up-dated position of the TACAN. He stated that there appeared to have been clear advice by Captain Simpson that the "false"
waypoint was 27 miles west of it. In addition he rejected the possible explanation that the advice had been misinterpreted by Captain Johnson to whom it had been given, and he adopted instead what in paragraph 245 he described as "the second explanation":
"(b) The second explanation is that both Captain Johnston and the Navigation Section knew quite well that the McMurdo waypoint lay 27 miles to the west of the TACAN and that since his track had not officially been approved by the Civil Aviation Division it should therefore be realigned with the TACAN and then someone forgot to ensure that Captain Collins was told of the change. Such an interpretation means that the evidence as to the alleged belief of a displacement of only 2.1 miles is untrue."
Then in paragraph 255 (d) he said this:
"If, as I have held, the Navigation Section knew the actual position of the McMurdo waypoint as being 27 miles to the west of the TACAN, then why did they not submit to Captain Johnson, or to flight Operations Division, that the waypoint should remain where it was? One view is that the Flight Operations Division expected, in terms of Captain Johnson"s letter to the Director of Civil Aviation dated 17 October 1979, that the next edition of the Ross Sea chart NZ-RNC4 would contain the official Air New Zealand flight path to McMurdo, and that the safest course would be to put the destination point back to the approximate location at which Civil Aviation Division had thought it had always been."
That last suggestion was not put to any of the navigation witnesses at the Inquiry. It implies that although those in the navigation section believed the airline had been using a computer track to the west of Ross Island for the past year because it was the better route they nevertheless suddenly became uneasy lest knowledge of the matter would now reach the Civil Aviation Division which had not given its official blessing to the change. The idea apparently is that because the airline might receive an official rebuke the officers in the section made their own independent decision that the route must once again be directed back over Mt. Erebus.
There was no evidence at all before the Royal Commission that the approval of the Civil Aviation Division was needed for a change from the direct Cape Hallett/McMurdo route. An affidavit in support of the present application for review indicates that if the matter had been raised at the Inquiry members of the navigation section would have wished to present evidence from the Civil Aviation Division that "a change of route from the direct route to the McMurdo Sound route would not have required CAD approval and therefore could have been lawfully accomplished by the airline without reference to CAD". That situation may have been antic.i.p.ated by the Commissioner himself for by reference to the false waypoint and the earlier consequential movement of the computer flight track down McMurdo Sound to the west he said that although approval of the route by the Civil Aviation Division should have been obtained it "would have been automatic" (paragraph 150).
In paragraph 255 (f) of the Report the explanation from all four members of the navigation section is described in the following way:
"In my opinion this explanation that the change in the waypoint was thought to be minimal in terms of distance is a concocted story designed to explain away the fundamental mistake, made by someone, in failing to ensure that Captain Collins was notified that his aircraft was now programmed to fly on a collision course with Mt.
Erebus."
That finding is one of those directly challenged in the present proceedings.
Advice of the Change
A different matter was considered by the Commissioner in relation to the change made in November 1979 to move the waypoint back to the TACAN at Williams Field. As usual a signal was sent to the United States base at McMurdo with advice that the aircraft was to fly to the Antarctic on 28th November and the flight plan for the journey. And in the list of waypoints appears the word "McMurdo" in lieu of the geographical co-ordinates which had appeared in the equivalent signal for the flight three weeks earlier. The message had been prepared by Mr Brown, one of the four officers in the navigation section.
The use of the word "McMurdo" was the subject of an idea put by the Commissioner to Mr Hewitt, who was the second of the witnesses from the navigation section. The Commissioner asked:
"I know you have explained to me how that happened but someone may suggest to me before the enquiry is over that the object was to thats (sic) not to reveal there had been this long standing error in the co-ordinates and that is why the word McMurdo was relayed to them. I take you would not agree with that"
Mr Hewitt said:
"Certainly not sir."
The suggestion had not been raised earlier at the Inquiry and it was not mentioned by anybody subsequently. In particular it was not put to Mr Brown himself when the latter was called to give evidence three months later. However the Commissioner expressed his view upon the matter in the following way. In paragraph 255 (e) he said this--
"In my opinion, the introduction of the word "McMurdo" into the Air Traffic Control flight plan for the fatal flight was deliberately designed to conceal from the United States authorities that the flight path had been changed, and probably because it was known that the United States Air Traffic Control would lodge an objection to the new flight path."
It will be observed that the last few words are qualified by "probably".
It appears that the Commissioner was told during a visit to Antarctica that the United States authorities would not have approved a flight path over Ross Island. But there was no evidence that Air New Zealand had ever received an intimation from the United States authorities to that effect or that the navigation section had reason to think they would so object. The qualification seems to reflect that position. In the result, when the findings in the two sub-paragraphs 255 (e) and (f) are put together they reveal the theory that at one at the same time the navigation section felt obliged to conceal from officials in Wellington the use of a flight track down McMurdo Sound that was regarded favourably by officials at McMurdo Station and from officials at McMurdo Station a flight track over Ross Island that was regarded favourably by officials in Wellington.
Whiteout
In relation to the cover-up allegations that have been made against the executive officers some reference should be made to their knowledge or otherwise of the freak meteorological condition known as "the whiteout phenomenon". Did they know or suspect that such a condition must have been an explanation for what happened and yet still be determined as the Commissioner found, to promote pilot error as the cause of the crash?
It is something that can be mentioned quite briefly. The Royal Commission Report has made it clear the phenomenon can result in a loss of horizon definition and depth perception and is a great hazard for those who fly in arctic or antarctic conditions. The Commissioner found that at the critical time "air crew had been deceived into believing that the rising white terrain ahead was in fact quite flat and that it extended on for many miles under the solid overcast". This danger is something well known to those who fly regularly in those areas.
Unfortunately it is not so well known by others, and as the Commissioner stated in paragraph 165 it was not understood by any of those involved in this case. He said:
"So far as I understand the evidence, I do not believe that either the airline or Civil Aviation Division ever understood the term "whiteout" to mean anything else than a snowstorm. I do not believe that they were ever aware, until they read the chief inspector"s report, of the type of "whiteout" which occurs in clear air, in calm conditions, and which creates this visual illusion which I have previously described and which is, without doubt, the most dangerous of all polar weather phenomena."
It would seem that if those at airline headquarters were unaware of the deceptive dangers of the whiteout phenomenon they could not have deliberately ignored it as a factor that should be taken into account in favour of the aircrew.
Instructions of the Chief Executive
In paragraph 41 and following paragraphs there is reference to "what happened at the airline headquarters at Auckland when the occurrence of the disaster became first suspected and then known". It is explained that the navigation section became aware of the fact that when the McMurdo waypoint co-ordinates were corrected in November 1979 the movement was not one of 2.1 miles within the vicinity of Williams Field but a distance of 27 miles from longitude 164 48" E; and that "by 30 November the occurrence of this mistake over the co-ordinates was known not only to the Flight Operations Division but also to the management of the airline. In particular it had been reported to the Chief Executive of Air New Zealand, Mr. M.R. Davis". At that point there follows the serious allegation in paragraph 45 already cited--
"The reaction of the chief executive was immediate. He determined that no word of this incredible blunder was to become publicly known."
On the face of it the unqualified idea expressed in that sentence is that Mr. Davis had decided to suppress from everybody outside the airline all information about the changed flight track. But if that meaning were intended it has been greatly modified in paragraph 48.
There it is said--
"It was inevitable that these facts would become known. Perhaps the chief executive had only decided to prevent adverse publicity in the meantime, knowing that the mistake over the co-ordinates must in the end be discovered."
Of course if the decision were merely "to prevent adverse publicity in the meantime" then such an att.i.tude could not in any way be consistent with an attempt "orchestrated" by Mr. Davis to hid from official scrutiny what finally was held by the Commissioner in paragraph 393 to be "the single dominant and effective cause of the disaster". Despite that, paragraph 48 goes on to say this:
"This silence over the changing of the co-ordinates and the failure to tell the air crew was a strategy which succeeded to a very considerable degree. The chief inspector discovered these facts after he had returned from Antarctica on or about 11 December 1979. In his report, which was published in June 1980, the chief inspector referred to what he termed the "error" in the McMurdo destination point, and the fact that it had been corrected a matter of hours before the flight left Auckland."
It is difficult to understand why the Commissioner considered "this silence over the changing of the co-ordinates and the failure to tell the air crew" had been "a strategy which succeeded to a very considerable degree". The information had been given to the chief inspector immediately on his return from Antarctica. That much is acknowledged in the two sentences that follow. It becomes apparent, however, that this was criticized not because the information had been kept away from those to whom it most certainly had to be given, those charged with the important responsibility of inquiring into the causes of the disaster. Mr. Davis was criticized for nothing more than his failure to release the material to the outside world. That is made plain by a subsequent statement towards the end of the Report which leads on to the very severe p.r.o.nouncement in paragraph 377 that the Commissioner had been obliged to listen to "a predetermined plan of deception ... an orchestrated litany of lies". The relevant pa.s.sage is in paragraph 374:
"The fact that the navigation course of the aircraft had been altered in the computer had been disclosed by the chief inspector in his report dated 31 May 1980, 6 months after the disaster. But it was not until the Commission of Inquiry began sitting that the airline publicly admitted that this had occurred."
The effect of the absence of general publicity that the information was given rather than its ready provision by the airline to Mr. Chippindale on the day after his return from the crash site is described in the remaining portion of paragraph 48 which continues in the following way:
"Then the chief inspector went on to say in his report (paragraph 2.5):
"The error had been discovered two flights earlier but neither crew of the previous flight or that of the accident flight were advised of the error by the flight despatcher prior to their departure."
The chief inspector did not make it clear, however, that the computer flight path of TE 901 had been altered before the flight, and that the alteration had not been notified to the air crew. Had that fact been disclosed in the chief inspector"s report then the publicity attending the report would undoubtedly have been differently aligned ... the news blackout imposed by the chief executive was very successful. It was not until the hearings of this Commission that the real magnitude of the mistake by Flight Operations was publicly revealed."
Concerning that last part of paragraph 48 it seems that the Commissioner"s remark immediately following the extract from paragraph 2.5 is inaccurate. It appears to suggest either that the chief inspector was unaware of the fact that the alteration to the co-ordinates "had not been notified to the air crew"; or that if he had been made aware of that fact then he had failed to bring it to public attention in his report as the next sentence suggests. But Mr. Chippindale was both aware of all this and he said so. In paragraph 1.17.1 he explicitly stated:
"This error was not corrected in the computer until the day before the flight. Although it was intended that it be drawn to the attention of the previous crew, immediately prior to their departure this was not done, _nor was it mentioned during the pre-flight dispatch planning for the crew of the accident flight_".
(Emphasis added.)