On September 11 our Amba.s.sador informed M. Delca.s.se of the advance of the Sirdar up the Nile, and on the 18th the French Foreign Minister stated further:--
"As a matter of fact, there is no Marchand Mission. In 1892 and 1893 M. Liotard was sent to the Upper Ubanghi as Commissioner, with instructions to secure French interests in the north-east. M.
Marchand had been appointed one of his subordinates, and received all his orders from M. Liotard. There could be no doubt that for a long time past the whole region of the Bahr-el-Ghazal had been out of the influence of Egypt."
Sir E. Monson left M. Delca.s.se in no doubt as to the view Her Majesty"s Government took of the situation. Of the interview referred to, he reports to Lord Salisbury as follows, under date September 22:--
"Although his Excellency made two or three allusions to the reasons for which, in his opinion, the French might consider that the region in question was open to their advance, he himself volunteered the suggestion that discussion between us would be inopportune.
"In this I, of course, concurred, reminding him of the terms of your lordship"s telegram of the 9th inst.; but I told him, as emphatically as I could, that I looked upon the situation at Fashoda, if M. Marchand had occupied that town, as very serious, inasmuch as Her Majesty"s Government would certainly not acquiesce in his remaining there, nor would they consent to relinquishing the claims of Egypt to the restoration of all the country latterly subject to the Khalifa, which had heretofore been a portion of her territory. I felt it to be my duty, I said, to speak with extreme frankness, and to a.s.sure him that on this point no compromise would be possible.
"M. Delca.s.se listened to me with grave attention, but his reply was chiefly to the effect that if the two Governments discussed the matter with calmness and a sincere desire to avoid a conflict, there could be no doubt of our arriving at a peaceable and satisfactory solution. France does not desire a quarrel. In saying this he could speak with absolute certainty. All his colleagues in the Government are, like himself, anxious for good relations with England. If this anxiety is reciprocated on the other side of the Channel (and the tone of the English Press inspires him with doubts of this) there can be no danger.
"I replied that Her Majesty"s Government have no desire to pick a quarrel with France, but that nothing could be gained by my concealing from him the gravity of the situation as I regarded it, or the fixed determination of Her Majesty"s Government to vindicate claims of the absolute justice of which they hold that there can be no question. I, of course, avoided the use of any expression which might sound like a menace, but short of this I did my best to make my declaration of the impossibility of the French being allowed to remain at Fashoda as clear and distinct as could be expressed in words."
On 25th September, the day the expedition returned from Fashoda to Omdurman, Mr Rennell Rodd, who during the absence of Lord Cromer in Europe was in charge of affairs in Egypt, telegraphed to Lord Salisbury the following despatch, which had been received from the Sirdar:--
"I found at Fashoda, whence I have just returned, M. Marchand with 8 officers and 120 men. The French flag had been hoisted over the old Government buildings in which they were located. I sent a letter announcing my approach on the day before my arrival at Fashoda. On the following morning, September 19, a reply was brought to me from M. Marchand by a small rowing-boat carrying the French flag. It stated that he had arrived at Fashoda on July 10, having been instructed by his Government to occupy the Bahr-el-Ghazal up to the confluence of the Bahr-el-Jebel, and also the Shilluk country on the left bank of the White Nile as far as Fashoda. It went on to say that he had concluded a treaty with the Shilluk chiefs by which they placed the country under the protection of France, and that he had sent this treaty to his Government for ratification by way of Abyssinia, as well as by the Bahr-el-Ghazal. He described his fight with the dervishes on August 25, and stated that, in antic.i.p.ation of a second and more serious attack, he had sent his steamer south for reinforcements, but that our arrival had prevented a further attack.
"When we arrived at Fashoda, M. Marchand and M. Germain came on board our steamer, and I at once informed them that the presence of a French party at Fashoda and in the Nile valley must be considered as a direct infringement of the rights of Egypt and of the British Government, and I protested in the strongest terms against the occupation of Fashoda by M. Marchand and his party, and the hoisting of the French flag in the dominions of his Highness the Khedive. M. Marchand stated, in reply, that he had received precise orders for the occupation of the country and the hoisting of the French flag over the Government buildings at Fashoda, and added that, without the orders of his Government, which, however, he expected would not be delayed, it was impossible for him to retire from the place. I then inquired of him whether, in view of the fact that I was accompanied by a superior force, he was prepared to resist the hoisting of the Egyptian flag at Fashoda. He hesitated, and replied that he could not resist. The Egyptian flag was then hoisted, about 500 yards south of the French flag, on a ruined bastion of the old Egyptian fortifications, commanding the only road which leads into the interior from the French position. The latter is entirely surrounded to the north by impa.s.sable marshes.
"Before leaving for the south I handed to M. Marchand a formal written protest on the part of the Governments of Great Britain and Egypt against any occupation of any part of the Nile valley by France, as being an infringement of the rights of those Governments. I added that I could not recognise the occupation by France of any part of the Nile valley.
"I left at Fashoda a garrison of one Soudanese battalion, four guns, and a gunboat under Major Jackson, whom I appointed Commandant of the Fashoda district, and I proceeded to Sobat, where the flag was hoisted and a post established on September 20.
We did not see or hear anything of the Abyssinians on the Sobat, but were informed that their nearest post was about 350 miles up that river. The Bahr-el-Jebel being entirely blocked by floating weed, I gave orders for a gunboat to patrol up the Bahr-el-Ghazal in the direction of Meshra-er-Rek. As we pa.s.sed Fashoda on the return journey north, I sent M. Marchand a letter stating that all transport of war material on the Nile was absolutely prohibited, as the country was under military law. The chief of the Shilluk tribe, accompanied by a large number of followers, has come into Major Jackson"s camp. He entirely denies having made any treaty with the French, and the entire tribe express the greatest delight at returning to allegiance to us.
"M. Marchand is in want of ammunition and supplies, and any that may be sent to him must take months to arrive at their destination. He is cut off from the interior, and is quite inadequately provided with water transport. Moreover, he has no following in the country, and nothing could have saved his expedition from being annihilated by the dervishes if we had been a fortnight later in crushing the Khalifa."
The gist of this despatch was communicated to the French Government, accompanied by a notification that the Sirdar"s "language and proceedings" had the complete approval of Lord Salisbury. M. Delca.s.se was evidently at his wits" end to escape from an _impa.s.se_ which was chiefly of his own creation.
In an interview with Sir E. Monson on September 27 he wished to put off a final decision till he had received the despatches which M.
Marchand had forwarded in duplicate by way of the French Congo and Abyssinia respectively.
"To gain time, M. Delca.s.se," writes our Amba.s.sador, "wished that I should request your lordship to consent to a telegram being sent by the French agent at Cairo to Khartoum, to be forwarded from thence up the Nile to Fashoda. The telegram would contain instructions to M. Marchand to send at once one of the French officers serving on his mission to Cairo with a copy of his above-mentioned report, so that the French Government might learn its contents as soon as possible. They were, of course, ready to bear all the expense.
"Stress was laid by M. Delca.s.se upon the great desire entertained at Paris to prevent any serious difficulty from arising; at the same time, he felt convinced, especially in view of the conduct of the Sirdar at Fashoda, acting as he undoubtedly was under instructions, that Her Majesty"s Government were as anxious as the French Government to avoid a conflict.
"I told M. Delca.s.se in reply that I must conclude from the language which he had held that the French Government had decided that they would not recall M. Marchand before receiving his report, and I asked if I was right in this conclusion. I pointed out to his Excellency that M. Marchand himself is stated to be desirous of retiring from his position, which appeared to be a disagreeable one. Such being the case, I must urgently press him to tell me whether he refused at once to recall M. Marchand.
"After considering his reply for some few minutes, his Excellency said that he himself was ready to discuss the question in the most conciliatory spirit, but I must not ask him for the impossible.
"I pointed out that your lordship"s telegram of the 9th inst., which I had communicated to him at the time, had made him aware that Her Majesty"s Government considered that there could be no discussion upon such questions as the right of Egypt to Fashoda."
To this Lord Salisbury replied next day:
"Her Majesty"s Government cannot decline to a.s.sist in forwarding a message from the French Agent in Egypt to a French explorer who is on the Upper Nile in a difficult position, and your Excellency is authorised to inform M. Delca.s.se that Her Majesty"s Acting Agent at Cairo will be instructed to transmit to Omdurman immediately any such message, and at the same time to request Sir H. Kitchener to forward it thence to its destination by any opportunity which may be available.
"Her Majesty"s Government do not desire to be made acquainted with the purport of the message. But you must explain that they are unable to accept any responsibility for the results to the safety or health of the explorer which the delay in quitting his present situation may bring about."
The official papers closed with the following laconic despatch from Lord Salisbury to Sir E. Monson, bearing date 3rd October.
"I request your Excellency to inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in accordance with his wish, his message for M. Marchand has been transmitted to Khartoum, and will be forwarded thence to its destination. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, you should state to M. Delca.s.se that the fact of Her Majesty"s Government having complied with his Excellency"s request in regard to the transmission of the message does not imply the slightest modification of the views previously expressed by them. You should add that, whether in times of Egyptian or Dervish dominion, the region in which M. Marchand was found has never been without an owner, and that, in the view of Her Majesty"s Government, his expedition into it with an escort of 100 Senegalese troops has no political effect, nor can any political significance be attached to it."
In the appendix were given past speeches and despatches by M. Decrais, M. Hanotaux, Lord Kimberley, Sir E. Grey, etc.
The rest can be quickly told. Military and naval preparations for war in both countries were redoubled and the public tone was bellicose.
Consols were affected and war appeared almost inevitable. It was an occasion for union among all who rightly set patriotism above party. Lord Rosebery, Late Premier, with splendid grace and disinterestedness, in a speech, 13th October, voiced the sentiment of the ma.s.ses and cla.s.ses. His lordship said:--
"Behind the policy of the British Government in this matter there is the untiring and united strength of the nation itself.
(Cheers.) It is the policy of the last Government deliberately adopted and sustained by the present Government. (Cheers.) That is only a matter of form, but it is the policy of the nation itself, and no Government that attempted to recede from or palter with that policy would last a week. (Loud cheers.) I am perfectly certain that no idea or intention of any weakening on this point or this question has entered the head of Her Majesty"s present advisers."
Messages were transmitted up the Nile to Major Marchand at Fashoda. In response thereto he sent Captain Baratier down with despatches. That officer arrived with Slatin Pasha in Cairo on the 20th October. His despatches were wired to Paris, for which Baratier himself started next day. It happened that the Sirdar, who also left for England on that date, was a fellow-traveller with him. Another hitch occurred, the French Government stating that Marchand"s report made no allusion to the meeting with the Sirdar at Fashoda. That they would have to wait for before giving an answer. Marchand, it was alleged, had not had time to bring his report down to date, when Baratier left him.
They had not long to wait, for suddenly the announcement was sprung that Major Marchand, acting on his own volition, had left Fashoda and was coming down by Khedivial transport, to Cairo. He arrived in that city on the evening of 3rd November, and got a deservedly hearty reception from the English as well as the French community. Prominent officials, civil and military, were there to greet the brave and hardy explorer. His companion, Captain Baratier, who had been to Paris and had hastened back intending to return to Fashoda, met the Major next day in Cairo. But on the very day that Major Marchand reached Cairo, the French Government had issued an official note stating it had been decided to evacuate Fashoda, as the position had been reported untenable. So saying "No, no, they would ne"er consent," they consented.
At the Mansion House banquet given to the Sirdar, on 4th November, Lord Salisbury said:--
"I received from the French Amba.s.sador this afternoon the information that the French Government had come to the conclusion that the (Fashoda) occupation was of no sort of value to the French Republic, and they thought that under those circ.u.mstances, to persist in an occupation which only cost them money and did harm, merely because some of their advisers thought they would be an unwelcome neighbour, would not show the wisdom with which the French Republic has uniformly been guided. They have done what I believe every Government would have done in the same position--they have resolved that the occupation must cease. A formal intimation to that effect was made to me this afternoon, and it has been conveyed to the French authorities at Cairo. I do not wish to be misunderstood as saying that all causes of controversy are by this removed between the French Government and ourselves. It is probably not so, and it may be that we shall have many discussions in the future, but a cause of controversy of a singularly acute and somewhat dangerous character has been removed, and we cannot but congratulate ourselves upon it."
In the same connection it is of interest to learn what Major Marchand had to say. The full text of his speech made at a banquet given to him and Captain Baratier by the French Club at Cairo on the 7th October appeared in the Press. In the presence of the Acting French Diplomatic Agent and others, Major Marchand said:--
"Monsieur le Ministre de France, Monsieur le President, Messieurs--There are two reasons why you will not expect a speech from me. In the first place I am only a soldier and no orator; and then one cannot be talkative on a day of reflection, a day which brings to me personally a great sorrow, the official abandonment of Fashoda. Fashoda! it was only a point--it is true that it synthetised everything. But if we lose the point we abandon nothing of our thesis. To reflect is not to despair--on the contrary. The experiences of this world teach us that the sum of our sorrows is not greater than that of our joys. The more the black period may be prolonged the more quickly will approach the dawn of proud aspirations at length realised. And the granite Sphinx which near at hand dreams on the desert sands, the Sphinx which saw the pa.s.sage of Bonaparte, which saw Lesseps and his work, has not yet uttered its last word, has not murmured the supreme sentence. The more fiercely evil fortune may pursue us the more should we call to our aid the great hopes which swell the heart and fortify the will. The French colony in Cairo, moreover, has shown more than ten times over already that it knows no discouragement. I should like, my dear and valiant compatriots, to give you some small recompense. Listen! When, nearly three years ago, the Congo-Nile mission left France, it was not in order to make a more or less famous journey of exploration. No, its aim was far higher. You have already guessed it. Why, then, proclaim it here? We desired (here the speaker paused a moment) to carry across French Africa to the French in Egypt a hand-grip from the French of France. The road was long, sometimes hard; we have reached our destination, however, since I have the honour to greet you here to-day. Do you not see a symbol in this? Fortune, which detests broad and easy paths, is perhaps at this moment on her way, bringing you the succour so patiently looked for. We must never despair, and who can say that the Sphinx may not be about to smile? It is for this that I have come to tell you that if we are few to-day we shall be many to-morrow--who forget nothing, who abandon nothing. It is with this thought that I drink to your health, gentlemen, the health of the French colony in Egypt. To the Greater France!"
It is easy to feel great sympathy with so gallant and hardy a soldier, who, having successfully accomplished the perilous mission entrusted to him by his Government, found support denied him and his work fruitless. Major Marchand and Captain Baratier again availed themselves of the Egyptian military transport to return to their comrades. At half-past 8 a.m., 11th December, the French hauled down their flag at Fashoda, and left for the Sobat river. They were intending to make their way up that stream to the nearest Abyssinian post, and thereafter, striking through Menelik"s country, hoped to arrive on the East African coast at Djibutil. Their sick comrades they entrusted to the Egyptian military authorities to send home by the Nile through Lower Egypt. The invalided Frenchmen and Senegalese in question reached Cairo at the end of the year.
Perhaps it was only to be expected that the French press and politicians would display increased virulence against this country over the Fashoda settlement. But their persistence in that course, and the fact of their present extraordinary naval expenditure, can only mean getting ready for war against Great Britain. This may lead our people to consider whether it would not be cheapest and wisest to settle the quarrel off-hand. True, delay makes for peace, but a peace that is to be a struggle to overtop one another in armaments may be more costly in every sense than sharp and decisive warfare. The chief cause of the soreness in France against us is our presence in Egypt.
Yet the French have no such vital interest there as this country has.
To many of our colonies and dependencies the shortest way lies through Egypt. Again, the French form quite a minority in numbers and wealth among the foreign communities in Egypt. Since 1882, the year of occupation, Great Britain has been careful to avoid interference with the privileges and rights of all foreigners. In what community controlled by France through sixteen years would it have been allowed that an alien language should be maintained in use in public places.
No official step has been taken to diminish the use of French in street nomenclature, or public conveyances, or public departments in Egypt until last year. Arabic is the language of the people, and English is the language of commerce in the country. A sensible change in the direction indicated is at last evident, even in Cairo and Alexandria. Shops and warehouses are displaying Anglo-Saxon signs, and the natives are discarding French and are speaking English as the one foreign language necessary to acquire.
There has been talk among our neighbours of emulating the Sirdar"s enterprise and founding French colleges at Khartoum and Fashoda. But urged by less disinterested motives they may find it necessary instead to devote their funds to the cultivation of the Gallic tongue in Lower and Upper Egypt, rather than in the Soudan. In the year 1897, in Tantah, the third largest town in the Delta, there were 130 scholars learning French and but 40 studying English. In 1898 there were 98 at the English cla.s.ses and but a moiety at the French. The scholastic year 1899, according to the officials of the Public Instruction Department, will see a farther and even more serious decline in the study of the French language. The French officials themselves are painfully aware that the Gallic speech, for colloquial intercourse between educated natives and Europeans, is doomed if matters continue as at present. In a.s.souan, where during 1897 much the same state of things prevailed as at Tantah; in 1898 there were 118 scholars learning English and but three at the French cla.s.ses.
Until quite recently, it was wont to be the case in Lower Egypt that there were always two pupils learning French to one devoting attention to acquiring English. In Upper Egypt of late years the difference had not been so marked, the proportion of French and English students being about equal. These figures refer to primary cla.s.ses in Upper Egypt, and to secondary, as well as primary, cla.s.ses in Cairo and Alexandria. As a matter of fact, the results of the examinations did not follow in quite the same proportion in the Delta. About three pupils have pa.s.sed in French to two in English. Shortly after the battle of Omdurman, applications had to be made for entrance into the school cla.s.ses for English and French tuition. In a great number of schools, in both Upper and Lower Egypt, especially in the stronghold of the French tongue--the Delta--not a single application was made by candidates for entrance to the second primaries, in which French teaching begins. That means to say that there will a dearth and practically a cessation of French teaching in 1899 in the primary schools, and subsequently, or in 1900, the year of the Exposition Universelle at Paris, a total discontinuance of it in the secondary schools. Taking the secondary schools examinations throughout the whole of Lower Egypt by themselves, I learn that in 1898, although there were a larger proportion of candidates for French certificates of proficiency, yet the numbers that actually pa.s.sed in each language were about the same. The Examining Commissioners are Egyptian, English, and French.
It is in Egypt as in certain other countries. The great ambition of every lad is to get into the Government service, and failing that to become a lawyer. Law schools are therefore well attended. Heretofore budding lawyers have been taught in French cla.s.ses only. An English-speaking law section was started in 1898. The natives are quick to appreciate any change which is to their advantage. Pupils in the secondary schools have now opened to them careers which have heretofore been closed. There is in truth a silent, but certain to be effective, educational and social revolution begun in Egypt. No more will every whim and caprice of those who seek to obstruct the advance of the Egyptians be tolerated. In 1899 for the first time examining educational centres will be established at a.s.souan and Suakin. All those south of a.s.siut will be for English students only, for French will be quite dropped. Not only will there be a college at Khartoum but one at Ka.s.sala, where English as well as Arabic will be taught. In a new and thorough manner has the regeneration of Egypt and the Soudan been undertaken. The dream of a red English through-traffic line from Cairo to Cape Town will have a speedy realisation. Possibly within eighteen months the railway will be carried to the Sobat. Certainly before 1899 is ended there will be through communication with Khartoum. Mr Cecil Rhodes is busy with his South African lines, which by that time should be up to the Zambesi, and within three years after there will possibly be open rail and water communication from the Mediterranean to Cape Town. But before then the telegraph wire will bind North and South Africa together, and to the United Kingdom.
POSTSCRIPT.
This volume was written and in the printer"s hands when an article by a Mr E. N. Bennett appeared in the columns of _The Contemporary Review_, ent.i.tled "After Omdurman." That gentleman made a series of grave charges reflecting upon the Anglo-Egyptian arms, not only during the Khartoum Expedition, but also on their conduct in Egypt and the Soudan since 1882. In the _Daily Telegraph_ and elsewhere I have deservedly stigmatised Mr Bennett"s allegations as untrue, stupid, and wantonly mischievous.
In the pages of _The Khartoum Campaign, 1898_, can be read the detailed version of events which happened in the field "before" as well as "after" Omdurman. I venture to think that abundant refutation will be found in the Work of most of Mr Bennett"s scandalous a.s.sertions. Although it may seem to lend further temporary importance to what that gentleman has written, as his accusations were made public under the cover of a respectable magazine, perhaps a few words more may not be out of place.
Mr Bennett"s article was seemingly framed on the specious pretext of, under a discussion of the principles of international law, questions of belligerency, Geneva Convention rules, and so forth, to base thereon a claim for the treatment of dervishes as combatants ent.i.tled to all the amenities of civilised warfare. Several pages of his composition are given up to treating upon that matter. For instance, he says--"Moreover, it is worth remembering that the dervishes were not "savages" in the sense in which the word is applied to the followers of a Lobengula or a Samory. On the contrary, they satisfied all the requirements for recognition as an armed force." Now, that is an aspersion upon Lobengula and Samory in particular. For unredeemed devilishness, the dervishes have had no equals. The fact is, that the Mahdists made it a constant practice to ruthlessly slaughter all prisoners in battle, wounded or unwounded; to enslave, torture, or murder their enemies, active or pa.s.sive; to loot and to burn; to slay children and debauch women. To set up a pretext that such monsters are ent.i.tled to the grace and consideration of the most humane laws, is to beggar commonsense and yap intolerable humbug. Yet British self-respect was such, Mr Bennett to the contrary notwithstanding, that the dervishes were treated as men, and not as wild beasts.
Started upon his false pursuit, Mr Bennett proceeds from error to error, abounding in reckless misstatements, atrocious imputations, and scattering charges void of truth. As briefly as possible, I will deal with his accusations. One of his first deliverances is as follows:--"It is, of course, an open secret that in all our Soudan battles the enemy"s wounded have been killed. The practice has, ever since the days of Tel-el-Kebir, become traditional in Soudanese warfare. After the battle of Atbara, it was announced that 3000 dervishes had been killed. There was practically no mention of the wounded.... How, then, was it that no wounded were accounted for at the Atbara?" Again he writes:--"But I cannot help thinking that if the killing of the wounded had been sternly repressed at Tel-el-Kebir and during the earlier Soudan campaigns, our dervish enemies would have learned to expect civilised treatment," etc. Gaining courage, probably from his own audacity, Mr Bennett had the hardihood to virtually declare that the cruelties permitted by British officers made the dervishes what they were.