Poor Emperor! Innocent simpleton to place such trust in a written bond. Mr.
Root had already telegraphed to the American Minister at Seoul to withdraw from Korea and to return to the United States.
No one supposes that the Washington authorities were deceived by the statement of the j.a.panese authorities or that they believed for one moment that the treaty was secured in any other way than by force. To imagine so would be an insult to their intelligence. It must be remembered that j.a.pan was at this time at the very height of her prestige. President Roosevelt was convinced, mainly through the influence of his old friend, Mr. George Kennan, that the Koreans were unfit for self-government. He was anxious to please j.a.pan, and therefore he deliberately refused to interfere. His own explanation, given some years afterwards, was:
"To be sure, by treaty it was solemnly covenanted that Korea should remain independent. But Korea itself was helpless to enforce the treaty, and it was out of the question to suppose that any other nation, with no interest of its own at stake, would do for the Koreans what they were utterly unable to do for themselves."
There we have the essence of international political morality.
The letter of the Emperor of Korea to the President of the United States makes interesting reading:
"Ever since 1883 the United States and Korea have been in friendly treaty relations. Korea has received many proofs of the good will and the sympathy of the American Government and people.
The American Representatives have always shown themselves to be in sympathy with the welfare and progress of Korea. Many teachers have been sent from America who have done much for the uplift of our people.
"But we have not made the progress that we ought. This is due partly to the political machinations of foreign powers and partly to our mistakes. At the beginning of the j.a.pan-Russia war the j.a.panese Government asked us to enter into an alliance with them, granting them the use of our territory, harbours, and other resources, to facilitate their military and naval operations.
j.a.pan, on her part, guaranteed to preserve the independence of Korea and the welfare and dignity of the royal house. We complied with j.a.pan"s request, loyally lived up to our obligations, and did everything that we had stipulated. By so doing we put ourselves in such a position that if Russia had won, she could have seized Korea and annexed her to Russian territory on the ground that we were active allies of j.a.pan.
"It is now apparent that j.a.pan proposes to abrogate their part of this treaty and declare a protectorate over our country in direct contravention of her sworn promise in the agreement of 1904.
There are several reasons why this should not be done.
"In the first place, j.a.pan will stultify herself by such a direct breach of faith. It will injure her prestige as a power that proposes to work according to enlightened laws.
"In the second place, the actions of j.a.pan in Korea during the past two years give no promise that our people will be handled in an enlightened manner. No adequate means have been provided whereby redress could be secured for wrongs perpetrated upon our people. The finances of the country have been gravely mishandled by j.a.pan. Nothing has been done towards advancing the cause of education or justice. Every move on j.a.pan"s part has been manifestly selfish.
"The destruction of Korea"s independence will work her a great injury, because it will intensify the contempt with which the j.a.panese people treat the Koreans and will make their acts all the more oppressive.
"We acknowledge that many reforms are needed in Korea. We are glad to have the help of j.a.panese advisers, and we are prepared loyally to carry out their suggestions. We recognize the mistakes of the past. It is not for ourselves we plead, but for the Korean people.
"At the beginning of the war our people gladly welcomed the j.a.panese, because this seemed to herald needed reforms and a general bettering of conditions, but soon it was seen that no genuine reforms were intended and the people had been deceived.
"One of the gravest evils that will follow a protectorate by j.a.pan is that the Korean people will lose all incentive to improvement. No hope will remain that they can ever regain their independence. They need the spur of national feeling to make them determine upon progress and to make them persevere in it. But the extinction of nationality will bring despair, and instead of working loyally and gladly in conjunction with j.a.pan, the old-time hatred will be intensified and suspicion and animosity will result.
"It has been said that sentiment should have no place in such affairs, but we believe, sir, that sentiment is the moving force in all human affairs, and that kindness, sympathy, and generosity are still working between nations as between individuals. We beg of you to bring to bear upon this question the same breadth of mind and the same calmness of judgment that have characterized your course hitherto, and, having weighed the matter, to render us what aid you can consistently in this our time of national danger."
[Private Seal of the Emperor of Korea.]
VI
THE RULE OF PRINCE ITO
Marquis Ito was made the first j.a.panese Resident-General in Korea. There could have been no better choice, and no choice more pleasing to the Korean people. He was regarded by the responsible men of the nation with a friendliness such as few other j.a.panese inspired. Here was a man greater than his policies. Every one who came in contact with him felt that, whatever the nature of the measures he was driven to adopt in the supposed interests of his Emperor, he yet sincerely meant well by the Korean people.
The faults of his administration were the necessary accompaniments of j.a.panese military expansion; his virtues were his own. It was a n.o.ble act for him to take on himself the most burdensome and exacting post that j.a.panese diplomacy had to offer, at an age when he might well have looked for the ease and dignity of the close of an honour-sated career.
The Marquis brought with him several capable j.a.panese officials of high rank, and began his new rule by issuing regulations fixing the position and duties of his staff. Under these, the Resident-General became in effect supreme Administrator of Korea, with power to do what he pleased. He had authority to repeal any order or measure that he considered injurious to public interests, and he could punish to the extent of not more than a year"s imprisonment or not more than a 200 yen fine. This limitation of his punitive power was purely nominal, for the country was under martial law and the courts-martial had power to inflict death. Residents and Vice-Residents, of j.a.panese nationality, were placed over the country, acting practically as governors. The police were placed under j.a.panese inspectors where they were not themselves j.a.panese. The various departments of affairs, agricultural, commercial, and industrial, were given j.a.panese directors and advisers, and the power of appointing all officials, save those of the highest rank, was finally in the hands of the Resident-General. This limitation, again, was soon put on one side. Thus, the Resident-General became dictator of Korea--a dictator, however, who still conducted certain branches of local affairs there through native officials and who had to reckon with the intrigues of a Court party which he could not as yet sweep on one side.
To j.a.pan, Korea was chiefly of importance as a strategic position for military operations on the continent of Asia and as a field for emigration.
The first steps under the new administration were in the direction of perfecting communications throughout the country, so as to enable the troops to be moved easily and rapidly from point to point. A railway had already been built from Fusan to Seoul, and another was in course of completion from Seoul to Wi-ju, thus giving a trunk line that would carry large numbers of j.a.panese soldiers from j.a.pan itself to the borders of Manchuria in about thirty-six hours. A loan of 10,000,000 yen was raised on the guarantee of the Korean Customs, and a million and a half of this was spent on four main military roads, connecting some of the chief districts with the princ.i.p.al harbours and railway centres. Part of the cost of these was paid by the loan and part by special local taxation. It may be pointed out that these roads were military rather than industrial undertakings. The usual methods of travel and for conveying goods in the interior of Korea was by horseback and with pack-ponies. For these, the old narrow tracks served, generally speaking, very well. The new roads were finely graded, and were built in such a manner that rails could be quickly laid down on them and artillery and ammunition wagons rapidly conveyed from point to point. Another railway was built from Seoul to Gensan, on the east coast.
The old Korean "Burglar Capture Office," the native equivalent to the Bow Street Runners, or the Mulberry Street detectives, was abolished, as were the local police, and police administration was more and more put in the hands of special constables brought over from j.a.pan. The j.a.panese military gendarmerie were gradually sent back and their places taken by civilian constables. This change was wholly for the good. The gendarmerie had earned a very bad reputation in country parts for harshness and arbitrary conduct.
The civilian police proved themselves far better men, more conciliatory, and more just.
One real improvement inst.i.tuted by the Residency-General was the closer control of j.a.panese immigrants. Numbers of the worst offenders were laid by the heels and sent back home. The Residency officials were increased in numbers, and in some parts at least it became easier for a Korean to obtain a hearing when he had a complaint against a j.a.panese. The Marquis Ito spoke constantly in favour of a policy of conciliation and friendship, and after a time he succeeded in winning over the cooperation of some of the foreigners.
It became more and more clear, however, that the aim of the j.a.panese was nothing else than the entire absorption of the country and the destruction of every trace of Korean nationality. One of the most influential j.a.panese in Korea put this quite frankly to me in 1906. "You must understand that I am not expressing official views," he told me. "But if you ask me as an individual what is to be the outcome of our policy, I only see one end.
This will take several generations, but it must come. The Korean people will be absorbed by the j.a.panese. They will talk our language, live our life, and be an integral part of us. There are only two ways of colonial administration. One is to rule over the people as aliens. This you British have done in India, and therefore your Empire cannot endure. India must pa.s.s out of your rule. The second way is to absorb the people. This is what we will do. We will teach them our language, establish our inst.i.tutions, and make them one with us."
The policy of the new administration towards foreigners was one of gradual, but no less sure, exclusion. Everything that could be done was done to rob the white man of what prestige was yet left to him. Careful and systematic efforts were made, in particular, by the j.a.panese newspapers and some of the officials to make the native Christian converts turn from their American teachers, and throw in their lot with the j.a.panese. The native press, under j.a.panese editorship, systematically preached anti-white doctrines. Any one who mixed freely with the Korean people heard from them, time after time, of the principles the j.a.panese would fain have them learn.
I was told of this by ex-Cabinet Ministers, by young students, and even by native servants. One of my own Korean "boys" put the matter in a nutsh.e.l.l to me one day. He raised the question of the future of j.a.pan in Asia, and he summarized the new j.a.panese doctrines very succinctly. "Master," he said to me, "j.a.panese man wanchee all Asia be one, with j.a.panese man topside.
All j.a.panese man wanchee this; some Korean man wanchee, most no wanchee; all Chinaman no wanchee."
It may be thought that the j.a.panese would at least have learnt from their experience in 1895 not to attempt to interfere with the dress or personal habits of the people. Nothing among all their blunders during the earlier period was more disastrous to them than the regulations compelling the men to cut off their topknots. These did j.a.pan greater harm among the common people than even the murder of the Queen. Yet no sooner had j.a.pan established herself again than once more sumptuary regulations were issued.
The first was an order against wearing white dress in wintertime. People were to attire themselves in nothing but dark-coloured garments, and those who refused to obey were coerced in many ways. The j.a.panese did not at once insist on a general system of hair-cutting, but they brought the greatest pressure to bear on all in any way under their authority. Court officials, public servants, magistrates, and the like, were commanded to cut their hair. Officials were evidently instructed to make every one who came under their influence have his topknot off. The Il Chin Hoi, the pro-j.a.panese society, followed in the same line. European dress was forced on those connected with the Court. The national costume, like the national language, was, if possible, to die. Ladies of the Court were ordered to dress themselves in foreign style. The poor ladies in consequence found it impossible to show themselves in any public place, for they were greeted with roars of derision.
The lowered status of the white in Korea could be clearly seen by the att.i.tude of many of the j.a.panese towards him. I heard stories from friends of my own, residents in the country, quiet and inoffensive people that made my blood boil. It was difficult, for instance, to restrain one"s indignation when a missionary lady told you of how she was walking along the street when a j.a.panese soldier hustled up against her and deliberately struck her in the breast. The Roman Catholic bishop was openly insulted and struck by j.a.panese soldiers in his own cathedral, and nothing was done. The story of Mr. and Mrs. Weigall typifies others. Mr. Weigall is an Australian mining engineer, and was travelling up north with his wife and a.s.sistant, Mr. Taylor, and some Korean servants, in December, 1905. He had full authorizations and pa.s.sports, and was going about his business in a perfectly proper manner. His party was stopped at one point by some j.a.panese soldiers, and treated in a fashion which it is impossible fully to describe in print. They were insulted, jabbed at with bayonets, and put under arrest. One soldier held his gun close to Mrs. Weigall and struck her full in the chest with his closed fist when she moved. The man called them by the most insulting names possible, keeping the choicest phrases for the lady. Their servants were kicked. Finally they were allowed to go away after a long delay and long exposure to bitter weather, repeated insults being hurled after them. The British authorities took up this case. There was abundant evidence, and there could be no dispute about the facts. All the satisfaction, however, that the Weigalls could obtain was a nominal apology.
Then there was the case of the Rev. Mr. McRae, a Canadian missionary living in northeastern Korea. Mr. McRae had obtained some land for a mission station, and the j.a.panese military authorities there wanted it. They drove stakes into part of the property, and he thereupon represented the case to the j.a.panese officials, and after at least twice asking them to remove their stakes, he pulled them up himself. The j.a.panese waited until a fellow-missionary, who lived with Mr. McRae, had gone away on a visit, and then six soldiers entered his compound and attacked him. He defended himself so well that he finally drove them off, although he received some bad injuries, especially from the blows from one of the men"s rifles.
Complaint was made to the chief authorities, and, in this case, the j.a.panese promised to punish the officer concerned. But there were dozens of instances affecting Europeans of all ranks, from consular officials to chance visitors. In most cases the complaints were met by a simple denial on the part of the j.a.panese. Even where the offence was admitted and punishment was promised, the Europeans would a.s.sure you that the men, whom it had been promised to imprison, came and paraded themselves outside their houses immediately afterwards in triumph. In Korea, as in Formosa, the policy was and is to humiliate the white man by any means and in any way.
Two regulations of the j.a.panese, apparently framed in the interests of the Koreans, proved to be a dangerous blow at their rights. New land laws were drawn up, by which fresh t.i.tle-deeds were given for the old and complicated deeds of former times. As the Koreans, however, pointed out, large numbers of people held their land in such a way that it was impossible for them to prove their right by written deeds. Until the end of 1905 large numbers of Koreans went abroad to Honolulu and elsewhere as labourers. The Residency-General then framed new emigration laws, nominally to protect the natives, which have had the result of making the old systematic emigration impossible. Families who would fain have escaped the j.a.panese rule and establish themselves in other lands had every possible hindrance put in their way.
Act after act revealed that the j.a.panese considered Korea and all in it belonged to them. Did they want a thing? Then let them take it, and woe be to the man who dared to hinder them! This att.i.tude was ill.u.s.trated in an interesting fashion by a bit of vandalism on the part of Viscount Tanaka, Special Envoy from the Mikado to the Korean Emperor. When the Viscount was in Seoul, late in 1906, he was approached by a j.a.panese curio-dealer, who pointed out to him that there was a very famous old PaG.o.da in the district of P"ung-duk, a short distance from Song-do. This PaG.o.da was presented to Korea by the Chinese Imperial Court a thousand years ago, and the people believed that the stones of which it was constructed possessed great curative qualities. They named it the "Medicine King PaG.o.da" (Yakw.a.n.g Top), and its fame was known throughout the country. It was a national memorial as much as the Monument near London Bridge is a national memorial for Englishmen or the Statue of Liberty for Americans. Viscount Tanaka is a great curio-collector, and when he heard of this PaG.o.da, he longed for it.
He mentioned his desire to the Korean Minister for the Imperial Household, and the Minister told him to take it if he wanted it. A few days afterwards, Viscount Tanaka, when bidding the Emperor farewell, thanked him for the gift. The Korean Emperor looked blank, and said that he did not know what the Viscount was talking about. He had heard nothing of it.
However, before long, a party of eighty j.a.panese, including a number of gendarmes, well armed and ready for resistance, swooped down on Song-do.
They took the PaG.o.da to pieces and placed the stones on carts. The people of the district gathered round them, threatened them, and tried to attack them. But the j.a.panese were too strong. The PaG.o.da was conveyed in due course to Tokyo.
Such an outrage could not go unnoticed. The story of the loss spread over the country and reached the foreign press. Defenders of the j.a.panese at first declared that it was an obvious and incredible lie. The _j.a.pan Mail_ in particular opened the vials of its wrath and poured them upon the head of the editor of the _Korea Daily News_--the English daily publication in Seoul--who had dared to tell the tale. His story was "wholly incredible."
"It is impossible to imagine any educated man of ordinary intelligence foolish enough to believe such a palpable lie, unless he be totally blinded by prejudice." The _Mail_ discovered here again another reason for supporting its plea for the suppression of "a wholly unscrupulous and malevolent mischief-maker like the _Korea Daily News."_ "The j.a.panese should think seriously whether this kind of thing is to be tamely suffered.
In allowing such charges at the door of the Mikado"s Special Envoy who is also Minister of the Imperial Household, the _Korea Daily News_ deliberately insults the Mikado himself. There is indeed the reflection that this extravagance will not be without compensation, since it will demonstrate conclusively, if any demonstration were needed, how completely unworthy of credence have been the slanders. .h.i.therto ventilated by the Seoul journal to bring the j.a.panese into odium."
There were instant demands for denials, for explanations, and for proceedings against the wicked libeller. Then it turned out that the story was true, and, in the end, the j.a.panese officials had to admit its truth.
It was said, as an excuse, that the Resident-General had not given his consent to the theft, and that Viscount Tanaka did not intend to keep the PaG.o.da himself, but to present it to the Mikado. The organ of the Residency-General in Seoul, the _Seoul Press_, made the best excuse it could. "Viscount Tanaka," it said, "is a conscientious official, liked and respected by those who know him, whether foreign or j.a.panese, but he is an ardent virtuoso and collector, and it appears that in this instance his collector"s eagerness got the better of his sober judgment and discretion."
But excuses, apologies, and regrets notwithstanding, the PaG.o.da was not returned.
It may be asked why the white people living in Korea did not make the full facts about Korea known at an earlier date. Some did attempt it, but the strong feeling that existed abroad in favour of the j.a.panese people--a feeling due to their magnificent conduct during the war--caused complaints to go unheeded. Many missionaries, while indignant at the injury done to their native neighbours, counselled patience, believing that the abuses were temporary and would soon come to an end.
At the beginning of the war every foreigner--except a small group of pro-Russians, sympathized with j.a.pan. We had all been alienated by the follies and mistakes of the Russian Far Eastern policy. We saw j.a.pan at her best, and we all believed that her people would act well by this weaker race. Our favourable impressions were strengthened by the first doings of the j.a.panese soldiers, and when scandals were whispered, and oppression began to appear, we all looked upon them as momentary disturbances due to a condition of war. We were unwilling to believe anything but the best, and it took some time to destroy our favourable prepossessions. I speak here not only for myself, but for many another white man in Korea at the time.
I might support this by many quotations. I take, for instance, Professor Hulbert, the editor of the _Korea Review_, to-day one of the most persistent and active critics of j.a.panese policy. At the opening of the war Professor Hulbert used all his influence in favour of j.a.pan.
"What Korea wants," he wrote, "is education, and until steps are taken in that line there is no use in hoping for a genuinely independent Korea. Now, we believe that a large majority of the best-informed Koreans realize that j.a.pan and j.a.panese influence stand for education and enlightenment, and that while the paramount influence of any one outside Power is in some sense a humiliation, the paramount influence of j.a.pan will give far less genuine cause for humiliation than has the paramount influence of Russia. Russia secured her predominance by pandering to the worst elements in Korean officialdom. j.a.pan holds it by strength of arm, but she holds it in such a way that it gives promise of something better. The word reform never pa.s.sed the Russians"
lips. It is the insistent cry of j.a.pan. The welfare of the Korean people never showed its head above the Russian horizon, but it fills the whole vision of j.a.pan; not from altruistic motives mainly but because the prosperity of Korea and that of j.a.pan rise and fall with the same tide."[1]
[Footnote 1: _Korea Review_, February, 1904.]