was employed in the Treaty of Paris as a euphemism, intended to make less unpalatable to Russia a restriction upon her sovereign rights which she took the earliest opportunity of repudiating.
I am, Sir, your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND.
Brighton, October 6 (1898).
THE SUEZ Ca.n.a.l
Sir,--Will you allow me to reply in the fewest possible words to the questions very courteously addressed to me by Mr. Gibson Bowles in his letter which appeared in _The Times_ of yesterday?
1. It is certainly my opinion, for what it is worth, that the full operation of the Convention of 1888 is suspended by the reserves first made on behalf of this country during the sittings of the Conference of 1885. These reserves were texually repeated by Lord Salisbury in his despatch of October 21, 1887, enclosing the draft convention which, three days later, was signed at Paris by the representatives of France and Great Britain, the two Powers which, with the a.s.sent of the rest, had been carrying on the resumed negotiations with reference to the ca.n.a.l. Lord Salisbury"s language was also carefully brought to the notice of each of the other Powers concerned; in the course of the somewhat protracted discussions which preceded the final signature of the same convention at Constantinople on October 29, 1888.
2. All the signatories of the convention having thus become parties to it after express notice of "the conditions under which her Majesty"s Government have expressed their willingness to agree to it," must, it can hardly be doubted, share the view that the convention is operative only _sub modo_.
3. Supposing the convention to have become operative, and supposing the territorial Power to be neutral in a war between States which we may call A and B, the convention would certainly ent.i.tle A to claim unmolested pa.s.sage for its ships of war on their way to attack the forces of B in the Eastern seas.
4. The language of the convention, being as it, is the expression of a compromise involving much re-drafting, is by no means always as clear as it might be. But when Mr. Gibson Bowles is again within reach of Blue-books he will probably agree with me that the treaty need not, as he suggests, be "read as obliging the territorial Power, even when itself a belligerent, to allow its enemy to use the ca.n.a.l freely for the pa.s.sage of that enemy"s men-of-war." The wide language of Art. 1 (which is substantially in accordance with Mr. Gibson Bowles"s reminiscence of it) must be read in connection with Art. 10, and without forgetting that, in discussing the effect of an attack upon the ca.n.a.l by one of the parties to the convention, Lord Salisbury wrote in 1887, "on the whole it appears to be the sounder view that, in such a case, the treaty, being broken by one of its signatories, would lose its force in all respects."
Your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND.
Oxford, October 9 (1898).
THE CLOSING OF THE DARDANELLES
Sir,--Now that the pressure upon your s.p.a.ce due to the clash of opposing views of domestic politics is likely to be for the moment relaxed, you may, perhaps, not think it inopportune that attention should be recalled to a question of permanent international interest raised by the recent action of the Turkish Government in closing the Dardanelles to even commercial traffic.
I cordially agree, as would, I suppose, most people, with your leading article of some weeks since in deprecating any crude application to the case of the Dardanelles and Bosporus of _dicta_ with reference to freedom of pa.s.sage through straits connecting two open seas. It would, indeed, be straining what may be taken to be a general principle of international law to say that Turkey is by it prohibited from protecting her threatened capital by temporarily closing the Straits.
A good deal of vague reference has, however, been made in the discussions which have taken place upon the subject to "Treaties" under which it seems to be thought that trading ships enjoy, in all circ.u.mstances, rights of free navigation through the Straits in question which they would not have possessed otherwise. I should like, therefore, with your permission, to state what seem to be the relevant Treaty provisions upon the subject, whether between the Powers const.i.tuting the European Concert collectively, or between Russia and Turkey as individual Powers.
As to what may be described as the "European" Treaties, it is necessary, once for all, to put aside as irrelevant Art. 10 of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and its annexed Convention; Art. 2 of the Treaty of London of 1871; and the confirmatory Art. 63 of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878.
These articles have exclusive reference to the "ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire," under which, so long as the Porte is at peace, no foreign ships of war are to be admitted into the Straits. There are, however, two articles, still in force, of these "European" Treaties which may seem to bear upon the present inquiry. By Art. 12 of the Treaty of Paris:--
"Free from any impediment, the commerce in the ports and waters of the Black Sea shall be subject only to regulations of health, Customs, and police, framed in a spirit favourable to the development of commercial transactions."
And by Art. 3 of the Treaty of London:--
"The Black Sea remains open, as heretofore, to the mercantile marine of all nations."
It is submitted that these provisions relate solely to commerce carried on by vessels already within the Black Sea, and contain no covenant for an unrestricted right of access to that sea.
As between Russia and Turkey individually, Treaties which are still in force purport, no doubt, to give to the former a stronger claim to free pa.s.sage through the Straits for her mercantile marine than that which can be supposed to be enjoyed by other Powers. By Art. 7, for instance, of the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829, the Porte recognises and declares the pa.s.sage of the "Ca.n.a.l de Constantinople," and of the Strait of the Dardanelles, to be entirely free and open to Russian merchant vessels; and goes on to extend the same privilege to the merchant vessels of all Powers at peace with Turkey. Art. 24 of the Treaty of San Stefano is still more explicit, providing that "the Bosporus and Dardanelles shall remain open in time of war as in time of peace to the merchant vessels of neutral States arriving from or bound to Russian ports." The rest of the article contains a promise by the Porte never henceforth to establish a "fict.i.tious blockade, at variance with the spirit of the Declaration of Paris"; meaning thereby such a blockade of ports on the Black Sea as had been enforced by Turkish ships of war stationed at the entrance to the Bosporus.
It may well be doubted whether these articles, containing concessions extorted from Turkey at the end of wars in which she had been defeated, ought not, like so many other provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano, to have been abrogated by the Treaty of Berlin. They are of such a character that, in the struggle for existence, Turkey can hardly be blamed for disregarding them. As was said long ago, "Ius commerciorum aequum est, at hoc acquius, tuendae salutis." The imperious necessities of self-preservation were recognised both by Lord Morley and by Lord Lansdowne in the debate which took place on May 3, although Lord Lansdowne intimated that
"the real question, which will have to be considered sooner or later, is the extent to which a belligerent Power, controlling narrow waters which form a great trade avenue for the commerce of the world, is justified in entirely closing such an avenue in order to facilitate the hostile operations in which the Power finds itself involved."
It is, I think, clear that the solution of a question at once so novel and so delicate must be undertaken, not by any one Power, but by the Concert of Europe, or of the civilised world, which must devise some guarantee for the safety of any littoral Power which would be called upon in the general interest to restrict its measures of self-defence.
In the meantime, we may surely say that the case is provided for neither by established international law nor by "European" Treaties; and, further, that the Treaties between Russia and Turkey, which do provide for it, are not such as it is desirable to perpetuate.
I am, Sir, your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND.
Oxford, May 22 (1912).
THE CLOSING OF THE DARDANELLES
Sir,--I am reminded by Mr. Lucien Wolf"s courteous letter that I ought probably to have mentioned, in alluding to the Treaty of San Stefano, that it is doubtful whether Art. 24 of that Treaty is in force. It was certainly left untouched by the Treaty of Berlin, but the language of the relevant article (3) of the definitive Treaty of Peace of 1879 is somewhat obscure, nor is much light to be gained upon the point from the protocol of the 14th _seance_ of the Congress of Berlin, at which Art.
24 came up for discussion.
The earlier Treaties, however, which were revived beyond question by Art. 10 of the Treaty of 1879, grant to Russian merchant vessels full rights of pa.s.sage between the Black Sea and the aegean, exercisable, for all that appears, in time of war as well as of peace, although these Treaties contain no express words to that effect. Such rights, I would again urge, if enjoyed by one Power, should be enjoyed by all; upon terms to be settled, not by any pair of Powers but by the Powers collectively.
I am, Sir, your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND.
Oxford, June 5 (1912).
SECTION 3
_In a Special Danger Zone?_
THE GERMAN THREAT
Sir,--It may perhaps be desirable, for the benefit of the general reader, to distinguish clearly between the two topics dealt with in the recent announcement of German naval policy.
1. We find in it what may, at first sight, suggest the establishment of a gigantic "paper blockade," such as was proclaimed in the Berlin Decree of 1806, stating that "Les iles Britanniques sont declarees en etat de blocus." But in the new decree the term "blockade" does not occur, nor is there any indication of an intention to comply with the prescriptions of the Declaration of Paris of 1856 as to the mode in which such an operation must be conducted. What we really find in the announcement is the specification of certain large s.p.a.ces of water, including the whole of the British Channel, within which German ships will endeavour to perpetrate the atrocities about to be mentioned.
2. These promised, and already perpetrated, atrocities consist in the destruction of merchant shipping without any of those decent preliminary steps, for the protection of human life and neutral property, which are insisted on by long established rules of international law. Under these rules, the exercise of violence against a merchant vessel is permissible, in the first instance, only in case of her attempting by resistance or flight to frustrate the right of visit which belongs to every belligerent cruiser. Should she obey the cruiser"s summons to stop, and allow its officers to come on board, they will satisfy themselves, by examination of her papers, and, if necessary, by further search, of the nationality of ship and cargo, of the destination of each, and of the character of the latter. They will then decide whether or no they should make prize of the ship, and in some cases may feel justified in sending a prize to the bottom, instead of taking her into port. Before doing so it is their bounden duty to preserve the ship papers, and, what is far more important, to provide for the safety of all on board.
This procedure seems to have been followed, more or less, by the submarines which sank the _Durward_ in the North Sea, and several small vessels near the Mersey, but is obviously possible to such craft only under very exceptional circ.u.mstances. It was scandalously not followed in the cases of the _Tokomaru_, the _Ikaria_, and the hospital ship (!) _Asturias_, against which a submarine fired torpedoes, off Havre, without warning or inquiry, and, of course, regardless of the fate of those on board. The threat that similar methods of attack will be systematically employed, on a large scale, on and after the 18th inst., naturally excites as much indignation among neutrals as among the Allies of the Entente.
I am, Sir, your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND.
Oxford, February 12 (1915).
SECTION 4
_Aerial Warfare_
It may be desirable to supplement what is said in the following letters by mentioning that the Declaration of 1899 (to remain in force for five years) was largely ratified, though not by Great Britain; that of 1907 (to remain in force till the termination of the third Peace Conference) was ratified by Great Britain and by most of the other great Powers in 1909, not, however, by Germany or Austria; that aerial navigation is regulated by the Acts, I & 2 Geo. 5, c. 4, and 2 & 3 Geo. 5, c.
22; and that an agreement upon the subject was entered into between France and Germany, on July 26, 1913, by exchange of notes, "en attendant la conclusion d"une convention sur cette matiere entre un plus grand nombre d"etats" (the international Conference held at Paris in 1910 had failed to agree upon the terms of such a Convention); and that Art. 25 of The Hague Convention of 1907, No. iv., was ratified by Great Britain, and generally.
THE DEBATE ON AERONAUTICS
Sir,--It is not to be wondered at that the Chairman of Committees declined to allow yesterday"s debate on aviation to diverge into an enquiry whether the Powers could be induced to prohibit, or limit, the dropping of high explosives from aerial machines in war time. The question is, however, one of great interest, and it may be desirable, with a view to future discussions, to state precisely, since little seems to be generally known upon the subject, what has already been attempted in this direction.
In the _Reglement_ annexed to The Hague Convention of 1899, as to the "Laws and Customs of War on Land," Art. 23, which specifically prohibits certain "means of injuring the enemy," makes no mention of aerial methods; but Art. 25, which prohibits "the bombardment of towns, villages, habitations, or buildings, which are not defended," was strengthened, when the _Reglement_ was reissued in 1907 as an annexe to the, as yet not generally ratified, Hague Convention No. iv. of that year, by the insertion, after the word "bombardment," of the words "by any means whatever," with the expressed intention of including in the prohibition the throwing of projectiles from balloons.