Two detachments, amounting each to 1,600 men, were to march from Pittsburgh and Wyoming against Detroit and Niagara. A third body of troops which was to be stationed on the Mohawk during the winter and to be powerfully reinforced in the spring, was to seize Oswego and to secure the navigation of Lake Ontario with vessels to be constructed of materials to be procured in the winter. A fourth corps was to penetrate into Canada by the St. Francis and to reduce Montreal and the posts on Lake Champlain, while a fifth should guard against troops from Quebec.
Thus far America could proceed unaided by her ally. But Upper Canada being reduced another campaign would still be necessary for the reduction of Quebec. This circ.u.mstance would require that the army should pa.s.s the winter in Canada, and in the meantime the garrison of Quebec might be largely reinforced. It was therefore essential to the complete success of the enterprise that France should be induced to take a part in it.
The conquest of Quebec and of Halifax was supposed to be an object of so much importance to France as well as to the United States that her aid might be confidently expected.
It was proposed to request the King of France to furnish four or five thousand troops, to sail from Brest the beginning of May under convoy of four ships of the line and four frigates, the troops to be clad as if for service in the West Indies and thick clothes to be sent after them in August. A large American detachment was to act with this French army and it was supposed that Quebec and Halifax might be reduced by the beginning or middle of October. The army might then either proceed immediately against New Foundland or remain in garrison until the spring when the conquest of that place might be accomplished.
It had been supposed probable that England would abandon the further prosecution of the war on the continent of North America, in which case the government would have a respectable force at its disposal, the advantageous employment of which had engaged in part the attention of Washington. He had contemplated an expedition against the British posts in Upper Canada as a measure which might be eventually eligible and which might employ the arms of the United States to advantage if their troops might safely be withdrawn from the sea-board. He had, however, considered every object of this sort as contingent. Having estimated the difficulties to be encountered in such an enterprise he had found them so considerable as to hesitate on the extent which might safely be given to the expedition admitting the United States to be evacuated by the British armies.
In this state of mind Washington received the magnificent plan already prepared by Congress. He was forcibly struck with the impracticability of executing that part of it which, was to be undertaken by the United States should the British armies continue in the country and with the serious mischief which would result to the common cause as well as from diverting so considerable a part of the French force from other objects to one which was, in his opinion, so unpromising as from the ill impression which would be made on the court and nation by the total failure of the American government to execute its part of a plan originating with itself--a failure would most probably sacrifice the troops and ships employed by France.
On comparing the naval force of England with that of France in different parts of the world, the former appeared to Washington to maintain a decided superiority and consequently to possess the power of shutting up the ships of the latter which might be trusted into the St. Lawrence.
To suppose that the British government would not avail itself of this superiority on such an occasion would be to impute to it a blind infatuation or ignorance of the plans of its adversary, which could not be safely a.s.sumed in calculations of such serious import.
A plan, too, consisting of so many parts to be prosecuted both from Europe and America by land and by water--which, to be successful, required such an harmonious cooperation of the whole, such a perfect coincidence of events--appeared to him to be exposed to too many accidents to risk upon it interests of such high value.
In a long and serious letter to Congress he apologized for not obeying their orders to deliver the plan with his observations upon it to Lafayette, and entering into a full investigation of all its parts demonstrated the mischiefs and the dangers with which it was replete.
This letter was referred to a committee whose report admits the force of the reasons urged by Washington against the expedition and their own conviction that nothing important could be attempted unless the British armies should be withdrawn from the United States and that even in that event the present plan was far too complex.
Men, however, recede slowly and reluctantly from favorite and flattering projects on which they have long meditated, and the committee in their report proceeded to state the opinion that the posts held by the British in the United States would probably be evacuated before the active part of the ensuing campaign, and that, therefore, eventual measures for the expedition ought to be taken.
This report concludes with recommending, "that the general should be directed to write to the Marquis de Lafayette on that subject, and also write to the minister of these States at the court of Versailles very fully, to the end that eventual measures may be taken in case an armament should be sent from France to Quebec for co-operating therewith to the utmost degree which the finances and resources of these States will admit."
This report also was approved by Congress and transmitted to Washington who felt himself greatly embarra.s.sed by it. While his objections to the project retained all their force he found himself required to open a correspondence for the purposes of soliciting the concurrence of France in an expedition he disapproved, and of promising a cooperation he believed to be impracticable. In reply to this communication he said: "The earnest desire I have strictly to comply in every instance with the views and instructions of Congress cannot but make me feel the greatest uneasiness when I find myself in circ.u.mstances of hesitation or doubt with respect to their directions. But the perfect confidence I have in the justice and candor of that honorable body emboldens me to communicate without reserve the difficulties which occur in the execution of their present order, and the indulgence I have experienced on every former occasion induces me to imagine that the liberty I now take will not meet with disapprobation."
After reviewing the report of the committee and stating his objections to the plan and the difficulties he felt in performing the duty a.s.signed to him, he added: "But if Congress still think it necessary for me to proceed in the business I must request their more definite and explicit instructions and that they will permit me, previous to transmitting the intended dispatches, to submit them to their determination. I could wish to lay before Congress more minutely the state of the army, the condition of our supplies and the requisites necessary for carrying into execution an undertaking that may involve the most serious events.
If Congress think this can be done more satisfactorily in a personal conference I hope to have the army in such a situation before I can receive their answer as to afford me an opportunity of giving my attendance."
Congress acceded to his request for a personal interview, and on his arrival in Philadelphia a committee was appointed to confer with him as well on this particular subject as on the general state of the army and of the country.
The result of these conferences was that the expedition against Canada was entirely, though reluctantly, given up, and every arrangement recommended by Washington received that attention which was due to his judgment and experience and which his opinions were ent.i.tled to receive.
If anything were necessary to be added to this ridiculous scheme for the conquest of Canada in order to prove the inefficiency and folly of the Congress of 1778 we have it in the fact that France was averse to adding that province to the United States and did not desire to acquire it for herself. She only sought the independence of this country and its permanent alliance.
Mr. De Sevelinges in his introduction to Botta"s History recites the private instructions to Mr. Gerard on his mission to the United States.
One article was, "to avoid entering into any formal engagement relative to Canada and other English possessions which Congress proposed to conquer." Mr. De Sevelinges adds, that "the policy of the cabinet of Versailles viewed the possession of those countries, especially of Canada by England as a principle of useful inquietude and vigilance to the Americans. The neighborhood of a formidable enemy must make them feel more sensibly the price which they ought to attach to the friendship and support of the King of France."
[C.] REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO CONFER WITH WASHINGTON ON THE SECOND SCHEME FOR THE CONQUEST OF CANADA, AND ON THE GENERAL STATE OF THE ARMY AND THE COUNTRY.
"January I, 1779. The committee appointed to confer with the commander-in-chief on the operations of the next campaign, report that the plan proposed by Congress for the emanc.i.p.ation of Canada, in cooperation with an army from France, was the princ.i.p.al subject of the said conference. That, impressed with a strong sense of the injury and disgrace which must attend an infraction of the proposed stipulations, on the part of these States, your committee have taken a general view of our finances, of the circ.u.mstances of our army, of the magazines of clothes, artillery, arms and ammunition, and of the provisions in store, and which can be collected in season.
"Your committee have also attentively considered the intelligence and observations communicated to them by the commander-in-chief, respecting the number of troops and strongholds of the enemy in Canada; their naval force, and entire command of the water communication with that country; the difficulties, while they possess such signal advantages, of penetrating it with an army by land; the obstacles which are to be surmounted in acquiring a naval superiority; the hostile temper of many of the surrounding Indian tribes towards these States; and above all, the uncertainty whether the enemy will not persevere in their system of hara.s.sing and distressing our sea-coast and frontiers by a predatory war.
"That on a most mature deliberation, your committee cannot find room for a well grounded presumption that these States will be able to perform their part of the proposed stipulations. That in a measure of such moment, calculated to call forth, and direct to a single object, a considerable portion of the force of our ally which may otherwise be essentially employed, nothing else than the highest probability of success could justify Congress in making the proposition.
"Your committee are therefore of opinion, that the negotiation in question, however desirable and interesting, should be deferred until circ.u.mstances render the cooperation of these States more certain, practicable, and effectual.
"That the minister plenipotentiary of these States at the court of Versailles, the minister of France in Pennsylvania, and the minister of France, be respectively informed that the operations of the next campaign must depend on such a variety of contingencies to arise, as well from our own internal circ.u.mstances and resources as the progress and movements of our enemy, that time alone can mature and point out the plan which ought to be pursued. That Congress, therefore, cannot, with a degree of confidence answerable to the magnitude of the object, decide on the practicability of their cooperating the next campaign in an enterprise for the emanc.i.p.ation of Canada; that every preparation in our power will nevertheless be made for acting with vigor against the common enemy, and every favorable incident embraced with alacrity to facilitate and hasten the freedom and independence of Canada, and her union with these States--events which Congress, from motives of policy with respect to the United States, as well as of affection to their Canadian brethren, have greatly at heart."
This report is evidently inspired by Washington, from beginning to end.
1. Footnote: This officer was not of the same family with the Tory Butler.
CHAPTER XVII.
WASHINGTON"S OPERATIONS IN THE NORTHERN STATES. 1779.
We have seen that Washington had gone from his winter quarters near Middlebrook in the Jerseys to hold a conference with Congress on the subject of the invasion of Canada. When this matter had been disposed of there still remained many subjects demanding the joint attention of the supreme Legislature and the Commander-in-Chief, and accordingly he spent a considerable part of the winter of 1778-9 at Philadelphia consulting with Congress on measures for the general defense and welfare of the country. Washington felt extreme anxiety at the inadequate means at his disposal for conducting the campaign of 1779. The state of Congress itself, as we have already shown, was sufficiently embarra.s.sing to him, but there were other causes of uneasiness in the general aspect of affairs. The French alliance was considered by the people as rendering the cause of independence perfectly safe; with little or no exertion on our part England was supposed to be already conquered in America, and, moreover, she was threatened with a Spanish war. Hence the States were remiss in furnishing their quotas of men and money. The currency, consisting of Continental bills, was so much depreciated that a silver dollar was worth forty dollars of the paper money. The effect of this last misfortune was soon apparent in the conduct of the officers of the Jersey brigade.
In pursuance of Washington"s plan of chastising the Indians, to which we referred in the last chapter, it was resolved to lead a force into those villages of the Six Nations which were hostile to the United States and destroy their settlements.
As the army destined for this expedition was about to move alarming symptoms of discontent appeared in a part of it. The Jersey brigade, which had been stationed during the winter at Elizabethtown, was ordered early in May (1779) to march by regiments. This order was answered by a letter from General Maxwell stating that the officers of the First regiment had delivered a remonstrance to their colonel, addressed to the Legislature of the State, declaring that unless their complaints on the subjects of pay and support should obtain the immediate attention of that body, they were, at the expiration of three days, to be considered as having resigned, and requesting the Legislature, in that event, to appoint other officers to succeed them. They declared, however, their readiness to make every preparation for obeying the orders which had been given, and to continue their attention to the regiment until a reasonable time should elapse for the appointment of their successors.
"This," added the letter of General Maxwell, "is a step they are extremely unwilling to take, but it is such as I make no doubt they will all take; nothing but necessity--their not being able to support themselves in time to come and being loaded with debts contracted in time past--could have induced them to resign at so critical a juncture."
The intelligence conveyed in this letter made a serious impression on Washington. He was strongly attached to the army and to its interests, had witnessed its virtues and its sufferings, and lamented sincerely its present distresses. The justice of the complaints made by the officers could no more be denied than the measure they had adopted could be approved. Relying on their patriotism and on his own influence, he immediately wrote a letter to General Maxwell to be laid before them in which, mingling the sensibility of a friend with the authority of a general, he addressed to their understanding and to their love of country, observations calculated to invite their whole attention to the consequences which must result from the step they were about to take.
"The patience and perseverance of the army," proceeds the letter, "have been, under every disadvantage, such as to do them the highest honor both at home and abroad, and have inspired me with an unlimited confidence of their virtue, which has consoled me amidst every perplexity and reverse of fortune to which our affairs, in a struggle of this nature, were necessarily exposed. Now that we have made so great a progress to the attainment of the end we have in view, so that we cannot fail without a most shameful desertion of our own interests, anything like a change of conduct would imply a very unhappy change of principles, and a forgetfulness as well of what we owe to ourselves as to our country. Did I suppose it possible this could be the case, even in a single regiment of the army, I should be mortified and chagrined beyond expression. I should feel it as a wound given to my own honor, which I consider as embarked with that of the army at large. But this I believe to be impossible. Any corps that was about to set an example of the kind would weigh well the consequences, and no officer of common discernment and sensibility would hazard them. If they should stand alone in it, independent of other consequences, what would be their feelings on reflecting that they had held themselves out to the world in a point of light inferior to the rest of the army? Or if their example should be followed, and become general, how could they console themselves for having been the foremost in bringing ruin and disgrace upon their country? They would remember that the army would share a double portion of the general infamy and distress, and that the character of an American officer would become as infamous as it is now glorious.
"I confess the appearances in the present instance are disagreeable, but I am convinced they seem to mean more than they really do. The Jersey officers have not been outdone by any others in the qualities either of citizens or soldiers; and I am confident no part of them would seriously intend anything that would be a stain on their former reputation. The gentlemen cannot be in earnest; they have only reasoned wrong about the means of obtaining a good end, and, on consideration, I hope and flatter myself they will renounce what must appear to be improper. At the opening of a campaign, when under marching orders for an important service, their own honor, duty to the public and to themselves, and a regard to military propriety, will not suffer them to persist in a measure which would be a violation of them all. It will even wound their delicacy, coolly to reflect that they have hazarded a step which has an air of dictating terms to their country, by taking advantage of the necessity of the moment."
This letter did not completely produce the desired effect. The officers did not recede from their claims. In an address to Washington, they expressed their unhappiness that any act of theirs should give him pain, but proceeded to justify the step they had taken. Repeated memorials had been presented to their Legislature which had been received with promises of attention, but had been regularly neglected. "At length,"
said they, "we have lost all confidence in our Legislature. Reason and experience forbid that we should have any. Few of us have private fortunes; many have families, who already are suffering everything that can be received from an ungrateful country. Are we then to suffer all the inconveniences, fatigues, and dangers of a military life, while our wives and our children are perishing for want of common necessaries at home--and that without the most distant prospect of reward, for our pay is now only nominal? We are sensible that your Excellency cannot wish nor desire this from us. We are sorry that you should imagine we meant to disobey orders. It was and still is our determination to march with our regiment and to do the duty of officers until the Legislature should have a reasonable time to appoint others, but no longer.
"We beg leave to a.s.sure your Excellency that we have the highest sense of your ability and virtues; that executing your orders has ever given us pleasure; that we love the service, and we love our country--but when that country gets so lost to virtue and justice as to forget to support its servants, it then becomes their duty to retire from its service."
This letter was peculiarly embarra.s.sing to Washington. To adopt a stern course of proceeding might hazard the loss of the Jersey line, an event not less injurious to the service than painful to himself. To take up the subject without doing too much for the circ.u.mstances of the army would be doing too little for the occasion. He therefore declined taking any other notice of the letter than to declare through General Maxwell, that while they continued to do their duty in conformity with the determination they had expressed he should only regret the part they had taken and should hope they would perceive its impropriety.
The Legislature of New Jersey, alarmed at the decisive step taken by the officers, was at length induced to pay some attention to their situation--they consenting on their part to withdraw their remonstrance.
In the meantime they continued to perform their duty and their march was not delayed by this unpleasant altercation.
In communicating this transaction to Congress Washington took occasion to remind that body of his having frequently urged the absolute necessity of some general and adequate provision for the officers of the army. "I shall only observe," continued the letter, "that the distresses in some corps are so great, either where they were not until lately attached to any particular State, or where the State has been less provident, that the officers have solicited even to be supplied with the clothing destined for the common soldiery, coa.r.s.e and unsuitable as it was. I had not power to comply with the request.
"The patience of men animated by a sense of duty and honor will support them to a certain point, beyond which it will not go. I doubt not Congress will be sensible of the danger of an extreme in this respect, and will pardon my anxiety to obviate it."
Before the troops destined for the grand expedition were put in motion an enterprise of less extent was undertaken which was completely successful. A plan for surprising the towns of the Onondagas, one of the nearest of the hostile tribes, having been formed by General Schuyler and approved by Washington, Colonel Van Schaick a.s.sisted by Lieutenant-Colonel Willet and Major Cochran marched from Fort Schuyler on the morning of the 19th of April at the head of between five and six hundred men and on the third day reached the point of destination. The whole settlement was destroyed after which the detachment returned to Fort Schuyler without the loss of a single man. For this handsome display of talents as a partisan, the thanks of Congress were voted to Colonel Van Schaick and the officers and soldiers under his command.
The cruelties exercised by the Indians in the course of the preceding year had given a great degree of importance to the expedition now meditated against them, and the relative military strength and situation of the two parties rendered it improbable that any other offensive operations could be carried on by the Americans in the course of the present campaign. The army under the command of Sir Henry Clinton, exclusive of the troops in the southern department, was computed at between sixteen and seventeen thousand men. The American army, the largest division of which lay at Middlebrook under the immediate command of Washington, was rather inferior to that of the British in real strength. The grand total, except those in the southern and western country, including officers of every description amounted to about 16,000. Three thousand of these were in New England under the command of General Gates, and the remaining 13,000 were cantoned on both sides of the North river.
After the destruction of Forts Clinton and Montgomery in 1777, it had been determined to construct the fortifications intended for the future defense of the North river at West Point, a position which being more completely embosomed in the hills was deemed more defensible. The works had been prosecuted with unremitting industry but were far from being completed.
King"s Ferry, some miles below West Point, where the great road, the most convenient communication between the middle and eastern States, crossed the North river, is completely commanded by two opposite points of land. That on the west side, a rough and elevated piece of ground, is denominated Stony Point; and the other, on the east side, a flat neck of land projecting far into the water, is called Verplanck"s Point.
The command of King"s Ferry was an object worth the attention of either army, and Washington had comprehended the points which protect it within his plan of defense for the Highlands. A small but strong work called Fort Fayette was completed at Verplanck"s and was garrisoned by a company commanded by Captain Armstrong. The works on Stony Point were unfinished. As the season for active operations approached Sir Henry Clinton formed a plan for opening the campaign with a brilliant _coup de main_ up the North river and toward the latter end of May made preparations for the enterprise.
These preparations were immediately communicated to Washington who was confident that Clinton meditated an attack on the forts in the Highlands or designed to take a position between those forts and Middlebrook, in order to interrupt the communication between the different parts of the American army, to prevent their reunion and to beat them in detail.