In a few hours after Greene entered on his command he received the report of one of Morgan"s foraging parties, not far from Camden. The party advanced to the vicinity of the British posts at Clermont, which was viewed by Col. William A. Washington, who saw that it was too strong to be taken by small arms and cavalry, the only weapons and force present; he therefore had recourse to stratagem. Having made an imposing show of part of his men and having placed the trunk of a pine tree in such a situation as, at a distance, to have the appearance of a cannon, he summoned the post to surrender, and it yielded without firing a shot.
The Tory Colonel Rugely and 112 men whom he had collected in the place were made prisoners. This inconsiderable event elated Greene"s army and was considered by them as a good omen of success under their new leader.
General Greene"s situation was embarra.s.sing. His army was feeble, consisting, on the 8th of December (1780), of 2,029 infantry, of whom 1,482 were in camp and 547 in detachments; 821 were Continentals and 1,208 were militia. Besides these there were 90 cavalry, 60 artillerymen, and 128 Continentals on extra service, const.i.tuting in all a force of 2,307 men.
In North Carolina there were many Loyalists, and hostilities were carried on between them and their republican neighbors with the most rancorous animosity. The country was thinly inhabited and abounded in woods and swamps. The cultivated parts were laid waste by hostile factions, and no magazines for the army were provided. The troops were almost naked, and Greene obliged to procure subsistence for them day by day.
He found that he could not long remain at Charlotte for the country between that place and Camden, having been traversed by the contending armies, was quite exhausted. In order, therefore, to procure subsistence for his troops, as well as to distract and hara.s.s the enemy, Greene, though fully aware of the danger of such a measure, felt himself constrained to divide his little army.
General Morgan had been invested with the command of the light troops by Gates, and Greene placed him at the head of one of the divisions of his army, consisting of nearly 400 infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Howard, 170 Virginia riflemen under Major Triplett, and 80 light dragoons under Lieut.-Col. William A. Washington. With this small force Morgan was sent to the south of the Catawba to observe the British at Wynnsborough and Camden and to shift for himself, but was directed to risk as little as possible. On the 25th of December (1780) he took a position toward the western frontier of South Carolina, not far from the confluence of the Pacolet and Broad rivers, and about fifty miles northwest from Wynnsborough. With the other division of his army Greene left Charlotte on the 20th of the same month (December, 1780), and on the 29th arrived at Hick"s Corner on the east side of the Pedee, opposite the Cheraw hills, about seventy miles northeast from Wynnsborough, where he remained some time. He marched to that place in the hope of finding more plentiful subsistence for his troops, but his difficulties in that respect were not much diminished, for the country was almost laid waste by the cruel feuds of the hostile factions.
General Morgan did not long remain inactive. On the 27th of December (1780) he detached Colonel Washington with his dragoons and 200 militia, who next day marched forty miles, surprised a body of Loyalists at Ninety-six, killed or wounded 150 of them, and took 40 prisoners, without sustaining any loss. At that time Morgan was joined by Major M"Dowell with 200 North Carolina, and by Colonel Pickens with 70 South Carolina militia.
The British had to contend not only with the force under Greene and Morgan, but were also obliged to watch other adversaries not less active and enterprising. Sumter had been defeated by Tarleton on the 18th of August (1780), and his followers dispersed, but that daring and indefatigable partisan did not long remain quiet. He was soon again at the head of a considerable band and had frequent skirmishes with his adversaries. Always changing his position about Enoree, Broad, and Tiger rivers, he often a.s.sailed the British posts in that quarter. On the 12th of November (1780) he was attacked at Broad river by Major Wemyss, but repulsed the party and made the major prisoner. On the 20th of the same month he was attacked by Tarleton at Black Stocks, near Tiger river; the encounter was sharp and obstinate; Tarleton was repulsed with loss, but Sumter was wounded in the battle, and, being unfitted for active service, his followers dispersed. Sumter showed much humanity to his prisoners. Although Wemyss had deliberately hanged Mr. Cusack in the Cheraw district, and although he had in his pocket a list of several houses burned by his orders, yet he met with every indulgence. At Black Stocks the wounded were kindly treated.
Other partisan chiefs arose and among them General Marion held a distinguished place. He had commanded a regiment in Charleston at the time of the siege, but having received a wound which fractured his leg, and being incapable of discharging the [1] active duties of his office, he withdrew from the town. On the advance of Gates, having procured a band of followers, he penetrated to the Santee, hara.s.sed the British detachments, and discouraged the Loyalists. After the defeat of the Americans at Camden he rescued a party of Continental prisoners who were under a British guard. So ill was he provided with arms that he was obliged to forge the saws of the sawmills into rude swords for his hors.e.m.e.n, and so scanty was his ammunition that at times he engaged when he had not three cartridges to each of his party. He secured himself from pursuit in the recesses of the forest and in deep swamps. [2]
Cornwallis impatiently waited the arrival of reinforcements. After the victory at Camden, when he was flushed with the sanguine hope not only of overrunning North Carolina, but of invading Virginia, General Leslie was detached from New York to the southward with a considerable body of troops, and, according to orders, landed in Virginia, expecting to meet the southern army in that State. On finding himself unable to accomplish his lofty schemes, and obliged to fall back into South Carolina, Cornwallis ordered Leslie to re-embark and sail for Charleston. He arrived there on the 13th of December (1780), and on the 19th began his march with 1,500 men to join Cornwallis. His lordship resolved to begin offensive operations immediately on the arrival of his reinforcements, but, in the meantime, alarmed by the movements of Morgan for the safety of the British post at Ninety-six, he detached Tarleton with the light and legion infantry, the fusiliers or Seventh regiment, the first battalion of the Seventy-first regiment, 350 cavalry, 2 field pieces, and an adequate number of the royal artillery, in all about 1,100 men, with orders to strike a blow at Morgan and drive him out of the province. As Tarleton"s force was known to be superior to that under Morgan, no doubt whatever was entertained of the precipitate flight or total discomfiture of the Americans.
Meanwhile Cornwallis left Wynnsborough and proceeded toward the northwest, between the Broad and Catawba rivers. General Leslie, who had halted at Camden in order to conceal as long as possible the road which the British army was to take, was now ordered to advance up the Catawba and join the main body on its march. By this route Cornwallis hoped to intercept Morgan if he should escape Tarleton, or perhaps to get between General Greene and Virginia and compel him to fight before the arrival of his expected reinforcements. The British generals enc.u.mbered with baggage and military stores, marching through bad roads, and a country intersected by rivulets which were often swollen by the rains, advanced but slowly. Tarleton, however, with his light troops, proceeded with great celerity and overtook Morgan probably sooner than was expected.
On the 14th of January (1781) Morgan was informed of the movements of the British army and got notice of the march of Tarleton and of the force under his command. Sensible of his danger he began to retreat, and crossed the Pacolet, the pa.s.sage of which he was inclined to dispute, but, on being told that Tarleton had forded the river six miles above him, he made a precipitate retreat, and at ten at night on the 16th of January the British took possession of the ground which the Americans had left a few hours before.
Although his troops were much fatigued by several days" hard marching through a difficult country, yet, determined that Morgan should not escape, Tarleton resumed the pursuit at three next morning, leaving his baggage behind under a guard with orders not to move till break of day. Morgan, though retreating, was not disinclined to fight. By great exertions he might have crossed Broad river or reached a hilly tract of country before he could have been overtaken. He was inferior to Tarleton in the number of his troops, but more so in their quality, as a considerable part of his force consisted of militia, and the British cavalry were three times more numerous than the American. But Morgan, who had great confidence both in himself and in his men, was apprehensive of being overtaken before he could pa.s.s Broad river, and he chose rather to fight voluntarily than to be forced to a battle.
Therefore, having been joined by some militia under Colonel Pickens, he halted at a place called the Cowpens, about three miles from the line of separation between North and South Carolina. Before daylight on the morning of the 17th of January (1781), he was informed of the near approach of Tarleton, and instantly prepared to receive him.
The ground on which Morgan halted had no great advantages, but his dispositions were judicious. On rising ground, in an open wood, he drew up his Continental troops and Triplett"s corps, amounting together to nearly 500 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Howard. Colonel Washington with his cavalry was posted in their rear, behind the eminence, ready to act as occasion might require. At a small distance in front of his Continentals was a line of militia under Colonel Pickens and Major M"Dowell, and 150 yards in front of Pickens was stationed a battalion of North Carolina and Georgia volunteers under Major Cunningham, with orders to give one discharge on the approaching enemy, and then to retreat and join the militia. Pickens was directed, when he could no longer keep his ground, to fall back with a retreating fire and form on the right of the Continentals.
Scarcely were those dispositions made when the British van appeared.
Tarleton, who had been informed by two prisoners of Morgan"s position and strength, instantly formed his troops. The light and legion infantry and the Seventh regiment, and a captain with fifty dragoons on each flank, const.i.tuted his first line; the first battalion of the Seventy-first regiment and the rest of the cavalry composed the reserve.
Formerly Tarleton had succeeded by sudden and impetuous a.s.saults, and, entertaining no doubt of speedy and complete victory on the present occasion, he led on his men to the attack with characteristic ardor, even before his troops were well formed. The British rushed forward impetuously, shouting and firing as they advanced. The American volunteers, after a single discharge, retreated to the militia under Pickens. The British advanced rapidly, and furiously attacked the militia, who soon gave way and sought shelter in the rear of the Continentals. Tarleton eagerly pressed on, but the Continentals, undismayed by the retreat of the militia, received him firmly, and an obstinate conflict ensued. Tarleton ordered up his reserve, and the Continental line was shaken by the violence of the onset. Morgan ordered his men to retreat to the summit of the eminence and was instantly obeyed. The British, whose ranks were somewhat thinned, exhausted by the previous march and by the struggle in which they had been engaged, and believing the victory won, pursued in some disorder, but, on reaching the top of the hill, Howard ordered his men to wheel and face the enemy; they instantly obeyed and met the pursuing foe with a well-directed and deadly fire. This unexpected and destructive volley threw the British into some confusion, which Howard observing, ordered his men to charge them with the bayonet. Their obedience was as prompt as before, and the British line was soon broken. About the same moment Washington routed the cavalry on the British right, who had pursued the flying militia and were cutting them down on the left and even in the rear of the Continentals. Ordering his men not to fire a pistol, Washington charged the British cavalry sword in hand. The conflict was sharp, but not of long duration. The British were driven from the ground with considerable loss and closely pursued. Howard and Washington pressed the advantage which they had gained; many of the militia rallied and joined in the battle. In a few minutes after the British had been pursuing the enemy, without a doubt of victory, the fortune of the day entirely changed; their artillerymen were killed, their cannon taken, and the greater part of the infantry compelled to lay down their arms. Tarleton, with about forty horse, made a furious charge on Washington"s cavalry, but the battle was irrecoverably lost, and he was reluctantly obliged to retreat. Upwards of 200 of his cavalry, who had not been engaged, fled through the woods with the utmost precipitation, bearing away with them such of the officers as endeavored to oppose their flight. The only part of the infantry which escaped was the detachment left to guard the baggage, which they destroyed when informed of the defeat, and, mounting the wagons and spare horses, hastily retreated to the army. The cavalry arrived in camp in two divisions; one in the evening, with the tidings of their disastrous discomfiture, and the other, under Tarleton himself, appeared next morning. In this battle the British had ten commissioned officers and upwards of 100 privates killed. More than 500 were made prisoners, nearly 200 of whom, including twenty-nine commissioned officers, were wounded. Two pieces of artillery, two standards, 800 muskets, thirty-five baggage wagons and about 100 horses fell into the hands of the Americans whose loss amounted only to 12 men killed and 60 wounded. The British force under Tarleton has been commonly estimated at 1,100 men, and the American army at 1,000, although Morgan, in his official report to Greene, written two days after the battle, states it to have been only 800. [3]
Cornwallis was at Turkey creek, twenty-five miles from the Cowpens, confident of the success of his detachment or at least without the slightest apprehension of its defeat. He was between Greene and Morgan and it was a matter of much importance to prevent their junction and to overthrow the one of them while he could receive no support from the other. For that purpose he had marched up Broad river and instructed General Leslie to proceed on the banks of the Catawba in order to keep the Americans in a state of uncertainty concerning the route which he intended to pursue, but the unexpected defeat of his detachment was an occurrence equally mortifying and perplexing and nothing remained but to endeavor to compensate the disaster by the rapidity of his movements and the decision of his conduct.
He was as near the fords of the Catawba as Morgan and flattered himself that, elated with victory and enc.u.mbered with prisoners and baggage, that officer might yet be overtaken before he could pa.s.s those fords.
Accordingly, on the 18th of January, (1781) he formed a junction with General Leslie and on the 19th began his remarkable pursuit of Morgan.
In order the more certainly to accomplish his end at Ramsour"s Mills he destroyed the whole of his superfluous baggage. He set the example by considerably diminishing the quant.i.ty of his own and was readily imitated by his officers although some of them suffered much less by the measure. He retained no wagons except those loaded with hospital stores and ammunition and four empty ones for the accommodation of the sick and wounded. But notwithstanding all his privations and exertions he ultimately missed his aim for Morgan displayed as much prudence and activity after his victory as bravery in gaining it. Fully aware of his danger he left behind him, under a flag of truce, such of the wounded as could not be moved with surgeons to attend them, and scarcely giving his men time to breathe he sent off his prisoners under an escort of militia and followed with his regular troops and cavalry, bringing up the rear in person. He crossed Broad river at the upper fords, hastened to the Catawba, which he reached on the evening of the 28th, and safely pa.s.sed it with his prisoners and troops next day--his rear having gained the northern bank only about two hours before the van of the British army appeared on the opposite side.
Much rain had fallen on the mountains a short time before and it rained incessantly during the night. The river rose and in the morning was impa.s.sable. Morgan made a hair-breadth escape, for had the river risen a few hours sooner he would have been unable to pa.s.s and probably would have been overtaken and overwhelmed by his pursuers and had the flood in the river been a little later Cornwallis might have forced a pa.s.sage and entirely discomfited the American division. But it was two days before the inundation subsided, and in that interval Morgan sent off his prisoners towards Charlottesville, in Virginia, under an escort of militia and they were soon beyond the reach of pursuit. The Americans regarded the swelling of the river with pious grat.i.tude as an interposition of Heaven in their behalf and looked forward with increased confidence to the day of ultimate success.
Morgan called for the a.s.sistance of the neighboring militia, and prepared to dispute the pa.s.sage of the river; but on the 31st of January (1781), while he lay at Sherwood"s ford, General Greene unexpectedly appeared in camp and took on himself the command. Toward the end of December, (1781) Greene, as already mentioned, took a position at Hick"s creek on the east side of the Peedee, and had in camp 1,100 Continental and State troops fit for service. On the 12th of January (1781) he was joined by Col. Henry Lee"s partisan legion which arrived from the North and consisted of 100 well-mounted hors.e.m.e.n and 120 infantry. This reinforcement was next day dispatched on a secret expedition and in order to divert the attention of the enemy from the movements of the legion, Major Anderson, with a small detachment was sent down the Peedee. On the night of the 24th, Lee surprised Georgetown and killed some of the garrison, but the greater part fled into the fort which Lee was not in a condition to besiege.
Although Cornwallis perceived that he would meet with opposition yet he determined to force the pa.s.sage. The river was about 500 yards wide, three feet deep, and the stream rapid. The light infantry of the guards under Colonel Hall, accompanied by a guide, first entered the ford; they were followed by the grenadiers who were succeeded by the battalions.
As soon as Davidson perceived the direction of the British column he led his men to the point where it was about to land. But before he arrived the light infantry had overcome all difficulties and were ascending the bank and forming. While pa.s.sing the river, in obedience to orders, they reserved their fire, and, on gaining the bank, soon put the militia to flight. Davidson was the last to retreat and on mounting his horse to retire he received a mortal wound.
The defeat of Davidson opened the pa.s.sage of the river. All the American parties retreated, and on the same day the rest of the British army crossed at Beattie"s ford. Tarleton, with the cavalry and the Twenty-third regiment, was sent in pursuit of the militia, and being informed on his march that the neighboring militia were a.s.sembling at Tarrant"s tavern, about ten miles distant, he hastened with the cavalry to that place. About 500 militia were a.s.sembled and seemed not unprepared to receive him. He attacked them with his usual impetuosity and soon defeated and dispersed them with considerable slaughter.
The pa.s.sage of the river and the total discomfiture of the party at Tarrant"s tavern so much intimidated the inhabitants of the country that the royal army received no further trouble from the militia till it had pa.s.sed the Yadkin.
A grand military race now began between the retreating Americans under Greene and the pursuing British under Cornwallis. Greene marched so rapidly that he pa.s.sed the Yadkin at the trading ford on the night between the 2d and 3d of February (1781), partly by fording and partly by means of boats and flats. So closely was he pursued that the British van was often in sight of the American rear and a sharp conflict happened not far from the ford, between a body of American riflemen and the advanced guard of the British army, when the latter obtained possession of a few wagons. Greene secured all the boats on the south side and here it again happened as at the Catawba--the river suddenly rose by reason of the preceding rains and the British were unable to pa.s.s. This second escape by the swelling of the waters was interpreted by the Americans as a visible interposition of Heaven in their behalf and inspired then with a lofty enthusiasm in that cause which seemed to be the peculiar care of Omnipotence.
Greene, released from the immediate pressure of his pursuers, continued his march northward and on the 7th of February joined his division under Huger and Williams near Guilford Courthouse.
In order to cover his retreat and to check the pursuing enemy Greene formed a light corps out of Lee"s legion, Howard"s infantry, Washington"s cavalry, and some Virginia riflemen under Major Campbell, amounting to 700 men, the flower of the southern army. As General Morgan was severely indisposed the command of these light troops was given to Col. Otho Holland Williams, formerly adjutant-general.
Having refreshed his troops, and made the necessary arrangements on the morning of the 10th of February (1781), Greene left Guilford Courthouse on his march towards the Dan, and was pursued by Cornwallis, who had been detained by the long circuit which he was obliged to make in order to pa.s.s the Yadkin. The retreat and pursuit were equally rapid, but the boldness and activity of the American light troops compelled the British to march compactly and with caution, for on one occasion Colonel Lee charged the advanced cavalry of the British army suddenly and furiously, killed a number, and made some prisoners. On this occasion Cornwallis felt the loss of the light troops who had been killed or taken at the Cowpens. He was destined to regret their loss through the rest of the campaign.
Greene"s precautions and preparations for pa.s.sing the Dan were successful and on the 14th of February he crossed that river at Boyd"s and Irwin"s ferries with his army, baggage, and stores. Although his light troops had marched forty miles that day, yet the last of them had scarcely reached the northern bank when the advanced guard of the British army appeared on the other side of the river.
The escape of Greene into Virginia without a battle and without any loss except a few wagons at the Yadkin, was a severe disappointment to Cornwallis. He had entirely failed in his attempts against Greene, but he was consoled by the reflection that he had completely driven him out of North Carolina, and that now there was nothing to hinder the loyal inhabitants from openly espousing the British cause and reinforcing the royal army.
Cornwallis now gave up the pursuit and repaired to Hillsborough with the view of calling out and organizing the Royalist forces. His adherents, though here particularly strong, did not come forward to the extent expected. The larger portion, as elsewhere, regarded the cause with that pa.s.sive and inert attachment which we have remarked to be generally prevalent and even the more zealous having suffered severely by former premature displays, dreaded lest the republican cause should regain the ascendancy. The view also of the distress and exhaustion of the British troops after so long a march was by no means alluring. Yet seven companies were formed and detachments began to come in from different quarters.
On the other hand, Greene, having obtained a reinforcement of Virginia militia, repa.s.sed the Dan and with his light troops endeavored to annoy the British army and prevent recruiting. Major Lee surprised a detachment of Royalists who mistook him for Tarleton and cut them nearly to pieces. On account of the exhausted state of the country at Hillsborough, Cornwallis soon withdrew to a position on the Allimance creek between Haw and Deep rivers, where he could be better supplied and support his friends who were numerous there. Greene, however, by an active use of his cavalry and light troops, severely hara.s.sed his opponent and by changing his own position every night, eluded the attempt to bring him to an engagement.
At length General Greene, having received reinforcements which raised his army to above 4,200 men, of whom about a third were regulars, determined to offer battle. This was what Cornwallis had eagerly sought, yet his own effective force being reduced to somewhat under 2,000 he felt now some hesitation, and probably would have acted more wisely in maintaining the defensive. Even the enterprising Tarleton observes that in his circ.u.mstances defeat would have been total ruin, while any victory he might expect to gain could yield little fruit. All the habits and views of Cornwallis, however, being directed to an active campaign, he formed his resolution and, on the 15th of March (1781), proceeded to the attack. Greene had drawn up his army very judiciously near Guilford Courthouse mostly on a range of hills covered with trees and brushwood.
Greene made disposition of his troops in the following order: The first line was composed of North Carolina militia, the right under General Eaton and the left under General Butler, with two pieces of artillery under Captain Singleton. The right flank was supported by Kirkwood"s Delawareans, Lynch"s riflemen, and the cavalry, all under Lieutenant-Colonel Washington, and the left in like manner by Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell"s riflemen and the infantry of the legion, all under Lieutenant-Colonel Lee. The second line, which was formed 300 yards in the rear of the first, consisted of two brigades of Virginia militia, the right under General Lawson and the left under General Stevens. The third, 400 yards in reserve was formed upon the brow of the hill near the courthouse. The right of this line was composed of Hawes"s and Greene"s Virginia regiments under General Huger; the left of the first and second Maryland regiments, the former under Gunby, the latter under Ford--the whole commanded by Colonel Williams. In the center of the last line was placed the remainder of the artillery.
Captain Singleton commenced his fire, which was returned by the enemy, who had formed their line of battle--the right wing under General Leslie and the left under Lieutenant-Colonel Webster, with the artillery in the center under Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod. The first battalion of the guards, under Lieutenant-Colonel Norton, served as a support for the right, and the second, with one company of grenadiers under General O"Hara, for the left wing. Tarleton"s dragoons were held in reserve. The British commander having made all his dispositions advanced, fired one round, and charged bayonets. Our militia having given a few shots while the enemy was at a distance were seized by a panic when they saw him coming down upon them. Many of them threw away their muskets, and the entreaties of Butler, Eaton, and Davie, with the threats of Lee, were of no avail. Almost the entire body fled. The artillery now retired to the left of the Marylanders. At this crisis the enemy considered victory as already within his grasp and continued to push on when he was attacked on his right and left by Lee and Washington. Cornwallis perceiving this threw one regiment out to engage Lee, and one regiment together with his light infantry and yagers to resist Washington, filling up the breach thus created by advancing the grenadiers with two battalions of the guards, which had formed the supports to the flanks. Lee and Washington fell back in good order, delivering their fire until they came up with the second line which gave battle in good earnest. The right flank was supported by Washington, who ordered Lynch"s riflemen to fall upon the left of Webster, who had to be supported by O"Hara. Here Webster ordered the Thirty-third regiment to attack Lynch and was thereby in a measure relieved. O"Hara charged the Virginia right wing, which was obliged to yield ground. Lee on the left n.o.bly did his duty and firmly held his position. When the militia on the right gave way those on the left fell back and were not rallied until they came up on the left of the third line. Campbell"s riflemen and Lee"s legion stood perfectly firm and continued the contest against one regiment, one battalion, and a body of infantry and riflemen. The American reserve, with the artillery posted in a most favorable position, was fresh and ready for the word of command. Webster having overcome the Americans of the second line in his front advanced upon the third and was received by Gunby"s Maryland regiment with a most galling fire which made his troops falter. Gunby advanced, charging bayonets, when the enemy was completely routed.
Leslie, after the left of the Virginia militia gave way, advanced to the support of O"Hara, who had forced the American right wing, and the combined commands of these generals charged the Second Maryland regiment of the third line. This regiment, panic-stricken, fled. Gunby, coming up at the time, held the enemy in check and a deadly conflict ensued. Gunby having his horse shot under him, Lieutenant-Colonel Howard a.s.sumed the command. Washington seeing how hot was the battle at this point pushed forward and charged the enemy, and Howard advancing with his bayonets leveled, the British were completely routed.
The pursuit was continued for some distance when Cornwallis came up and determined to gain the victory at any cost. He opened the fire of his artillery alike on friend and foe, causing an indiscriminate slaughter of British and Americans.
The British were rallied at all points, and Greene, considering it better to preserve the advantages he had gained, withdrew his forces.
This was done in good order and Cornwallis continued the pursuit but a short distance. The loss of the Americans was about 400 in killed and wounded; that of the British about 800. The enemy retained the field, but his victory was both empty, and disastrous.
Notwithstanding Cornwallis claimed a victory he resolved to fall back on Wilmington, near the mouth of Cape Fear river, where he could recruit his troops and obtain supplies and reinforcements by sea.
Greene retreated about fifteen miles, taking post behind a small stream called Troublesome creek, where he expected and awaited an attack.
1. Footnote: Marion was a strict temperance man. Being at a dinner party where the guests, determined on a hard drinking bout, had locked the door to prevent his exit, he jumped out of a second-story window, and broke his leg. This was the wound above referred to. It occasioned him to leave the city. He thus escaped surrendering when Charleston fell, and his temperance preserved to the country one of its bravest defenders.
2. Footnote: Marion, on account of his successful stratagems and sudden surprises of the British, was called by them the _Swamp-Fox_. His own countrymen styled him the _Bayard_ of the South.
3. Footnote: The action at the Cowpens was one of the medal victories.
Congress had separate gold medals struck in honor of it, and presented to Morgan, Howard, and Col. William A. Washington. The name Cowpens, according to Irving, comes from the old designation of Hannah"s Cowpens, the place being part of a grazing establishment belonging to a man named Hannah. The worthy grazier could hardly have foreseen the immortality which was destined to attach to his Cowpens.
CHAPTER XXII.
THE CAMPAIGN AT THE SOUTH CONCLUDED. 1781.
While the events recorded in the last chapter were pa.s.sing Washington was by no means a pa.s.sive spectator. He held a constant correspondence with Greene and sent him all the aid he could. Writing to him on the 9th of January, 1781, he says: "It is impossible for anyone to sympathize more feelingly with you in the sufferings and distresses of the troops than I do, and nothing could aggravate my unhappiness so much as the want of ability to remedy or alleviate the calamities which they suffer and in which we partic.i.p.ate but too largely.