But either appearance is all, or there is a substance beyond consciousness:
? Either reality is a delusion, or a knowledge of it is impossible.
3. Simple Destructive--
If A is B, C is D; and if A is B, E is F: But either C is not D, or E is not F: ? A is not B.
If table-rappers are to be trusted, the departed are spirits; and they also exert mechanical energy:
But either the departed are not spirits, or they do not exert mechanical energy:
? Table-rappers are not to be trusted.
4. Complex Destructive--
If A is B, C is D; and if E is F, G is H: But either C is not D, or G is not H: ? Either A is not B, or E is not F.
If poetic justice is observed, virtue is rewarded; and if the mirror is held up to Nature, the villain triumphs:
But either virtue is not rewarded, or the villain does not triumph:
? Either poetic justice is not observed, or the mirror is not held up to Nature.
Such are the four Moods of the Dilemma that emerge if we only use affirmative hypotheticals for the major premise; but, certainly, it is often quite as natural to employ two negative hypotheticals (indeed, one might be affirmative and the other negative; but waive that); and then four more moods emerge, all having negative conclusions. It is needless to intimidate the reader by drawing up these four moods in battle array: they always admit of reduction to the foregoing moods by obverting the hypotheticals. Still, by the same process we may greatly decrease the number of moods of the Categorical Syllogism; and just as some Syllogisms are most simply expressed in Celarent or Cesare, so some Dilemmas are most simply stated with negative major premises--e.g., The example of a Simple Constructive Dilemma above given would run more naturally thus: _If the Tories win, the Government will not innovate; and if the Whigs, the Lords will not let them_: and similarly Demosthenes" Dilemma--_If aeschines joined, he is not consistent; and if he did not, he is not patriotic_. Moreover, the propriety of recognising Dilemmas with negative major premises, follows from the above a.n.a.lysis of the Dilemma into a combination of Conditional Syllogisms, even if (as in -- 1 of this chapter) we take account of only four Moods of the Hypothetical Syllogism.
In the rhetorical use of the Dilemma, it may be observed that the disjunction in the minor premise ought to be obvious, or (at any rate) easily acceptable to the audience. Thus, _Either the Tories or the Whigs will win; Either aeschines joined in the rejoicings, or he did not_; such propositions are not likely to be disputed. But if the orator must stop to prove his minor premise, the smacking effect of this figure (if the expression be allowed) will be lost. Hence the minor premises of other examples given above are only fit for a select audience. That _Either ghosts are not spirits, or they do not exert mechanical energy_, supposes a knowledge of the principle, generally taught by physical philosophers, that only matter is the vehicle of energy; and that _Either appearance is all, or there is substance beyond consciousness_, is a doctrine which only metaphysical philosophers could be expected to understand, and upon which they could not be expected to agree. However, the chief danger is that a plausible disjunction may not be really such as to exclude any middle ground: _Either the Tories or the Whigs win_, is bad, if a tie be possible; though in the above argument this is negligible, seeing that a tie cannot directly cause innovations. _Either aeschines joined in the rejoicings, or he did not_, does not allow for a decent conformity with the public movement where resistance would be vain; yet such conformity as need not be inconsistent with subsequent condemnation of the proceedings, nor incompatible with patriotic reserve founded on a belief that the rejoicings are premature and ominous.
Another rhetorical consideration is, that the alternatives of the disjunctive conclusion of a Complex Dilemma should both point the same way, should be equally distasteful or paradoxical. "Either inconsistent or unpatriotic": horrid words to a politician! "Either no reality or no possible knowledge of it": very disappointing to an anxious inquirer!
Thus the disjunctive conclusion is as bad for an opponent as the categorical one in a Simple Dilemma.
Logicians further speak of the Trilemma, with three Hypotheticals and a corresponding triple Disjunction; and of a Polylemma, with any further number of perplexities. But anyone who has a taste for logical forms may have it amply gratified in numerous text-books.
CHAPTER XIII
TRANSITION TO INDUCTION
-- 1. Having now discussed Terms, Propositions, Immediate and Mediate Inferences, and investigated the conditions of formal truth or consistency, we have next to consider the conditions of material truth: whether (or how far) it is possible to arrive at propositions that accurately represent the course of nature or of human life. Hitherto we have dealt with no sort of proof that gives any such a.s.surance. A valid syllogism guarantees the truth of its conclusion, provided the premises be true: but what of the premises? The relation between the premises of a valid syllogism and its conclusion is the same as the relation between the antecedent and consequent of a hypothetical proposition. If A is B, C is D: grant that A is B, and it follows that C is D; and, similarly, grant the premises of a syllogism, and the conclusion follows. Again, grant that C is not D, and it follows that A is not B; and, similarly, if the conclusion of a valid syllogism be false, it follows that one, or other, or both of the premises must be false. But, once more, grant that C is D, and it does not follow that A is B; so neither, if the conclusion of a syllogism be true, does it follow that the premises are.
For example:--
Sociology is an exact science; Mathematics is a branch of Sociology: ? Mathematics is an exact science.
Here the conclusion is true although the premises are absurd. Or again:--
Mathematics is an exact science; Sociology is a branch of Mathematics: ? Sociology is an exact science.
Here the major premise is true, but the minor is false, and the conclusion is false. In both cases, however, whether the conclusion be true or false, it equally follows from the premises, if there is any cogency in Barbara. The explanation of this is, that Barbara has only formal cogency; and that whether the conclusion of that, or any other valid mood, shall be true according to fact and experience, depends upon how the form is filled up. How to establish the premises, then, is a most important problem; and it still remains to be solved.
-- 2. We may begin by recalling the distinction between the denotation and connotation of a general term: the denotation comprising the things or events which the term is a name for; the connotation comprising the common qualities on account of which these things are called by the same name. Obviously, there are very few general terms whose denotation is exhaustively known; since the denotation of a general term comprises all the things that have its connotation, or that ever have had, or that ever will have it, whether they exist here, or in Australia, or in the Moon, or in the utmost stars. No one has examined all men, all mammoths, all crystals, all falling bodies, all cases of fever, all revolutions, all stars--nor even all planets, since from time to time new ones are discerned. We have names for animals that existed long before there were men to observe them, and of which we know only a few bones, the remains of mult.i.tudinous species; and for others that may continue to exist when men have disappeared from the earth.
If, indeed, we definitely limit the time, or place, or quant.i.ty of matter to be explored, we may sometimes learn, within the given limits, all that there is to know: as all the bones of a particular animal, or the list of English monarchs. .h.i.therto, or the names of all the members of the House of Commons at the present time. Such cases, however, do not invalidate the above logical truth that few general terms are exhaustively known in their denotation; for the very fact of a.s.signing limits of time and place impairs the generality of a term. The bones of a certain animal may be all examined, but not the bones of all animals, nor even of one species. The English monarchs that have reigned hitherto may be known, but there may be many still to reign.
The general terms, then, with which Logic is chiefly concerned, the names of Causes and Kinds, such as gravitation, diseases, social events, minerals, plants and animals, stand for some facts that are, or have been, known, and for a great many other similar ones that have not been, and never will be, known. The use of a general term depends not upon our direct knowledge of everything comprised in its denotation, but upon our readiness to apply it to anything that has its connotation, whether we have seen the thing or not, and even though we never can perceive it; as when a man talks freely of the ichthyosaurus, or of the central heat of planets, or of atoms and ether.
Hence Universal Propositions, which consist of general terms, deceive us, if we suppose that their predicates are directly known to be related to all the facts denoted by their subjects. In exceptional cases, in which the denotation of a subject is intentionally limited, such exhaustive direct knowledge may be possible; as that "all the bones of a certain animal consist of phosphate of lime," or that every member of the present Parliament wears a silk hat. But what predication is possible concerning the hats of all members of Parliament from the beginning? Ordinarily, then, whilst the relation of predicate to subject has been observed in some cases, in much the greater number of cases our belief about it depends upon something besides observation, or may be said (in a certain sense) to be taken on trust.
"All rabbits are herbivorous": why do we believe that? We may have seen a few wild rabbits feeding: or have kept tame ones, and tried experiments with their diet; or have read of their habits in a book of Natural History; or have studied the anatomy and physiology of the digestive system in many sorts of animals: but with whatever care we add testimony and scientific method to our own observation, it still remains true that the rabbits observed by ourselves and others are few in comparison with those that live, have lived and will live. Similarly of any other universal proposition; that it "goes beyond the evidence" of direct observation plainly follows from the fact that the general terms, of which such propositions consist, are never exhaustively known in their denotation. What right have we then to state Universal Propositions? That is the problem of Inductive Logic.
-- 3. Universal Propositions, of course, cannot always be proved by syllogisms; because to prove a universal proposition by a syllogism, its premises must be universal propositions; and, then, these must be proved by others. This process may sometimes go a little way, thus: _All men are mortal_, because _All animals are_; and _All animals are mortal_, because _All composite bodies are subject to dissolution._ Were there no limit to such sorites, proof would always involve a _regressus ad infinitum_, for which life is too short; but, in fact, prosyllogisms soon fail us.
Clearly, the form of the Syllogism must itself be misleading if the universal proposition is so: if we think that premises prove the conclusion because they themselves have been established by detailed observation, we are mistaken. The consideration of any example will show this. Suppose any one to argue:
All ruminants are herbivorous; Camels are ruminants: ? Camels are herbivorous.
Have we, then, examined all ruminants? If so, we must have examined all camels, and cannot need a syllogism to prove their herbivorous nature: instead of the major premise proving the conclusion, the proof of the conclusion must then be part of the proof of the major premise. But if we have not examined all ruminants, having omitted most giraffes, most deer, most oxen, etc., how do we know that the unexamined (say, some camels) are not exceptional? Camels are vicious enough to be carnivorous; and indeed it is said that Bactrian camels will eat flesh rather than starve, though of course their habit is herbivorous.
Or, again, it is sometimes urged that--
All empires decay: ? Britain will decay.
This is manifestly a prediction: at present Britain flourishes, and shows no signs of decay. Yet a knowledge of its decay seems necessary, to justify any one in a.s.serting the given premise. If it is a question whether Britain will decay, to attempt (while several empires still flourish) to settle the matter by a.s.serting that _all_ empires decay, seems to be "a begging of the question." But although this latter case is a manifest prediction, it does not really differ from the former one; for the proof that camels are herbivorous has no limits in time. If valid, it shows not only that they are, but also that they will be, herbivorous.
Hence, to resort to a dilemma, it may be urged: If _all_ the facts of the major premise of any syllogism have been examined, the syllogism is needless; and if _some_ of them have not been examined, it is a _pet.i.tio principii_. But either all have been examined, or some have not.
Therefore; the syllogism is either useless or fallacious.
-- 4. A way of escape from this dilemma is provided by distinguishing between the formal and material aspects of the syllogism considered as a means of proof. It begs the question formally, but not materially; that is to say, if it be a question whether camels are herbivorous, and to decide it we are told that "_all_ ruminants are," laying stress upon the "all," as if all had been examined, though in fact camels have not been, then the question as to camels is begged. The form of a universal proposition is then offered as evidence, when in fact the evidence has not been universally ascertained. But if in urging that "all ruminants are herbivorous" no more is meant than that so many other ruminants of different species are known to be herbivorous, and that the ruminant stomach is so well adapted to a coa.r.s.e vegetable diet, that the same habit may be expected in other ruminants, such as camels, the argument then rests upon material evidence without unfairly implying the case in question. Now the nature of the material evidence is plainly this, that the resemblance of camels to deer, oxen, etc., in chewing the cud, justifies us in believing that they have a further resemblance in feeding on herbs; in other words, we a.s.sume that _resemblance is a ground of inference_.
Another way of putting this difficulty which we have just been discussing, with regard to syllogistic evidence, is to urge that by the Laws of Syllogism a conclusion must never go beyond the premises, and that therefore no progress in knowledge can ever be established, except by direct observation. Now, taking the syllogism formally, this is true: if the conclusion go beyond the premises, there must be either four terms, or illicit process of the major or minor term. But, taking it materially, the conclusion may cover facts which were not in view when the major premise was laid down; facts of which we predicate something not as the result of direct observation, but because they resemble in a certain way those facts which had been shown to carry the predicate when the major premise was formed.
"What sort of resemblance is a sufficient ground of inference?" is, therefore, the important question alike in material Deduction and in Induction; and in endeavouring to answer it we shall find that the surest ground of inference is resemblance of causation. For example, it is due to causation that ruminants are herbivorous. Their instincts make them crop the herb, and their stomachs enable them easily to digest it; and in these characters camels are like the other ruminants.
-- 5. In ch. ix, -- 3, the _Dictum de omni et nullo_ was stated: "Whatever may be predicated of a term distributed may be predicated of anything that can be identified with that term." Nothing was there said (as nothing was needed) of the relations that might be implied in the predication. But now that it comes to the ultimate validity of predication, we must be clear as to what these relations are; and it will also be convenient to speak no longer of terms, as in Formal Logic, but of the things denoted. What relations, then, can be determined between concrete facts or phenomena (physical or mental) with the greatest certainty of general truth; and what axioms are there that sanction mediate inferences concerning those relations?
In his _Logic_ (B. II. c. 2, -- 3) Mill gives as the axiom of syllogistic reasoning, instead of the _Dictum_: "A thing which co-exists with another thing, which other co-exists with a third thing, also co-exists with that third thing." Thus the peculiar properties of Socrates co-exist with the attributes of man, which co-exist with mortality: therefore, Socrates is mortal. But, again, he says that the ground of the syllogism is Induction; that man is mortal is an induction. And, further, the ground of Induction is causation; the law of causation is the ultimate major premise of every sound induction. Now causation is the principle of the succession of phenomena: how, then, can the syllogism rest on an axiom concerning co-existence? On reflection, too, it must appear that "Man is mortal" predicates causation: the human const.i.tution issues in death.
The explanation of this inconsistency may perhaps be found in the history of Mill"s work. Books I. and II. were written in 1831; but being unable at that time to explain Induction, he did not write Book III.
until 1837-8. Then, no doubt, he revised the earlier Books, but not enough to bring his theory of the syllogism into complete agreement with the theory of Induction; so that the axiom of co-existence was allowed to stand.
Mill also introduced the doctrine of Natural Kinds as a ground of Induction supplementary, at least provisionally, to causation; and to reasoning about Kinds, or Substance and Attribute, his axiom of co-existence is really adapted. Kinds are groups of things that agree amongst themselves and differ from all others in a mult.i.tude of qualities: these qualities co-exist, or co-inhere, with a high degree of constancy; so that where some are found others may be inferred. Their co-inherence is not to be considered an ultimate fact; for, "since everything which occurs is determined by laws of causation and collocations of the original causes, it follows that the co-existences observable amongst effects cannot themselves be the subject of any similar set of laws distinct from laws of causation" (B. III. c. 5, -- 9). According to the theory of evolution (worked out since Mill wrote), Kinds--that is, species of plants, animals and minerals--with their qualities are all due to causation. Still, as we can rarely, or never, trace the causes with any fullness or precision, a great deal of our reasoning, as, e.g., about men and camels, does in fact trust to the relative permanence of natural Kinds as defined by co-inhering attributes.
To see this more clearly, we should consider that causation and natural Kinds are not at present separable; propositions about causation in concrete phenomena (as distinct from abstract "forces") always involve the a.s.sumption of Kinds. For example--"Water rusts iron," or the oxygen of water combines with iron immersed in it to form rust: this statement of causation a.s.sumes that water, oxygen, iron, and iron-rust are known Kinds. On the other hand, the const.i.tution of every concrete thing, and manifestly of every organised body, is always undergoing change, that is, causation, upon which fact its properties depend.
How, then, can we frame principles of mediate reasoning, about such things? So far as we consider them as Kinds, it is enough to say: _Whatever can be identified as a specimen of a known substance or Kind has the properties of that Kind_. So far as we consider them as in the relation of causation, we may say: _Whatever relation of events can be identified with the relation of cause and effect is constant_. And these principles may be generalised thus: _Whatever is constantly related to a phenomenon (cause or Kind), determined by certain characters, is related in the same way to any phenomenon, that has the same characters_. Taking this as axiom of the syllogism materially treated, we see that herbivorousness, being constantly related to ruminants, is constantly related to camels; mortality to man and, therefore, to Socrates; rusting to the immersion of iron in water generally and, therefore, to this piece of iron. _Nota notae, nota rei ipsius_ is another statement of the same principle; still another is Mill"s axiom, "Whatever has a mark has what it is a mark of." A mark is anything (A) that is never found without something else (B)--a phenomenon constantly related to another phenomenon--so that wherever A is found, B may be expected: human nature is a mark of mortality.
-- 6. The Syllogism has sometimes been discarded by those who have only seen that, as formally stated, it is either useless or fallacious: but those who also perceive its material grounds retain and defend it. In fact, great advantages are gained by stating an argument as a formal syllogism. For, in the first place, we can then examine separately the three conditions on which the validity of the argument depends: