(1) The cla.s.s of Afrikanders who are to some extent deteriorated by a.s.similative influences with the English race, whose restoration to patriotism will need great efforts, discretion, and patience.
(2) The apparently unthinking and apathetic cla.s.s who prefer to relegate all initiative to leaders whom they will loyally follow.
This cla.s.s is the most numerous by far.
(3) The warmly patriotic cla.s.s, including men gifted with intelligence, energy, and speech, qualified as leaders, and apt to exercise influence over the rest.
Among these three cla.s.ses many exist whose views and religious scruples need to be corrected. Scripture abounds in proofs and salient a.n.a.logies applying to the situation and justifying our cause. In this, as well as in other directions, the members who work in circulating written propaganda will supply the correct and conclusive arguments accessible to all.
Upon the basis of our just rights the British Government, if not the entire nation, is the usurping enemy of the Boer nation.
In dealing with an enemy it is justifiable to employ, besides force, also means of a less open character, such as diplomacy and stratagem.
[Sidenote: Anti-british methods.]
The greatest danger to Afrikanderdom is the English policy of Anglicising the Boer nation--to submerge it by the process of a.s.similation.
A distinct att.i.tude of holding aloof from English influences is the only remedy against that peril and for thwarting that insidious policy.
It is only such an att.i.tude that will preserve the nation in its simple faith and habits of morality, and provide safety against the dangers of contamination and pernicious examples, with all their fateful consequences to body and soul.
Let the Dutch language have the place of honour in schools and homes.
Let alliances of marriage with the English be stamped as unpatriotic.
Let every Afrikander see that he is at all times well armed with the best possible weapons, and maintains the expert use of the rifle among young and old, so as to be ready when duty calls, and the time is ripe for a.s.serting the nation"s rights and being rid of English thraldom.
Employ teachers only who are animated with truly patriotic sentiments.
Let it be well understood that English domination will also bring English intolerance and servitude, for it is only a very frail link which separates the English State Church from actual Romanism, and its proselytism _en bloc_ is only a matter of short time.
Equally repugnant and dangerous is England"s policy towards the coloured races, whom she aims, for the sake of industrial profit, at elevating to equal rank with whites, in direct conflict with spiritual authority--a policy which incites coloured people to rivalry with their superiors, and can only end in common disaster.
Whilst remaining absolutely independent, the ties of blood, relationship, and language point to Holland for a domestic base.
As to commerce, Germany, America, and other industrial nations could more than fill the gap left by England, and such connections should be cultivated as a potent means towards obtaining foreign support to our cause and identification with it.
If the mineral wealth of the Transvaal and Orange Free State becomes established--as appears certain from discoveries already made--England will not rest until these are also hers.
The leopard will retain its spots. The independence of both Republics is at stake on that account alone, with the risk that the rightful owners of the land will become the hewers of wood and drawers of water for the usurpers.
There is no alternative hope for the peace and progress of South Africa except by the total excision of the British ulcer.
Reliable signs are not wanting to show that our nation is designed by Providence as the instrument for the recovery of its rights, and for the chastis.e.m.e.nt of proud, perfidious Albion."[19]
[Footnote 19: P. 64 _et seq._ of _The Origin of the Anglo-Boer War Revealed_ (Hodder & Stoughton).]
These brief and disjointed sentences present in their shortest form arguments and exhortations with which the Dutch population of the Free State, the Transvaal, and the Cape Colony, were familiarised through the Press, the pulpit, the platform, and through individual intercourse and advocacy, from the time of the Retrocession in 1881 onwards. It is in effect the scheme of a Bond "worked out more in detail by some friends at Bloemfontein," as published by Borckenhagen in his paper, _The Bloemfontein Express_, on April 7th, 1881, to which Du Toit, the founder of the Bond in the Cape Colony, referred in the pamphlet, _De Transvaalse Oorlog_ (The Transvaal War), which he issued from his press at the Paarl later on in the same year. The nationalist creed, as thus formulated, was preached consistently in the Free State; but in the Cape Colony it was modified by Hofmeyr to meet the exigencies of Colonial politics.
None the less it was in the Cape Colony that the Bond, as a political organisation, was destined to find its chief sphere of action. In the Free State it was discouraged by President Brand, and in point of fact the British population was too insignificant a factor in the politics of the central republic to make it necessary to maintain a distinct organisation for the promotion of nationalist sentiment. In the Transvaal, again, the Bond maintained no regular organisation. And this for two reasons. Every burgher of the northern Republic was sufficiently animated by the anti-British sentiments which it was intended to promote; and the only "const.i.tution" which the Transvaal Dutch would accept was one which embodied principles so flagrantly inconsistent with submission to British authority that it could not be adopted by the branches of the Bond in the Cape Colony without exposing its members to immediate prosecution for high treason.[20]
[Footnote 20: Under the changed conditions of to-day the Boer population is organised in the Transvaal into _Het Volk_, and in the Orange River Colony into the _Oranjie Unie_; both practically identical with the Bond in the Cape Colony.]
[Sidenote: The origin of the Bond.]
In the politics of the Cape Colony, however, the Bond became the predominant force; and any picture, however briefly sketched, of South Africa as it was when Lord Milner"s administration commenced, must include some account of the origin and methods of this remarkable organisation.
The origin of the Afrikander Bond is to be found in the articles written by the Rev. S. J. du Toit, a Dutch predikant, in _De Patriot_, a newspaper published at the Paarl, of which he was the editor. Mr. du Toit"s political standpoint is sufficiently revealed by the fact that in 1881 he claimed that _De Patriot_ had done more than any other single agency to secure the successful revolt of the Boers from British authority accomplished in that year. The inspiration which drove his pen to advocate the founding of a political organisation, that should serve to prepare the way for a more general and complete "war of independence," was the defeat of the British troops by the Transvaal burghers.
"This is now our time," he wrote, in the same year, "to establish the Bond, while a national consciousness has been awakened through the Transvaal War. And the Bond must be our preparation for the future confederation of all the States and Colonies of South Africa. The English Government keeps talking of a confederation under the British flag. That will never happen. We can a.s.sure them of that. We have often said it: there is just one hindrance to confederation, and that is the English flag. Let them take that away, and the confederation under the free Afrikander flag would be established. But so long as the English flag remains here the Afrikander Bond must be our confederation.
And the British will, after a while, realise that Froude"s advice is the best for them: they must just have Simon"s Bay as a naval and military station on the road to India, and give over all the rest of South Africa to the Afrikanders."[21]
[Footnote 21: Reprint of a pamphlet (found with the first leaf torn) containing an English translation of _De Transvaalse Oorlog_, p. 8.]
This general statement of the purpose of the Bond was supported by reiterated appeals to racial pa.s.sion:
"The little respect which the Afrikander had for British troops and cannons [up to the Majuba defeat]," he writes, "is utterly done away. And England has learnt so much respect for us Afrikanders that she will take care not to be so ready to make war with us again.... The Englishman has made himself hated, language and all. And this is well."
[Sidenote: The objects of the Bond.]
When, by the use of these and even more violent expressions, the mind of the Dutch population had been sufficiently aroused, Du Toit proceeded to unfold his plan of campaign. His _modus operandi_ is similar to that of Borckenhagen in its main features. The Bond, says _De Patriot_, must boycott all English traders, except only those who are ready to adopt its principles. English signboards, advertis.e.m.e.nts, shops and book-keepers, must be abolished. The English banks must be replaced by a National Bank. No land must be sold to Englishmen. The Republics must "make their own ammunition, and be well supplied with cannon, and provide a regiment of artillery to work them." And he cheerfully notices that "at Heidelberg there are already 4,000 cartridges made daily, and a few skilful Afrikanders have begun to make sh.e.l.ls, too. This is right: so must we become a nation." For the Cape Colony, however, "such preparations are not so especially necessary." But, most of all, Du Toit insists upon the need of combating the growing use of the English language. "English education," he laments, "has done more mischief to our country and nation than we can express." And, therefore, he urges "war" against the English language. In the schools, in the Church, and "in our family life above all," it must be considered a "disgrace to speak English.... Who will join the war? All true Afrikanders, we hope."
Thus was the Bond, the child of Majuba, quickened into conscious being by the fiery pen of the predikant, Du Toit. Poor Du Toit! His after life was a strange commentary upon this early triumph of his brain, won in the drowsy solitudes of the Paarl. Summoned to be Director of Education in the Transvaal, he was quickly disillusioned of his love of his Dutch mother-country by actual intercourse with the contemptuous Hollanders whom Kruger had invited to serve the Republic.
Later, again, he was rejected by the Bond which he had himself created, and driven to find comfort in the broad freedom of allegiance to an Empire-state.
The object of the Bond, as stated by Du Toit in _De Transvaalse Oorlog_, was the "creation of a South African nationality ... through the establishment of this Bond in all states and colonies of South Africa." Its organisation was to consist of a central governing body (_bestuur_), with provincial, district, and ward _besturen_. The central _bestuur_ was to be composed of five members, two for the Cape Colony, and one each for the Transvaal, Natal, and Free State, who were "to meet yearly in one or other of the chief towns of the component states." The provincial _besturen_, consisting of one representative from each of the district _besturen_, were to meet every six months at their respective colonial or state capitals.[22]
[Footnote 22: _De Transvaalse Oorlog_, pp. 7 and 8.]
The first Congress of the Afrikander Bond was held at Graaf Reinet in 1882. In the draft const.i.tution then drawn up for the approval of its members, the relationship of the Bond to the British Government in South Africa was defined with commendable frankness. In the "Programme of Principles" was the article:
In itself acknowledging no single form of government as the only suitable form, and whilst acknowledging the form of government existing at present, [the Bond] means that the aim of our national development must be a united South Africa under its own flag.
[Sidenote: Hofmeyr"s influence.]
And it was upon the basis of this "Programme of Principles" that the earliest Bond organisations were formed in the Transvaal, the Free State, and the Cape Colony. In the year following the Graaf Reinet Congress, however, the "Farmers" Protection a.s.sociation" was amalgamated with the Bond in the Cape Colony, and the influence of Mr.
J. H. Hofmeyr led the joint organisation to adopt a modified "programme." Mr. Hofmeyr, who was destined afterwards to a.s.sume the undisputed headship of the Bond, was an economist as well as a nationalist. He was intensely interested in the development of the country districts, and he saw that the conditions of agriculture could hardly be improved without the co-operation of the British and more progressive section of the farming cla.s.s. He also knew that an organisation, professing to forward aims of avowed disloyalty, would rapidly find itself in collision with the Cape Government. With the growth of Mr. Hofmeyr"s influence the policy, though not the aims, of the Bond was changed. All declarations, such as the clause "under its own flag," inconsistent with allegiance to the British Crown were omitted from the official const.i.tution, and its individual members were exhorted to avoid any behaviour or expressions likely to prevent Englishmen from joining the organisation. As early as 1884 the Bond secured the return of twenty-five members to the Cape Parliament, and it was their support that enabled the Upington Ministry to maintain itself in office against an opposition which consisted of the main body of the representatives elected by the British population; and from this date onwards it was the recognised aim of Mr. Hofmeyr to control the Legislature of the Colony by making it impossible for any ministry to dispense with the support of the Bond members, although he refrained from putting a ministry of Bondsmen into office. To have done this latter might have united the British population and their representatives in a solid phalanx, and endangered the success of the effort to separate the British settlers in the country districts from the more recent arrivals from England--mostly townsmen--which remained a fruitful source of Afrikander influence up to the time of the Jameson Raid. By representing the new British population, which followed in the wake of the mineral discoveries, as "fortune-seekers"
and adventurers and not genuine colonists, the Bond endeavoured, not merely to widen the natural line of cleavage between the townsman and the countryman, but actually to detach the older British settlers from sympathy with the mother country, and, by drawing them within the sphere of Afrikander nationalist aspirations, to make them share its own antagonism to British supremacy.
[Sidenote: Merriman and the Bond.]
But, in spite of the change of policy due to Mr. Hofmeyr, the old leaven of stalwart Bondsmen remained sufficiently in evidence to draw from Mr. J. X. Merriman--then a strong Imperialist in close a.s.sociation with Mr. J. W. Leonard--a striking rebuke. The speech in question was made, fittingly enough, at Grahamstown, the most "English" town in South Africa, in 1885. It was reprinted with complete appropriateness, in _The Cape Times_ of July 10th, 1899. The struggle which Mr. Merriman had foreseen fourteen years before was then near at hand; while Mr. Merriman himself had become a member of a ministry placed in power by the Bond for the avowed purpose of "combating the British Government."
"The situation is a grave one," he said. "It is not a question of localism; it is not a question of party politics; but it is a question whether the Cape Colony is to continue to be an integral part of the British Empire.... You will have to keep public men up to the mark, and each one of you will have to make up his mind whether he is prepared to see this colony remain a part of the British Empire, which carries with it obligations as well as privileges, or whether he is prepared to obey the dictates of the Bond. From the very first time, some years ago, when the poison began to be instilled into the country, I felt that it must come to this--Is England or the Transvaal to be the paramount force in South Africa?... Since then that inst.i.tution has made a show of loyalty, while it stirred up disloyalty.... Some people, who should have known better, were dragged into the toils under the idea that they could influence it for good, but the whole teaching of history goes to show that when the conflict was between men of extreme views and moderate men, the violent section triumphed. And so we see that some moderate men are in the power of an inst.i.tution whose avowed object is to combat the British Government. In any other country such an organisation could not have grown; but here, among a scattered population, it has insidiously and successfully worked.... No one who wishes well for the British Government could have read the leading articles of the _Zuid Africaan_, and _Express_, and _De Patriot_, in expounding the Bond principles, without seeing that the maintenance of law and order under the British Crown and the object they have in view are absolutely different things. My quarrel with the Bond is that it stirs up race differences. Its main object is to make the South African Republic the paramount power in South Africa."
This was plain speaking. The rare insight revealed in such a sentence as this--"in any other country such an organisation could not have grown, but here, _among a scattered population_, it has insidiously and successfully worked"; the piquant incident of the reproduction of the speech on the eve of the war; the fact that the man who made this diagnosis was to drink the poison whose fatal effects he described so faithfully, was indeed to become the most bitter opponent of the great statesman that "kept South Africa a part of the British Empire,"--these things together make Mr. Merriman"s Grahamstown speech one of the most curious and instructive of the political utterances of the period.
[Sidenote: Change of Bond policy.]