"It seems almost superfluous to argue the case for further railway development in South Africa, and especially in the new colonies. The richest agricultural districts of both colonies are far removed from markets. The through lines to the coast from the great centres of industry will be choked with traffic. Both to stimulate agriculture and to facilitate the operations of commerce, additional lines and relief lines will be urgently required. Moreover, if the construction of the most necessary of these is undertaken as fast as the districts through which they pa.s.s are pacified, employment will be provided for large numbers of persons who would otherwise be idle and dependent on Government for relief, as well as for many newcomers, who will be a valuable addition to the population of the country. If there is one enterprise which is certain to be thoroughly popular with the old population, it is this. The one thing which the Boers will thoroughly appreciate will be railways bringing their richest land into touch with the best markets. And the British population will be equally in favour of such a course."[318]
[Footnote 318: Cd. 903.]
Thus, six months before Vereeniging, and less than three months after Lord Milner"s return from England, the "big unfinished job" was well in hand.
CHAPTER XII
THE SURRENDER OF VEREENIGING
[Sidenote: The gold industry re-started.]
With the beginning of the year 1902, the question of the ultimate submission of the Boers had become a matter of months, or even weeks.
The guerilla leaders had been beaten at their own game. In spite of the extension of the area of the war, the terrorising of the peaceably inclined burghers, the co-operation of the Afrikander nationalists, and the encouragement derived from Boer sympathisers in England, the most important districts of the Transvaal and half of the Orange River Colony were being restored to the pursuits of peace. The great industry of South Africa was re-established, and agriculture was not only resumed but even developing upon more enlightened principles within the protected areas of the two colonies; while in the Orange River Colony 150 new British settlers had been planted upon farms before the terms of the Vereeniging surrender were signed. The story of this steady progress is told by the mere items in the monthly records furnished by Lord Milner to the Home Government. The gold industry of the Rand recommenced in May, 1901, when, with permission to set 150 stamps at work, 7,439 oz. of gold were won. Up to November, when, as we have seen, the military situation for the first time permitted any considerable body of refugees to return, progress was slow; but in this month the output amounted to 32,000 oz. in round numbers. In December the number of stamps working had risen to 953, and the output to 52,897 oz. Henceforward the advance was rapid and sustained. In the remaining five months of the war (January to May, 1902), the number of stamps at work rose to 2,095, the monthly output to 138,600 oz., of the value of 600,000, and 30,000 additional British refugees had been brought back to their homes on the Rand, in view of the increasing certainty of employment afforded by the expanding gold industry. Thus, before the surrender of the Boer forces in the field, half of the British population had been restored to the Transvaal, and the gold industry had been so far re-established that its production had reached one-third of the highest annual rate attained before the war broke out. Nor must it be forgotten that during these last months the conditions of the refugee camps were being steadily improved, until, as already noted, the death-rate was ultimately reduced below the normal.
The Home Government had been unprepared for the military struggle precipitated by the ultimatum; Lord Milner was determined that, so far as his efforts could avail, it should not be unprepared for the economic conflict for which peace would be the signal. In a despatch of January 25th, 1902, he urged once more upon Mr. Chamberlain the importance of settling British colonists upon the land, and pressed for a "decision on the main issues" raised by this question.
[Sidenote: Land settlement.]
"This subject has for long occupied my attention," he wrote, "and, in a tentative way, a good deal has been done. But we have reached a point where little more progress can be made without a decision on the main issues. The question is, whether British colonisation is to be undertaken on a large and effective scale, under Government control and with Government a.s.sistance, or to be left to take care of itself, with whatever little help and sympathy an Administration, devoid of any general plan, and with no special funds devoted to the particular purpose, can give it.... The princ.i.p.al consideration is the necessity of avoiding a sharp contrast and antagonism in the character and sentiments of the population between the country districts and the towns. If we do nothing, we shall be confronted, sooner or later, with an industrial urban population, rapidly increasing, and almost wholly British in sentiment, and, on the other hand, a rural population, wholly Dutch, agriculturally unprogressive. It is not possible to contemplate such a state of affairs without grave misgivings. We shall have to reinstate the bulk of our prisoners upon their farms, and provide them with the means of starting life anew, but unless we at the same time introduce some new element we may be simply laying up the material for further trouble. The land will remain as neglected, the att.i.tude of the rural population as unprogressive, and as much out of sympathy with British ideas as ever.... To satisfy these demands, it is clear that no small and makeshift scheme will suffice. Land settlement must be undertaken on a large scale; otherwise, however useful, it will be _politically_ unimportant.
"The time is fast approaching when it will be absolutely necessary to raise loans for both new colonies to meet expenses arising immediately out of the war. I wish to place on record my profound conviction that unless, in raising these loans, we provide a substantial sum for the purchase of land and the settlement thereon of farmers of British race, an opportunity will be lost which will never recur, and the neglect of which will have the most prejudicial effect on the future peace and prosperity of South Africa. I do not, indeed, ask that these first loans should include a sum as large as may ultimately be required if land settlement is to a.s.sume the proportions which I contemplate. But, if our first considerable undertakings in this line are proving themselves successful, I foresee no difficulty in obtaining more money later on, should we require it. What I do fear is a check now, when we ought to be in a position to seize every possible opportunity of getting hold of land suitable to our purpose, and of retaining in the country such men as we want to put on it. If we lose the next year or two we lose the game, and without that power of acting promptly, which a ready command of money alone can give, we shall begin to throw away opportunities from this moment at which I am writing onwards.
"What I want to put plainly to His Majesty"s Government are these two questions: (1) Are we to be allowed to go on purchasing good land, by voluntary agreement wherever possible, but compulsorily, if necessary? And, a.s.suming this question to be answered in the affirmative, (2) what amount shall we be able to dispose of for this purpose in the immediate future?"[319]
[Footnote 319: Cd. 1,163.]
It had been arranged during Lord Milner"s last visit to England that the large expenditure inevitably arising out of the economic reconstruction and future development of the new colonies, should be provided by a loan secured upon their a.s.sets and revenues. The purposes for which this immediate outlay was especially required were the acquisition of the existing railways and the construction of new lines, land settlement, the repatriation of the Boers, and the compensation of loyalists for war losses both in the new colonies and in the Cape and Natal. Lord Milner now proposed that the Home Government should decide to appropriate, out of the funds to be thus raised, a sum of 3,000,000 to land settlement, and that of this sum 2,000,000 should be spent in the Transvaal and 1,000,000 in the Orange Colony. The "development" loan, as it was called, was not issued until after Mr. Chamberlain"s visit to South Africa in the (South African) summer of 1902-3; but Lord Milner"s proposal was approved in principle, and he was enabled to employ the limited resources at his disposal in the purchase of blocks of land suitable for the purposes of agriculture in both colonies.
Apart from the progress thus achieved in this matter of supreme importance, as Lord Milner deemed it, to the future of South Africa, the preparation of the administrative machinery, the _materiel_ of transport, and the supplies of all kinds required for the repatriation of the Boers, was pushed forward with increasing activity. At the same time certain other administrative questions were brought by him to the consideration of the Home Government during these months (January to May, 1902), with the result that the ink was scarcely dry upon the Treaty of Surrender before he was able to ask for, and obtain, decisions upon them.
[Sidenote: On the eve of peace.]
The telegrams which pa.s.sed between Lord Milner and the Colonial Office on these matters, during the weeks immediately preceding and following the Vereeniging surrender, are significant. Beside the clear thrust of Lord Milner"s calculated energy, Mr. Chamberlain"s efforts to keep pace with the needs of the situation sink into comparative inertia. On April 18th Lord Milner telegraphs the particulars of the 10 per cent.
tax which he proposes to levy on the net produce of the mining industry. The rate is high--twice as high as the gold tax under the Republic--and will yield an annual revenue of 500,000 or 600,000 on a basis of the present normal production of the mines; but he believes that it will be "accepted without serious opposition, if it is imposed while the industry is rapidly advancing." And he expresses the hope that the explanation which he has furnished will be "sufficient to show the principles" of the tax, and that he may publicly announce the decision on this matter of such general economic importance at once.
Mr. Chamberlain, however, requires further information; and we find Lord Milner telegraphing on June 2nd: "I trust you will now agree to the tax on the profits of gold mines; I am anxious to publish the Proclamation in next Friday"s _Gazette_." And to this Mr. Chamberlain replies on June 4th, "I agree to the imposition of a 10 per cent. tax on the profits of gold mines." On June 2nd, that is, two days after the terms of surrender have been signed at Pretoria, Lord Milner sends a "most urgent" telegram on the immediate financial position:
"The departments are still very busy with the estimates of the new colonies and Constabulary. They are rather late this year, but that was quite unavoidable. The result promises to be good.
We can pay for all normal expenditure and the 6,000 South African Constabulary out of revenue. But, as you know, there is nothing provided for the various extraordinary items which have been hitherto financed out of the 500,000 grant for relief and re-settlement. In all my estimates I have relied on a loan for this. As I understand, the loan is deferred. As the 500,000 is nearly exhausted, and it would be disastrous if land settlement, which latter is at last making good progress, were stopped, especially at this juncture, I would ask for immediate authority to spend another 500,000 on these purposes. This is independent of the amounts which will be required under the last clause of the Terms of Surrender, about which I will address you immediately. I earnestly hope that there may be no delay in acceding to this request. The work to be got through in the immediate future is so enormous that, unless we can get the fundamental questions of finance settled promptly, a breakdown is inevitable. It would be a great relief to my mind to feel that services already started and working well were provided for at least for some months ahead, before I plunge into the new and heavy job of restoring the Boer population, which will require all my attention in the immediate future."[320]
[Footnote 320: Cd. 1,163.]
Mr. Chamberlain"s reply comes on June 18th:
"You may incur expenditure up to 500,000 more for relief and re-settlement, pending the issue of the loan."
On June 10th Lord Milner telegraphs an outline scheme for repatriating the Boers. "As time presses," he concludes, "I am going ahead on these lines; but I am anxious to know that they have your general approval."
The reply, dated June 18th, is: "The proposals are approved generally.
Send by post a report on the details of the arrangement and the persons appointed." At the same time Lord Milner has been pressing for a decision on the question of land settlement. He has sent a despatch on May 9th containing full particulars of the terms upon which it is proposed to offer and to suitable applicants; and he now telegraphs, on June 20th:
[Sidenote: "It is vital to make a start".]
"If you could agree generally to the terms in my despatch, I would immediately deal with some of the most pressing cases on those lines. The terms may be improved upon later; meanwhile it is vital to make a start."
There is land available, and there are men available--over-sea colonists, and yeomen with a knowledge of agriculture, who have fought in the war, and have, therefore, a first claim to be considered. But these desirable settlers cannot afford to wait in a country like South Africa, where the cost of living is abnormally high, without a definite prospect of employment.
"Unless something is done at once," he says, "there will be bitter complaint. [The Transvaal] Government is already being severely, though unjustly, criticised for the delay."
This is answered by Mr. Chamberlain"s telegram of July 7th, in which he "concurs generally" in Lord Milner"s proposals, and leaves him "full discretion to deal with the details of the scheme, which it is not possible to criticise effectively" in London.
In a telegram of June 21st we get the announcement of the formal initiation of Crown Colony government:
"I have this day read and published the Letters Patent," Lord Milner says, "const.i.tuting the Government of the Transvaal, and my Commission; and I have taken the prescribed oath."
And on July 3rd he suggests that an announcement should be made at once of the intention of the Home Government to enlarge the Legislative Councils of both colonies by the admission of a non-official element:
[Sidenote: Colonists and the settlement.]
"I felt at one time that in the case of the Transvaal this would be unworkable," he adds, "but my present opinion is strongly to the effect that we should seize the opportunity of the present improved feeling between the Dutch and British in the new colonies to commence co-operation between them in the conduct of public business."
To this proposal Mr. Chamberlain gives his approval in a brief telegram of July 7th.[321]
[Footnote 321: Cd. 1,163.]
Bare and jejune as are these telegrams, they tell us something of the spirit of relentless vigour by which Lord Milner drove the c.u.mbrous wheels of Downing Street into quicker revolutions at the shifting of the scenes from war to peace. Within six weeks of the surrender of Vereeniging he was fully engaged in what he afterwards called "the tremendous effort, wise or unwise in various particulars, made after the war, not only to repair its ravages, but also to re-start the new colonies on a far higher plane of civilisation than they had ever previously attained."[322] The story of this "tremendous effort," with its economic problems and its political agitations, must be reserved for a separate volume. It only remains, therefore, to relate the part which Lord Milner played in determining the conditions under which the republican Dutch were incorporated into the system of British South Africa.
[Footnote 322: At Johannesburg, March 31st, 1905. From _The Star_ report.]
Before we approach the actual circ.u.mstances which accompanied the surrender of the Boer forces in the field, it is necessary to recall the exchange of views on the subject of the settlement of the new colonies which took place between the Imperial authorities and the Governments of the Cape and Natal in the early months of the preceding year (1901). In these communications--the origin of which has been mentioned previously[323]--the significance attached by loyalist opinion in South Africa to certain questions, necessarily left undetermined in Mr. Chamberlain"s p.r.o.nouncements of the general policy of the British Government, was fully disclosed. The Cape ministers, while recognising that full representative self-government should be conferred at an early date, unhesitatingly affirmed the necessity of maintaining a system of Crown Colony government until "such time as it was certain that representative inst.i.tutions could be established, due regard being had to the paramount necessity of maintaining and strengthening British supremacy in the colonies in question." And as, in their opinion, "this consummation would be ultimately a.s.sured and materially strengthened by a large influx of immigrants favourably disposed to British rule," they expressed the hope that "no time would be lost after the conclusion of the war in putting into effect a large scheme of land settlement." More than this, with the object-lesson of the actual breakdown of representative government in their own Colony before their eyes, they added a recommendation that this British immigration should not be confined to the new colonies, but that a portion of the funds to be provided by the Imperial Government for this purpose should be allocated to the Cape Colony.
[Footnote 323: See p. 489.]
[Sidenote: The language question.]
In the minute furnished by the Natal Ministry the question of the settlement of the new colonies was discussed in greater detail, and in particular attention was drawn to the opportunities for the promotion of a federal union of British South Africa, which the establishment of British government in the former Republics would afford. The settlement of the new colonies, in their opinion, should be so treated as to become a preliminary stage in the creation of a federal administration which "should be accomplished, if possible, before intercolonial jealousies and animosities should have had time to crystallise and become formidable." The Natal ministers, therefore, insisted upon the importance of measures calculated to secure the predominance of the English language in the new colonies. In support of this recommendation they pointed out that the preservation of the "Taal" is purely a matter of sentiment. The Boer vernacular, so called, "has neither a literature nor a grammar"; it is distinct from "the Dutch language used in public offices and official doc.u.ments." No one acquainted with the conditions of Boer life will dispute the truth of this contention. The Boer child, if he is to receive an education sufficient to qualify him for the public services, or for a professional or commercial career, must in any case learn a second language; and since to learn the Dutch of Holland is no less difficult--probably more difficult--to him than to learn English, the desire to have Dutch taught in schools in preference to English becomes a matter of political sentiment, and not of practical convenience. On the other hand, the strongest reasons exist for making English the common language of both races. Apart from its superiority to Dutch as the literary vehicle of the Anglo-Saxon world and the language of commerce, the predominance of the English language is a matter which vitally affects the success of British policy in South Africa.
"The general good of the new colonies and of South Africa generally," the Natal ministers wrote, "requires the predominance of the English language. The language question has done more, probably, than anything else to separate the races and to provoke racial animosity."
They, therefore, recommend that--
"English should be the official and predominant language in the higher courts, and in the public service--combined with such concessions in favour of Dutch as justice, convenience, and circ.u.mstances may require. Dutch interpreters should be attached to all courts and to the princ.i.p.al public offices, and their services should be available free of charge, in civil as well as in criminal cases. English should be the medium of instruction in all secondary schools, and in all standards in primary schools situated in English districts, and in the higher standards in all other primary schools. Dutch should be the medium of instruction meanwhile in the lower forms in the Dutch districts, and it should be taught in all schools where there is a reasonable demand for it."[324]
[Footnote 324: Cd. 1,163.]
On the question of disarmament they wrote: