"As I look at the matter, the Government is making certain promises in this doc.u.ment, and I consider that all promises to which a reference may be made later should appear in it.
Everything to which the Government is asked to bind itself should appear in this doc.u.ment, and nothing else. I do not object to clauses being added, but I wish to prevent any possible misunderstanding."
[Sidenote: Lord Milner"s vigilance.]
And again, in the course of the same meeting, we find him saying: "You must put in writing every point that strikes you, and let them be laid before His Majesty"s Government." And, to prevent any possible misconstruction of Lord Kitchener"s statement, "there is a pledge that the matter [the question of the payment of receipts] will be properly considered," he says:
"Yes, naturally, if we put anything down in writing. I am convinced that it is necessary to make it quite clear that this doc.u.ment must contain everything about which there is anything in the form of a pledge."
And before telegraphing the draft agreement to the Home Government he draws the attention of the commissioners in the most explicit language to the fact that the Middelburg proposal has been "completely annulled"; and that, therefore, if the draft agreement should be signed, there must be "no attempt to explain the doc.u.ment, or its terms, by anything in the Middelburg proposal."
The greatness of the debt owed by England and the empire to Lord Milner for the inflexible determination with which he penetrated, unmasked, and finally baffled the tortuous diplomacy of the Boer commissioners may be estimated from the fact that within three months of the signing of the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria, three out of their number asked the British Government to re-open the discussion and make, what Mr. Chamberlain rightly termed, "an entirely new agreement." As it was, Lord Milner"s faultless precision during the whole progress of the negotiations at Pretoria provided the Home Government with a complete answer to the representatives of the Boer "delegates."
"It would not be in accordance with my duty," wrote Mr.
Chamberlain,[337] "to enter upon any discussion of proposals of this kind, some of which were rejected at the conferences at Pretoria; while others, which were not even mentioned on those occasions, would certainly not have been accepted at any time by His Majesty"s Government."
[Footnote 337: Mr. Chamberlain to Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey, August 28th, 1902. Cd. 1,284.]
[Sidenote: Approval of Home Government.]
At the close of the afternoon meeting (May 21st) the draft agreement was telegraphed to the Home Government. On the 27th Mr. Chamberlain informed Lord Milner by telegram that the Cabinet approved of the submission of this doc.u.ment with certain minor alterations, and with the new clause dealing with the grant of 3,000,000, to the a.s.sembly at Vereeniging. Meanwhile the nature of the penalties to be inflicted upon the colonial rebels, a subject which had been discussed in private conversations between the Boer leaders and Lords Kitchener and Milner, but which was excluded from the "Terms of Surrender," had been settled by communications which had pa.s.sed between Lord Milner and Mr.
Chamberlain and the Governments of the Cape and Natal. The reason for this course was that the Home Government and Lord Milner, while they objected on principle to the treatment of rebels being made part of the agreement with the surrendering enemy, were nevertheless quite willing that the latter should be informed of the clemency which it was, in any case, intended to show to the rebels. The Terms of Surrender, in the form given to them by the Home Government, and the statement of the treatment to be meted out to the rebels by their respective Governments, were communicated to the Boer commissioners on May 28th. At the same time they were distinctly told that His Majesty"s Government was not prepared to listen to any suggestion of further modifications of the Terms, but that they must be submitted to the a.s.sembly for a "Yes" or "No" vote as an unalterable whole. The Boer commissioners left at 7 o"clock in the evening of the same day for Vereeniging, and on the day following the Terms of Surrender were submitted to the "Yes" or "No" vote of the burgher representatives.
One other point had been raised and settled between Lord Milner and the Home Government. Under the Proclamation of August 7th, 1901, certain of the Boer leaders were liable to the penalties of confiscation and banishment. Lord Milner was of opinion, however, that in view of the general surrender this proclamation should be "tacitly dropped," although property already confiscated under its terms could not, of course, be restored; and in this view the Home Government concurred.
The text of the doc.u.ment submitted to the burgher representatives at Vereeniging on May 29th was as follows:
"_Draft Agreement as to the Terms of Surrender of the Boer Forces in the Field, approved by His Majesty"s Government._
"His Excellency General Lord Kitchener and his Excellency Lord Milner, on behalf of the British Government, and Messrs. M. T.
Steyn, J. Brebner, General C. R. De Wet, General C. Olivier, and Judge J. B. M. Hertzog, acting as the Government of the Orange Free State, and Messrs. S. W. Burger, F. W. Reitz, Generals Louis Botha, J. H. Delarey, Lucas Meyer, Krogh, acting as the Government of the South African Republic, on behalf of their respective burghers desirous to terminate the present hostilities, agree on the following articles:
[Sidenote: The surrender agreement.]
"1. The burgher forces in the field will forthwith lay down their arms, handing over all guns, rifles, and munitions of war in their possession or under their control, and desist from any further resistance to the authority of His Majesty King Edward VII., whom they recognise as their lawful Sovereign. The manner and details of this surrender will be arranged between Lord Kitchener and Commandant-General Botha, a.s.sistant Commandant-General Delarey, and Chief Commandant De Wet.
"2. All burghers in the field outside the limits of the Transvaal or Orange River Colony, and all prisoners of war at present outside South Africa who are burghers will, on duly declaring their acceptance of the position of subjects of His Majesty King Edward VII., be gradually brought back to their homes as soon as transport can be provided, and their means of subsistence ensured.
"3. The burghers so surrendering or so returning will not be deprived of their personal liberty or their property.
"4. No proceedings, civil or criminal, will be taken against any of the burghers surrendering or so returning for any acts in connection with the prosecution of the war. The benefit of this clause will not extend to certain acts, contrary to usages of war, which have been notified by the Commander-in-Chief to the Boer generals, and which shall be tried by court-martial immediately after the close of hostilities.
"5. The Dutch language will be taught in public schools in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony where the parents of the children desire it, and will be allowed in courts of law when necessary for the better and more effectual administration of justice.
"6. The possession of rifles will be allowed in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony to persons requiring them for their protection, on taking out a licence according to law.
"7. Military administration in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony will at the earliest possible date be succeeded by civil government, and, as soon as circ.u.mstances permit, representative inst.i.tutions, leading up to self-government, will be introduced.
"8. The question of granting the franchise to the natives will not be decided until after the introduction of self-government.
"9. No special tax will be imposed on landed property in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony to defray the expenses of the war.
"10. As soon as conditions permit, a Commission, on which the local inhabitants will be represented, will be appointed in each district of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, under the presidency of a magistrate or other official, for the purposes of a.s.sisting the restoration of the people to their homes, and supplying those who, owing to war losses, are unable to provide themselves with food, shelter, and the necessary amount of seed, stock, implements, etc., indispensable to the resumption of their normal occupation.
"His Majesty"s Government will place at the disposal of these Commissions a sum of 3,000,000 for the above purposes, and will allow all notes issued under Law 1 of 1900 of the South African Republic, and all receipts given by officers in the field of the late Republics, or under their orders, to be presented to a Judicial Commission, which will be appointed by the Government, and if such notes and receipts are found by this Commission to have been duly issued in return for valuable considerations, they will be received by the first-named Commissions as evidence of war losses suffered by the persons to whom they were originally given.
"In addition to the above-named free grant of 3,000,000, His Majesty"s Government will be prepared to make advances on loan for the same purposes free of interest for two years, and afterwards repayable over a period of years with 3 per cent.
interest. No foreigner or rebel will be ent.i.tled to the benefit of this clause."[338]
[Footnote 338: Cd. 1,096. President Steyn was too ill to sign the Agreement, and De Wet signed first of the Free State representatives. He was declared President, in the place of Steyn, at Vereeniging on the 29th.]
[Sidenote: Punishment of rebels.]
To this must be added the following statement as to the punishment of the colonial rebels, a copy of which was handed to the Boer commissioners on May 28th, after it (together with the Terms of Surrender) had been read to them by Lord Milner.
"His Majesty"s Government must place it on record that the treatment of Cape and Natal colonists who have been in rebellion and who now surrender will, if they return to their colonies, be determined by the colonial Governments and in accordance with the laws of the colonies, and that any British subjects who have joined the enemy will be liable to trial under the law of that part of the British Empire to which they belong.
"His Majesty"s Government are informed by the Cape Government that the following are their views as to the terms which should be granted to British subjects of Cape Colony who are now in the field, or who have surrendered, or have been captured since 12th April, 1901:
"With regard to the rank and file, they should all, upon surrender, after giving up their arms, sign a doc.u.ment before the resident magistrate of the district in which the surrender takes place acknowledging themselves guilty of high treason, and the punishment to be awarded to them, provided they shall not have been guilty of murder or other acts contrary to the usages of civilised warfare, should be that they shall not be ent.i.tled for life[339] to be registered as voters or to vote at any Parliamentary Divisional Council, or munic.i.p.al election. With reference to justices of the peace and field-cornets of Cape Colony and all other persons holding an official position under the Government of Cape Colony or who may occupy the position of commandant of rebel or burgher forces, they shall be tried for high treason before the ordinary court of the country or such special court as may be hereafter const.i.tuted by law, the punishment for their offence to be left to the discretion of the court, with this proviso, that in no case shall the penalty of death be inflicted.
"The Natal Government are of opinion that rebels should be dealt with according to the law of the Colony."[340]
[Footnote 339: This was reduced to a period of five years.]
[Footnote 340: Cd. 1,096. As compared with the Middelburg terms, the terms accepted at Vereeniging were slightly less favourable to the Boers in respect of permission to possess arms, and the use of the Dutch language; but the monetary a.s.sistance promised to the repatriated burghers was more generous. The free grant was raised from one million to three millions, and the advances on loan were offered for the first two years free of interest, and subsequently at only three per cent. The greater destruction of property consequent upon the prolongation of the war made this increased a.s.sistance necessary and reasonable. It is noticeable, however, that Lord Milner, alike in the Middelburg and Vereeniging negotiations, although he was opposed to any payment of the costs incurred by the Boer leaders in carrying on the war, was prepared to go even farther than the Home Government in the direction of a generous treatment of the Boers in all other matters that concerned their material prosperity.
One variation as between the Middelburg and Vereeniging terms is noticeable in view of the statement, made in the House of Commons by the present (1906) Under-Secretary for the Colonies (Mr. Winston Churchill), that the use of the word "natives" in clause viii. of the Terms of Surrender prevented the introduction of any legislation affecting the _status_ of Asiatics and "coloured persons" in the new colonies prior to the establishment of self-government. This a.s.sertion was based upon the contention that the word "natives" is understood by the Boers to indicate the "native of any country other than those of the European inhabitants of South Africa." The actual text of the corresponding clause in the Middelburg terms (Lord Kitchener"s despatch of March 20th, 1901, in Cd. 528) is as follows: "As regards the extension of the franchise to the Kafirs in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, it is not the intention of His Majesty"s Government to give such franchise before representative government is granted to these colonies, and if then given it will be so limited as to secure the just predominance of the white races. The legal position of coloured persons will, however, be similar to that which they hold in Cape Colony." Apart from the fact that the Boers were debarred by Lord Milner"s specific statements either from going behind the English text of the Vereeniging Terms of Surrender, or from "explaining [the Vereeniging Terms] by anything in the Middelburg proposal," it is difficult to see how this Middelburg clause could have raised any presumption in the minds of the Boer commissioners that the English word "native" was intended to include not only the Kafirs (of which word it is a loose equivalent, since the dark-skinned native of the Bantu tribes, or the Kafir, has practically ousted the aboriginal yellow-skinned natives of South Africa--the Bushmen and Hottentots), but the "coloured people," or half-castes.
Lord Milner himself declared in the House of Lords (July 31st, 1906) with reference to Mr. Churchill"s statement that the question had not been raised, to the best of his belief, by the Boer commissioners; and that in any case there was nothing in the Vereeniging Agreement to prevent the Crown Colony administration of the new colonies from legislating in respect of "coloured persons." [And _a fortiori_ in respect of British Indians.] His words were: "The English text of the treaty says "natives" and does not say "coloured people." I think that in the Dutch version the word "naturellen" was used. I venture to say that n.o.body familiar with the common use of language in South Africa would hold either that "natives" included coloured people, some of whom very much more resemble whites than natives, or that "naturellen"
included "kleurlingen," which is the universally accepted Dutch word in South Africa for coloured people."]
[Sidenote: The last debates.]
[Sidenote: Accepting the inevitable.]
With the departure of the Boer commissioners from Pretoria the final stage of the protracted negotiations had been reached, but it still required three days of discussion (May 29th-31st) before the a.s.sembly at Vereeniging could be brought to accept the inevitable. On the morning of the 29th the delegates a.s.sembled in the tent provided by the British military authorities, and a report of the proceedings of the peace conferences at Pretoria, drawn up by the Boer commissioners on the preceding evening, was read. Mr. Schalk Burger, as Acting President of the South African Republic, then announced that the meeting was called upon to decide which of three possible courses should be taken--to continue the war, to accept the British terms, or to surrender unconditionally.[341] The rest of the morning sitting, and part of the afternoon sitting, were occupied by the delegates in questioning the commissioners as to the meaning of the various Articles in the Terms of Surrender. According to the understanding between the Boer commissioners and the British authorities, the Surrender Agreement should have been submitted forthwith to the delegates for acceptance or rejection. This course was actually proposed, but a resolution to that effect was immediately negatived on the ground that "the matter was too important to be treated with so much haste." The explanation of the delay is probably to be found in the circ.u.mstance that, although the Boer leaders had left Pretoria convinced, as a body, of both the desirability and the necessity of accepting the British terms, each of them was anxious, individually, to avoid any action which would fix the responsibility of the surrender upon himself. They refrained, therefore, as long as possible from any decisive declaration, each one desiring that his neighbour should be the first to speak the final word. And so, instead of the question of submission being put to the vote immediately after the delegates had acquainted themselves with the actual meaning of the Surrender Agreement, two days were consumed in a long and protracted discussion, and the British terms were not accepted until the afternoon of Sat.u.r.day, the 31st, the latest possible moment within the limit of time fixed by the British Commander-in-Chief. In this long debate Louis Botha consistently advocated submission; but De Wet spoke more than once in favour of continuing the war. One of the arguments used by the Free State Commander-in-Chief is instructive. "Remembering that the sympathy for us, which is to be found in England itself," he said, "may be regarded as being, for all practical purposes, a sort of indirect intervention, I maintain that this terrible struggle must be continued." The really decisive utterance seems to have come in the form of a long and eloquent speech delivered by Mr. s.m.u.ts, the substance of which lies in the fine sentence: "We must not sacrifice the Afrikander nation itself upon the altar of independence." From this moment the discussion increased in vehemence, until, in the words of the minutes, "after a time of heated dispute--for every man was preparing himself for the bitter end--they came to an agreement." Then a long resolution, drawn up by Hertzog and s.m.u.ts, and empowering the commissioners to sign the Surrender Agreement, was adopted by 54 to 6 votes.
[Footnote 341: The minutes of the final meetings of the commando representatives--as also those of the earlier meetings of May 15th to 17th--have been published by General Christian de Wet in _The Three Years" War_.]
After the vote on the British terms had been taken, a resolution const.i.tuting a committee[342] to collect funds for the dest.i.tute Boers was pa.s.sed; and the Peace Commissioners, having telegraphed the decision of the delegates to Lord Kitchener, hastened back by train to sign the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria.
[Footnote 342: Three of the members of this committee, Generals Botha, De Wet, and De la Rey, were instructed to proceed to Europe for the purposes of this appeal.]
Late in the afternoon of May 31st, Lord Milner, who had returned to Johannesburg on the 28th, and had been busily engaged on administrative matters while the discussion at Vereeniging was going on, was informed that Lord Kitchener wished to speak to him on the telephone. Then, along the wire, in the familiar voice of the Commander-in-Chief, came the welcome words: "It is peace." There was just time to pack up and catch the half-past six train, which brought the High Commissioner to Pretoria at a quarter past eight. Lord Milner and his staff, when at Pretoria, habitually stayed at the former British Agency, but this night he dined with Lord Kitchener; and here, at Lord Kitchener"s house, the Boer commissioners appeared at about 10 o"clock, and just before eleven (May 31st) the Surrender Agreement was signed.[343]
[Footnote 343: The actual surrender of the arms in the possession of the burgher and rebel commandos was carried out with admirable prompt.i.tude. Three weeks after the agreement had been signed Lord Kitchener was able, in a final despatch from Capetown on June 23rd, to record his "high appreciation of the unflagging energy and unfailing tact" with which Generals Louis Botha, De la Rey, and Christian de Wet had facilitated the work of the British commissioners appointed to receive the surrender of the burghers in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony. Nor were the Boer and rebel commandos in the Cape Colony less expeditious in surrendering to General French. In all 21,226 burghers and colonial rebels, of whom 11,166 were in the Transvaal, 6,455 in the Orange River Colony, and 3,635 in the Cape, laid down their arms. Lord Kitchener"s last words (despatches of June 21st and 23rd), addressed respectively to the Colonial Governments and the Secretary of State for War, are noticeable and characteristic utterances. His message to the former was:
"I find it difficult in the short s.p.a.ce at my disposal to acknowledge the deep obligation of the Army in South Africa to the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Cape Colony, and Natal. I will only say here that no request of mine was ever refused by any of these Governments, and that their consideration and generosity were only equalled by the character and quality of the troops they sent to South Africa, or raised in that country."
And of the troops, which under his command had successfully accomplished a military task of unparalleled difficulty, he wrote: