"And now, if I have one wish, it is that I may never again have to deal at any length with this topic. But in order that I may put it aside with a good conscience, I wish, having been more or less compelled to deal with it, to do so honestly, and not to shut my eyes to unpleasant facts. The great bulk of the population of the Colony--Dutch as well as English--are, I firmly believe, thoroughly loyal, in the sense that they know they live under a good const.i.tution, and have no wish to change it, and regard with feelings of reverence and pride that august lady at the head of it. If we had only domestic questions to consider; if political controversy were confined to the internal affairs of the country, there would, no doubt, be a great deal of hard language used by conflicting parties, and very likely among the usual amenities of party warfare somebody would call somebody else disloyal; but the thing would be so absurd--so obviously absurd--that n.o.body would take it seriously, and the charges would be forgotten almost as soon as uttered.
[Sidenote: The loyalty of the Bond.]
"What gives the sting to the charge of disloyalty in this case, what makes it stick, and what makes people wince under it, is the fact that the political controversies of this country at present unfortunately turn largely upon another question--I mean the relations of Her Majesty"s Government to the South African Republic--and that, whenever there is any prospect of any difference between them, a number of people in the Colony at once vehemently, and without even the semblance of impartiality, espouse the side of the Republic. Personally I do not think that they are disloyal. I am familiar at home with the figure of the politician--often the best of men, though singularly injudicious--who, whenever any disputes arise with another country, starts with the a.s.sumption that his own country must be in the wrong. He is not disloyal, but really he cannot be very much surprised if he appears to be so to those of his fellow-citizens whose inclination is to start with the exactly opposite a.s.sumption. And so I do not take it that in this case people are necessarily disloyal because they carry their sympathy with the Government of the Transvaal--which, seeing the close tie of relationship which unites a great portion of the population here with the dominant section in that country, is perfectly natural--to a point which gives some ground for the a.s.sertion that they seem to care much more for the independence of the Transvaal than for the honour and the interests of the country to which they themselves belong.
"For my own part, I believe the whole object of those people in espousing the cause of the Transvaal is to prevent an open rupture between that country and the British Government. They loathe, very naturally and rightly, the idea of war, and they think that, if they can only impress upon the British Government that in case of war with the Transvaal it would have a great number of its own subjects at least in sympathy against it, that is a way to prevent such a calamity.
"But in this they are totally wrong, for this policy rests on the a.s.sumption that Great Britain has some occult design on the independence of the Transvaal--that independence which it has itself given--and that it is seeking causes of quarrel in order to take that independence away. But that a.s.sumption is the exact opposite of the truth. So far from seeking causes of quarrel, it is the constant desire of the British Government to avoid causes of quarrel, and not to take up lightly the complaints (and they are numerous) which reach it from British subjects within the Transvaal, for the very reason that it wishes to avoid even the semblance of interference in the internal affairs of that country, and, as regards its external relations, to insist only on that minimum of control which it has always distinctly reserved, and has reserved, I may add, solely in the interests of the future tranquillity of South Africa. That is Great Britain"s moderate att.i.tude, and she cannot be frightened out of it. It is not any aggressiveness on the part of Her Majesty"s Government which now keeps up the spirit of unrest in South Africa. Not at all. It is that unprogressiveness--I will not say the retrogressiveness--of the Government of the Transvaal and its deep suspicion of the intentions of Great Britain which makes it devote its attention to imaginary external dangers, when every impartial observer can see perfectly well that the real dangers which threaten it are internal.
[Sidenote: Milner"s appeal to the Dutch.]
"Now, I wish to be perfectly fair. Therefore, let me say that this suspicion, though absolutely groundless, is not, after all that has happened, altogether unnatural. I accept the situation that at the present moment any advice that I could tender, or that any of your British fellow-citizens could tender in that quarter, though it was the best advice in the world, would be instantly rejected because it was British. But the same does not apply to the Dutch citizens of this colony, and especially to those who have gone so far in the expression of their sympathy for the Transvaal as to expose themselves to these charges of disloyalty to their own flag. Their good-will at least cannot be suspected across the border; and if all they desire--and I believe it is what they desire--is to preserve the South African Republic, and to promote good relations between it and the British Colonies and Government, then let them use all their influence, which is bound to be great, not in confirming the Transvaal in unjustified suspicions, not in encouraging its Government in obstinate resistance to all reform, but in inducing it gradually to a.s.similate its inst.i.tutions, and, what is even more important than inst.i.tutions, the temper and spirit of its administration, to those of the free communities of South Africa, such as this Colony or the Orange Free State. That is the direction in which a peaceful way out of these inveterate troubles, which have now plagued this country for more than thirty years, is to be found."[36]
[Footnote 36: _Cape Times_, March 4th, 1898.]
Here was a bolt from the blue! All South Africa stood to attention. No such authoritative and inspiring utterance had come from the High Commissioners for South Africa since Frere had been recalled, now eighteen years ago. The Afrikander nationalists saw that their action and policy were exposed to the scrutiny of a penetrating intellect, and grew uneasy.
The position which Lord Milner had taken up was impregnable. What is the good of your loyalty, he said in effect to the Cape Dutch, if you refuse to help us in the one thing needful? And this the one thing of all others the justice of which you Afrikanders should feel--that the Transvaal should "a.s.similate its inst.i.tutions ... and the tone and temper of its administration, to those of the free communities of South Africa such as this Colony and the Orange Free State."
The impact of these words was tremendous. The weight behind them was the weight of inevitable truth.
A week later Mr. J. X. Merriman wrote to President Steyn to beg him to urge President Kruger to be careful. Under date March 11th, 1898, he says:
"You will, no doubt, have seen both Sir Alfred Milner"s speech at Graaf Reinet and the reported interview with Mr. Rhodes in _The Cape Times_. Through both there runs a note of thinly veiled hostility to the Transvaal and the uneasy menace of trouble ahead....
"Yet one cannot conceal the fact that the greatest danger to the future lies in the att.i.tude of President Kruger and his vain hope of building up a State on a foundation of a narrow, unenlightened minority, and his obstinate rejection of all prospect of using the materials which lie ready to his hand to establish a true Republic on a broad Liberal basis. The report of recent discussions in the Volksraad on his finances and their mismanagement fill one with apprehension. Such a state of affairs cannot last. It must break down from inherent rottenness, and it will be well if the fall does not sweep away the freedom of all of us.
"I write in no hostility to republics; my own feelings are all in the opposite direction.... Humanly speaking, the advice and good-will of the Free State is the only thing that stands between the South African Republic and a catastrophe."[37]
[Footnote 37: Cd. 369.]
[Sidenote: Sprigg and the Bond.]
Still more striking and salutary was the effect produced upon the British population in the Cape Colony. All who were not utterly abased by the yoke of Bond domination stood upright. Those whose spirit had been cowed by the odium of the Raid took heart. Never had the essential morality of England"s dealings with the Dutch been vindicated more triumphantly. The moral right of the Power which had done justice to the Dutch in its own borders to require the Dutch to do justice to the British within the borders of the Republic was una.s.sailable. We have noticed before how in the year 1897 the different sections of the British population were manifesting a tendency to draw closer together. After the Graaf Reinet speech this movement rapidly developed into a general determination to challenge the long domination of the Bond. It had been recognised for some time past that the recent and considerable growth of the urban population of the Colony, which was mainly British, had not been accompanied by any corresponding increase in the number of its parliamentary representatives. In February (1898), the anomalous condition of the Cape electoral system was brought before the Ministry. The indignation caused by the dismissal of Chief Justice Kotze, and the growing evidence of President Kruger"s determination to ride rough-shod over the British population in the Transvaal, contributed to unite the Colonial British of all sections, with the exception of the one or two men who were wholly identified with the Bond, in the common aim of obtaining a fair representation for the chief centres of British population in the Cape Colony; and the practically solid British party thus formed adopted the t.i.tle of "Progressives." The Ministry knew, of course, that any such measure would be displeasing to Mr. Hofmeyr; but Sir Gordon Sprigg, being now a.s.sured of the almost united support of the British members in the Colonial Parliament, resolved to bring forward a Redistribution Bill. The draft Bill was approved by the Executive Council on May 13th, and Dr. Te Water, Mr.
Hofmeyr"s representative in the Ministry, thereupon resigned.[38]
[Footnote 38: He was succeeded in the Colonial Secretaryship by Dr. Smartt, a former member of the Bond, but now a Progressive, and at the same time Sir Thomas Upington, who had resigned from ill-health, was succeeded by Mr. T.
Lynedoch Graham, as Attorney-General.]
[Sidenote: Redistribution.]
Sir Gordon Sprigg had now done a thing unprecedented in the parliamentary history of the Cape Colony in the last fifteen years. He had defied the Bond. He knew that the Bond was quite able to turn his Ministry out of Office. But he had made up his mind, in this event, to throw in his lot with the Progressive party, of which Mr. Rhodes was the actual chief. Mr. Hofmeyr did not leave him long in doubt. On the resignation of Dr. Te Water all the Bond artillery was at once turned on to the Ministry. On May 31st Mr. Schreiner gave notice of a vote of "no confidence." It was put off until June 13th, and in the meantime the second reading of the Redistribution Bill was met by the "previous question" moved by Mr. Theron, the Chairman of the Provincial Council of the Bond. No attempt was made, either in Parliament or in the Press, to conceal the fact that, under the question of redistribution, wider and more momentous issues were at stake. The counts in the Bond"s indictment of the Ministry, as set out in _Ons Land_, were (1) its Imperialist tendencies as evidenced by the proposed gift of a warship to the British Navy; and (2) its lack of sympathy with the South African Republic. Against these crimes it had nothing to place, except that it had permitted the employment of the captured Bechuanas, as indentured labourers[39]--its sole merit, in the opinion of the Bond journal. _The Cape Times_, on the other hand, declared with equal frankness that the real point to be decided was, whether the interests of President Kruger and the South African Republic, or those of the Cape Colony, as part of the British Empire, had the greater claim upon the Government and Parliament of the Colony. And Mr. Schreiner, when, on June 13th, he introduced the "no confidence" motion, asked the House to condemn the Ministry on the ground that it had not shown any "sympathy" with, or made any "conciliatory approach" towards, the "sister Republic." On Monday, June 20th, the second reading of the Redistribution Bill was carried by a majority of seven, but two days later, June 22nd, the Ministry found itself in a minority of five on Mr. Schreiner"s motion of "no confidence."[40] In these circ.u.mstances Sir Gordon Sprigg determined not to resign, but to appeal to the electorate--a course justified by const.i.tutional usage--and Parliament was dissolved.
[Footnote 39: These were prisoners taken in the suppression of the revolt in Bechua.n.a.land in 1897.]
[Footnote 40: The little group of six, of which Sir James Innes was the head--including Sir R. Solomon and four others--voted _with_ the Ministry for the Redistribution Bill, but _against_ it on the "no confidence" motion (with the exception of Sir James himself). Also one moderate Bondsman voted for "redistribution," but went against the Ministry on the "no confidence" motion.]
[Sidenote: The general election, 1898.]
The election which ensued was fought with great determination and no little bitterness. Both the Progressive party and the Bond were supplied with ample funds; the former had the purse of Mr. Rhodes and other Englishmen to draw upon, while the latter was subsidised by President Kruger and his agents from the revenues of the Transvaal.[41] Mr. Schreiner"s election utterances were studiously moderate; indeed, his letter of thanks to the electors of the Malmesbury division, by whom he was returned to Parliament, contained a reference to "the n.o.ble empire which was theirs, and to which they belonged." But such p.r.o.nouncements by no means represented the sentiment of the party with which he had identified himself. The objects of the Afrikander party, as presented in their most attractive form by _Ons Land_, were to overthrow Rhodes and all his works, to oppose the "Chartered clique" and "the influence of Mammon in politics," and to secure a "pure administration" and "the cultivation of friendly relations with the neighbouring states:" in other words, to give every possible encouragement to the Transvaal in the diplomatic struggle with Great Britain. The Dutch press in general preached the creed of Afrikander nationalism without disguise. The under-current of anti-British feeling which prevailed among the Dutch population may be understood from the fact that the following frank appeal from a republican nationalist to the Cape Afrikanders was published in the columns of _Ons Land_:
[Footnote 41: Mr. Rhodes was opposed at Barkly West by a candidate financed from Pretoria.]
"When one considers the state of affairs in the Cape Colony, it must be confessed the future does not appear too rosy. The majority of the Afrikander nation in the Cape Colony still go bent under the English yoke. The free section of the two Republics is very small compared to that portion subject to the stranger, and, whatever may be our private opinion, one thing at least is certain, namely, that without the a.s.sistance of the Cape Colonial Afrikanders the Afrikander cause is lost. The two Republics by themselves, surrounded as they are by the stranger [_i.e._ British] are unable to continue the fight. One day the question of who is to be master will have to be referred to the arbitrament of the sword, and then the verdict will depend upon the Cape Colonial Afrikanders. If they give evidence on our side we shall win. It does not help a bra.s.s farthing to mince matters.
This is the real point at issue; and in this light every Afrikander must learn to see it. And what a.s.sistance can we expect from Afrikanders in the Cape Colony?... The vast majority of them (Afrikanders) are still faithful, and will even gird on the sword when G.o.d"s time comes."[42]
[Footnote 42: As translated in _South Africa_, October 15th, 1898.]
At the same period the Dutch Reformed Church in the Colony had become what was, to all intents and purposes, a vehicle for the advocacy of rebellion. The manner in which the principles of Afrikander nationalism were combined with religious doctrine may be gathered from certain extracts from the _Studenten Blad_ of the Theological Seminary of Burghersdorp, which were translated and published by _The Albert Times_. The pa.s.sage following appeared on May 26th, 1899; and by November 16th the Seminary was closed, since the bulk of the students had at that date joined the Boer forces:
[Sidenote: Anti-british sentiment.]
"Must we love this people [the English] who robbed our ancestors of their freedom, who forced them to leave a land dear to them as their heart"s blood--a people that followed our fathers to the new fatherland which they had bought with their blood and s.n.a.t.c.hed from the barbarians, and again threatened their freedom?
Our fathers fought with the courage of despair, and retook the land with G.o.d"s aid and with their blood. But England is not satisfied. Again is our freedom threatened by the same people, and not only our freedom, but our language, our nationality, our religion! Must we surrender everything, and disown our fathers? I cannot agree with this. The thought is hateful to me--the thought of trampling on the bodies of our fathers as we extend the hand of friendship to those who have slain our fathers in an unrighteous quarrel.... But some may say that the Bible teaches us to love our enemies. I think, however, that the text cannot be here applied. Race hatred is something quite distinct from personal enmity. When I meet an Englishman as a private individual I must regard him as my fellow-creature; if, however, I meet him as an Englishman, then I, as an Afrikander, must regard him as the enemy of my nation and my religion--as a wolf that is endeavouring to creep into the fold. This is the chief reason why we must regard them as our enemies; they are the enemies of our religion."
At the beginning of September, when the bulk of the elections were over, 40 Afrikander members and 36 Progressives had been returned.
Three seats remained to be filled. Mr. Rhodes, who had been returned both for Barkly West and Namaqualand, decided to sit for the former const.i.tuency, and the decision of the Bond to contest the seat thus vacated caused a delay in the new election for Namaqualand. The return of the two representatives of the Vryburg division was not to take place until the 15th. As all three const.i.tuencies were expected to elect Progressives--an expectation which was fulfilled--the result of the general election was to give the Bond a bare majority of one, and this in spite of the fact that a considerably larger total of votes had been cast for the Progressive than for the Bond candidates.[43]
[Footnote 43: In a house of 79, 40 Afrikander and 39 Progressive members were returned. A very careful and reliable calculation showed that, of an aggregate of 82,304 votes polled, 44,403 were cast for Progressive, and 37,901 for Afrikander candidates. More than this, while no Progressive member was returned by a majority of less than 137, three Afrikanders won their seats by respective majorities, of two, ten, and twenty. The Progressives, therefore, were ent.i.tled, on their aggregate vote, to a majority of six.]
[Sidenote: Milner"s impartiality.]
These somewhat unusual circ.u.mstances gave rise to an incident which is significant of the absolute impartiality with which Lord Milner discharged the duties of his office as const.i.tutional Governor of the Cape Colony. In view of the circ.u.mstance that the Progressives had polled a majority of the electorate, although they were actually in a minority in the a.s.sembly, Mr. Rhodes was of opinion that the Ministry should remain in office, and postpone the meeting of Parliament until the Namaqualand election had been held. He believed, further, that in the period of grace thus obtained it would be found possible to induce one or other of the Bond members to change sides, and thereby put the Ministry again in a majority. The immediate obstacle to the execution of this plan of action was the necessity of obtaining "supply." The partial appropriation made by Parliament before the dissolution was exhausted, and the only method by which funds could be provided without the authority of Parliament was the issue of Governor"s warrants on the Treasury. Lord Milner was willing to sign warrants to enable the Ministry to carry on the administration during the unavoidable interval between the exhaustion of the last appropriation and the commencement of the new session. But, in view of the const.i.tutional principle that no ministry which cannot obtain supply is justified in remaining in office, he absolutely refused to issue warrants for any longer period. He held, moreover, that as the Namaqualand election was a bye-election, the new Parliament would be completed, and therefore competent to transact business, so soon as the two members for Vryburg had been duly returned. Lord Milner was, no doubt, aware that the Sprigg Ministry would have had a fair prospect of retaining office if Mr. Rhodes had been allowed time to put his tactics into effect. On the other hand, he can scarcely have failed to observe that there was another aspect of the question. A loyalist ministry, by showing an undue desire to cling to office, with or without the employment of questionable political methods, would run the risk of alienating the more scrupulous of the British members, and of failing to obtain the support of the moderate Afrikander, who might otherwise have been won to the Progressive and Imperialist side. But, as Governor of the Colony, he refused to allow any considerations of party interest, on this or on any subsequent occasion, to influence his judgment. While he conceived it to be his duty to give advice and criticism to public men of all shades of political opinion, he showed himself inexorably opposed to the thought of straining his const.i.tutional powers in the slightest degree for the benefit of one side or the other.[44] Accordingly provision for the expenses of administration was made by Governor"s warrants up to September 30th, and on the day following the Vryburg election (September 16th), a proclamation summoning Parliament for October 7th was issued.
[Footnote 44: Mr. Rhodes had obtained an interview with Lord Milner for the purpose of laying his views before him. But, it is said, the unwonted sternness of the Governor"s expression at once convinced him of the hopelessness of his mission; and he withdrew without any attempt to argue his case. As Rhodes was a man of great personal magnetism, the incident is not without significance.]
[Sidenote: Schreiner, prime minister.]
On October 11th the Government was again defeated on a vote of "no confidence" by a majority of two.[45] On the 17th the House a.s.sembled with an Afrikander Ministry formed by Mr. Schreiner. In addition to the Premier it contained Dr. Te Water and Mr. Herholdt, both members of the Bond; Messrs. Merriman and Sauer, who were now in close a.s.sociation with the Bond; and Mr. (now Sir) Richard Solomon. The latter, who had been defeated in the general election, was provided with a seat upon his accepting office as Attorney-General. The Progressives continued to be led in opposition by Sir Gordon Sprigg.
Mr. (now Sir) James Rose Innes was returned as an "independent," since he had found himself unable to work in a.s.sociation with a party in which Mr. Rhodes had a dominant influence. The new Ministry was not strong enough to resist the continued demand of the Progressives for a measure of electoral reform; but the Redistribution Bill, as now pa.s.sed, took the form of a compromise so disastrous to the British population that the Bond majority was increased to eight by the new elections held in April, 1899.[46]
[Footnote 45: Both sides were one short of their full strength, but a Progressive, Dr. (now Sir William) Berry, was chosen Speaker of the House.]
[Footnote 46: The second reading of the Navy Contribution Bill, giving effect to Sir Gordon Sprigg"s pledge, was carried on December 2nd, 1898, without a division.]
Mr. Chamberlain"s policy, as we have seen, was based upon the belief that it was possible to win over the Dutch in the Cape Colony and the Free State to the side of the Imperial Government. But here, in October, 1898, was an Afrikander ministry in power in the Cape Colony pledged to prevent the intervention of the Imperial Government in the affairs of the Transvaal. From that moment the issue became more and more one not of right, but of might. In the Free State, as we have seen, what was virtually an offensive and defensive alliance with the northern Republic had been ratified by the Volksraad. In the Transvaal the work of armament was proceeding apace, and Dr. Leyds had been despatched to Europe, as Envoy Extraordinary of the Republic, with authority and funds calculated to enable him to enlist the active sympathy of the Continental powers on behalf of the Pretoria Executive. His place as State Secretary had been filled, in July, by Mr. Reitz, the former President of the Free State, and one of the actual founders of the Afrikander Bond; and Mr. s.m.u.ts, a younger and even more enthusiastic believer in the nationalist creed, was appointed to the office of State Attorney.[47] With the exception of Rhodesia and Natal and the native territories immediately under the control of the Imperial Government, the Afrikander nationalists dominated the whole of South Africa. Nor is it surprising that, in these circ.u.mstances, the tone of the communications pa.s.sing between the Transvaal Government and the paramount Power should have become increasingly unsatisfactory.[48]
[Footnote 47: The State-Secretaryship was offered first to Mr. Abraham Fischer, of the Free State, by whom it was declined (_Memoirs of Paul Kruger_, vol. ii., p. 297). The Cape Afrikanders desired the appointment of Mr. s.m.u.ts.]
[Footnote 48: On May 7th, 1897, President Kruger had formally requested the Imperial Government to allow all questions at issue between the two Governments under the Convention to be submitted to the arbitration of the President of the Swiss Republic. To this proposal Mr. Chamberlain replied, on October 10th, that the relationship of Great Britain to the South African Republic being that of a suzerain Power, it would be impossible for the Imperial Government to permit the intervention of a foreign Power. On April 16th, 1898, in a despatch embodying the legal opinions of Mr. Farelly, President Kruger claims that the South African Republic is an independent State, and denies the existence of any "suzerainty" on the part of Great Britain. In forwarding this despatch Lord Milner made the apposite comment that the propriety of employing the term suzerainty to express the rights possessed by Great Britain is an "etymological question," and Mr. Chamberlain, replying on December 15th, accepts President Kruger"s declaration that he is willing to abide by the articles of the Convention, rea.s.serts the claim of suzerainty, declines to allow foreign arbitration, and demands the immediate fulfilment of Article IV. In a despatch of May 9th, 1899, Mr. Reitz a.s.serts that the Republic is "a sovereign international State"; and on June 13th Mr.
Chamberlain replies that he has no intention of continuing the discussion.]
[Sidenote: Milner"s visit to England.]
In the (English) winter of 1898-9 Lord Milner paid a visit to England.
Sir William Greene, who had left Pretoria on a holiday on June 29th, was also at home during the same period. Lord Milner"s visit was due in part to the necessity for medical treatment;[49] but, in any case, it had become desirable that he should be able to communicate fully to Mr. Chamberlain the grave views which he had formed on the South African situation. He left for England on November 2nd, landed on the 19th, sailed on January 28th, and reached Capetown again on February 14th. During the whole of the two months that he was in England he was engaged in an endeavour to impress upon Mr. Chamberlain, and everybody else with whom he could converse, that the existing state of affairs was one which, if allowed to remain unchanged, would end in the loss of South Africa.
[Footnote 49: Owing to a slight affection of the eye.]