"I should like to have said a word about the dynamite monopoly, but I fear I have already exhausted your patience. My sole object in writing is to preserve the peace of South Africa. There are, of course, many unreasonable demands; but the President"s position will be strengthened, and, at all events, his conscience will be clear in case of war, if he has done everything that can reasonably be expected from him. I feel sure that, having used your influence to bring him and Sir Alfred together, you will also do your best to make your efforts in favour of peace successful. I feel sure also that Sir Alfred is anxious to make his mission a success; but there can be no success unless the arrangement arrived at is a permanent one, and not merely to tide over immediate difficulties."
And again, in writing to his brother, Mr. Melius de Villiers, Chief Justice of the Free State, at a later date (July 31st), he says, in allusion to this same visit to Pretoria:
"From an intimate acquaintance with what was going on, I foresaw, three months ago, that if President Kruger did not voluntarily yield he would be made to do so, or else be prepared to meet the whole power of England. I accordingly begged of Kruger"s friends to put the matter to him in this way: On the one side there is war with England; on the other side there are concessions which will avoid war or occupation of the country. Now, decide at once how far you will ultimately go; adopt the English five years"
franchise; offer it voluntarily to the Uitlanders, make them your friends, be a far-sighted statesman, and you will have a majority of the Uitlanders with you when they become burghers. The answer I got was: We have done too much already, and cannot do more. Yet afterwards they did a great deal more. The same policy of doing nothing except under pressure is still being pursued. The longer the delay, the more they will have to yield."
[Sidenote: Afrikander advice.]
This was plain speaking and sound statesmanship. Nor was Mr.
Merriman"s appeal, written almost concurrently (May 26th) with Sir Henry"s letter to President Steyn, any less emphatic. It was addressed to Mr. Abraham Fischer, a member of the Free State Executive and a convinced nationalist; and it is otherwise remarkable for an estimate of the economic conditions of the Boers which subsequent experience has completely justified:
"I most strongly urge you," he writes, "to use your utmost influence to bear on President Kruger to concede some colourable measure of reform, not so much in the interests of outsiders as in those of his own State. Granted that he does nothing. What is the future? His Boers, the backbone of the country, are perishing off the land; hundreds have become impoverished loafers, landless hangers-on of the town population. In his own interests he should recruit his Republic with new blood--and the sands are running out. I say this irrespective of agitation about Uitlanders. The fabric will go to pieces of its own accord unless something is done.... A moderate franchise reform and munic.i.p.al privileges would go far to satisfy any reasonable people, while a maintenance of the oath ought to be sufficient safeguard against the swamping of the old population."[66]
[Footnote 66: All these letters are in Cd. 369.]
But the Schreiner Cabinet contained, as we have seen, a representative of Mr. Hofmeyr in the person of Dr. Te Water. Mr. Merriman could see that the position in the Transvaal was one that could not go on indefinitely--that "the fabric would go to pieces of its own accord, unless something was done." Dr. Te Water was blind even to this aspect of the question. The correspondence found after the occupation of Bloemfontein (March 13th, 1900), from which these letters are taken, contains also certain letters to President Steyn that disclose both the nature of the Afrikander mediation, as it was understood by the nationalist leaders of the Cape Colony, and the faithfulness with which Dr. Te Water served them.
The Te Water correspondence, as we have it,[67] consists of three letters written respectively on May 8th, 17th, and 27th, from "the Colonial Secretary"s Office, Capetown," to President Steyn. The replies of the latter have been withheld, not unnaturally, from the public eye. In the first of these letters Dr. Te Water "hopes heartily" that Schreiner"s "proposition" for the Conference has been accepted, and then proceeds to impress upon him the advisability of President Kruger"s yielding on the ground, not of justice, but of temporary expediency. In so doing, this Minister of the Crown completely identifies himself with the aspirations of the Afrikander nationalists, and he concludes by asking for "a private telegraphic code. The absence thereof was badly felt on Sat.u.r.day, when Schreiner was obliged to write instead of telegraphing."
[Footnote 67: Cd. 369.]
"Circ.u.mstances appear to me now," he writes, "to be such that our friends in Pretoria must be yielding; with their friends at the head of the Government here, they have a better chance that reasonable propositions made by them will be accepted than they would have had if we had been unsuccessful at the late elections and our enemies were advisers.
[Sidenote: "Play to win time".]
"Schreiner, who knows more than any one of us, feels strongly that things are extremely critical.
"Telegrams from people in London, whom he thoroughly trusts, such as J. H."s[68] best friends, received by him on Sat.u.r.day and this morning, strengthen him in his opinion. We must now play to win time. Governments are not perpetual, and I pray that the present team, so unjustly disposed towards us, may receive their reward before long. Their successors, I am certain, will follow a less hateful policy towards us. When we hear that you have succeeded in Pretoria, then we must bring influence to bear here."
[Footnote 68: Mr. Hofmeyr.]
In the second letter Dr. Te Water regrets that he cannot share President Steyn"s view that "all the noise about war is bluff." Then there follows a pa.s.sage showing that Mr. Steyn had entertained expectations of a.s.sistance from the Schreiner Cabinet that even Dr. Te Water could not reconcile with his ideas of ministerial allegiance:
"But now I should like a few words of explanation," he writes, "as to what you mean by saying that "The Cape Ministry will be able to do much more good." In what respect do you think that we can be of more use than before?"
a.s.suming, for the moment, that President Steyn had written, "In the event of war becoming inevitable, or having broken out, the Cape Ministry will be able to do much more good than it is doing now," or words to this effect, it would appear that he shared the erroneous views of Mr. Reitz, against which Sir Henry de Villiers had protested during his visit to Pretoria. In the letter to Mr. Melius de Villiers, from which we have quoted above, Sir Henry writes:
"When I was in the Transvaal three months ago, I found that Reitz and others had the most extraordinary notions of the powers and duties of a Cape Ministry in case of war. They are ministers of the Crown, and it will be their duty to afford every possible a.s.sistance to the British Government. Under normal conditions, a responsible Ministry is perfectly independent in matters of internal concern, but in case of war they are bound to place all the resources of the Colony at the disposal of the British Crown; at least if they did not do so they would be liable to dismissal."
Dr. Te Water then continues:
"I would very much like to know your views, and if we are not already working in that direction I will try, as far as possible, to do what I can to give effect to your wishes, which may be for the welfare of all. Please let me hear immediately and fully about this."
[Sidenote: Te Water and Steyn.]
The last letter, written on the eve of the Conference, opens with a curiously significant pa.s.sage. There were some things discussed between Steyn and Te Water that Mr. Schreiner was not to know.
President Steyn has been getting nervous. Dr. Te Water, therefore, rea.s.sures him:
"Yours received on my return this morning from Aberdeen. Telegram also reached me. I keep all your communications strictly private: naturally you do not exclude my colleagues and our friend Hofmeyr. I have often read extracts to them, but do not be afraid; I shall not give you away."
It also contains the information that, as President Steyn had no private code available, Dr. Te Water has borrowed the private telegraphic code of the Cabinet for President Steyn"s use.
"To-day, by post, I send you personally our private telegraphic code for use. I borrowed one from Sauer; we have only three, and I must, therefore, ask you to let me have it back in a couple of weeks. Please keep it under lock, and use it yourself _only_. It is quite possible that you will have to communicate with us, and the telegraphic service is not entirely to be trusted. I am afraid that things leak out there in one way or another."
And he then drives home the advice given before: "It is honestly now the time to yield a little, however one may later again tighten the rope."
One other letter must be given to complete this view of the circ.u.mstances in which the conference met. It was written on May 9th, 1899--that is to say, on the day on which Mr. Hofmeyr proposed to Lord Milner that he should accept President Steyn"s good offices to arrange the conference with President Kruger. It is addressed to President Steyn, and, translated, runs as follows:
"DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "GOVERNMENT OFFICES, PRETORIA.
"_May 9th_, 1899.
"DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,--
"I am sorry that I could not earlier fulfil my promise as to the ammunition. The reason of it is that his honour the Commandant-General [General Joubert] was away, and I could consequently not get the desired information earlier.
"The General says that he has 15 to 20 (twenty) million Mauser and 10 to 12 million Martini-Henry cartridges, and if needed will be able to supply you with any of either sort.
"On that score your Excellency can accordingly be at rest.
"The situation looks very dark indeed, although nothing is as yet officially known to us. I trust that some change may still come in it through your proposed plan. The copies _re_ dynamite will be sent to you at the earliest opportunity. With best greeting,
"Your humble servant and friend, "P. GROEBLER."[69]
[Footnote 69: The original of this letter is now in the possession of Mr. E. B. Iwan Muller, by whom it was published in his work, _Lord Milner and South Africa_. The translation is that of the Department of Military Intelligence.]
The Cape nationalists had asked the Republics to "play for time,"
because they believed that, with the return of the Liberal party to power in England, it would be possible to achieve the aims of their policy without the risk of a conflict in arms. The Republics were "playing for time," but in another sense. They were waiting until their military preparations were sufficiently complete to allow them to defy the British Government.
[Sidenote: The Bloemfontein conference.]
It was in these circ.u.mstances that the High Commissioner met President Kruger in conference at Bloemfontein (May 31st--June 5th). He was accompanied only by his staff: Mr. G. V. Fiddes (Imperial Secretary), Mr. M. S. O. Walrond (Private Secretary), Colonel Hanbury Williams (Military Secretary) and Lord Belgrave (A.D.C.),[70] with Mr.
Silberbauer (the interpreter) and a shorthand writer. Mr. Schreiner had been very solicitous to attend the Conference; but Lord Milner, following his usual practice, had determined to keep the affairs of the High Commissionership completely distinct from those in which he was concerned as Governor of the Cape Colony. The absence both of the Prime Minister and Mr. Hofmeyr was not unnaturally a matter of "sincere regret" to Dr. Te Water, as he informed President Steyn on the eve of the Conference.[71] Nor did Lord Milner avail himself of President Steyn"s willingness to take part in the proceedings; but, at the High Commissioner"s suggestion, Mr. Fischer (who was a member of the Free State Executive) was invited to act as interpreter--a duty which he discharged to the satisfaction of both parties. With President Kruger there went to Bloemfontein Mr. Schalk Burger and Mr.
A. D. Wolmarans (members of the Transvaal Executive), Mr. J. C. s.m.u.ts (the State Attorney), and two other officials. All of these, the High Commissioner"s Staff, and Mr. Fischer were present at the meetings of the Conference; but the actual discussion was confined to Lord Milner and President Kruger.[72] As regards the business in hand, the failure to publish the despatch of May 4th had deprived Lord Milner of what would have proved a helpful influence. Mr. Hofmeyr"s action had procured an opportunity for "friendly discussion." But the friendliness was to be all on the side of the Imperial Government. For the purpose of the Afrikander leaders was, as we have seen, to secure a fict.i.tious concession on the part of President Kruger. Lord Milner"s aim was to obtain by friendly discussion a genuine and substantial measure of reform; and the prospect of his success would have been greatly increased if this despatch and Mr. Chamberlain"s reply to it had been before the public when the Conference took place. It was written with the object of making the British people and President Kruger alike aware how grave was the judgment which he had formed of the existing situation. With England alive to the near danger which threatened her supremacy in South Africa, and President Kruger brought to understand that the man with whom he had to deal was one who held these opinions, Lord Milner could have been "friendly" without the risk of having his friendliness mistaken for a readiness to accept the illusory concession which was all that the Afrikander mediation was intended to secure.
[Footnote 70: 2nd. Lieut. Royal Horse Guards. Exactly one year after the last day of the Conference (June 5th), he (then A.D.C. to Lord Roberts and Duke of Westminster) ran up the British flag over the Raadzaal at Pretoria.]
[Footnote 71: Letter of May 27th (in Cd. 369).]
[Footnote 72: Lord Milner left Capetown by special train at 8.30 a.m. on Monday, May 29th, and reached Bloemfontein punctually at 5 p.m. on Tuesday. Here he was met by President Steyn and various officials of the Free State; and an address of welcome was presented to him by the Mayor of Bloemfontein upon his arrival at the private house which had been provided for his accommodation during the Conference. At eleven o"clock on the following morning, Wednesday, the 31st, the High Commissioner went to the Presidency, where he was introduced by Mr. Steyn to President Kruger, Mr. Schalk Burger and Mr. Wolmarans. The first meeting of the Conference took place in the afternoon at 2.30, in the new offices of the Railway Department. In the evening a largely attended reception was given by President Steyn, at which Mr. Kruger was present for a short time and Lord Milner for about an hour. The Conference closed on the afternoon of Monday, June 5th, and Lord Milner then paid a farewell visit to President Steyn. The High Commissioner"s special train left Bloemfontein on the following morning at 10.30, and reached Capetown at 6.45 on the evening of Wednesday, the 7th, where he was received by a large crowd, including three of the Cape Ministers and a number of Progressive Members of Parliament.
President Steyn, who was present at the station on Tuesday morning to see the High Commissioner off, did everything possible for the comfort and convenience of his state guest during the week that he was in Bloemfontein. The proceedings of the Conference, with the High Commissioner"s report upon them, are published in C. 9,404.]
[Sidenote: Lord Milner"s att.i.tude.]
As it was, Lord Milner was placed in a position of great embarra.s.sment. If he "used plain language" he exposed himself to the charge of entering upon the discussion in an aggressive spirit, calculated to make agreement difficult. If he adopted a conciliatory tone, his arguments seemed to be nothing more than the abortive protests with which the grim old President had cheerfully filled the republican waste-paper basket for the last ten years. It has been suggested that Lord Milner might have obtained a better result if he had shown himself less "inflexible"; if, in short, he had been willing to accept a "compromise." But any such criticism is based upon an entire misunderstanding of the method which the High Commissioner did, in fact, adopt. The five years" franchise--the Bloemfontein minimum--was in itself a compromise. What Lord Milner said, in effect, to President Kruger was this: "I have a whole sheaf of grievances against you: the dynamite monopoly, excessive railway rates, interference with the independence of the judiciary, a vicious police system, administrative corruption, munic.i.p.al abuses, and the rest. I will let all these go in exchange for one thing--a franchise reform which will give at once to a fair proportion of the Uitlander population some appreciable representation in the government of the Republic." Lord Milner not only offered a compromise, but a compromise that enormously reduced the area of dispute. His "inflexibility" arose from the simple fact that, having readily and frankly yielded all that could be yielded without sacrificing the paramount object of securing a permanent settlement of the Uitlander question, he had nothing further to concede, and said so.
[Sidenote: President Kruger.]
No two men more characteristic of the two utterly unlike and antagonistic political systems, which they respectively represented, could have been found. At the evening reception given by President Steyn on the opening day of the Conference, a big man, in a tightly b.u.t.toned frock-coat, stood just inside the door for ten minutes, and then moved awkwardly away. Above the frock-coat was a peasant"s face, half-shrewd, half-furtive, with narrow eyes and a large, crooked mouth which somehow gave the man a look of power. This was President Kruger, _aetat._ 74. Once, doubtless, Paul Kruger"s large and powerful frame had made him an impressive figure among a race of men as stalwart as the Boers. But he was now an old man: the powerful body had become shapeless and unwieldy; he had given up walking, and only left his stoep to drag himself clumsily into his carriage, and although he retained all his old tenacity of purpose, his mind had lost much of its former alertness. It needed all Mr. s.m.u.ts" mental resources--all that the young Afrikander had so recently learnt at Cambridge and the Temple--to enable the old President to maintain, even by the aid of his State-Attorney"s ingenious paper pleadings, a decent show of defence against the perfect moderation and relentless logic with which the High Commissioner presented the British case. Lord Milner went to the Conference to make "one big straightforward effort to avert a great disaster"; Kruger to drive a "Kafir bargain." The end was as Lord Milner had foreseen. To yield the necessary instalment of reform seemed to President Kruger, in this mind, "worse than annexation"; and on June 5th Lord Milner declared, "The Conference is absolutely at an end, and there is no obligation on either side arising out of it."