LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.
Dropmore, May 1st, 1798.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,
I got your letter here last night. I should not have gone out of town even for one day, if I had not understood from Dundas that the Duke of York, though quite determined against adopting the subst.i.tution you propose, seemed to think that in order to avoid putting you under difficulties of any sort, he could forbear to make the demand on your regiment.
I do not say that I like this expedient, but I see no other without his abandoning a measure which, for one, I should be very sorry to see abandoned, believing, as I do, that things of much more importance than the matter of any legal question of a Militia Act, depend upon it. I really believe that you are not accurately informed when you speak of the wishes of the Militia in general being against this measure. But on this point you have certainly better means of knowing individual opinions than I can have. On the legal point, the opinion of the King"s law servants must of course be the only guide for a Commander-in-chief, even if he were not a Prince of the blood, but much more when he is so, and consequently not supposed to enter into discussions of that sort, or to be responsible for them.
I grieve that in these times you should set the example of raising these questions; but I am confident you would not do so if you did not think it right. I own I should have thought that any idea of _disobeying, as a Militia officer_, a command of the Commander-in-chief, was out of the question in the present moment, and that if the case (I had almost said) which you yourself put, had occurred, that of being ordered to embark on board Lord Bridport"s fleet, you would have done so, with a protest of _ne trahatur in exemplum_.
Dundas will, as I understand from him, explain to you what he considers to be the case about your letter, which he states to me to have been an official letter addressed, I think, to P. W. Howe or his Adjutant-General, and which therefore he did not consider in any other light than as an accurate statement of the doubt given in officially and meant to be so considered. But all this is of very little consequence in comparison of that of the light in which the thing itself places you, if it were possible that you could adopt the resolution you speak of.
I take it for granted that Dundas"s Bill is meant only to extend to British subjects, or may easily be so limited. As such, it is surely highly advantageous in the present moment to have the services of the men who, of all British officers, have seen the most real service.
I do not think that the Vienna news at all lessens the expediency of calling out the remaining third of the Militia. It is highly probable that the French, seeing that they cannot hope to contend again with England and Austria joined together, may determine to accelerate their attack on us, and put the whole on that one desperate issue.
Ever, my dearest brother, Most affectionately yours, G.
The insurrection in Ireland was now approaching the moment which had been arranged by the rebels for the final move upon the capital. The whole plan of the rising, which was to have taken place on the 23rd of May, appeared in the details of a paper found upon the person of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, whose capture on the 19th frustrated the designs of the infatuated conspirators. Measures of the most careful precaution had been previously taken by the Government. Sir Ralph Abercromby, who had been in command of the army, and expressed a wish to retire, was replaced by General Lake, whose knowledge of the country afforded the strongest a.s.surance of success in the vigorous proceedings it became necessary to adopt.
The presence of the military in the disturbed districts, and the numerous seizures of arms and arrests of members of the provincial committees that were organized over the country, had considerably deranged the plans and weakened the resources of the confederacy previously to the arrest of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, which effectually crushed the hopes of the rebels, although for some months afterwards they carried on a sort of flying campaign, with a desperation and ferocity that constantly baffled the operations of the regular troops.
Lord Edward Fitzgerald died on the 3rd of June from the effects of the wounds he received in the frantic resistance he offered to the persons who arrested him.
LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.
Cleveland Row, May 25th, 1798.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,
Accounts of a very satisfactory nature have been received here this morning from Dublin. They were upon the very brink of an insurrection, which was to have taken place on the 22nd. They had intelligence of it, and by the arrest of Lord Edward Fitzgerald and the two Sheares"s, who were at the head of the plot, they have not only disconcerted this plan, but have procured indisputable evidence for proceeding against these traitors, and have now, I trust, the certainty of convicting them. A special Commission is preparing for the purpose of bringing them to trial as speedily as possible, but it will require about a month before all the forms can be got through. We are sending back O"Connor to them, and it is probable that his trial may be included in the same Commission.
They write on the 21st, in the best possible spirits, from the Castle. The attack was intended against Chapelizod, the magazine in the Phoenix, and the Castle, at the same time; and in order to increase the confusion, the houses of some of the leading people were also to have been attacked, and the individuals, at the head of whom of course was the Chancellor, were to be put to death. The camp near Dublin was also to be a.s.saulted.
In the desk of one of the Sheares"s was found the proclamation ready drawn, which was to be issued for the establishment of the Republican Government.
A letter was written on the 21st, to the Lord Mayor of Dublin, by Lord Castlereagh, to acquaint him with this design, and to order him to make search for arms, &c., and a message was to be sent to Parliament the 21st or 22nd. They are not quite sure that the idea of the insurrection was abandoned, even after this blow-up; but they were so completely on their guard, that there was nothing to be apprehended.
You will have seen that Lord E. F. made a desperate resistance when he was taken. It is, however, supposed that Ryan will recover, though stabbed in the belly. They had already taken about two thousand pikes in Dublin alone, and great numbers in the adjacent counties. On the whole, I trust that with vigorous measures, such as every one will feel this crisis requires, the seeds of the rebellion will be crushed.
I think there are full grounds to proceed against Lord Thanet and Co. for a conspiracy to rescue, as well as for the riot. O"Connor"s acquittal is imputed to Miller"s charge, and _that_ to his being completely exhausted, so as to omit some of the most material points in the evidence.
Ever most affectionately yours, G.
LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.
Cleveland Row, June 1st, 1798.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,
I did not answer your letter earlier, because I waited to know the opinion of others on the subject of the proposal which you mention.
I find that there is a very strong apprehension of creating by it dissatisfaction among the Militia, and of impeding the future raising and augmentation of that force. For it is reasoned thus: although in the present moment the public spirit is so high that it is probable a very large part would readily concur in a similar proposition, yet there would certainly be many individuals, and perhaps some bodies among them, who would be reluctant to alter their original terms of service. These persons would hardly be placed in a fair situation, because although the option would still nominally be left to them; yet that would be attended with so much odium, and would so much carry the appearance of backwardness, that any persons in such a time as this, and particularly persons engaged in military service, would naturally be very unwilling to expose themselves to it. By this means, all security and confidence in the original terms of enlistment would be lost, and both officers and men, deliberating about entering into the Militia, would do it with the idea that they might continually be called upon to serve out of the kingdom, which would destroy the whole Militia system.
Besides this, another objection strikes me, which I think perhaps even stronger than the preceding. It is that of the loss of security to this country, both in point of fact and opinion, from rendering that force applicable otherwise than to the immediate protection of Great Britain. I hope that in all cases we should have done our best, according to such judgment as we could form at the time: but I will fairly own to you that I do not myself believe that England would have been now as secure as I trust it is, if we had possessed the power of disposing of the Militia regiments for Channel or Irish service, and much less if that power had also been extended to the continent in general.
A third argument I think of little weight, but I know from what I have heard in general conversation on the subject, that it would make considerable impression among a particular cla.s.s of men. The Militia is now raised by a sort of direct burthen on the landed interest, who are reconciled to it from the apparent and visible protection which their property derives from it. Whereas, if it was applied to purposes of more general, though possibly greater, public advantage, that would be called _unfair_ upon the counties, as the term now is, and we should infallibly have proposals for throwing the whole burthen, in all its various shapes, more equally on the general ma.s.s of property within the kingdom.
For all these reasons, tempting as it would be in the present state of the war, to avail ourselves of the service of that which const.i.tutes the greatest part of our regular force for the purpose of those operations, with the necessity of which we are thoroughly impressed, yet I really do not think, nor is it thought by others, that we can prudently attempt it.
A more limited idea has occurred to me, in which I think your zeal might be useful in the way of example. It is this. In any case of invasion (which is by no means to be put out of the question, however the public love to flatter themselves about it) I think it is evident that there might, and probably would be, much boat service. It is by no means impossible that, even in the very act of landing, they might have to be opposed by gun-boats, _et id genus omne_, and that troops would be wanted for that service. If landed, and having taken Dumourier"s "_position on the coast_" to wait for reinforcements and provisions, perhaps the General who commands our force in that quarter may wish to attack them from the sea, without waiting for the certain arm of starvation which would be hanging over them. The same principle applies to the defence of our tide rivers, harbours, &c. Now, for all this, I should think it would be highly useful that our troops should in some degree be trained to this boat work, and though perhaps an inland regiment of Militia might not be thought the best to begin with, yet by suggesting this idea to Sir W. Howe, and expressing your readiness and that of your regiment to lend yourselves to it, an example might be set to others and a very useful practice introduced.
I wrote this early in the morning and before the arrival of the post, so that I do not know whether there will be any accounts from Dublin. If there are, I will add them before I close this letter.
Those of yesterday were, as I understood from the Duke of P. and King, perfectly good, but I did not see them. The only thing that appears at all distressing is that the communication with the south was still interrupted, and although this may arise from the disturbed state of any one point through which the roads pa.s.s, yet it is productive of uneasiness, and may afford opportunities for spreading alarms in the south, the consequences of which might be very serious. No disturbance had shown itself in the north.
Buonaparte is gone to Toulon instead of Rastadt, and it is now publicly declared at Paris that his object is Cadiz, Portugal, or Ireland. If we are not more than commonly unfortunate, _il trouvera a qui parler en chemin_.
I do not think Pitt could avoid answering Fremy"s call, and as it has turned out it is certainly better as it is. One shudders to think what might have happened.
Ever most affectionately yours, G.
I do not enclose the "Gazette," because I conclude you have it.
There was nothing else of any importance from Ireland last night, and nothing at all this morning.
In the month of June, Lord Cornwallis, upon whose military talents the Cabinet placed great reliance, was appointed to succeed Lord Camden in the government of Ireland; and the Irish Secretaryship was again offered to Mr. Thomas Grenville, and declined.
MR. T. GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.
Aylesbury, June 11th, 1798.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,
By a letter from Cleveland Row which I have this moment received, I find the Irish storm, which I told you I had seen gathering, is likely to fall as I had expected it. It is settled that Lord Cornwallis is to go Lord-Lieutenant, and in case of Pelham"s declining on account of his health, I see I shall be urged in the strongest manner possible to fill his situation there. I have already talked this matter so much over with you, and you know so entirely, both my utter aversion to it, and my reluctance to decline any personal risk or inconvenience in these critical times, that I cannot on either side add anything upon this subject; but upon a matter of so much anxiety and importance to me, a matter too of which you are in every respect qualified to give me so good an opinion, you will not be surprised at the solicitude which I express to know all that you may think about it. Perhaps it may not come in question, if Pelham is strong again and in health, but if it does, as very possibly it may, I cannot enough say how desirous I shall be to discuss the whole matter with you; and as time may press in the instant of its being proposed, I know that you will readily turn this in your mind in the present moment. I shall be in town on Thursday, which being a fair day here, ends our eight days"
exercise; it has pa.s.sed very prosperously, they do extremely well, and have been from seventy to eighty out, and working every day seven or eight hours. We go on to beat the rebels in Ireland, but we beat them into soldiers.
G.o.d bless you, dearest brother.
LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.
Cleveland Row, June 13th, 1798.
MY DEAREST BROTHER,
I do not hear of any Irish news this morning; if there is any, I will add it before I close this letter. I entirely agree with you in thinking the situation of Irish Secretary to be in rank and estimation much below Tom"s calibre. In point of real utility and scope for displaying the powers of his mind, G.o.d knows it is difficult, extensive, and important enough for the talents of the greatest man this country ever saw. It is, however, as you will have learnt by my note of yesterday, out of the question; and Pelham"s rank is too much on a level with his, to admit of the idea of interposing Tom or Lord D. between Lord C. and him.
When I wrote yesterday, I had not seen Nugent"s letter, nor indeed heard much of the particulars, as you will have seen from my letter. I think nothing can be better than Nugent"s conduct seems to have been, and his letter is extremely manly, distinct and judicious. But what a picture does it offer of our officers! I believe I do not know _this_ Lumley; but I do not, as far as I _have_ known them, think that there is one of the race fit to be trusted with the command of a patrole of watchmen, from Lord Scarborough downwards. Walpole I had long known, and certainly I should have said the same of him. What a calamity it is, that our army has not yet been taught that the command of troops in moments of difficulty and danger requires skill and knowledge, and is not a faculty bought with a commission at the regulated price.
_Je vois tres en noir_ about this Irish business; but with me that feeling never has, I trust, operated otherwise than as an incitement to greater exertion, "to bate no jot of heart, or hope, but still bear up, and steer right onward." We have gone through such scenes as this country has never before known; where we have been wanting in firmness, we have suffered for it; where we have shown courage adequate to the danger, G.o.d has borne us through it; and so I trust He will do. At all events, our lives, and honour, and the existence of our country, are staked upon the issue, and nothing but resolution can save us.
I saw with the greatest pleasure the address of your regiment. I am happy it has taken that shape, because I think it the least exceptionable, and still am inclined to the measure. If it depended on my choice alone, I do not think many hours would pa.s.s over before you would be in march.