_From Lord Clarendon_
_G.G., April 19th_. I am delighted you approved of what I said last night,[Footnote: In the House of Lords.] and much obliged to you for letting me know it. I thought Derby"s speech excellent, though perhaps a trifle too bellicose in the latter part for John Bull, who always wants a little preparation before he is taken over rough ground. He is under the strict neutrality delusion just now, and has not yet thought of realising his role in a European war.
Your article is attracting great attention, and seems to be working a great deal of good. Where did you get the information contained in the note to p.
566? [Footnote: See _ante_, p. 13.] I meant to have used it, and to have appealed to Aberdeen to confirm the statement, but thought it prudent to ask him beforehand whether he agreed.
The article on "Austria, France, and Italy," in the April number of the Review brought Reeve the following letter from Mr. Edward Cheney, till then a mere acquaintance, though between the two a friendship quickly sprang up which was broken only by death. Mr. Cheney had lived for several years in Italy, and his letters--always interesting, frequently amusing--commonly relate to Italian affairs; but he was a well-read, accomplished, and large-minded man, and in his judgement on literary questions Reeve had great confidence.
Audley Square, April 20th.
My dear sir,--At the risk of appearing intrusive, and perhaps impertinent, I cannot resist my strong inclination to express the great satisfaction with which I have read the article in the last number of the "Edinburgh Review" on the Italian question. I do not presume to attribute the authorship to yourself, though the clearness of the style, the closeness of the reasoning, and the candour of the deductions would naturally lead me to that conclusion; but, in truth, its merits are far beyond its technical excellencies, and I rejoice peculiarly on its appearance at a moment when public attention is concentrated on the affairs of the Italian peninsula, and when the public, too, has so much need of enlightenment. A man who writes as the author of that article has done confers an incalculable benefit on his countrymen; and, as one not altogether incompetent to form a judgement on the subject, I beg to offer him my congratulations.
I have lived many years in Italy, am minutely acquainted with every part of it. I have many friends and intimates amongst its natives. I admire the country, and like its people; and, while doing justice to many of their excellent and amiable qualities, I cannot be blind to the fact that most of the misfortunes which have befallen them are attributable mainly to their want of constancy, their want of ambition, and--the word must be spoken--their want of courage. They are now on the eve of another and more serious revolution; they are rushing with reckless indifference upon a danger the extent of which they cannot realise to themselves, but which must inevitably overwhelm them. A European war must be the consequence, a war in which England must ultimately take a part; and the man who calmly and dispa.s.sionately endeavours to open the eyes of his countrymen to the truth, and who, regardless of pa.s.sing obloquy, dares to a.s.sert it, is their real benefactor; and though, at the first moment, he may share the fate of those who tell unwelcome truths, justice will ultimately be done him, though not, perhaps, till the cry of regret is raised that his warning and advice were both neglected. I would conclude my letter with another apology for having thus far intruded on your valuable time; but you yourself will be able to suggest my best excuse in the deep interest which we both take in the subject.
Believe me, my dear Sir,
Very sincerely yours,
EDWARD CHENEY.
_From M. Guizot_
_Paris, April 21st_.--J"ai recu et lu votre article il y a deja plusieurs jours, et je l"ai trouve excellent. Il est impossible de mieux resumer les faits, de mieux etablir les droits et de faire mieux pressentir la bonne politique. Lord Derby et Lord Clarendon vous ont donne pleinement raison.
Ils ont garde, l"un et l"autre, chacun dans sa position, une juste mesure, tout en parlant avec une grande franchise. L"effet est grand ici.
The question is how to get clear of this imbroglio, the handiwork of a lot of mischief-makers, who are at once timid and rash, obstinate and unenterprising, conscious of their weakness, yet persisting in their folly.
We are waiting impatiently for the decisive answers from Turin and Vienna; and then the congress; and then your elections; and then--what? I have pa.s.sed the best part of my life in doing, and am not yet accustomed to waiting without knowing what for....
_From Lord Brougham_
[_Cannes_] _April 21st_.--I am extremely obliged to you for sending the article, which I have read with the greatest satisfaction. There are one or two things of minor importance on which I differ. The matter of Genoa as connected with Piedmont, I need not say, is not one of these. Indeed, it might have been put stronger, and without reference to Lord W. Bentinck; for, if I rightly recollect, when I, in 1817, attacked Castlereagh on the misdeeds of the congress in 1815, I put the surrender of Genoa to Piedmont in the very front of the charges against the congress--independent of Lord W. B."s proclamation, and on the ground of the Genoese hatred of Piedmont.
I again referred to this the first night of the session.
I broke through my rule of never attending funerals yesterday. The last time I broke it was my dear friend Follett; this time it was Tocqueville. I should have been the only member of the Inst.i.tute, but Ampere had set out from Rome on receiving T."s letter, and arrived the day after his death. He is carried to Tocqueville--near Cherbourg, as you know; one of his brothers and a nephew accompany it. Mme. T. is not nearly so ill as was believed. It is bronchitis, not lungs; so she expects to go by slow journeys in a few days.
_April 22nd_.--Since I wrote yesterday I have received an account which, whether true or not, shows the opinion they have in Italy of our great ally. A man who had stood his friend and prevented the King of Holland from disinheriting him, has lately been at Paris, and was kindly received by him. So far is certain, and his kindness to those who befriended him formerly is a good quality he really possesses. But it is added that he told him to tell his nation not to be disheartened by the congress, because care would be taken to make proposals which must be rejected, and that he was as ready as ever. I really believe there is nothing too base in the way of perfidy he would scruple to do, if his resolution was fixed and it appeared clearly to be his interest. There has, however, been a change in him of late, as to determination. He is more easily swayed by others than he was, and he falters more when left alone. Altogether, it is a cruel calamity for the world to have such a person to depend upon. I wish someone would show how much he appeals to the mult.i.tude--the mere _mob_. He is still a socialist in practice; and if anyone will read the Robespierre papers, he will see that there is a deliberate design to make the poor--the persons without property--rule. One man whom I afterwards knew (Julien de Paris), and who had been a philanthropist _exalte_, states, in one of his reports to the Committee of Public Safety, that those who have no property are the great majority, and therefore must govern. There could be no greater service to France than a full exposition of these principles--the ones which L. N. adopts; and at the same time a full account of the abominable character of the first Napoleon, of which the materials are abundant in the correspondence with Joseph, [Footnote: _Memoires et Correspondance politique et militaire du roi Joseph_ (6 tom. 8vo.
1854).] and also in the printed, but unpublished, vols. of his whole correspondence.
[_Cannes_] _May 4th_--I suppose some folks will now have discovered what reliance there is to be placed on a capricious and absolute man. It was clear from the first that he had resolved upon this Italian speculation, and that as soon as he could mitigate the universal feeling and opinion against him, he would have his way. The congress, whether suggested by him through Russia or not, was only one means of delay till all was ready, and one way of putting Austria in the wrong, or making an outcry against her as if she was--for really, except in the clumsy way of doing it, I can see nothing to blame in her refusal. She is treated as the aggressor. Now all she has done, or could do, was in her own defence, and nothing in the world can be more absurd than pretending that she is the cause of the war. If she beat the allies ever so much, she does not gain one inch of territory, while their real object is to strip her. As for L. N. considering himself aggrieved by her breaking off the negotiation and beginning to defend herself, it can only be on the supposition that he has a right to interfere on behalf of the Italians. Indeed, the same thing may be said of Sardinia.
It is considered that she is aggrieved if the other Italian States are aggrieved; and now comes this rising in Tuscany and the smaller duchies to embarra.s.s one party and so far help the other. But there is no reason to believe that any rising in Lombardy will take place.
The unaccountable part of it is the Austrians delaying their attack. It seemed clear that their plan would be to march upon Turin before the French could get up, and yet they have suffered 40,000 men to be landed at Genoa, and a considerable force to cross by Mont Cenis, without doing anything.
Can it be that the sudden notice to Piedmont was an act of the Emperor without his ministers being consulted, and that they are less prepared than was supposed? Bunsen"s son, who is in the Prussian mission at Turin, wrote ten days ago that the Government was ready to remove to Genoa, expecting the Austrians to come before the French arrived, and knowing Turin to be indefensible. It now seems that there must be a battle before Turin can be taken. All the road from Paris to Ma.r.s.eilles has been enc.u.mbered with troops, and all the steamers have been taken by the Government, and more men will be sent if wanted. The usual effect of a war has been perceived--namely, making the mult.i.tude rally round the Government--consequently there is less outcry against the war than there was, except amongst thinking people and those who are suffering from the suspension of all trade. The Emperor himself will probably join the army when they are prepared for an advantageous movement. He is playing a game that may be desperate. This Russian alliance is denied, but substantially it is true, and I have little doubt that some undertaking is effected to give leave to Russia in Turkey, on condition that she does something for Poland (one of L. N."s hobbies) and helps some Italian arrangement for the cousin.
The next letter is endorsed by Reeve--"An affectionate record of a long friendship. I have inserted it in the copy of his Journals."
_From Mr. C. C. Greville_
_May 6th_.--I will not delay to thank you warmly for your kind note. Your accession to the P. C. office gave me a friendship which I need not say how much I have valued through so many years of happy intercourse, which I rejoice at knowing has never been for an instant clouded or interrupted, and which will, I hope, last the same as long as I last myself. It is always painful to do anything for the last time, and I cannot without emotion take leave of an office where I have experienced for so many years so much kindness, consideration, and goodwill. I have told Hamilton that I hope still to be considered as _amicus curiae_, and to be applied to on every occasion when I can be of use to the office, or my personal services can be employed to promote the interest of any member of it. Between you and me there has been, I think, as much as possible between any two people, the "idem velle, idem nolle et idem sentire de republica," and in consequence the "firma amicitia." G.o.d bless you, and believe me always,
Yours most sincerely and faithfully, C. C. G.
_From Lord Brougham_
[_Cannes_] _May 18th_.--I really begin to feel anxious about the peace of Europe, and not without some alarm as to our own position. There can be no doubt that for the present (if not more permanently) this man [the Emperor], working on the French feeling, has got the mob, military and civil, with him. The war has ceased to be unpopular, and all reckon upon victory. If they succeed, he will, for a while, be satisfied with the gratification of his vanity and the strengthening of his power; but soon after he will be pushed by his unruly supporters, and will try a deeper game. Of this they are as much convinced in Germany as of his existence, and even Prussia will not persist holding back. If she does, and if the Russian alliance continues, she will be destroyed as soon as Austria is weakened. I, therefore, expect to see Prussia take timely precautions. They are prepared at Frankfort to split with her if she does not.
I am now satisfied that the Austrians intended only a _razzia_ to Turin, and then to carry on only a defensive contest; and having been prevented--partly by the floods, and partly by our untimely intermeddling, and partly by their old error of having one head at Vienna, and another with the army--they have now given up the _razzia_, and will act on the defensive. This will not prevent them taking advantage of any opportunity of attacking, should they be able to do so with a certainty of success; but for any such dash I look rather to the French than to them. Certainly the Man is in a great difficulty if the Austrians steadily pursue this plan; for the expectations are wound up to a high pitch in France--especially in Paris and the great towns--of his doing something speedily, and the French nature is not to wait with calmness and patience. Even in this remote quarter, the thousands of fine troops pa.s.sing raises a great feeling for the war.
_To Lord Brougham
C. O., May 21st_.--To the very best of my belief, the Queen"s Speech will not be delivered till June 7th, but I speak without authority.... I have the greatest doubt whether it will be possible to unite all those sections of the H. of C. which are not to be regarded as Lord Derby"s supporters, in a direct adverse vote--on the address or otherwise; and if the attempt is made--as it probably will be I think it will fail. [Footnote: The attempt was made, and did not fail. The Ministry was defeated on the amendment to the address by 323 to 310.] The Government say they have 307 men on whom they can rely, and a fair chance that fifteen or twenty more men will not consent to take part in an active, offensive campaign. Indeed the country gentlemen say pretty generally that they will not attempt to turn the Government out, until they are satisfied that a more stable Government can be formed. But how is this possible when the numbers are--on one side a compact body of more than 300, and--on the other side, a divided body of 350? What we hope, therefore, is this: that John Russell and the Radicals will take a course on the subject of Reform which will be resisted by the moderate Liberals; and that the result will be a fusion between the moderate Liberals and the large Conservative phalanx. For it is clear that without some degree of support from the Conservatives, no other government can be carried on. As for any lasting or sincere union between Lord Palmerston and Lord John, it is quite hopeless, [Footnote: The event falsified this forecast. In the Ministry which Palmerston now formed Lord John was Foreign Secretary, and continued so till Palmerston"s death in 1865.] and the desire to keep the latter out of office is so general and intense, that it is probable he would fail to make a Cabinet, even if the Queen sent for him--which she will certainly not do until the last extremity. On the other hand, there is the great objection to Palmerston that he holds language about the Italians and the French--to whom he is entirely devoted--which is quite at variance with the convictions of every man of sense in the country. There can be very little doubt that the war will spread. The whole of Germany is burning with ardour to support Austria; and if the French gain a battle on the Po, nothing will prevent the whole strength of Germany from coming to the rescue. [Footnote: Louis Napoleon"s fear of this is a sufficient explanation of his ambiguous policy after Solferino.] The position of France is, in reality, most critical, for all her best troops are in Italy, and she would have great difficulty in placing 100,000 men on the Rhine, where she may have to confront half a million of combatants.
Hortensius" [Footnote: William Forsyth, Q.C., for many years standing counsel to the India Office. As the author, among other works, of _Hortensius_, and residing, as he still resides, at 61 Rutland Gate, Lord Brougham, in writing to Reeve, invariably refers to him as either "Hortensius" or "your neighbour." In 1872 he published _Letters from Lord Brougham to William Forsyth_, with some facsimiles to show his "extraordinary hand." "I think," wrote Mr. Forsyth, "the hieroglyphics will puzzle most readers;" but the samples he has given are as copper-plate compared with some of the letters to Reeve of about the same date.]
appointment was, I believe, purely an act of Lord Stanley"s, and I dare say your kindness in mentioning his name had due effect. Hortensius applied, by letter, for the appointment, and about three weeks after came a letter to say he was appointed.
_From Lord Brougham_
[_Cannes_] _May 24th_. I have been reading over again your excellent article on the subject of the day, and I may say of the place; and the more I reflect on it, I come the nearer to your view in all respects. Really the more we consider this abominable man"s conduct (and his accomplice Cavour is quite as bad, though not so foolish), the greater indignation we feel at the unprovoked breach of the peace. The audacity of the pretence from a despot and usurper exceeds precedent. What can be said too of Russia, which keeps her hold of Poland only ten years longer than the settlement of 1815! It really would be important, now that the attempt has been made to represent [the first] Napoleon as the friend of oppressed nationalities, that we should direct men"s attention a little more to the enormities in that man"s whole history. Party motives arising out of our English divisions to a certain degree prevented the real truth from being generally felt respecting him. There was the usual exaggeration on both sides. One party painted the devil blacker than he was, crediting to him crimes which he never committed. The other, because their adversaries thus painted him, would allow nothing against him, and exaggerated his merits--though it were difficult to overrate his capacity, and his military genius especially. But the more his moral guilt is examined the blacker it will appear, and the late publication, which you call candid, I believe has been true and full owing to careless superintendence. When I say publication I mean printing, for it is not really published, though copies are freely given. The publication of Joseph"s memoirs is also full of important matter.
Now from these and the existing materials, a full and plain account of the man ought to be prepared, [Footnote: This is what M. Lanfrey began to do, and was going on with at the time of his lamented death, at the age of forty-nine, in 1877.] and you may rely on it that great effect against the present man would be produced; for he ostentatiously connects his policy with the former one"s, and there is the greatest care taken to suppress attacks on Napoleon I. in the periodical publications--at least in the newspapers. But if the English and German and Belgian press are full of the facts, and repeatedly lay them before the world, no policy of the French press can long keep the truth from reaching the public. However, I am drawn away from what I had intended to mention--the present state of the public mind on the war question in this country. The giddy and warlike nature of the people, and his going to the army, has produced an effect not only in removing the unpopularity of the war, but in raising a warlike spirit--at least for the present. If victory comes, this will be increased. It is probable he may for the present be satisfied with the strength which he will derive from it; but the army will probably join with the mob in wishing for further proceedings, and then we shall find that Germany will be attacked, and I must even say that we shall do well to be prepared in England. I believe, however, that the Austrians in Italy will make it a lingering affair by defensive operations, and this will exhaust the French patience. The lies of the Sardinian press, and indeed official accounts, make it impossible to tell how far they have at the beginning suffered a check. But I plainly perceive that, if something brilliant is not done, L.
N. will be shaken.
_From Count Zamoyski_
_Paris, May 28th_. May is pa.s.sing and your plans are not yet realised; we still await your arrival. Mme. Krasinska is leaving Paris for Warsaw, and has charged me to forward you the enclosed, in which she gives you the address of the person here who is ready to receive the papers you have promised her, which both she and the friends of the deceased await with lively interest.
Having written thus much on the matter in hand, Zamoyski turned again to politics and the discussion at some length of the situation in Italy, out of which many of the Poles fondly hoped their freedom was to come. The English mistrust of Napoleon, he argued, was as injudicious as unfounded, and could do nothing but harm by forcing France into the arms of Russia.
One of the many wild suggestions afloat at the time amounted to little less than a complete remodelling of the map of Europe. Austria, deprived of her Italian provinces, was to be compensated on the lower Danube; as a balance to which, Russia was to occupy Constantinople, and, to mark her friendship to France--who was entering on the war for an _idee_--would restore freedom to Poland. And there were some who believed it. Zamoyski was clearer-headed; but his mind also was warped by sense of wrong, and his fancy was as wild as the other. If England, he urged, will not act in concert with France, let her at least emulate the n.o.ble example France is setting. She is preparing to free Italy; let England, as her part in the generous rivalry, free Poland. Russia is still England"s enemy. This is England"s opportunity. And he seems to have persuaded himself that, if she did not avail herself of it, she would be a recreant to the cause of liberty and humanity. It is very curious.
_From the Countess Krasinska_
_Paris, 26 mai_.--Je vous remercie infiniment, Monsieur, de votre bonne lettre et de tout ce que vous voulez bien me dire de celui que nous ne cesserons pas de regretter, et qui m"a bien et bien souvent parle de vous et des annees de jeunesse pa.s.sees avec vous dans une etroite et sincere amitie. Ce souvenir a ete constant dans son coeur! Je regrette infiniment aussi que les evenements politiques vous aient empeche de venir a Paris, comme vous vous le proposiez. Je suis obligee de partir pour Varsovie, et crains de vous manquer si vous venez bientot ici. Dans tous les cas, si vous vouliez bien confier vos precieux ma.n.u.scrits [Footnote: If sent to M. Okrynski, the letters were returned; for they were afterwards given to Sigismond"s grandson, the present Count Adam Krasinski (_see post_. p.
389).] a M. Victor Okrynski, Rue de la Pepiniere 66, je vous en serai bien reconnaissante. C"est chez lui que je laisse en depot ce que nous avons ra.s.semble jusqu"ici.
It would seem from the following note that Lord Macaulay had spoken to Reeve of Dr. Thomas Campbell"s "Diary of a Visit to England in 1775; by an Irishman;" a small book--little more than a pamphlet--which had been published at Sydney in 1854. It had struck Reeve that such a "Diary"
might be the text for an interesting article in the "Review;" and the correspondence respecting it derives a peculiar value from its near approach to the close of Macaulay"s labours.
_From Lord Macaulay_
Holly Lodge, Kensington, June 1st.
Dear Reeve,--Before you determine anything about Dr. T. Campbell"s Diary, you had better read it. I have lent my copy, which is probably the only copy in England, and do not expect to get it back till next week. When it comes, I will send it to you, and we will then talk further. Ever yours truly, MACAULAY.
_From M. Guizot_
_Val Richer, June 11th_.--... On the Continent, it seems to me, there is now only one question--Will Austria remain obstinate? If she does, if she is determined to fight on, although beaten; not to give up her Italian possessions, although she has lost them in Italy, and to impose on the conquerors of Milan the necessity of being also the conquerors of Vienna--in that case the actual beginning of the war is a trifle; we are advancing towards a general war and European chaos. The mere continuance of the struggle will be quite sufficient to make it impossible for anyone--for Lord Derby as much as for Lord Palmerston--to stop it or to foresee where it will lead. Has Austria the will and the strength to prolong the struggle? Or will she be alarmed and intimidated by her first defeats, and be persuaded to make such concessions as will give, if not Italy herself, at least her patrons for the time being, a decent pretext to declare themselves satisfied, and to retreat in triumph? I repeat this seems to me the only question. If I were to judge by the reports that reach me from Germany, no doubt is there felt. Austria, both emperor and country, are said to be perfectly determined to fight to the last extremity, being convinced that in their extreme peril, and when, in their persons, European order is endangered, they will find allies and a chance of safety. But I do not put much faith in rumours which promise a somewhat heroic firmness.
Great things are apt to come to nothing nowadays, and it may well be that the Italian question will fall through, and all this noise end in some transaction which will be neither a true nor lasting solution. Italy has long been the scene of events that end thus....