The Duke of Otranto, president of the committee, appeared in the council, and in public, to approve the principles and determinations of his colleagues. In private, it was a different affair. Devoted in appearance to all parties, he flattered and deceived them in turn, by pretended confidential communications, and chimerical hopes. He spoke of liberty to the republicans, of glory and Napoleon II. to the Bonapartists, of legitimacy to the friends of the King, of guarantees and a general peace to the partizans of the Duke of Orleans; and thus contrived to secure himself on all sides, in case of need, favourable chances and supporters[78]. Men familiar with his practices were not the dupes of his artifices, and endeavoured to unmask them: but his apparent conduct was so irreproachable, that their warnings were considered as the result of personal prejudice, or unjust suspicion.
[Footnote 78: The Emperor, informed of the manoeuvres of M. Fouche, said: "He is ever the same; always ready to thrust his foot into every one"s slipper."]
Besides, it was agreed on all hands, that the fate of France depended on the negotiations with foreign powers: and it was hoped, that the plenipotentiaries, and particularly Messrs. d"Argenson and la Fayette, whose principles were inflexible, would render every kind of surprise or treachery impracticable.
These plenipotentiaries had left Paris on the 25th of June. Their instructions were as follows:
_Instructions for Messieurs the Plenipotentiaries of the Committee of Government to the Allied Powers._
"Paris, June the 23d, 1815.
"The object of the mission of messieurs the plenipotentiaries, appointed to repair to the allied powers, has no farther need of being developed. It is in their hearts, as it is in the hearts of all Frenchmen: the business is, to save their country.
"The salvation of the country is connected with two essential subjects: the independence of the nation, and the integrity of its territories.
"The independence of the nation cannot be complete, except the const.i.tuent principles of the present organization of France be secure from every foreign attack. One of the principles of this organization is the inheritance of the throne in the imperial family. The Emperor having abdicated, his rights have devolved on his son. The foreign powers cannot make the least attack on this principle of inheritance, established by our const.i.tutions, without violating our independence.
"The declaration of the 13th, and the treaty of the 25th of March, have received an important modification by the explanatory article, which the British cabinet annexed to the ratification of this treaty: an article, by which this cabinet announces, _that it has no intention of pursuing the war for the purpose of imposing a particular government on France_. This modification has been adopted by the allies; it has been sanctioned by Lord Clancarty"s letter of the 6th of May, to the drawing up of which all the other plenipotentiaries gave their a.s.sent; it has been sanctioned by a note of Prince Metternich"s, dated the 9th; and finally by the declaration of the combined powers dated the 12th of the same month.
"It is this grand principle, acknowledged by the combined powers, to which messieurs the plenipotentiaries ought particularly to appeal.
"We cannot conceal, that it is much to be feared, that the combined powers will think themselves at present bound more by the declarations, which they made before the commencement of hostilities.
They will not fail to object,
"That, if, previous to the war, they set up a distinction between the nation and the Emperor, this distinction no longer exists, when the nation, by uniting all its forces in the hands of this prince, has in fact united his fate with its own:
"That, though, previous to the war, they were sincere in their intention of not interfering in the internal concerns of France, they are compelled to interfere in them now, precisely for the prevention of any similar recurrence of war, and for ensuring tranquillity for the future.
"It would be superfluous, to point out to messieurs the plenipotentiaries the answers they may make to these objections. They will find their best refutation in the sentiments of national honour, which, after the whole nation had joined the Emperor, could not but fight with him and for him; and could not separate from him, till some act, such as that of an abdication, dissolved the ties between the nation and its sovereign. It will be easy to them to demonstrate, that, if this sacred duty of honour compelled the French nation, to make war for its own defence, as well as that of the head, that was attempted to be taken from it; the abdication of this head replaces the nation in a state of peace with all the powers, since it was this head alone, that they wished to remove: and that, if the declaration made by the combined powers, of having no intention to impose on France a particular government, were frank and sincere, this sincerity, and this frankness, ought now to be manifested by their respect for the national independence, when recent circ.u.mstances have removed the only grievance, of which they thought themselves authorised to complain.
"There is an objection of a more serious nature, which the combined powers might bring forward first, if they be determined to avail themselves of all the advantages, which their military position seems to offer them. This objection would be that of an inclination to refuse to acknowledge the committee of government, and the plenipotentiaries, and the acts of the national representatives, as proceeding from a state of things illegal in their eyes, because they have constantly refused, to admit the principle, on which it is founded. This objection, if it be strongly urged, and the combined powers will not wave it, will leave little prospect of the possibility of an accommodation. However messieurs the plenipotentiaries will a.s.suredly neglect no endeavour, to combat such objections; and they will be in no want of arguments, to combat them with success, particularly with respect to the British government, the present dynasty of which reigns solely in virtue of those principles, the application of which we in our turn have occasion to claim.
"Perhaps, too, without disavowing the independence of the French nation, the allied sovereigns will persist in declaring, that they have no proof, that the wishes of the nation are the wishes expressed by the government, or even by the chambers; and that thus, in order to know the real wishes of the nation, they must begin by restoring things to the state in which they were before the month of March, 1815; leaving to the nation afterwards to decide, whether it ought to retain its old government, or give itself a new one.
"The answer to these objections also will be found in that which England itself formerly gave to the enemies, who were for disputing its right of changing its government and its dynasty. England then answered, that the simple fact of the possession of the sovereign authority authorised foreign powers, to treat with him, who was invested with it. Thus, in case the authorities actually existing in France were not, what in fact they are, clothed in the most perfect legality, the refusal to treat with them can be supported by no solid argument. It would be declaring, that they are resolved to try, how far they can carry the claims of force; and announcing to France, that there is no security for her but in the resources of desperation.
"In fine, there is one less obnoxious chance, against which also we ought to be provided. It is, that the combined powers, faithful at least in part to their declaration, do not absolutely insist on imposing the Bourbon family on France; but that, on the other hand, they require the exclusion of the son of the Emperor Napoleon, under pretence, that a long minority might give rise either to a dangerous display of ambitious views on the part of the princ.i.p.al members possessing the authority in France, or to internal commotions, the shock of which would be felt abroad. Were the question brought to this point, messieurs the plenipotentiaries would find in the principles of the objection itself the principle of its answer; since the division of power in the hands of a council commonly renders its authority weaker, and the minority of a prince is always a period of slackness and languor in the government. They would find it particularly in the present temper of the French nation, in the want it feels of a long peace, in the fears which the idea of a continuation or renewal of war must inspire, and in the shackles imposed by the laws of the const.i.tution on the pa.s.sions of the members of the government.
Besides, whatever its construction may be, they will find in all its circ.u.mstances, and in a thousand others besides, very valid arguments, to oppose to those, that may be alleged against the maintenance of hereditary principles in the dynasty of the Emperor Napoleon.
"The first and most solid pledge, that the allies can give the French nation of their intention to respect its independence, is to renounce without reserve all design of subjecting it anew to the government of the Bourbon family. The allied powers must now be well convinced themselves, that the re-establishment of this family is incompatible with the general tranquillity of France, and consequently with the repose of Europe. If it be their wish, as they declare, to produce a stable order of things in France and other nations, the purpose would be completely defeated. The return of a family, strangers to our manners, and continually surrounded by men, who have ceased to be French, would rekindle a second time among us every kind of animosity, and every pa.s.sion; and it would be an illusion, to expect a stable order to arise from the midst of so many elements of discord and trouble. Thus the exclusion of the Bourbon family is an absolute condition of the maintenance of the general tranquillity; and for the general interest of Europe, as well as for the particular interest of France, it is one of the points, to which messieurs the plenipotentiaries must most strongly adhere.
"The question of the integrity of the territory of France is intimately connected with that of its independence. If the war, declared by the allied powers against the Emperor Napoleon, were in fact declared against him alone, the integrity of our territory is not threatened. It is of importance to the general balance of power, that France should retain at least the limits a.s.signed it by the treaty of Paris. What the foreign cabinets themselves considered as proper and necessary in 1814, they cannot look upon with other eyes in 1815. What pretence can justify now a dismemberment of the French territory by the foreign powers? Every thing in the system of Europe is altered; all to the advantage of England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia; all to the detriment of France. The French nation is not jealous; but it will not be subjugated, or dismembered.
"Thus the efforts of messieurs the plenipotentiaries will have two leading objects; the maintenance of the national independence, and the preservation of the integrity of the French territories.
"These two objects are linked together, and mutually dependent on each other: they cannot be separated, and no modification of either of them can be admitted, without endangering the safety of the country.
"But if the foreign powers should make any proposals, capable of being reconciled with our dearest interests; and they should be offered to us as the ultimatum of our safety; messieurs the plenipotentiaries, refraining from the expression of a premature opinion, will hasten _to give an account of them, and to demand the orders of government_.
"Whatever may be the dispositions of the foreign powers; whether they acknowledge the two principles, that are pointed out to messieurs the plenipotentiaries as the bases of their mission; or the negotiations lead to other discussions, of a nature to require enlarging upon; it is highly important, on either supposition, that a general armistice should be previously agreed on. The first care of messieurs the plenipotentiaries must consequently be, to demand an armistice, and insist on its being promptly concluded upon.
"There is one sacred duty, that the French nation cannot forget; which is, _to stipulate the safety and inviolability of the Emperor Napoleon out of its territory_. This is a debt of honour, which the nation feels the necessity of acquitting toward a prince, who long covered it with glory; and who in his misfortunes renounces the throne, that the nation may be saved without him, since it appears, that with him it cannot be saved.
"The choice of the place, to which the Emperor will have to retire, may be a subject of discussion. Messieurs the plenipotentiaries will appeal to the personal generosity of the sovereigns, to obtain a residence to be fixed upon, with which the Emperor will have reason to, be satisfied.
"Independently of the general considerations, which messieurs the plenipotentiaries will have to urge to the allied sovereigns indiscriminately, they will themselves judge of the various arguments, which they will have to employ with respect to the different cabinets separately.
"The interests of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, not being the same; it will be proper, to exhibit under different points of view to each of these cabinets the advantages, that the new order of things, recently established in France, may offer them respectively. All the powers will find in it a guarantee of the preservation of whatever they possess, either of territory, or of influence: but, with these general advantages, some of them must find themselves separately benefited.
"Austria may well be supposed, not to see with pleasure the re-establishment of one branch of the Bourbon dynasty on the throne of Fiance, while another branch of the same house reascends the throne of Naples.
"This circ.u.mstance, which belongs to the policy of the cabinet, may also receive some support from family affection: the regard of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria for his grandson may induce him, not to oppose the high destiny offered to him. It may be, that the Austrian cabinet may perceive in this bond of relationship a means of strengthening its cause by the support of the French nation; and that, alarmed at the aggrandis.e.m.e.nt of Russia and of Prussia, whose alliance no doubt is a grievance to it, it may lay hold of the opportunity of an advantageous reconciliation with France, so as in case of need to find in it a powerful auxiliary against those two governments.
"Other reasons offer themselves, to incline the cabinet of Petersburg toward us. The liberal opinions professed by the Emperor of Russia authorize a language to be held to his minister, and even to this potentate himself, to which few other sovereigns would be capable of listening. There is room for thinking also, that this monarch takes but little interest personally in the welfare of the Bourbon family, whose conduct in general has not been pleasing to him. He had not much reason to be satisfied with it, when he found it express its grat.i.tude almost exclusively to the Prince Regent of England. Besides, the object of Russia is attained all its thirst of power, and its self-love, are equally satisfied. Tranquil for a long time to come, and victor without having fought, the Emperor Alexander may proudly return to his dominions, and enjoy a success, that will not have cost him a single man. The continuance of the war with France would now be to him a war without an object. It would be repugnant to all the calculations of good policy, and to the interests of his people.
Messieurs the plenipotentiaries will avail themselves of these circ.u.mstances, and of many others also, to endeavour to neutralize a power so formidable as Russia.
"That continental power, from which France has the least favour to expect, is the court of Berlin: but this court is that of which the forces have received the most violent check; and if Russia and Austria be ever so little disposed; to enter into negotiations, Prussia will be inevitably compelled to accede to them. Besides, even with this court, arguments of great weight will not be wanting, to render it more amicably disposed, if it will listen only to its real and permanent interests.
"Messieurs the plenipotentiaries will find with the allied sovereigns the British plenipotentiaries and it will be with these, perhaps, that the negotiation will present most difficulties. The question with respect to the allies is scarcely a matter of discussion: with this power, every argument and every principle are in our favour; but it remains to be seen, whether its will be not independent of all principles, and of all arguments.
"The particulars noticed above were no doubt unnecessary; as every thing there mentioned would have suggested itself to messieurs the plenipotentiaries themselves. But these hints may not be without their use, since their natural effect will be, to lead the minds of messieurs the plenipotentiaries to more weighty considerations, and more powerful motives, which they will know how to employ seasonably for the grand purpose of the important and difficult mission with which they are charged.
"Messieurs the plenipotentiaries will find in the reports made to the Emperor by the Duke of Vicenza on the 12th of April and 7th of June last, as well as in the justificatory pieces, that accompany these reports, all the data they can require, to form a just estimate of our situation with regard to the foreign powers, and to regulate their conduct toward the ministers of these different powers."
On the 26th of June the plenipotentiaries had their first interview with two Prussian officers delegated by Marshal Blucher. They gave an account of it to the committee by the following despatch, addressed to M. Bignon, who had the portfolio of foreign affairs.
"Laon, June the 26th, 1815, "Ten o"clock in the evening.
"Monsieur le Baron Bignon,
"We have received the letter, which you did us the honour to write to us yesterday the 25th, respecting the Emperor"s intention of repairing to the United States of America with his brothers.
"We have at length just received our pa.s.sports, to proceed to the head-quarters of the allied sovereigns, which we shall find at Heidelberg or at Manheim. The Prince of Schoenburgh, aide-de-camp of Marshal Blucher, accompanies us. We shall take the road through Metz; and set off in an hour.
"Marshal Blucher has declared to us, by the Prince of Schoenburgh and Count Noslitz, who was more particularly empowered by him, that France will be in no degree restricted in the choice of a government: but in the armistice he proposed, _he required for the security of his army the fortified towns of Metz, Thionville, Mezieres, Maubeuge, Sarrelouis, and others_. He sets out with the principle, that he ought to be secured against any attempts, which the party, that he supposes the Emperor to have, may make. We combated this argument by irrefragable reasons, without gaining any ground. You are sensible, sir, that it was impossible for us, to accede to such demands.
"We did all in our power, to obtain the armistice on moderate terms; but it was impossible for us, to come to any conclusion, "because,"
said the prince, "he is not authorized to grant one, and immense advantages alone could induce him, to take such a step, as long as the princ.i.p.al object is unattained."
"We offered a suspension of hostilities, at least for five days. The refusal was equally positive, and for the same motives. Count de Noslitz has offered in the name of Prince Blucher, to receive at his head-quarters, _and at those of the Duke of Wellington, any commissioners you may send, who shall be exclusively employed in the negotiations necessary to stay the march of the armies, and prevent the effusion of blood_. It is a matter of urgency, that these commissioners set out to-morrow even, and that they take the road to Noyon, where orders will be given by Marshal Blucher to receive them.
Noyon will be his head-quarters. They cannot too often repeat, that the Emperor has no great party in France; that he availed himself rather of the faults of the Bourbons, than of any dispositions existing in his favour; and that he could not fix the attention of the nation, but for the allies failing to adhere to their declaration.
"We have hopes of seeing our negotiations take a successful turn, though we cannot be insensible to their difficulties. The only means of preventing the events of the war from occasioning their failure absolutely consist in granting a truce of a few days. The choice of negotiators may have some influence on this; and we repeat, there is not a moment to be lost in sending them to the English and Prussian armies.
"The two aides-de-camp of Prince Blucher declared repeatedly, that the allies are in no respect tenacious of the restoration of the Bourbons: but we have proofs, that they are inclined to approach as near as possible to Paris, and then they may frame some pretence, to change their language.