Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position at Spottsylvania C. H. with one army corps, at Todd"s Tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spottsylvania road with the road from Alsop"s to Old Court House. If this move is made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the Ny River.
I think it would be advisable in making the change to leave Hanc.o.c.k where he is until Warren pa.s.ses him. He could then follow and become the right of the new line. Burnside will move to Piney Branch Church.
Sedgwick can move along the pike to Chancellorsville and on to his destination. Burnside will move on the plank road to the intersection of it with the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, then follow Sedgwick to his place of destination.
All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops move, and then move off quietly.
It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack on Hanc.o.c.k this afternoon. In case they do we must be prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our whole force. Such a result would necessarily modify these instructions.
All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellorsville.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
During the 7th Sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at Todd"s Tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were to go by that route at night. Soon after dark Warren withdrew from the front of the enemy, and was soon followed by Sedgwick. Warren"s march carried him immediately behind the works where Hanc.o.c.k"s command lay on the Brock Road. With my staff and a small escort of cavalry I preceded the troops. Meade with his staff accompanied me. The greatest enthusiasm was manifested by Hanc.o.c.k"s men as we pa.s.sed by. No doubt it was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. It indicated to them that they had pa.s.sed through the "beginning of the end" in the battle just fought. The cheering was so l.u.s.ty that the enemy must have taken it for a night attack. At all events it drew from him a furious fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us.
Meade and I rode in advance. We had pa.s.sed but a little way beyond our left when the road forked. We looked to see, if we could, which road Sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day. It seemed to be the right-hand one, and accordingly we took it. We had not gone far, however, when Colonel C. B. Comstock, of my staff, with the instinct of the engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us into the lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a rapid gallop and all alone. In a few minutes he returned and reported that Lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into his lines in a short distance. We returned to the forks of the road, left a man to indicate the right road to the head of Warren"s column when it should come up, and continued our journey to Todd"s Tavern, where we arrived after midnight.
My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two-fold: first, I did not want Lee to get back to Richmond in time to attempt to crush Butler before I could get there; second, I wanted to get between his army and Richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field. But Lee, by accident, beat us to Spottsylvania. Our wagon trains had been ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the movement commenced. Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the Army of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so informed his government.
Accordingly he ordered Longstreet"s corps--now commanded by Anderson--to move in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsylvania. But the woods being still on fire, Anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directly on to his destination that night. By this accident Lee got possession of Spottsylvania. It is impossible to say now what would have been the result if Lee"s orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain that we would have been in Spottsylvania, and between him and his capital.
My belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to see which could reach Richmond first, and the Army of the Potomac would have had the shorter line. Thus, twice since crossing the Rapidan we came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the Rapidan to the James River or Richmond. The first failure was caused by our not following up the success gained over Hill"s corps on the morning of the 6th, as before described: the second, when fires caused by that battle drove Anderson to make a march during the night of the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th.
But accident often decides the fate of battle.
Sheridan"s cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of the 7th, lasting at Todd"s Tavern until after night, with the field his at the close. He issued the necessary orders for seizing Spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the Po River, which Lee"s troops would have to cross to get to Spottsylvania. But Meade changed Sheridan"s orders to Merritt--who was holding the bridge--on his arrival at Todd"s Tavern, and thereby left the road free for Anderson when he came up. Wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry; but he could not hold it against the Confederate corps which had not been detained at the crossing of the Po, as it would have been but for the unfortunate change in Merritt"s orders. Had he been permitted to execute the orders Sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the Po River which Anderson had to cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable Warren to reinforce Wilson and hold the town.
Anderson soon intrenched himself--if indeed the intrenchments were not already made--immediately across Warren"s front. Warren was not aware of his presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which Merritt had engaged earlier in the day. He a.s.saulted at once, but was repulsed. He soon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made a second attack, this time with his whole corps. This time he succeeded in gaining a position immediately in the enemy"s front, where he intrenched. His right and left divisions--the former Crawford"s, the latter Wadsworth"s, now commanded by Cutler--drove the enemy back some distance.
At this time my headquarters had been advanced to Piney Branch Church.
I was anxious to crush Anderson before Lee could get a force to his support. To this end Sedgwick who was at Piney Branch Church, was ordered to Warren"s support. Hanc.o.c.k, who was at Todd"s Tavern, was notified of Warren"s engagement, and was directed to be in readiness to come up. Burnside, who was with the wagon trains at Aldrich"s on our extreme left, received the same instructions. Sedgwick was slow in getting up for some reason--probably unavoidable, because he was never at fault when serious work was to be done--so that it was near night before the combined forces were ready to attack. Even then all of Sedgwick"s command did not get into the engagement. Warren led the last a.s.sault, one division at a time, and of course it failed.
Warren"s difficulty was twofold: when he received an order to do anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the army should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him. His ideas were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him orders had thought of others at the time he had of him. In like manner, when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division, holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an order without his presence. His difficulty was const.i.tutional and beyond his control. He was an officer of superior ability, quick perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be done with a small command.
Lee had ordered Hill"s corps--now commanded by Early--to move by the very road we had marched upon. This shows that even early in the morning of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but still thought that the Army of the Potomac had gone to Fredericksburg.
Indeed, he informed the authorities at Richmond he had possession of Spottsylvania and was on my flank. Anderson was in possession of Spottsylvania, through no foresight of Lee, however. Early only found that he had been following us when he ran against Hanc.o.c.k at Todd"s Tavern. His coming detained Hanc.o.c.k from the battle-field of Spottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept Early back and forced him to move by another route.
Had I ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, it would have put Hanc.o.c.k in the lead. It would also have given us an hour or earlier start. It took all that time for Warren to get the head of his column to the left of Hanc.o.c.k after he had got his troops out of their line confronting the enemy. This hour, and Hanc.o.c.k"s capacity to use his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to crush Anderson before he could be reinforced. But the movement made was tactical. It kept the troops in ma.s.s against a possible a.s.sault by the enemy. Our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the right pa.s.sed. If an attack had been made by the enemy he would have found the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and 6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was pa.s.sed.
By a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still pa.s.sing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by it would have been very much exposed. Then, too, I had not yet learned the special qualifications of the different corps commanders. At that time my judgment was that Warren was the man I would suggest to succeed Meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from the field. As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an able man; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and importance of the duty he had to perform.
CHAPTER LII.
BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA--HANc.o.c.k"S POSITION--a.s.sAULT OF WARREN"S AND WRIGHT"S CORPS--UPTON PROMOTED ON THE FIELD--GOOD NEWS FROM BUTLER AND SHERIDAN.
The Mattapony River is formed by the junction of the Mat, the Ta, the Po and the Ny rivers, the last being the northernmost of the four. It takes its rise about a mile south and a little east of the Wilderness Tavern. The Po rises south-west of the place, but farther away.
Spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and where they are but a few miles apart. The Brock Road reaches Spottsylvania without crossing either of these streams. Lee"s army coming up by the Catharpin Road, had to cross the Po at Wooden Bridge. Warren and Hanc.o.c.k came by the Brock Road. Sedgwick crossed the Ny at Catharpin Furnace. Burnside coming by Aldrich"s to Gates"s house, had to cross the Ny near the enemy. He found pickets at the bridge, but they were soon driven off by a brigade of Willc.o.x"s division, and the stream was crossed. This brigade was furiously attacked; but the remainder of the division coming up, they were enabled to hold their position, and soon fortified it.
About the time I received the news of this attack, word came from Hanc.o.c.k that Early had left his front. He had been forced over to the Catharpin Road, crossing the Po at Corbin"s and again at Wooden Bridge.
These are the bridges Sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupy on the 8th, while one division should occupy Spottsylvania. These movements of the enemy gave me the idea that Lee was about to make the attempt to get to, or towards, Fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. I made arrangements to attack his right and get between him and Richmond if he should try to execute this design. If he had any such intention it was abandoned as soon as Burnside was established south of the Ny.
The Po and the Ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with abrupt banks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms--at the time we were there--and difficult to cross except where bridged. The country about was generally heavily timbered, but with occasional clearings. It was a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an offensive one.
By noon of the 9th the position of the two armies was as follows: Lee occupied a semicircle facing north, north-west and north-east, inclosing the town. Anderson was on his left extending to the Po, Ewell came next, then Early. Warren occupied our right, covering the Brock and other roads converging at Spottsylvania; Sedgwick was to his left and Burnside on our extreme left. Hanc.o.c.k was yet back at Todd"s Tavern, but as soon as it was known that Early had left Hanc.o.c.k"s front the latter was ordered up to Warren"s right. He formed a line with three divisions on the hill overlooking the Po early in the afternoon, and was ordered to cross the Po and get on the enemy"s flank. The fourth division of Hanc.o.c.k"s corps, Mott commanding, was left at Todd"s when the corps first came up; but in the afternoon it was brought up and placed to the left of Sedgwick"s--now Wright"s--6th corps. In the morning General Sedgwick had been killed near the right of his intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters. His loss was a severe one to the Army of the Potomac and to the Nation. General H. G. Wright succeeded him in the command of his corps.
Hanc.o.c.k was now, nine P.M. of the 9th of May, across the left flank of Lee"s army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder of Meade"s army, by the Po River. But for the lateness of the hour and the darkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river again at Wooden Bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with both friend and foe.
The Po at the points where Hanc.o.c.k"s corps crossed runs nearly due east.
Just below his lower crossing--the troops crossed at three points--it turns due south, and after pa.s.sing under Wooden Bridge soon resumes a more easterly direction. During the night this corps built three bridges over the Po; but these were in rear.
The position a.s.sumed by Hanc.o.c.k"s corps forced Lee to reinforce his left during the night. Accordingly on the morning of the 10th, when Hanc.o.c.k renewed his effort to get over the Po to his front, he found himself confronted by some of Early"s command, which had been brought from the extreme right of the enemy during the night. He succeeded in effecting a crossing with one brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenched in his front, no more were crossed.
Hanc.o.c.k reconnoitred his front on the morning of the 10th, with the view of forcing a crossing, if it was found that an advantage could be gained. The enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high ground overlooking the river, and commanding the Wooden Bridge with artillery.
Anderson"s left rested on the Po, where it turns south; therefore, for Hanc.o.c.k to cross over--although it would bring him to the same side of the stream with the rest of the army--would still farther isolate him from it. The stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of the enemy to unite with the main body. The idea of crossing was therefore abandoned.
Lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement of Hanc.o.c.k"s, and I determined to take advantage of it. Accordingly in the morning, orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the centre by Warren"s and Wright"s corps, Hanc.o.c.k to command all the attacking force. Two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the Po.
Gibbon was placed to the right of Warren, and Birney in his rear as a reserve. Barlow"s division was left south of the stream, and Mott of the same corps was still to the left of Wright"s corps. Burnside was ordered to reconnoitre his front in force, and, if an opportunity presented, to attack with vigor. The enemy seeing Barlow"s division isolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury.
Barlow repulsed the a.s.sault with great slaughter, and with considerable loss to himself. But the enemy reorganized and renewed the a.s.sault.
Birney was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river crossings built by our troops, and covered the crossings. The second a.s.sault was repulsed, again with severe loss to the enemy, and Barlow was withdrawn without further molestation. General T. G. Stevenson was killed in this move.
Between the lines, where Warren"s a.s.sault was to take place, there was a ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almost impenetrable by man. The slopes on both sides were also covered with a heavy growth of timber. Warren, before noon, reconnoitred his front twice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions. He was repulsed on both occasions, but gained such information of the ground as to induce him to report recommending the a.s.sault.
Wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably advanced position from the one he started from. He then organized a storming party, consisting of twelve regiments, and a.s.signed Colonel Emory Upton, of the 121st New York Volunteers, to the command of it. About four o"clock in the afternoon the a.s.sault was ordered, Warren"s and Wright"s corps, with Mott"s division of Hanc.o.c.k"s corps, to move simultaneously.
The movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of struggles began. The battle-field was so densely covered with forest that but little could be seen, by any one person, as to the progress made. Meade and I occupied the best position we could get, in rear of Warren.
Warren was repulsed with heavy loss, General J. C. Rice being among the killed. He was not followed, however, by the enemy, and was thereby enabled to reorganize his command as soon as covered from the guns of the enemy. To the left our success was decided, but the advantage was lost by the feeble action of Mott. Upton with his a.s.saulting party pushed forward and crossed the enemy"s intrenchments. Turning to the right and left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners.
Mott was ordered to his a.s.sistance but failed utterly. So much time was lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the right position to reinforce, that I ordered Upton to withdraw; but the officers and men of his command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gained that I withdrew the order. To relieve them, I ordered a renewal of the a.s.sault. By this time Hanc.o.c.k, who had gone with Birney"s division to relieve Barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him. His corps was now joined with Warren"s and Wright"s in this last a.s.sault. It was gallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of the enemy; but they were not able to hold them. At night they were withdrawn. Upton brought his prisoners with him, but the guns he had captured he was obliged to abandon. Upton had gained an important advantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by him lost it to us. Before leaving Washington I had been authorized to promote officers on the field for special acts of gallantry. By this authority I conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon Upton on the spot, and this act was confirmed by the President. Upton had been badly wounded in this fight.
Burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of Spottsylvania Court House, completely turning Lee"s right. He was not aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and I, being with the troops where the heavy fighting was, did not know of it at the time. He had gained his position with but little fighting, and almost without loss. Burnside"s position now separated him widely from Wright"s corps, the corps nearest to him. At night he was ordered to join on to this. This brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an important advantage. I attach no blame to Burnside for this, but I do to myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to me his position.
The enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to follow up his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on Barlow.
Then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entire corps against two brigades. Barlow took up his bridges in the presence of this force.
On the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none except by Mott who made a reconnoissance to ascertain if there was a weak point in the enemy"s line.
I wrote the following letter to General Halleck:
NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 11, 1864--8.30 A.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C.
We have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting. The result up to this time is much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy as well as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time eleven general officers killed, wounded and missing, and probably twenty thousand men.
I think the loss of the enemy must be greater--we having taken over four thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except a few stragglers. I am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.
The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great numbers. My object in having them sent to Belle Plain was to use them as an escort to our supply trains. If it is more convenient to send them out by train to march from the railroad to Belle Plain or Fredericksburg, send them so.
I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take.
Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of Lee"s army being detached for the defence of Richmond.