We were now to operate in a different country from any we had before seen in Virginia. The roads were wide and good, and the country well cultivated. No men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black man having been sent away. The country, however, was new to us, and we had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were, or where they led to. Engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty of supplying the place of both maps and guides. By reconnoitring they were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army corps.
Our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction which would not separate the army too widely.
Hanc.o.c.k who had the lead had marched easterly to Guiney"s Station, on the Fredericksburg Railroad, thence southerly to Bowling Green and Milford. He was at Milford by the night of the 21st. Here he met a detachment of Pickett"s division coming from Richmond to reinforce Lee.
They were speedily driven away, and several hundred captured. Warren followed on the morning of the 21st, and reached Guiney"s Station that night without molestation. Burnside and Wright were retained at Spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended a.s.sault, and to hold Lee, if possible, while Hanc.o.c.k and Warren should get start enough to interpose between him and Richmond.
Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either by attacking Wright and Burnside alone, or by following by the Telegraph Road and striking Hanc.o.c.k"s and Warren"s corps, or even Hanc.o.c.k"s alone, before reinforcements could come up. But he did not avail himself of either opportunity. He seemed really to be misled as to my designs; but moved by his interior line--the Telegraph Road--to make sure of keeping between his capital and the Army of the Potomac. He never again had such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow.
The evening of the 21st Burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed by Wright, 6th corps. Burnside was to take the Telegraph Road; but finding Stanard"s Ford, over the Po, fortified and guarded, he turned east to the road taken by Hanc.o.c.k and Warren without an attempt to dislodge the enemy. The night of the 21st I had my headquarters near the 6th corps, at Guiney"s Station, and the enemy"s cavalry was between us and Hanc.o.c.k.
There was a slight attack on Burnside"s and Wright"s corps as they moved out of their lines; but it was easily repulsed. The object probably was only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon the rear of the Confederates.
By the morning of the 22d Burnside and Wright were at Guiney"s Station.
Hanc.o.c.k"s corps had now been marching and fighting continuously for several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. They were, therefore, permitted to rest during the 22d. But Warren was pushed to Harris"s Store, directly west of Milford, and connected with it by a good road, and Burnside was sent to New Bethel Church. Wright"s corps was still back at Guiney"s Station.
I issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next day:
NEW BETHEL, VA., May 22, 1864
MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.
Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at five A.M. to-morrow. At that hour each command will send out cavalry and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is. If beyond the South Anna, the 5th and 6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to Beaver Dam Station, the other to Jericho Bridge, then south by roads reaching the Anna, as near to and east of Hawkins Creek as they can be found.
The 2d corps will move to Chesterfield Ford. The 9th corps will be directed to move at the same time to Jericho Bridge. The map only shows two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of plantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give one for each corps.
The troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. The trains will be moved at the same time to Milford Station.
Headquarters will follow the 9th corps.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
Warren"s corps was moved from Harris"s Store to Jericho Ford, Wright"s following. Warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and by five o"clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters.
The men had to wade in water up to their waists. As soon as enough troops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artillery and the rest of the troops crossed. The line formed was almost perpendicular to the course of the river--Crawford on the left, next to the river, Griffin in the centre, and Cutler on the right. Lee was found intrenched along the front of their line. The whole of Hill"s corps was sent against Warren"s right before it had got in position. A brigade of Cutler"s division was driven back, the enemy following, but a.s.sistance coming up the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches with heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hundred prisoners left in our hands. By night Wright"s corps was up ready to reinforce Warren.
On the 23d Hanc.o.c.k"s corps was moved to the wooden bridge which spans the North Anna River just west of where the Fredericksburg Railroad crosses. It was near night when the troops arrived. They found the bridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the north side. Hanc.o.c.k sent two brigades, Egan"s and Pierce"s, to the right and left, and when properly disposed they charged simultaneously. The bridge was carried quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved into the river, and some of them were drowned. Several hundred prisoners were captured. The hour was so late that Hanc.o.c.k did not cross until next morning.
Burnside"s corps was moved by a middle road running between those described above, and which strikes the North Anna at Ox Ford, midway between Telegraph Road and Jericho Ford. The hour of its arrival was too late to cross that night.
On the 24th Hanc.o.c.k"s corps crossed to the south side of the river without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. The railroad in rear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. Wright"s corps crossed at Jericho early the same day, and took position to the right of Warren"s corps, extending south of the Virginia Central Railroad. This road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear (west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them over the burning ties. It was found, however, that Burnside"s corps could not cross at Ox Ford. Lee had taken a position with his centre on the river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line making an acute angle where it overlooked the river.
Before the exact position of the whole of Lee"s line was accurately known, I directed Hanc.o.c.k and Warren each to send a brigade to Ox Ford by the south side of the river. They found the enemy too strong to justify a serious attack. A third ford was found between Ox Ford and Jericho. Burnside was directed to cross a division over this ford, and to send one division to Hanc.o.c.k. Crittenden was crossed by this newly-discovered ford, and formed up the river to connect with Crawford"s left. Potter joined Hanc.o.c.k by way of the wooden bridge.
Crittenden had a severe engagement with some of Hill"s corps on his crossing the river, and lost heavily. When joined to Warren"s corps he was no further molested. Burnside still guarded Ox Ford from the north side.
Lee now had his entire army south of the North Anna. Our lines covered his front, with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but a single division. To get from one wing to the other the river would have to be crossed twice. Lee could reinforce any part of his line from all points of it in a very short march; or could concentrate the whole of it wherever he might choose to a.s.sault. We were, for the time, practically two armies besieging.
Lee had been reinforced, and was being reinforced, largely. About this time the very troops whose coming I had predicted, had arrived or were coming in. Pickett with a full division from Richmond was up; Hoke from North Carolina had come with a brigade; and Breckinridge was there: in all probably not less than fifteen thousand men. But he did not attempt to drive us from the field.
On the 22d or 23d I received dispatches from Washington saying that Sherman had taken Kingston, crossed the Etowah River and was advancing into Georgia.
I was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waiting for Burnside"s corps to pa.s.s. Meade and his staff, besides my own staff, were with me. The lady of the house, a Mrs. Tyler, and an elderly lady, were present. Burnside seeing us, came up on the porch, his big spurs and saber rattling as he walked. He touched his hat politely to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they had never seen so many "live Yankees" before in their lives. The elderly lady spoke up promptly saying, "Oh yes, I have; many more." "Where?" said Burnside. "In Richmond." Prisoners, of course, was understood.
I read my dispatch aloud, when it was received. This threw the younger lady into tears. I found the information she had received (and I suppose it was the information generally in circulation through the South) was that Lee was driving us from the State in the most demoralized condition and that in the South-west our troops were but little better than prisoners of war. Seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that a part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my news from Sherman was true. I a.s.sured her that there was no doubt about it.
I left a guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troops should have all pa.s.sed, and a.s.sured her that if her husband was in hiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also. But I presume he was in the Confederate army.
On the 25th I gave orders, through Halleck, to Hunter, who had relieved Sigel, to move up the Valley of Virginia, cross over the Blue Ridge to Charlottesville and go as far as Lynchburg if possible, living upon the country and cutting the railroads and ca.n.a.l as he went. After doing this he could find his way back to his base, or join me.
On the same day news was received that Lee was falling back on Richmond.
This proved not to be true. But we could do nothing where we were unless Lee would a.s.sume the offensive. I determined, therefore, to draw out of our present position and make one more effort to get between him and Richmond. I had no expectation now, however, of succeeding in this; but I did expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach the James River high up. Sheridan was now again with the Army of the Potomac.
On the 26th I informed the government at Washington of the position of the two armies; of the reinforcements the enemy had received; of the move I proposed to make (*32); and directed that our base of supplies should be shifted to White House, on the Pamunkey. The wagon train and guards moved directly from Port Royal to White House. Supplies moved around by water, guarded by the navy. Orders had previously been sent, through Halleck, for Butler to send Smith"s corps to White House. This order was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should be landed on the north side of the Pamunkey, and marched until they joined the Army of the Potomac.
It was a delicate move to get the right wing of the Army of the Potomac from its position south of the North Anna in the presence of the enemy.
To accomplish it, I issued the following order:
QUARLES" MILLS, VA., May 25, 1864.
MAJOR GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.
Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all their teams and artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-morrow.
Send that belonging to General Wright"s corps as far on the road to Hanover Town as it can go, without attracting attention to the fact.
Send with it Wright"s best division or division under his ablest commander. Have their places filled up in the line so if possible the enemy will not notice their withdrawal. Send the cavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch and seize, if they can, Littlepage"s Bridge and Taylor"s Ford, and to remain on one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry and artillery all pa.s.s. As soon as it is dark to-morrow night start the division which you withdraw first from Wright"s corps to make a forced march to Hanover Town, taking with them no teams to impede their march.
At the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the 5th and 6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them for the same place. The two divisions of the 9th corps not now with Hanc.o.c.k, may be moved down the north bank of the river where they will be handy to support Hanc.o.c.k if necessary, or will be that much on their road to follow the 5th and 6th corps. Hanc.o.c.k should hold his command in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. To-morrow it will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will have to take. As soon as the troops reach Hanover Town they should get possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood. I think it would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy"s left, to-morrow afternoon, also.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
Wilson"s division of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved by our right south to Little River. Here he manoeuvred to give the impression that we were going to attack the left flank of Lee"s army.
Under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north side of the river, Lee being completely deceived by Wilson"s feint. On the afternoon of the 26th Sheridan moved, sending Gregg"s and Torbert"s cavalry to Taylor"s and Littlepage"s fords towards Hanover. As soon as it was dark both divisions moved quietly to Hanover Ferry, leaving small guards behind to keep up the impression that crossings were to be attempted in the morning. Sheridan was followed by a division of infantry under General Russell. On the morning of the 27th the crossing was effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty, taken prisoners. Thus a position was secured south of the Pamunkey.
Russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to Hanover Town. Here Barringer"s, formerly Gordon"s, brigade of rebel cavalry was encountered, but it was speedily driven away.
Warren"s and Wright"s corps were moved by the rear of Burnside"s and Hanc.o.c.k"s corps. When out of the way these latter corps followed, leaving pickets confronting the enemy. Wilson"s cavalry followed last, watching all the fords until everything had recrossed; then taking up the pontoons and destroying other bridges, became the rear-guard.
Two roads were traversed by the troops in this move. The one nearest to and north of the North Anna and Pamunkey was taken by Wright, followed by Hanc.o.c.k. Warren, followed by Burnside, moved by a road farther north, and longer. The trains moved by a road still farther north, and had to travel a still greater distance. All the troops that had crossed the Pamunkey on the morning of the 27th remained quiet during the rest of the day, while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the crossing that had been secured for them.
Lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from North Anna; for on the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to Richmond: "Enemy crossed to north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at Hanover Town." The troops that had then crossed left his front the night of the 25th.
The country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops over. The streams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush. The banks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult to approach except where there were roads and bridges.
Hanover Town is about twenty miles from Richmond. There are two roads leading there; the most direct and shortest one crossing the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, near the Virginia Central Railroad, the second going by New and Old Cold Harbor. A few miles out from Hanover Town there is a third road by way of Mechanicsville to Richmond. New Cold Harbor was important to us because while there we both covered the roads back to White House (where our supplies came from), and the roads south-east over which we would have to pa.s.s to get to the James River below the Richmond defences.
On the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by noon all had crossed except Burnside"s corps. This was left on the north side temporarily to guard the large wagon train. A line was at once formed extending south from the river, Wright"s corps on the right, Hanc.o.c.k"s in the centre, and Warren"s on the left, ready to meet the enemy if he should come.
At the same time Sheridan was directed to reconnoitre towards Mechanicsville to find Lee"s position. At Hawes" Shop, just where the middle road leaves the direct road to Richmond, he encountered the Confederate cavalry dismounted and partially intrenched. Gregg attacked with his division, but was unable to move the enemy. In the evening Custer came up with a brigade. The attack was now renewed, the cavalry dismounting and charging as infantry. This time the a.s.sault was successful, both sides losing a considerable number of men. But our troops had to bury the dead, and found that more Confederate than Union soldiers had been killed. The position was easily held, because our infantry was near.
On the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force, to find the position of Lee. Wright"s corps pushed to Hanover Court House. Hanc.o.c.k"s corps pushed toward Totopotomoy Creek; Warren"s corps to the left on the Shady Grove Church Road, while Burnside was held in reserve. Our advance was pushed forward three miles on the left with but little fighting. There was now an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and Sheridan was sent to meet it.