(m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding.
(n) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding. (o) Four brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not indicated.
(p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton"s, Fitz-Lee"s, and W. H. F. Lee"s Division, and Dearing"s Brigade.
*But one general officer reported present for duty in the artillery, and Alexander"s name not on the original.
(*28) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S., May II, 1864.--3 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.
Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and 6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in a vigorous a.s.sault on the enemy at four o"clock A.M. to-morrow.
will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and vigorous attack. Warren and Wright should hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents itself. There is but little doubt in my mind that the a.s.sault last evening would have proved entirely successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been heartily entered into by Mott"s division and the 9th corps.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
(*29) HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES U. S., May 11, 1864.-4 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE, Commanding 9th Army Corps.
Major-General Hanc.o.c.k has been ordered to move his corps under cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the enemy at 4 o"clock A.M. to-morrow. You will move against the enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o"clock A.M. to-morrow the 12th inst. Let your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy.
I send two of my staff officers, Colonels Comstock and Babc.o.c.k, in whom I have great confidence and who are acquainted with the direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you and General Hanc.o.c.k with instructions to render you every a.s.sistance in their power. Generals Warren and Wright will hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by yours and Hanc.o.c.k"s attack, and will push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
(*30) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S., May 12, 1864, 6.30 P.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C.
The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day"s work, including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of artillery. The enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the last ditch. We have lost no organizations, not even that of a company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division (Johnson"s), one brigade (Doles"), and one regiment entire from the enemy.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
(*31) SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 13, 1864.
HON E. M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR, Washington, D. C.
I beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days"
battles, to wit: Brigadier-General H. G. Wright and Brigadier-General John Gibbon to be Major-Generals; Colonel S.
S. Carroll, 8th Ohio Volunteers Colonel E. Upton, 121st New York Volunteers; Colonel William McCandless, 2d Pennsylvania Reserves, to be Brigadier-Generals. I would also recommend Major-General W.
S. Hanc.o.c.k for Brigadier-General in the regular army. His services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this recognition. In making these recommendations I do not wish the claims of General G. M. Dodge for promotion forgotten, but recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. I would also ask to have General Wright a.s.signed to the command of the Sixth Army Corps. I would further ask the confirmation of General Humphreys to the rank of Major-General.
General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations.
He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I have come in contact with. If their services can be rewarded by promotion to the rank of Major-Generals in the regular army the honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally gratified. I would not like to see one of these promotions at this time without seeing both.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
(*32) QUARLES" MILLS, VA., May 26, 1864.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Washington, D. C.
The relative position of the two armies is now as follows: Lee"s right rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburg road and south of the North Anna, his centre on the river at Ox Ford, and his left at Little River with the crossings of Little River guarded as far up as we have gone. Hanc.o.c.k with his corps and one division of the 9th corps crossed at Chesterfield Ford and covers the right wing of Lee"s army. One division of the 9th corps is on the north bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, with bridges above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army with equal facility. The 5th and 6th corps with one division of the 9th corps run from the south bank of the Anna from a short distance above Ox Ford to Little River, and parallel with and near to the enemy.
To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify. To turn the enemy by his right, between the two Annas is impossible on account of the swamp upon which his right rests. To turn him by the left leaves Little River, New Found River and South Anna River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of our army, to be crossed. I have determined therefore to turn the enemy"s right by crossing at or near Hanover Town. This crosses all three streams at once, and leaves us still where we can draw supplies.
During the last night the teams and artillery not in position, belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river and moved down to the rear of the left. As soon as it is dark this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced march for Hanover Town to seize and hold the crossings. The balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and follow as rapidly as possible. The left wing will also withdraw from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of the right wing. Lee"s army is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. A battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the MORALE over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee"s army is already a.s.sured. The promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the enemy.
We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and Fredericksburg roads. I want to leave a gap on the roads north of Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to import rail from elsewhere. Even if a crossing is not effected at Hanover Town it will probably be necessary for us to move on down the Pamunkey until a crossing is effected. I think it advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from Port Royal to the White House. I wish you would direct this change at once, and also direct Smith to put the railroad bridge there in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to hold it.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
(*33) NEAR COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864, 7 A.M.
MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, Commanding A. P.
The moment it becomes certain that an a.s.sault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken. I shall go to where you are in the course of an hour.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
(*34) COLD HARBOR, June 5,1864.
MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C.
A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north-east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad to enable us to use that road for supplying the army. To do so would give us a long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea from the start has been to beat Lee"s army if possible north of Richmond; then after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the James River to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat.
I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them.
Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of the city. I have therefore resolved upon the following plan:
I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable circ.u.mstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about Beaver Dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. When this is effected I will move the army to the south side of the James River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on north side and crossing there. To provide for this last and most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest cla.s.s ought to be immediately provided.
Once on the south side of the James River, I can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the ca.n.a.l. If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be lost to him also. Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make the effort to destroy the ca.n.a.l by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can.
The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be found without this protection.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
(*35) COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.
MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER
Commanding Dept. W. Va.