"U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General."
When I had read and pondered this, I determined to ride over to General Grant"s headquarters on Gravelly Run, and get a clear idea of what it was proposed to do, for it seemed to me that a suspension of operations would be a serious mistake. Mounting a powerful gray pacing horse called Breckenridge (from its capture from one of Breckenridge"s staff-officers at Missionary Ridge), and that I knew would carry me through the mud, I set out accompanied by my a.s.sistant Adjutant-General, Colonel Frederick C. Newhall, and an escort of about ten or fifteen men. At first we rode north up the Boydton plank-road, and coming upon our infantry pickets from a direction where the enemy was expected to appear, they began to fire upon us, but seeing from our actions that we were friends, they ceased, and permitted us to pa.s.s the outposts. We then struggled on in a northeasterly direction across-country, till we struck the Vaughn road. This carried us to army headquarters, which were established south of Gravelly Run in an old cornfield. I rode to within a few yards of the front of General Grant"s tent, my horse plunging at every step almost to his knees in the mud, and dismounted near a camp-fire, apparently a general one, for all the staff-officers were standing around it on boards and rails placed here and there to keep them from sinking into the mire.
Going directly to General Grant"s tent, I found him and Rawlins talking over the question of suspending operations till the weather should improve. No orders about the matter had been issued yet, except the despatch to me, and Rawlins, being strongly opposed to the proposition, was frankly expostulating with General Grant, who, after greeting me, remarked, in his quiet way: "Well, Rawlins, I think you had better take command." Seeing that there was a difference up between Rawlins and his chief, I made the excuse of being wet and cold, and went outside to the fire. Here General Ingalls met me and took me to his tent, where I was much more comfortable than when standing outside, and where a few minutes later we were joined by General Grant. Ingalls then retired, and General Grant began talking of our fearful plight, resulting from the rains and mud, and saying that because of this it seemed necessary to suspend operations. I at once begged him not to do so, telling him that my cavalry was already on the move in spite of the difficulties, and that although a suspension of operations would not be fatal, yet it would give rise to the very charge of disaster to which he had referred at City Point, and, moreover, that we would surely be ridiculed, just as General Burnside"s army was after the mud march of 1863. His better judgment was against suspending operations, but the proposition had been suggested by all sorts of complaints as to the impossibility of moving the trains and the like, so it needed little argument to convince him, and without further discussion he said, in that manner which with him meant a firmness of purpose that could not be changed by further complainings, "We will go on." I then told him that I believed I could break in the enemy"s right if he would let me have the Sixth Corps; but saying that the condition of the roads would prevent the movement of infantry, he replied that I would have to seize Five Forks with the cavalry alone.
On my way back to Dinwiddie I stopped at the headquarters of General Warren, but the General being asleep, I went to the tent of one of his staff-officers. Colonel William T. Gentry, an old personal friend with whom I had served in Oregon. In a few minutes Warren came in and we had a short conversation, he speaking rather despondently of the outlook, being influenced no doubt by the depressing weather.
From Warren"s headquarters I returned, by the Boydton road to Dinwiddie Court House, fording Gravelly Run with ease. When I got as far as the Dabney road I sent Colonel Newhall out on it toward Five Forks, with orders for Merritt to develop the enemy"s position and strength, and then rode on to Dinwiddie to endeavor to get all my other troops up. Merritt was halted at the intersection of the Five Forks and Gravelly Church roads when Newhall delivered the orders, and in compliance moving out Gibbs"s brigade promptly, sharp skirmishing was brought on, Gibbs driving the Confederates to Five Forks, where he found them behind a line of breastworks running along the White Oak road. The reconnoissance demonstrating the intention of the enemy to hold this point, Gibbs was withdrawn.
That evening, at 7 o"clock, I reported the position of the Confederate cavalry, and stated that it had been reinforced by Pickett"s division of infantry. On receipt of this despatch, General Grant offered me the Fifth Corps, but I declined to take it, and again asked for the Sixth, saying that with it I believed I could turn the enemy (Pickett"s) left, or break through his lines. The morning of the 31st General Grant replied the the Sixth Corps could not be taken from its position in the line, and offered me the Second; but in the mean time circ.u.mstances had changed, and no corps was ordered.
CHAPTER VI.
BATTLE OF DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE--PICKETT REPULSED--REINFORCED BY THE FIFTH CORPS--BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS--TURNING THE CONFEDERATE LEFT--AN UNQUALIFIED SUCCESS--RELIEVING GENERAL WARREN--THE WARREN COURT OF INQUIRY--GENERAL SHERMAN"S OPINION.
The night of March 30 Merritt, with Devin"s division and Davies"s brigade, was camped on the Five Forks road about two miles in front of Dinwiddie, near J. Boisseau"s. Crook, with Smith and Gregg"s brigades, continued to cover Stony Creek, and Custer was still back at Rowanty Creek, trying to get the trains up. This force had been counted while crossing the creek on the 29th, the three divisions numbering 9,000 enlisted men, Crook having 3,300, and Custer and Devin 5,700.
During the 30th, the enemy had been concentrating his cavalry, and by evening General W. H. F. Lee and General Rosser had joined Fitzhugh Lee near Five Forks. To this force was added, about dark, five brigades of infantry--three from Pickett"s division, and two from Johnson"s--all under command of Pickett. The infantry came by the White Oak road from the right of General Lee"s intrenchments, and their arrival became positively known to me about dark, the confirmatory intelligence being brought in then by some of Young"s scouts who had been inside the Confederate lines.
On the 31st, the rain having ceased, directions were given at an early hour to both Merritt and Crook to make reconnoissances preparatory to securing Five Forks, and about 9 o"clock Merritt started for the crossroads, Davies"s brigade supporting him. His march was necessarily slow because of the mud, and the enemy"s pickets resisted with obstinacy also, but the coveted crossroads fell to Merritt without much trouble, as the bulk of the enemy was just then bent on other things. At the same hour that Merritt started, Crook moved Smith"s brigade out northwest from Dinwiddie to Fitzgerald"s crossing of Chamberlain"s Creek, to cover Merritt"s left, supporting Smith by placing Gregg to his right and rear. The occupation of this ford was timely, for Pickett, now in command of both the cavalry and infantry, was already marching to get in Merritt"s rear by crossing Chamberlain"s Creek.
To hold on to Fitzgerald"s ford Smith had to make a sharp fight, but Mumford"s cavalry attacking Devin, the enemy"s infantry succeeded in getting over Chamberlain"s Creek at a point higher up than Fitzgerald"s ford, and a.s.sailing Davies, forced him back in a northeasterly direction toward the Dinwiddie and Five Forks road in company with Devin. The retreat of Davies permitted Pickett to pa.s.s between Crook and Merritt, which he promptly did, effectually separating them and cutting off both Davies and Devin from the road to Dinwiddie, so that to get to that point they had to retreat across the country to B. Boisseau"s and then down the Boydton road.
Gibbs"s brigade had been in reserve near the intersection of the Five Forks and Dabney roads, and directing Merritt to hold on there, I ordered Gregg"s brigade to be mounted and brought to Merritt"s aid, for if Pickett continued in pursuit north of the Five Forks road he would expose his right and rear, and I determined to attack him, in such case, from Gibbs"s position. Gregg arrived in good season, and as soon as his men were dismounted on Gibbs"s left, Merritt a.s.sailed fiercely, compelling Pickett to halt and face a new foe, thus interrupting an advance that would finally have carried Pickett into the rear of Warren"s corps.
It was now about 4 o"clock in the afternoon and we were in a critical situation, but having ordered Merritt to bring Devin and Davies to Dinwiddie by the Boydton road, staff-officers were sent to hurry Custer to the same point, for with its several diverging roads the Court House was of vital importance, and I determined to stay there at all hazards. At the same time orders were sent to Smith"s brigade, which, by the advance of Pickett past its right flank and the pressure of W. H. F. Lee on its front, had been compelled to give up Fitzgerald"s crossing, to fall back toward Dinwiddie but to contest every inch of ground so as to gain time.
When halted by the attack of Gregg and Gibbs, Pickett, desisting from his pursuit of Devin, as already stated, turned his undivided attention to this unexpected force, and with his preponderating infantry pressed it back on the Five Forks road toward Dinwiddle, though our men, fighting dismounted behind barricades at different points, displayed such obstinacy as to make Pickett"s progress slow, and thus give me time to look out a line for defending the Court House. I selected a place about three-fourths of a mile northwest of the crossroads, and Custer coming up quickly with Capehart"s brigade, took position on the left of the road to Five Forks in some open ground along the crest of a gentle ridge. Custer got Capehart into place just in time to lend a hand to Smith, who, severely pressed, came back on us here from his retreat along Chamberlain"s "bed"--the vernacular for a woody swamp such as that through which Smith retired. A little later the brigades of Gregg and Gibbs, falling to the rear slowly and steadily, took up in the woods a line which covered the Boydton Road some distance to the right of Capehart, the intervening gap to be filled with Pennington"s brigade. By this time our horse-artillery, which for two days had been stuck in the mud, was all up, and every gun was posted in this line.
It was now near sunset, and the enemy"s cavalry thinking the day was theirs, made a dash at Smith, but just as the a.s.sailants appeared in the open fields, Capehart"s men opened so suddenly on their left flank as to cause it to recoil in astonishment, which permitted Smith to connect his brigade with Custer unmolested. We were now in good shape behind the familiar barricades, and having a continuous line, excepting only the gap to be filled with Pennington, that covered Dinwiddie and the Boydton Road. My left rested in the woods about half a mile west of the Court House, and the barricades extended from this flank in a semicircle through the open fields in a northeasterly direction, to a piece-of thick timber on the right, near the Boydton Road.
A little before the sun went down the Confederate infantry was formed for the attack, and, fortunately for us, Pennington"s brigade came up and filled the s.p.a.ce to which it was a.s.signed between Capehart and Gibbs, just as Pickett moved out across the cleared fields in front of Custer, in deep lines that plainly told how greatly we were outnumbered.
Accompanied by Generals Merritt and Custer and my staff, I now rode along the barricades to encourage the men. Our enthusiastic reception showed that they were determined to stay. The cavalcade drew the enemy"s fire, which emptied several of the saddles--among others Mr. Theodore Wilson, correspondent of the New York Herald, being wounded. In reply our horse-artillery opened on the advancing Confederates, but the men behind the barricades lay still till Pickett"s troops were within short range. Then they opened, Custer"s repeating rifles pouring out such a shower of lead that nothing could stand up against it. The repulse was very quick, and as the gray lines retired to the woods from which but a few minutes before they had so confidently advanced, all danger of their taking Dinwiddie or marching to the left and rear of our infantry line was over, at least for the night. The enemy being thus checked, I sent a staff-officer--Captain Sheridan--to General Grant to report what had taken place during the afternoon, and to say that I proposed to stay at Dinwiddie, but if ultimately compelled to abandon the place, I would do so by retiring on the Vaughn road toward Hatcher"s Run, for I then thought the attack might be renewed next morning. Devin and Davies joined me about dark, and my troops being now well in hand, I sent a second staff-officer--Colonel John Kellogg--to explain my situation more fully, and to a.s.sure General Grant that I would hold on at Dinwiddie till forced to let go.
By following me to Dinwiddie the enemy"s infantry had completely isolated itself, and hence there was now offered the Union troops a rare opportunity. Lee was outside of his works, just as we desired, and the general-in-chief realized this the moment he received the first report of my situation; General Meade appreciated it too from the information he got from Captain Sheridan, en route to army headquarters with the first tidings, and sent this telegram to General Grant:
"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, "March 31, 1865. 9:45 p.m.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT:
"Would it not be well for Warren to go down with his whole corps and smash up the force in front of Sheridan? Humphreys can hold the line to the Boydton plank-road, and the refusal along with it. Bartlett"s brigade is now on the road from G. Boisseau"s, running north, where it crosses Gravelly Run, he having gone down the White Oak road.
Warren could go at once that way, and take the force threatening Sheridan in rear at Dinwiddie, and move on the enemy"s rear with the other two.
"G. G. MEADE, Major-General."
An hour later General Grant replied in these words:
"HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, "DABNEY"S MILLS, March 311, 1865. 10:15 P. M.
"MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE, "Commanding Army of the Potomac.
Let Warren move in the way you propose, and urge him not to stop for anything. Let Griffin (Griffin had been ordered by Warren to the Boydton road to protect his rear) go on as he was first directed.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."
These two despatches were the initiatory steps in sending the Fifth Corps, under Major-General G. K. Warren, to report to me, and when I received word of its coming and also that Genera Mackenzie"s cavalry from the Army of the James was likewise to be added to my command, and that discretionary authority was given me to use all my forces against Pickett, I resolved to destroy him, if it was within the bounds of possibility, before he could rejoin Lee.
In a despatch, dated 10:05 p.m., telling me of the coming of Warren and Mackenzie, General Grant also said that the Fifth Corps should reach me by 12 o"clock that night, but at that hour not only had none of the corps arrived, but no report from it, so believing that if it came all the way down to Dinwiddie the next morning, our opportunity would be gone, I concluded that it would be best to order Warren to move in on the enemy"s rear while the cavalry attacked in front, and, therefore, at 3 o"clock in the morning of April 1 sent this despatch to General Warren:
"CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS, DINWIDDIE C. H., "April 1, 1865--3. A.M.
"MAJOR-GENERAL WARREN, "Commanding Fifth Army Corps.
"I am holding in front of Dinwiddie Court House, on the road leading to Five Forks, for three-quarters of a mile with General Custer"s division. The enemy are in his immediate front, lying so as to cover the road just this side of A. Adams"s house, which leads across Chamberlain"s bed, or run. I understand you have a division at J.[G]
Boisseau"s; if so, you are in rear of the enemy"s line and almost on his flank. I will hold on here. Possibly they may attack Custer at daylight; if so, attack instantly and in full force. Attack at daylight anyhow, and I will make an effort to get the road this side of Adams"s house, and if I do, you can capture the whole of them.
Any force moving down the road I am holding, or on the White Oak road, will be in the enemy"s rear, and in all probability get any force that may escape you by a flank movement. Do not fear my leaving here. If the enemy remains, I shall fight at daylight.
"P. H. SHERIDAN, Major-General."
With daylight came a slight fog, but it lifted almost immediately, and Merritt moved Custer and Devin forward. As these divisions advanced the enemy"s infantry fell back on the Five Forks road, Devin pressing him along the road, while Custer extended on the left over toward Chamberlain"s Run, Crook being held in watch along Stony Creek, meanwhile, to be utilized as circ.u.mstances might require when Warren attacked.
The order of General Meade to Warren the night of March 31--a copy being sent me also--was positive in its directions, but as midnight came without a sign of or word from the Fifth Corps, notwithstanding that was the hour fixed for its arrival, I nevertheless a.s.sumed that there were good reasons for its non-appearance, but never once doubted that measures would be taken to comply with my despatch Of 3 A. M. and therefore hoped that, as Pickett was falling back slowly toward Five Forks, Griffin"s and Crawford"s divisions would come in on the Confederate left and rear by the Crump road near J.[G]
Boisseau"s house.
But they did not reach there till after the enemy had got by. As a matter of fact, when Pickett was pa.s.sing the all-important point Warren"s men were just breaking from the bivouac in which their chief had placed them the night before, and the head of Griffin"s division did not get to Boisseau"s till after my cavalry, which meanwhile had been joined by Ayres"s division of the Fifth Corps by way of the Boydton and Dabney roads. By reason of the delay in moving Griffin and Crawford, the enemy having escaped, I ma.s.sed the Fifth Corps at J.[G] Boisseau"s so that the men could be rested, and directed it to remain there; General Warren himself had not then come up. General Mackenzie, who had reported just after daybreak, was ordered at first to stay at Dinwiddie Court House, but later was brought along the Five Forks road to Dr. Smith"s, and Crook"s division was directed to continue watching the crossings of Stony Creek and Chamberlain"s Run.
That we had accomplished nothing but to oblige our foe to retreat was to me bitterly disappointing, but still feeling sure that he would not give up the Five Forks crossroads without a fight, I pressed him back there with Merritt"s cavalry, Custer advancing on the Scott road, while Devin drove the rearguard along that leading from J.[G]
Boisseau"s to Five Forks.
By 2 o"clock in the afternoon Merritt had forced the enemy inside his intrenchments, which began with a short return about three-quarters of a mile east of the Forks and ran along the south side of the White Oak road to a point about a mile west of the Forks. From the left of the return over toward Hatcher"s Run was posted Mumford"s cavalry, dismounted. In the return itself was Wallace"s brigade, and next on its right came Ransom"s, then Stewart"s, then Terry"s, then Corse"s.
On the right of Corse was W. H. F. Lee"s division of cavalry. Ten pieces of artillery also were in this line, three on the right of the works, three near the centre at the crossroads, and four on the left, in the return. Rosser"s cavalry was guarding the Confederate trains north of Hatcher"s Run beyond the crossing of the Ford road.
I felt certain the enemy would fight at Five Forks--he had to--so, while we were getting up to his intrenchments, I decided on my plan of battle. This was to attack his whole front with Merritt"s two cavalry divisions, make a feint of turning his right flank, and with the Fifth Corps a.s.sail his left. As the Fifth Corps moved into action, its right flank was to be covered by Mackenzie"s cavalry, thus entirely cutting off Pickett"s troops from communication with Lee"s right flank, which rested near the Butler house at the junction of the Claiborne and White Oaks roads. In execution of this plan, Merritt worked his men close in toward the intrenchments, and while he was thus engaged, I ordered Warren to bring up the Fifth Corps, sending the order by my engineer officer, Captain Gillespie, who had reconnoitred the ground in the neighborhood of Gravelly Run Church, where the infantry was to form for attack.
Gillespie delivered the order about 1 o"clock, and when the corps was put in motion, General Warren joined me at the front. Before he came, I had received, through Colonel Babc.o.c.k, authority from General Grant to relieve him, but I did not wish to do it, particularly on the eve of battle; so, saying nothing at all about the message brought me, I entered at once on the plan for defeating Pickett, telling Warren how the enemy was posted, explaining with considerable detail, and concluding by stating that I wished his troops to be formed on the Gravelly Church road, near its junction with the White Oak road, with two divisions to the front, aligned obliquely to the White Oak road, and one in reserve, opposite the centre of these two.
General Warren seemed to understand me clearly, and then left to join his command, while I turned my attention to the cavalry, instructing Merritt to begin by making demonstrations as though to turn the enemy"s right, and to a.s.sault the front of the works with his dismounted cavalry as soon as Warren became engaged. Afterward I rode around to Gravelly Run Church, and found the head of Warren"s column just appearing, while he was sitting under a tree making a rough sketch of the ground. I was disappointed that more of the corps was not already up, and as the precious minutes went by without any apparent effort to hurry the troops on to the field, this disappointment grew into disgust. At last I expressed to Warren my fears that the cavalry might expend all their ammunition before the attack could be made, that the sun would go down before the battle could be begun, or that troops from Lee"s right, which, be it remembered, was less than three miles away from my right, might, by striking my rear, or even by threatening it, prevent the attack on Pickett.
Warren did not seem to me to be at all solicitous; his manner exhibited decided apathy, and he remarked with indifference that "Bobby Lee was always getting people into trouble." With unconcern such as this, it is no wonder that fully three hours" time was consumed in marching his corps from J.[G] Boisseau"s to Gravelly Run Church, though the distance was but two miles. However, when my patience was almost worn out, Warren reported his troops ready, Ayres"s division being formed on the west side of the Gravelly Church road, Crawford"s on the east side, and Griffin in reserve behind the right of Crawford, a little different from my instructions. The corps had no artillery present, its batteries, on account of the mud, being still north of Gravelly Run. Meanwhile Merritt had been busy working his men close up to the intrenchments from the angle of the return west, along the White Oak road.
About 4 o"clock Warren began the attack. He was to a.s.sault the left flank of the Confederate infantry at a point where I knew Pickett"s intrenchments were refused, almost at right angles with the White Oak road. I did not know exactly how far toward Hatcher"s Run this part of the works extended, for here the videttes of Mumford"s cavalry were covering, but I did know where the refusal began. This return, then, was the point I wished to a.s.sail, believing that if the a.s.sault was made with spirit, the line could be turned. I therefore intended that Ayres and Crawford should attack the refused trenches squarely, and when these two divisions and Merritt"s cavalry became hotly engaged, Griffin"s division was to pa.s.s around the left of the Confederate line; and I personally instructed Griffin how I wished him to go in, telling him also that as he advanced, his right flank would be taken care of by Mackenzie, who was to be pushed over toward the Ford road and Hatcher"s Run.