On the 11th of August, General Scott, after crossing the mountains, concentrated his forces in the valley. General Twiggs encamped with his division in advance, on the direct road, at Ayotla, near the northern sh.o.r.e of Lake Chalco; General Quitman was stationed with his troops a short distance in the rear; General Worth occupied the town of Chalco on the western sh.o.r.e of its lake, while General Pillow brought up the rear by an encampment near Worth.
This position of the army commanded four routes to the capital whose capture was the coveted prize. The first of these, as well as the shortest and most direct, was the main post road which reaches the city by the gate or _garita_ of San Lazaro on the east. After pa.s.sing Ayotla this road winds round the foot of an extinct volcanic hill for five miles when it approaches the sedgy sh.o.r.es and marshes of Lake Tezcoco on the north, thence it pa.s.ses over a causeway built across an arm of Tezcoco for two miles, and, by another causeway of seven miles finally strikes the city. The road is good, level, perfectly open and comfortable for ordinary travelling, but the narrow land between the lakes of Chalco and Tezcoco, compressed still more by broken hills and rocks, admits the most perfect military defence. At the end of the first causeway over the arm of Tezcoco which we have just described, is the abrupt oblong volcanic hill styled El Penon, four hundred and fifty feet above the level of the lake, its top accessible in the direction of Ayotla at only one point, and surrounded by water except on the west towards Mexico. It is a natural fortress; yet Santa Anna had not neglected to add to its original strength, and to seize it as the eastern key of his defences. Three lines of works were thrown up, at the base, at the brow, and on the summit of the eminence. The works at the base, completely encircling El Penon, consisted of a ditch fifteen feet wide, four and a half feet deep, and a parapet fifteen feet thick whose slope was raised eight and a half feet above the bottom of the ditch. Ample breastworks formed the other two lines of the bristling tiara. In addition to this, the causeway across the arm of Tezcoco, immediately in front, had been cut and was defended by a battery of two guns, while the fire from all the works, mounting about sixty pieces, swept the whole length of the causeway.
The second road to the capital was by Mexicalzingo. After leaving Ayotla the highway continues along the main post road for six or seven miles and then deflects southwardly towards the village of Santa Maria, whence it pursues its way westwardly towards Istapalapan, but, just before reaching Mexicalzingo, it crosses a marsh formed by the waters of Lake Xochimilco, on a causeway nearly a mile long. This approach, dangerous as it was by its natural impediments, was also protected by extensive field works which made it almost as perilous for a.s.sault as the Penon.
The third route lay through Tezcoco. Leaving Chalco and the Hacienda of Buena Vista, it strikes off from the main route directly north, and pa.s.sing through the town of Tezcoco, it sweeps westwardly around the sh.o.r.es of the lake of that name until it crosses the stone d.y.k.e of San Cristoval, near the lake and town of that name; thence, by a road leading almost directly south for fifteen miles, through the sacred town of Guadalupe Hidalgo, it enters the capital. It is an agreeable route through a beautiful country, yet extremely circuitous though free from all natural or artificial obstacles, until it reaches Santiago Zacualco within two miles of Guadalupe. But at the period of Scott"s invasion of the valley, General Valencia, with the troops that were afterwards convened at Contreras, was stationed at Tezcoco, either for the purpose of observation, or to induce an attack in that quarter, and thus to draw our forces into a snare on the northern route, or to fall on the rear of the American commander if he attacked El Penon, or advanced by the way of Mexicalzingo. At Santiago Zacualco, west of the lake and on the route, formidable works were thrown up to defend the entire s.p.a.ce between the western sh.o.r.e of lake Tezcoco and the mountains; while on the road to Queretaro, at the mountain pa.s.s north of Tenepantla, other defences were erected, so as to screen the country on all sides of the group of hills which lies west of the lakes of Tezcoco and San Cristoval and north of the town of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
The fourth and last advance to the city was that which turned to the south from the Hacienda of Buena Vista, and pa.s.sing by the town of Chalco, led along the narrow land intervening between the sh.o.r.es of lake Chalco and the first steeps of the mountains forming the southern rim of the valley, until it fell at right angles, at Tlalpam or San Agustin de las Cuevas, into the main road from the city of Mexico towards the southern States of the Republic.
All these routes were boldly reconnoitred by the brave engineers accompanying the American army, and, where they could not extend their personal observations, the officers obtained from the people of the country, information upon which subsequent events proved that they were justified in relying. From the knowledge thus gained as to the route south of the lake of Chalco, they were induced to believe, although it was rough, untravelled, difficult, and narrowly hemmed in between the lake and the mountains, yet that the long and narrow defile, which was open to resistance at many points, was not sufficiently obstructed or fortified to prevent our pa.s.sage. All the routes on the lower lands, it should also be remembered, were liable to increased difficulties from the deluging rains prevailing at this season on the highlands of Mexico, and which sometimes convert the highways and their borders, for many leagues, into almost impa.s.sable lagunes.
Santa Anna and his engineers had probably supposed that this southern route would not be adopted, but a reasonable explanation of his conduct is given by one of the most competent commentators upon the valley of Mexico and the march of the American army.[69] "When an enemy is in front of El Penon, the communication between it and troops on the other routes _is only by way of the city of Mexico itself_; in other words, the American troops being at Ayotla, General Santa Anna"s forces at El Penon were one day"s march distant from those at Mexicalzingo, three from those under General Valencia, and would have been about four days" march from troops thrown forward on the Chalco route. Fords on these different routes were by no means within supporting distances of each other. Holding the position that General Scott then did, it would have required, of an equal enemy, four times his own force, to have opposed successfully his further advance. The Mexican forces were not numerically equal to this, and, accordingly, they were concentrated at the threatened point. It is evident that as long as the American troops were in front of El Penon, the enemy _necessarily_ held to their position. In moving off, the former could gain one day the start. This brought the only difficult parts of the Chalco route actually nearer General Scott than the Mexican chief. If to this we add the delay necessary in moving heavy artillery and breaking up from a fortified position, it would seem that, instead of oversight, it was rather impossible for General Santa Anna to meet our forces sooner than he did."
The description of the various routes to the capital has necessarily acquainted the reader with the important Mexican defences on the north, the east, and the north-east of the capital, both by military works hastily thrown up after Santa Anna"s retreat from Cerro Gordo, and by the encampment of large bodies of soldiery. We thus, already know a part of the external line of defences at El Penon, Mexicalzingo, Tezcoco, Santiago Zacualco, and the Pa.s.s north of Tenepantla. But in addition to these, there are others that must be noticed on the south and west of the capital, which it should always be recollected is situated in the lap of the valley, but near the western edge of the gigantic rim of mountains.
Along the Chalco route there were no more fortifications, but west of lakes Chalco and Xochimilco, a line of entrenchments had been commenced, connecting the fortified _hacienda_, or ma.s.sive stone plantation house of San Antonio, about six miles south of the city, with the town of Mexicalzingo. West of this _hacienda_, the Pedregal, a vast, broken field of lava, spread out along the edge of the main road, and skirting it to San Agustin, extended high upon the mountain slopes still further west near San Angel and Contreras, whose neighboring fields were cut into deep ravines and barrancas by the wash from the declivities. The Pedregal was a most formidable obstacle in the march or manuvres of an army. But few levels of arable land were found among its rocky wastes. It admitted the pa.s.sage of troops at but few points, and was entirely impracticable for cavalry or artillery, except by a single mule-path.[70] North of San Angel and the edge of the Pedregal, at the distance of about four miles, rose the solitary hill and castle of Chapultepec, which had been amply prepared for defence; and still further north on the same line, frowned the stern ridges of the _sierra_, cut by barrancas and profound dells, until the ring of the outer series of military works was thus finally united at the pa.s.s beyond Tenepantla. But inside of this formidable barrier of outworks, nearer the city, another line of fortifications had been prepared to dispute the American march. The first, and perhaps the most important of these, was at Churubusco, a scattered village lying midway between San Agustin and the city of Mexico, directly on the road, at a spot where the stream or rivulet of Churubusco runs eastwardly from a point on the road from San Angel to the capital, towards the lake of Xochimilco. The sides of the water course were planted with the p.r.i.c.kly maguey, and one of the most western buildings in the village was a strong ma.s.sive stone convent, whose walls had been cut for musketry, and whose parapets, azoteas or flat roofs, and windows, all afforded suitable positions for soldiery.
Large quant.i.ties of ammunition were stored within the edifice. The enclosure of the church and convent was defended by about two thousand men, and mounted seven guns, while, towards the east was a beautiful, solid and scientifically constructed tete de pont which covered the bridge over the stream by which the road led to the capital. In this work three heavy guns were mounted, while the neighborhood is said to have swarmed with troops.
We have already mentioned the garita or gate of San Lazaro, which was the entrance to the city by the main road from the east, pa.s.sing the hill and fortification of El Penon. This garita was strengthened by strong works on the road, with platforms and embrasures for heavy cannon, which would have swept the path, while the marshes on the south were protected by redoubts and lunettes extending to the garita or entrance of La Candelaria on the ca.n.a.l from Xochimilco. North of San Lazaro strong works hemmed in the city to the garita of Peralvillo, and connected with defences and fortified houses reaching to the garita of Santiago. Other advanced works were begun in that quarter, while the ground in front of the main line was cut into _troux de loups_.
On the west of the city are the garitas of San Cosme and Belen. "Works had been commenced to connect that of San Cosme, the most northerly of the two, with that of Santiago, and the nature of the country and of the buildings, formed obstructions to any advance between San Cosme and Belen. Belen was defended princ.i.p.ally by the citadel of Mexico, a square bastioned work with wet ditches, immediately inside the garita.
Barricades had also been commenced; but the great obstacle to an entrance by either garita, was presented in the rock and castle of Chapultepec, two miles south-west of the city. From this hill two aqueducts extend to the capital, the one, north-east, in a direct line to Belen, and the other, north, to the suburb of San Cosme, where, turning at right angles, it continued onward and entered at the garita. The roads from the west ran along the sides of the aqueducts.
Two roads enter the city from the south, between the garita of San Antonio and Belen, one at Belen and the other at the garita of El nino Perdido, neither of these roads have branches to the Acapulco road south of the Pedregal and the Hacienda of San Antonio, and, therefore, had been left comparatively unfortified."[71]
These defences, overlooked by the lofty sierras and the barrancas which broke their feet, hemmed in the capital, and the Mexicans readily imagined that they could not be turned by an army marching from the east, so as to reach the city on the west, except by a tedious circuit which would allow them time to complete their protective works in that quarter. The east had claimed their chief and most natural attention, and thus the south and the west became unquestionably their weakest points.
Such were the Mexican lines, natural and artificial, around the capital in the valley in the middle of August, 1847, and such was the position of the American troops in front of them. The Mexicans numbered then, with all their levies, probably more than thirty thousand fighting men, while the Americans did not count more than ten thousand--under arms at all points. The invaders had prepared as well as circ.u.mstances admitted, and their _materiel_ for a.s.sault or siege had been gathered carefully, and transported slowly into the interior, through the country intervening between Vera Cruz and Puebla, every train being usually attacked by guerillas, and fighting its way boldly through the most dangerous pa.s.ses.
The equipments of the Mexicans, except the weapons saved from the wreck of former battles, had been chiefly prepared at the cannon foundries and powder factories of the country, and it is quite amazing to notice how completely a great exigency brought forth the latent energies of the people, teaching them what they might ordinarily effect, if guided by a spirit of industry and progress. Under the most disheartening depression, but fired by the stimulus of despair, by an overpowering sense of patriotic duty, and by religious enthusiasm which had been excited by the crusading address of the clergy of San Luis Potosi, issued in the month of April, they manifested in their last moments, a degree of zeal, calmness, and foresight that will forever redound to their credit on the page of history.
The Mexican preparations for defence were not, of course, as completely known to the Americans as we now describe them. Through spies, scouts and reconnoisances of our engineers, some of the exterior, and even of the interior lines were ascertained with tolerable accuracy; but sufficient was known to satisfy General Scott that of all the approaching routes to the capital, that which led along the southern sh.o.r.es of lake Chalco was the only one he ought to adopt.[72]
Accordingly, on the 15th of August, the movement was commenced in the reverse order from that in which the army had entered the valley from Puebla. Worth"s division pa.s.sing Pillow"s, led the advance, Pillow and Quitman followed, while Twiggs" brought up the rear. Scott took his position with Pillow, so as to communicate easily with all parts of the army. Water transportation, to some extent, had been obtained by General Worth at Chalco, by the siezure of market boats which plied between that place and the capital. When Twiggs moved he was a.s.sailed by Alvarez and his Pintos, but soon drove them off, while the advance columns, after pa.s.sing San Gregorio, were frequently a.s.sailed by the enemy"s light troops in their front, and hara.s.sed and impeded by ditches that had been hastily cut across the road, or by rocks rolled down from the mountains. These obstacles necessarily consumed time, but the simple-minded Indians of the neighborhood, who had just been compelled by the Mexicans to throw the impediments in the Americans"
way, were perhaps more easily induced to aid in clearing the path for the invaders, than their ancestors had been in the days of Cortez. On the afternoon of the 17th, Worth, with the advance, reached San Agustin, at the foot of the mountains, and at the intersection of the southern road from Mexico to Cuernavaca and Acapulco--a point whose topography we have already described;--and, on the 18th, the rear division entered the town.
As soon as Santa Anna discovered Scott"s advance by the Chalco route, and that the attack on Mexico would be made from the south instead of the east, he at once perceived that it was useless to attack the American rear, whilst pa.s.sing the defiles between the lake and the mountains even if he could possibly come up with it, and consequently, that it was best for him to quit his head quarters at El Penon, while he also recalled General Valencia with the most of the troops at Tezcoco and at Mexicalzingo, which were no longer menaced by the foe.
Santa Anna himself, established his quarters at the fortified hacienda of San Antonio, and ordered Valencia to march his whole division, cavalry, infantry and artillery, to the town of San Angel and Coyoacan, so as to cover the whole west and centre of the valley in front of Mexico.
[Footnote 69: See the admirable Map and Memoir of Lieutenant M. L.
Smith, and Brevet Captain E. L. F. Hardcastle, published in the Senate Doc.u.ment, No. 11 of the first session of the 31st Congress: 1849 "50.]
[Footnote 70: Ripley"s War with Mexico, vol. 2, 181.]
[Footnote 71: Ripley, 2d vol., 182.]
[Footnote 72: General Scott had set his heart, even at Puebla, on the Chalco route, but he resolved not to be obstinate, if, on a closer examination of the ground, a better route was presented. The last information of his spies and officers, _in the valley_, satisfied him as to the propriety of advancing by Chalco.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: PLAIN OF MEXICO. P LOOMIS, SC.]
CHAPTER XIV.
1847.
DIFFICULTIES OF THE ADVANCE--THE PEDREGAL--SAN ANTONIO--HACIENDA--RELATIVE POSITION OF AMERICAN AND MEXICAN ARMIES--PATH OVER THE PEDREGAL TO CONTRERAS--VALENCIA DISCONCERTS SANTA ANNA"S PLAN OF BATTLE--AMERICAN ADVANCE AND VICTORY AT CONTRERAS--SAN ANTONIO TURNED BY WORTH--BATTLE OF CHURUBUSCO--BATTLE AT THE CONVENT AND TETE DE PONT--THEIR CAPTURE--FLIGHT OF THE MEXICANS.
In order to understand the ensuing military movements, it will be proper for the reader to study the map of the valley, and acquaint himself fully with the relative posture of both parties. The plans of both generals in chief were well made; but the blunders and obstinacy of the Mexican second in command disconcerted Santa Anna"s desired combination, and ultimately opened the ground to the American advance with more ease than was antic.i.p.ated.
We will sketch rapidly the military value of the arena upon which the combatants stood on the 18th of August, 1847.
Let us imagine ourselves beside General Scott, standing on one of the elevations above the town of San Agustin de las Cuevas, at the base of the southern mountain barrier of the valley, and looking northward towards the capital. Directly in front, leading to the city, is the main road, the left or western side of which, even from the gate of San Agustin to the Hacienda of San Antonio, and thence westwardly to San Angel, forms, together with the bases of the southern and western mountains about St. Geronimo and Contreras, a vast basin, ten or twelve square miles in extent, covered with the Pedregal or the field of broken lava which we have already mentioned. This ma.s.s of jagged volcanic matter, we must remember, was at that time barely pa.s.sable with difficulty for infantry, and altogether impa.s.sable for cavalry or artillery, save by a single mule path. North, beyond the fortified _hacienda_ and headquarters of Santa Anna at San Antonio, the country opened. A line of field works, the lake of Xochimilco, a few cultivated farms, and vast flooded meadows, were on its right to the east, but from the _hacienda_, a road branches off to the west, leading around the northern edge of the _Pedregal_ or lava field through Coyoacan and San Angel, whence it deflects southwardly to Contreras. The main road, however, continues onward, northwardly, from the hacienda of San Antonio, until it crosses the Churubusco river at the strong fortification we have described. Beyond Churubusco the highway leads straight to the gate of San Antonio Abad, whence a work had been thrown north-westwardly towards the citadel. The city of Mexico, built on the bed of an ancient lake, was on a perfect level, nor were there any commanding or protecting elevations of importance around it within two or three miles, and the first of these, beyond this limit, were chiefly on the north and west.
Thus, General Santa Anna, in front, on the main road to the city, at the ma.s.sive fortified _hacienda_ of San Antonio, blocked up the highway in that direction, protected on his right by the barrier of the Pedregal; and by the lake of Xochimilco, the field works, and the flooded country on his left. General Valencia had been placed by him with his troops at San Angel, on the western edge of the valley, and at the village of Coyoacan, a little further east in the lap of the valley, on roads communicating easily with his position at San Antonio, while they commanded the approaches to the city by the circuitous path of the Pedregal around the edge of the valley from San Agustin de las Cuevas, through Contreras or Padierna. Valencia and Santa Anna were consequently within supporting distance of each other; and in their rear, in front of the city, were the fortifications of Churubusco. General Scott, with the whole American army was, therefore, apparently hemmed in between the lakes and the Pedregal on his flanks; the Mexican fortifications and army in front; and the steep mountains towards Cuernavaca in his rear. He was obliged, accordingly, either to retreat by the defiles through which he had advanced from Chalco,--to climb the steeps behind him and pa.s.s them to the _tierra caliente_,--to force the position in front at the hacienda of San Antonio,--or to burst the barrier of the Pedregal on his left, and, sweeping round the rim of the valley, to advance towards the capital through the village of San Angel. Such were some of the dangers and difficulties that menaced Scott on his arrival at San Agustin. He was in the heart of the enemy"s country, in front of a capital aroused by pride, patriotism and despair, and possessing all the advantages of an accurate knowledge of the ground on which it stood, or by which it was surrounded. Scott, on the other hand, like the mariner in storm on a lee sh.o.r.e, was obliged to feel his way along the dangerous coast with the lead, and could not advance with that perfect confidence which is ever the surest harbinger of success.
The reconnoissances of the American engineers which had been pushed boldly, in front, on the main road, to the north, by the hacienda of San Antonio, soon disclosed the difficulty in that direction. But among the ma.s.s of information which the American General received at Puebla, his engineers learned that _there was_ a pathway through this Pedregal whose route had been indicated by the spies with sufficient distinctness and certainty to justify a hope that he might be able to render it practicable for his whole army, and, thus, enable him to turn the right flank of the Mexicans" strongest positions. There is no doubt, as subsequent events demonstrated, that the ground in the neighborhood of Contreras, where the road descends from the mountains and barrancas towards San Angel was of great importance to the Mexicans in the defence of the various modes of access to the city, and it is unquestionable that a strong post should have been placed in that quarter to cripple the American advance. It is stated by Mexican writers, that General Mendoza, with two members of his topographical corps had reconnoitred this route and pa.s.s, and p.r.o.nounced it "absolutely indefensible." It is probable, therefore, that no general action, involving the fortunes of a division, or of a large ma.s.s of the Mexican army, should have been risked among the ravines between the mountains and the Pedregal near Contreras; yet we do not believe that it should have been left by Santa Anna without a force capable of making a staunch resistance.
We are now acquainted with the ground, and with the positions of the two armies. Scott"s plan was to force a pa.s.sage by either or both of the two adits to the levels of the valley in front of the city, while Santa Anna"s, according to his manifesto dated _subsequently_ on the 23d of August, was to have made a concerted retrograde movement with his troops, and to have staked the fortunes of the capital on a great battle, in which all his fresh, enthusiastic, and unharmed troops would have been brought into a general action against the comparatively small American army, upon an open ground where he would have had full opportunity to use and manuvre infantry, cavalry and artillery.
But this plan was disconcerted at first, and probably destroyed, both in its _materiel_ and _morale_, by the gross disobedience of General Valencia, who forgot as a soldier, that there can never be two commanders in the field. Valencia, apparently resolving to seize the first opportunity to attack the Americans, in spite of the reported untenable character of the ground about Padierna or Contreras, left his quarters at Coyoacan and San Angel, and advanced, without consulting his commander, to Contreras, upon whose heights he threw up an entrenched camp! As soon as Santa Anna learned this fact, he ordered the vain and reckless officer to retire, but finding him obstinately resolute in his insubordination, the commander-in-chief suffered him, in direct opposition to his own opinion, to remain and to charge himself with the whole responsibility of the consequences.
Thus, if Scott advanced upon the main road, he would meet only Santa Anna in front, and the efficiency of Valencia"s force, on his left flank, would be comparatively destroyed. If he conquered Valencia, however, at Contreras, after pa.s.sing the Pedregal, he would rout a whole division of the veterans of the north--the remnants of San Luis and Angostura,--while the remainder of the army, composed of recent levies and raw troops, disciplined for the occasion, would, in all likelihood, fall an easy prey to the eager Americans.
The reconnoissances of the American army were now completed both towards San Antonio over the main northern road, and towards Padierna or Contreras over the southern and south-western edge of the Pedregal. That brave and accomplished engineer, Captain--now Colonel Robert E. Lee--had done the work on the American left across the fields of broken lava, and being convinced that a road could be opened, if needed, for the whole army and its trains, Scott resolved forthwith to advance.
On the 19th of August, General Pillow"s division was commanded to open the way, and advancing carefully, bravely and laboriously over the worst portion of the pa.s.s,--cutting its road as it moved onward,--it arrived about one o"clock in the afternoon at a point amid the ravines and barrancas near Padierna or Contreras where the new road could only be continued under the direct fire of twenty-two pieces of Mexican artillery, most of which were of large calibre. These guns were in a strong entrenched camp, surrounded by every advantage of ground and by large bodies of infantry and cavalry, reinforced from the city, over an excellent road beyond the volcanic field. Pillow"s and Twiggs"s force, with all its officers on foot, picking a way along the Mexican front and extending towards the road from the city and the enemy"s left, advanced to dislodge the foe. Captain Magruder"s field battery of twelve and six-pounders, and Lieut. Callender"s battery of mountain howitzers and rockets, were also pushed forward with great difficulty within range of the Mexican fortifications, and, thus, a stationary battle raged until night fell drearily on the combatants amid a cold rain which descended in torrents. Wet, chilled, hungry and sleepless, both armies pa.s.sed a weary time of watching until early the next morning, when a movement was made by the Americans which resulted in a total rout of Valencia"s forces. Firing at a long distance against an entrenched camp was worse than useless on such a ground, and although General Smith"s and Colonel Riley"s brigades, supported by Generals Pierce"s and Cadwallader"s, had been under a heavy fire of artillery and musketry for more than three hours along the almost impa.s.sable ravine in front and to the left of the Mexican camp, yet so little had been effected in destroying the position that the main reliance for success was correctly judged to be in an a.s.sault at close quarters.
The plan had been arranged in the night by Brigadier General Persifer F. Smith, and was sanctioned by General Scott, to whom it was communicated through the indefatigable diligence of Captain Lee, of the Engineers.
At 3 o"clock A. M. of the 20th August, the movement commenced on the rear of the enemy"s camp, led by Colonel Riley and followed successively by Cadwallader"s and Smith"s brigades, the whole force being commanded by General Smith.
The march was rendered tedious by rain, mud and darkness; but, about sun rise, Riley reached an elevation behind the Mexicans, whence he threw his men upon the works, and, storming the entrenchments, planted his flag upon them in seventeen minutes. Meanwhile Cadwallader brought on the general a.s.sault by crossing the deep ravine in front and pouring into the work and upon the fugitives, frequent volleys of destructive musketry. Smith"s own brigade under the temporary command of Major Dimick, discovered, opposite and outside the work, a long line of Mexican cavalry drawn up in support, and by a charge against the flank, routed the horse completely, while General Shields held ma.s.ses of cavalry, supported by artillery, in check below him, and captured mult.i.tudes who fled from above.
It was a rapid and brilliant feat of arms. Scott,--the skilful and experienced General of the field,--doubts in his despatch whether a more brilliant or decisive victory is to be found on record, when the disparity of numbers, the nature of the ground, the artificial defences, and the fact that the Americans accomplished their end without artillery or cavalry, are duly and honestly considered. All our forces did not number more than 4,500 rank and file, while the Mexicans maintained, at least, six thousand on the field, and double that number in reserve under Santa Anna, who had advanced to support but probably seeing that it was not a spot for his theory of a general action, and that an American force intervened, declined aiding his disobedient officer. The Mexicans lost about 700 killed, 813 prisoners, including 4 Generals among 88 officers. Twenty-two pieces of bra.s.s ordnance, thousands of small arms and accoutrements, many colors and standards, large stores of ammunition, 700 pack mules, and numbers of horses fell into the hands of the victors.
The rage of Santa Anna against Valencia knew no bounds. He ordered him to be shot wherever found; but the defeated chief fled precipitately towards the west beyond the mountains, and for a long time lay in concealment until the storm of private and public indignation had pa.s.sed. The effect of this battle, resulting in the loss of the veterans of the north, was disastrous not only in the city, but to the _morale_ of the remaining troops of the main division under Santa Anna. It certainly demonstrated the importance of Padierna or Contreras as a military point of defence; but it unquestionably proved that the works designed to maintain it should have been differently planned and placed at a much earlier day, after mature deliberation by skilful engineers. The hasty decision and work of Valencia, made without preconcert or sanction of the General-in-chief, and in total violation of his order of battle, followed by the complete destruction of the entire division of the northern army, could only result in final disaster.
Whilst the battle of Contreras was raging early in the day, brigades from Worth"s and Quitman"s divisions had been advanced to support the combatants; but before they arrived on the field the post was captured, and they were, accordingly, ordered to return to their late positions. Worth, advanced from San Agustin, in front of San Antonio, was now in better position, for a road to the rear of the _hacienda_ had been opened by forcing the pa.s.s of Contreras. Moving from Contreras or Padierna through San Angel and Coyoacan, Pillow"s and Twiggs"s divisions would speedily be able to attack it from the north, while Worth, advancing from the south, might unquestionably force the position. Accordingly while Pillow and Twiggs were advanced, General Scott reached Coyoacan, about two miles, by a cross road, in the rear of the hacienda of San Antonio. From Coyoacan he despatched Pillow to attack the rear of San Antonio, while a reconnoissance was made of Churubusco, on the main road, and an attack of the place ordered to be effected by Twiggs with one of his brigades and Captain Taylor"s field battery.
General Pierce was next despatched, under the guidance of Captain Lee, by a road to the left, to attack the enemy"s right and rear in order to favor the movement on the Convent of Churubusco and cut off retreat to the capital. And, finally, Shields, with the New York and South Carolina volunteers, was ordered to follow Pierce and to command the left wing. The battle now raged from the right to the left of our whole line. All the movements had been made with the greatest rapidity and enthusiasm. Not a moment was lost in pressing the victory after the fall of Contreras. Shouting Americans and rallying Mexicans were spread over every field. Every one was employed; and, in truth, there was ample work to do, for even the commander-in-chief of our forces was left without a reserve or an escort, and had to advance for safety close in Twiggs"s rear.
Meanwhile, about an hour earlier, Worth, by a skilful and daring movement upon the enemy"s front and right at the hacienda of San Antonio, had turned and forced that formidable point whose garrison no doubt was panic struck by the victory of Contreras. The enterprise was n.o.bly achieved. Colonel Clarke"s brigade, conducted by the engineers Mason and Hardcastle, found a practicable path through the Pedregal west of the road, and, by a wide sweep, came out upon the main causeway to the capital. At this point the three thousand men of the Mexican garrison at San Antonio, were met in retreat, and cut by Clarke in their very centre;--one portion being driven off towards Dolores on the right, and the other upon Churubusco in the direct line of the active operations of the Americans. Whilst this brave feat of out-flanking was performed, Colonel Garland, Major Galt, Colonel Belton, and Lieutenant Colonel Duncan advanced to the front attack of San Antonio, and rushing rapidly on the flying enemy, took one General prisoner, and seized a large quant.i.ty of public property, ammunition and the five deserted guns.
Thus fell the two main keys of the valley, and thus did all the divisions of the American army at length reach the open and comparatively un.o.bstructed plains of the valley.