Stuart"s cavalry and the reserve artillery were also present. The rest of the army was with Jackson at Harper"s Ferry, or co-operating with him in the neighborhood of Maryland Heights. Out of forty-four brigades, Lee could put but fourteen or fifteen in line that day to oppose McClellan. He was very strong in artillery, however, and his cannon looked grimly over the hill-crests behind which his infantry were lying. Cutts"s and Jones"s battalions of the reserve artillery were ordered to report to Hill for the protection of the left of the Confederate line, and gave him in all the sixty or seventy guns which he speaks of in his report, and which have puzzled several writers who have described the battle. Whenever our troops showed themselves as they marched into position, they were saluted from shotted cannon, and the numerous batteries that were developed on the long line of hills before us no doubt did much to impress McClellan with the belief that he had the great bulk of Lee"s army before him.
The value of time was one of the things McClellan never understood.
He should have been among the first in the saddle at every step in the campaign after he was in possession of Lee"s order of the 9th, and should have infused energy into every unit in his army. Instead of making his reconnoissance at three in the afternoon of Monday, it might have been made at ten in the morning, and the battle could have been fought before night, if, indeed, Lee had not promptly retreated when support from Jackson would thus have become impossible. Or if McClellan had pushed boldly for the bridge at the mouth of the Antietam, nothing but a precipitate retreat by Lee could have prevented the interposition of the whole National army between the separated wings of the Confederates. The opportunity was still supremely favorable for McClellan, but prompt decision was not easy for him. Nothing but reconnoitring was done on Monday afternoon or on Tuesday, whilst Lee was straining every nerve to concentrate his forces and to correct what would have proven a fatal blunder in scattering them, had his opponent acted with vigor. The strongest defence the eulogists of the Confederate general have made for him is that he perfectly understood McClellan"s caution and calculated with confidence upon it; that he would have been at liberty to perfect his combinations still more at leisure, but for the accident by which the copy of his plan had fallen into our hands at Frederick City.
During the 16th we confidently expected a battle, and I kept with my division. In the afternoon I saw General Burnside, and learned from him that McClellan had determined to let Hooker make a movement on our extreme right to turn Lee"s position. Burnside"s manner in speaking of this implied that he thought it was done at Hooker"s solicitation, and through his desire, openly evinced, to be independent in command. I urged Burnside to a.s.sume the immediate command of the corps and allow me to lead my own division. He objected that as he had been announced as commander of the right wing of the army, composed of the two corps, he was unwilling to waive his precedence or to a.s.sume that Hooker was detached for anything more than a temporary purpose. I pointed out that Reno"s staff had been granted leave of absence to take the body of their chief to Washington, and that my division staff was too small for corps duty; but he met this by saying that he would use his staff for this purpose, and help me in every way he could till the crisis of the campaign should be over. Sympathizing with his very natural feeling, I ceased objecting, and accepted with as good grace as I could the unsatisfactory position of nominal commander of the corps to which I was a comparative stranger, and which, under the circ.u.mstances, naturally looked to him as its accustomed and real commander. Burnside"s intentions in respect to myself were thoroughly friendly, as he afterward proved, and I had no ground for complaint on this score; but the position of second in command is always an awkward and anomalous one, and such I felt it.
The 16th pa.s.sed without serious fighting, though we had desultory cannonading and picket firing. It was hard to restrain our men from showing themselves on the crest of the long ridge in front of us, and whenever they did so they drew the fire from some of the enemy"s batteries, to which ours would respond. McClellan reconnoitred the line of the Antietam near us, and the country immediately on our left, down the valley. As the result of this we were ordered to change our positions at nightfall, staff officers being sent to guide each division to its new camp. The selected positions were marked by McClellan"s engineers, who then took members of Burnside"s staff to identify the locations, and these in turn conducted our divisions. There was far more routine of this sort in that army than I ever saw elsewhere. Corps and division commanders should have the responsibility of protecting their own flanks and in choosing ordinary camps. To depend upon the general staff for this is to take away the vigor and spontaneity of the subordinate and make him perform his duty in a mechanical way. He should be told what is known of the enemy and his movements so as to be put upon his guard, and should then have freedom of judgment as to details. The changes made were as follows: Rodman"s division went half a mile further to the left, where a country road led to the Antietam ford, half a mile below the Burnside bridge. Sturgis"s division was placed on the sides of the road leading to the stone bridge just mentioned.
Willc.o.x"s was put in reserve in rear of Sturgis. My own was divided, Scammon"s brigade going with Rodman, and Crook"s going with Sturgis.
Crook was ordered to take the advance in crossing the bridge in case we should be ordered to attack. This selection was made by Burnside himself as a compliment to the division for the vigor of its a.s.sault at South Mountain. While we were moving we heard Hooker"s guns far off on the right and front, and the cannonade continued an hour or more after it became dark.
What, then, was the plan of battle of which the first step was this movement of Hooker"s? McClellan"s dispositions on the 15th were made whilst Franklin"s corps was still absent, and, under the orders he received, was likely to be so for a day at least. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 29.] Sumner"s two corps had been treated as the centre of the army in hand, Burnside"s had been divided by putting Hooker on the extreme right and the Ninth Corps on the extreme left, and Porter"s corps was in reserve. This looked as if a general attack in front with this organization of the army were intended. But the more McClellan examined the enemy"s position the less inclined he was to attack the centre. He could cross the bridge there and on the right, and deploy; but the gentle slopes rising toward Sharpsburg were swept by formidable batteries and offered no cover to advancing troops. The enemy"s infantry was behind stone fences and in sunken roads, whilst ours must advance over the open. Lee"s right rested upon the wooded bluffs above the Burnside bridge, where it could only be approached by a small head of column charging along the narrow roadway under a concentrated fire of cannon and small arms. No point of attack on the whole field was so unpromising as this. Then, as Jackson was still at Harper"s Ferry, there was the contingency of an attack in rear if anything less than the ma.s.s of our army were pushed beyond Lee"s right.
On our right, in front of Hooker, it was easy to turn the Confederate line. The road from Keedysville through Smoketown to the Hagerstown turnpike crossed the Antietam in a hollow, out of the line of fire, and a march around Lee"s left flank could be made almost wholly under cover. The topography of the field therefore suggested a flank attack from our right, if the National commander rejected the better strategy of interposing his army between Lee and Jackson as too daring a movement. This flank attack McClellan determined to make, and some time after noon of the 16th issued his orders accordingly. In his preliminary report of the battle, made before he was relieved from command, McClellan says:--
"The design was to make the main attack upon the enemy"s left,--at least to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more, by a.s.sailing the enemy"s right,--and as soon as one or both of the flank movements were fully successful, to attack their centre with any reserve I might then have in hand."
[Footnote: O R., vol. xix. pt. i. p. 30.]
His report covering his whole career in the war, dated August 4, 1863 (and published February, 1864, after warm controversies had arisen, and he had become a political character), modifies the above statement in some important particulars. It says:--
"My plan for the impending general engagement was to attack the enemy"s left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield supported by Sumner"s and if necessary by Franklin"s, and as soon as matters looked favorably there, to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy"s extreme right upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and having carried their position to press along the crest toward our right, and whenever either of these flank movements should be successful, to advance our centre with all the forces then disposable." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix, pt. i, p. 55.]
The opinion I got from Burnside at the time, as to the part the Ninth Corps was to take, was fairly consistent with the design first quoted, namely, that when the attack by Sumner, Hooker, and Franklin should be progressing favorably, we were "to create a diversion in favor of the main attack, with the hope of something more." It is also probable that Hooker"s movement was at first intended to be made by his corps alone, the attack to be taken up by Sumner"s two corps as soon as Hooker began, and to be shared in by Franklin if he reached the field in time, thus making a simultaneous oblique attack from our right by the whole army except Porter"s corps, which was in reserve, and the Ninth Corps, which was to create the "diversion" on our left and prevent the enemy from stripping his right to reinforce his left. It is hardly disputable that this would have been a better plan than the one actually carried out. Certainly the a.s.sumption that the Ninth Corps could cross the Antietam alone at the only place on the field where the Confederates had their line immediately upon the stream which must be crossed under fire by two narrow heads of column, and could then turn to the right along the high ground occupied by the hostile army before that army had been broken or seriously shaken elsewhere, is one which would hardly be made till time had dimmed the remembrance of the actual position of Lee"s divisions upon the field. It is also noticeable that the plan as given in the final report leaves no "centre" with which to "advance"
when either of the flank movements should be successful, Porter"s corps in reserve being the only one not included in the movement as described.
Further evidence that the plan did not originally include the wide separation of two corps to the right to make the extended turning movement is found in Hooker"s incomplete report, and in the wide interval in time between the marching of his corps and that of Mansfield. Hooker was ordered to cross the Antietam at about two o"clock in the afternoon of the 16th by the bridge in front of Keedysville and the ford below it. He says that after his troops were over and in march, he rode back to McClellan, who told him that he might call for reinforcements, and that when they came they should be under his command. Somewhat later McClellan rode forward with his staff to observe the progress making, and Hooker again urged the necessity of reinforcements. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 217.] Yet Sumner did not receive orders to send Mansfield"s corps to his support till evening, and it marched only half an hour before midnight, [Footnote: _Id_., p. 275.] reaching its bivouac, about a mile and a half in rear of that of Hooker, at 2 A.M. of the 17th. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 475.]
After crossing the Antietam, Hooker had shaped his course to the westward, aiming to reach the ridge on which the Hagerstown turnpike runs, and which is the dominant feature in the landscape. This ridge is about two miles distant from the Antietam, and for the first mile of the way no resistance was met. However, his progress had been observed by the enemy, and Hood"s two brigades were taken from the centre and pa.s.sed to the left of D. H. Hill. Here they occupied an open wood (since known as the East Wood) northeast of the Dunker Church. Hooker was now trying to approach the Confederate positions, Meade"s division of the Pennsylvania Reserves being in the advance.
A sharp skirmishing combat ensued, and artillery was brought into action on both sides. I have mentioned our hearing the noise of this engagement from the other extremity of the field in the fading light of evening. On our side Seymour"s brigade had been chiefly engaged, and had felt the enemy so vigorously that Hood supposed he had repulsed a serious effort to take the wood. Hooker was, however, aiming to pa.s.s quite beyond the flank, and kept his other divisions north of the hollow beyond the wood, and upon the ridge which reaches the turnpike near the largest re-entrant bend of the Potomac, which is only half a mile distant. Here he bivouacked upon the slopes of the ridge, Doubleday"s division resting with its right upon the turnpike, Ricketts"s division upon the left of Doubleday, and Meade covering the front of both with the skirmishers of Seymour"s brigade. Between Meade"s skirmishers and the ridge were the farmhouse and barn of J. Poffenberger, on the east side of the road, where Hooker made his own quarters for the night. Half a mile further in front was the farm of D. R. Miller, the dwelling on the east, and the barn surrounded by stacks on the west of the road.
[Footnote: Hooker"s unfinished report says he slept in the barn of D. R. Miller, but he places it on the east of the road, and the spot is fully identified as Poffenberger"s by General Gibbon, who commanded the right brigade, and by Lieutenant-Colonel Rufus R.
Dawes, Sixth Wisconsin (afterward Brevet Brigadier-General), both of whom subsequently visited the field and determined the positions.]
Mansfield"s corps (the Twelfth), marching as it did late in the night, kept further to the right than Hooker"s, but moved on a nearly parallel course, and bivouacked on the farm of another J.
Poffenberger, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 275, 475.] near the road which, branching from the Hagerstown turnpike at the Dunker Church, intersects the one running from Keedysville through Smoketown to the same turnpike about a mile north of Hooker"s position. [Footnote: See map, p. 299.]
On the Confederate side, Hood"s division had been so roughly handled that it was replaced by two brigades of Ewell"s division (commanded by Lawton), which with Jackson"s own (commanded by J. R. Jones) had been led to the field from Harper"s Ferry by Jackson, reaching Sharpsburg in the afternoon of the 16th. These divisions were formed on the left of D. H. Hill, and in continuation of his line along the turnpike, but with a brigade advanced to the East Wood, which was held as a salient. Hood"s division, on being relieved, was placed in reserve near the Dunker Church, and spent part of the night in cooking rations, of which its supply had been short for a day or two. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 923.] The combatants on both sides slept upon their arms, well knowing that the dawn would bring b.l.o.o.d.y work.
During the evening McClellan issued orders looking toward the joining of a general engagement at daybreak. McLaws"s Confederate division, which had been opposing Franklin, crossed the Potomac at Maryland Heights, and marched by way of Shepherdstown, reaching Sharpsburg on the morning of the 17th. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 855, 856.] Walker"s division, which had come from Harper"s Ferry on the 16th, extended Lee"s right down the Antietam, covering the ford at which Rodman, on our side, was expected to cross. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 914.] A. P. Hill"s division was the only force of the enemy completing the work at Harper"s Ferry, and Franklin was ordered to leave Couch"s division to observe Hill"s movements from our side of the Potomac, and to bring the remainder of his corps on the field early in the morning. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 376.] In the respite given him since Sunday, Lee had therefore concentrated all his army but one division, and was better ready for the battle than McClellan, for Franklin"s corps could come upon the field only after a considerable march, and he did not, in fact, reach it till ten o"clock or later. Sumner was ordered to have the Second Corps ready to march an hour before day, but he had no authority to move till explicit orders to that effect should reach him. I have said that Hooker claims in his report that the promise was made him that Mansfield"s corps, when it came to reinforce him, should be under his orders. If this were so, it would unite all the troops now present which had fought in Pope"s Army of Virginia. I find no trace, however, in the reports of the battle, that Hooker exercised any such command. He seems to have confined his work to the independent action of his own corps until Mansfield"s death, and was himself disabled almost immediately afterward. As there were commanders of wings of the army duly designated, and two corps were now separated by a long interval from the rest in an independent turning movement, it can hardly be debated that that was the place of all others where one of them should have been, unless McClellan were there in person. Had Burnside"s two corps been kept together as the right wing, the right attack could have been made a unit. If Sumner had then been directed to keep in communication with Burnside, and to advance when the latter did, n.o.body will doubt that Sumner would have been prompt in sustaining his comrades. But both Sumner and Burnside were made to feel that they were reduced from their proper rank, and however conscientious they might be in carrying out such orders as reached them, it was not in human nature that they should volunteer suggestions or antic.i.p.ate commands.
McClellan had thus thrown away the advantages, if there were any, in holding only two or three men directly responsible for the co-ordination of his movements, and had a.s.sumed the full personal responsibility of watching each phase of the battle and suiting the proper orders to each conjuncture as it should arise.
CHAPTER XV
ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE RIGHT
Hooker astir early--The field near the Dunker Church--Artillery combat--Positions of Hooker"s divisions--Rocky ledges in the woods--Advance of Doubleday through Miller"s orchard and garden--Enemy"s fire from West Wood--They rush for Gibbon"s battery--Repulse--Advance of Patrick"s brigade--Fierce fighting along the turnpike--Ricketts"s division in the East Wood--Fresh effort of Meade"s division in the centre--A lull in the battle--Mansfield"s corps reaches the field--Conflicting opinions as to the hour--Mansfield killed--Command devolves on Williams--Advance through East Wood--Hooker wounded--Meade in command of the corps--It withdraws--Greene"s division reaches the Dunker Church--Crawford"s in the East Wood--Terrible effects on the Confederates--Sumner"s corps coming up--Its formation--It moves on the Dunker Church from the east--Divergence of the divisions--Sedgwick"s pa.s.ses to right of Greene--Attacked in flank and broken--Rallying at the Poffenberger hill--Twelfth Corps hanging on near the church--Advance of French"s division--Richardson follows later--b.l.o.o.d.y Lane reached--The Piper house--Franklin"s corps arrives--Charge of Irwin"s brigade.
Before the break of day on Wednesday the 17th, it was discovered that Doubleday"s division of Hooker"s corps lay exposed to artillery fire from batteries of the enemy supposed to be in position on their front and right. In rousing the men and changing their place, the stillness of the night was so far broken that the Confederates believed they were advancing to attack, and a lively cannonade and picket firing antic.i.p.ated the dawn. [Footnote: R. R. Dawes, Service with the Sixth Wisconsin, p. 87.] The chance for getting their breakfast was thus destroyed, and Hooker prepared his whole command for action as soon as it should be light enough to move. Looking south from the Poffenberger farm along the turnpike, he then saw a gently rolling landscape of which the commanding point was the Dunker Church, whose white brick walls appeared on the right of the road, backed by the foliage of the West Wood, which came toward him filling a hollow that ran parallel to the turnpike, with a single row of fields between. On the east side of the turnpike was the Miller house, with its barn and stack-yard across the road to the right, and beyond these the ground dipped into a little depression.
Still further on was seen a large cornfield between the East Wood and the turnpike, rising again to the higher level, and Hooker noticed the glint from a long line of bayonets beyond the corn, struck by the first rays of the rising sun. There was, however, another little hollow at the further side of the cornfield, which could not be seen from Hooker"s position; and on the farthest ridge, near the church and extending across the turnpike toward the East Wood, were the Confederate lines, partly sheltered by piles of rails taken from the fences. They looked to Hooker as if they were deployed along the edge of the corn, but an open sloping field lay between the corn and them, after pa.s.sing the second hollow. It was plain that the high ground about the little white church was the key of the enemy"s position, and if that could be carried, Hooker"s task would be well done.
The enemy"s artillery had opened early from a high hill nearly east of the Miller house in a position to strike our forces in flank and rear as they should go forward, and Hooker placed batteries on the equally commanding height above Poffenberger"s and detached Hofmann"s brigade from Doubleday"s division to support it and to prevent the enemy from turning our extreme right. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 224.] This force maintained its position during the day, and was the nucleus about which both Hooker"s and Sedgwick"s men rallied after their fight. The enemy"s artillery referred to were several batteries under Stuart"s command supported by his cavalry and by Early"s brigade of infantry which Jackson detached for that purpose. [Footnote: Official Records vol.
xix. pt. i. p. 819.]
Doubleday"s division (except Hofmann), was in two lines, Gibbon"s and Phelps"s in front, supported by Patrick"s. Of Meade"s division Seymour"s brigade, which had sustained the combat of the evening before, had continued to cover the front with skirmishers during the night, and remained on the northeast side of the East Wood. The other brigades (Anderson and Magilton) were placed in reserve behind Doubleday. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 269.] The Tenth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserves was sent from Anderson"s to a strong position west of the turnpike near the extremity of the strip of wood northwest of the Miller house. It was among ledges of rock looking into the ravine beyond which were Stuart and Early. The ravine was the continuation northward to the Potomac of a little watercourse which headed near the Dunker Church and along one side of which the West Wood lay, the outcrop of rock making broken ledges along its whole length. Indeed, all the pieces of wood in the neighborhood seemed to be full of such rocks, and for that reason had been allowed to remain in forest. The regiment was ordered to cover its front with skirmishers and to hold its position at all hazards.
Ricketts"s division had bivouacked in a wood east of Doubleday"s.
Its three brigades (Duryea"s, Hartsuff"s, and Christian"s) were deployed on the left of Doubleday, and were to march toward the Dunker Church through the East Wood, pa.s.sing the line of Seymour"s brigade, which was then to become its support.
The Confederates opened a rapid artillery fire from the open ground in front of the Dunker Church as well as from Stuart"s position, and Hooker answered the challenge by an immediate order for his line to advance. Doubleday directed Gibbon, who was on the right, to guide upon the turnpike. Patrick remained for a time in the wood north of the Miller house, till he should be needed at the front. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 224.] Doubleday and his brigade commanders seem to have supposed that Meade"s men occupied part at least of the West Wood, and that they would cover Gibbon"s flank as he advanced. This belief was based on the stationing of the Tenth Pennsylvania Reserves; but that regiment was fifteen or twenty rods north of the northern end of the West Wood, and Gibbon"s right flank, as he advanced, was soon exposed to attack from Ewell"s division (Lawton in command), which held the wood, hidden from view and perfectly protected by the slope of the ground and the forest, as they looked over the rim into the undulating open fields in front. Part of Battery B, Fourth United States Artillery (Gibbon"s own battery), was run forward to Miller"s barn and stack-yard on the right of the road, and fired over the heads of the advancing regiments. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 229, 248.] Other batteries were similarly placed, more to the left, and our cannon roared from all the hill crests encircling the field. The line moved swiftly forward through Miller"s orchard and kitchen garden, breaking through a stout picket fence on the near side, down into the moist ground of the hollow, and up through the corn which was higher than their heads and shut out everything from view. [Footnote: Dawes, Sixth Wisconsin, p. 88.] At the southern side of the field they came to a low fence, beyond which was the open field already mentioned, and the enemy"s line at the further side of it. But the cornfield only covered part of the line, and Gibbon"s right had outmarched the left, which had been exposed to a terrible fire. The direction taken had been a little oblique, so that the right wing of the Sixth Wisconsin (the flanking regiment) had crossed the turnpike and was suddenly a.s.sailed by a sharp fire from the West Wood on its flank.
They swung back into the road, lying down along the high, stout post-and-rail fence, keeping up their fire by shooting between the rails. [Footnote: Dawes, Sixth Wisconsin, p. 89.]
Leaving this little band to protect their right, the main line, which had come up on the left, leaped the fence at the south edge of the cornfield, and charged up hill across the open at the enemy in front. But the concentrated fire of artillery and musketry was more than they could bear. Men fell by scores and hundreds, and the thinned lines gave way and ran for the shelter of the corn. They were rallied in the hollow on the north side of the field. The enemy had rapidly extended his left under cover of the West Wood, and now made a dash at the right flank and at Gibbon"s exposed guns. His men on the right faced by that flank and followed him bravely, though with little order, in a dash at the Confederates who were swarming out of the wood. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 91.] The gunners double-charged the cannon with canister, and under a terrible fire of artillery and rifles Lawton"s division broke and sought shelter.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 248.]
Patrick"s brigade had now come up in support of Gibbon, and was sent across the turnpike into the West Wood to cover that flank, two regiments of Gibbon"s going with him. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 243.] His men pushed forward, the enemy retiring, until they were in advance of the princ.i.p.al line in the cornfield upon which the Confederates of Jackson"s division were now marching to attack. Patrick faced his brigade to the left, parallel to the edge of the wood and to the turnpike, and poured his fire into the flank of the enemy, following it by a charge through the field and up to the fence along the road.
Again the Confederates were driven back, but their left came forward in the wood again, attacking Patrick"s right, forcing him to resume his original direction of front and to retire to the cover of a rocky ledge in the open at right angles to the turnpike not far from the northern end of the timber. Phelps"s brigade had gone forward with Gibbon"s, pushing nearly to the Confederate lines, and being driven back with great loss when they charged over open ground against the enemy.
Ricketts"s division advanced from the wood in which it had spent the night, pa.s.sed through Seymour"s skirmishers and entered the East Wood, swinging his left forward as he went. This grove was open, but the rocks made perfect cover for Jackson"s men, and every stone and tree blazed with deadly fire. Hartsuff endeavored to reconnoitre the ground, but was wounded and disabled immediately. Ricketts pushed on, suffering fearfully from an enemy which in open order could fall back from rock to rock and from tree to tree with little comparative loss. He succeeded at last in reaching the west edge of this wood, forming along the road and fences that were just within its margin.
Here he kept up a rapid fire till his ammunition was exhausted.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 258.]
When Doubleday"s men had been finally repulsed, our line on the right curved from the ledge where Patrick took refuge, forward in front of Miller"s orchard and garden, part of Gibbon"s men lying down along the turnpike fence facing to the west. Meade"s two brigades in reserve were sent forward, but when they reached Gibbon and Phelps, Ricketts was calling for a.s.sistance in the East Wood and Magilton"s brigade was sent to him, leaving a gap on the left of Anderson. Another gallant effort was now made, Seymour"s depleted brigade striving to cover the opening, but the enemy dashed at it as Anderson came up the slope, and the left being taken in flank, the whole broke again to the rear. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 269, 270.]
Ricketts"s right was also imperilled, and he withdrew his exhausted lines to reorganize and to fill their empty cartridge-boxes. There was a lull in the battle, and the combatants on both sides were making desperate efforts to reform their broken regiments.
Mansfield had called the Twelfth Corps to arms at the first sound of Hooker"s battle and marched to his aid. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 475.] It consisted of two divisions, Williams"s and Greene"s, the first of two and the other of three brigades.
There were a number of new and undrilled regiments in the command, and in hastening to the front in columns of battalions in ma.s.s, proper intervals for deployment had not been preserved, and time was necessarily lost before the troops could be put in line. Indeed, some of them were not regularly deployed at all. They had left their bivouac at sunrise which, as it was about the equinox, was not far from six o"clock. They had marched across the country without reference to roads, always a very slow mode of advancing, and doubly so with undrilled men. The untrained regiments must, in the nature of things, have been very much like a mob when their so-called columns-in-ma.s.s approached the field of battle. It is impossible to reconcile the statements of the reports as to the time they became engaged. General Williams says they were engaged before seven o"clock. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 476.] General Meade says they relieved his men not earlier than ten or eleven. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 270.]
It seems to be guesswork in both cases, and we are forced to judge from circ.u.mstantial evidence. Ricketts thinks he had been fighting four hours when he retired for lack of ammunition, and the Twelfth Corps men had not yet reached him. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 259.]
Patrick, on the extreme right, says that his men had made their coffee in the lull after his retreat to the sheltering ledge of rocks, and had completed their breakfast before the first of Mansfield"s men joined him there. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 244.] The circ.u.mstantial details given by several officers make the interval between the attack by the Twelfth Corps and the arrival of Sumner a very short one. It may be regarded as probable, therefore, that Hooker"s battle covered the larger part of the time between six o"clock and the arrival of Sumner at about ten.
On reaching the field, Mansfield had a brief consultation with Hooker, resulting in his ordering Williams to form his division nearly as Doubleday"s had been, and to advance with his right upon the turnpike. He himself led forward the left of Crawford"s brigade, which was the first to arrive, and pushed toward the East Wood. The regiments were still in columns of companies, and though Williams had ordered them deployed, the corps commander himself, as Crawford says, countermanded this order and led them under fire in column.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 484.] He evidently believed Ricketts"s men to be still holding the East Wood, and tried to keep his own from opening fire upon the troops that were seen there. At this moment he was mortally wounded, before the deployment was made.
General Alpheus S. Williams, on whom the command devolved, was a cool and experienced officer. He hastened the deployment of Crawford"s and Gordon"s brigades of his own division, sending one of the new and large regiments to a.s.sist the Pennsylvania regiment in holding the important position covering the right beyond the turnpike. As Greene"s division came up, he ordered him to form beyond Gordon"s left, and when deployed to move on the Dunker Church through the East Wood, guiding his left by the cloud of smoke from the Mumma house, which had been set on fire by D. H. Hill"s men.
[Footnote: _Id_., pp. 475, 1033.] At Doubleday"s request, he detached Goodrich"s brigade from Greene, and sent it to Patrick on the right with orders to advance into the West Wood from its northern extremity. Patrick says the regiments came separately and at considerable intervals, [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix.
pt. i. p. 244.] and it is not unlikely that the older regiments were sent in to relieve Hooker"s men as fast as they were ready, and the more disorganized ones were obliged to delay till they could be got into some sort of shape. Williams made his first disposition of his troops according to Hooker"s suggestion, but the latter received a serious wound in the foot, as it would seem, before the attack by the Twelfth Corps had begun. Hooker turned over the command to Meade, and a formal order confirming this was issued from McClellan"s head-quarters later in the day. [Footnote: _Id_., pt.
ii. p. 315.]
So many of the regiments were carried under fire while still in column that not only was the formation of the line an irregular one, but the deployment when made was more diagonal to the turnpike than Hooker"s had been, and the whole line faced more to the westward.
But they advanced with a courage equal to the heroism already shown on that field. The Confederates who now held the open s.p.a.ce at the Dunker Church were Hood"s two brigades, and the rest of Jackson"s corps extended into the West Wood. Stuart had found his artillery position on the hill too far from Jackson"s line, and the fighting was so near the church that he could not fire upon our men without hurting his own. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. i. p. 820.] He therefore moved further to the south and west, and Early carried his brigade (except the Thirteenth Virginia) back toward Ewell"s division, which now came under his command by the disabling of General Lawton in the fight. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 968, 969.]
Williams"s first line was a good deal shortened, and the divisions, guiding as well as they could upon Greene, crowded so far to the south that even Crawford"s brigade, which was on the right of all, went partly through the East Wood advancing on a line nearly at right angles to the turnpike. The enemy had followed Ricketts"s retiring battalions and were again in occupation of the East Wood.
His work was to be done over again, though the stubborn courage of Hood"s depleted brigades could not make up for the numbers which the National officers now led against him. But the rocks, the ledges, and the trees still gave him such cover that it was at a fearful cost that the Twelfth Corps men pushed him steadily back and then by a final rush drove him from the roads which skirted the grove on west and south. What was left of Jackson"s corps except Early"s brigade had come out of the West Wood to meet Crawford"s division, and the stout high fences along the turnpike were the scene of frightful slaughter. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i.
pp. 485, 487.] The Confederates tried to climb them, but the level fire of our troops swept over the field so that the top of the fence seemed in the most deadly line of the leaden storm, and the men in gray fell in windrows along its panels. Our own men were checked by the same obstacle, and lay along the ground shooting between the rails and over the fallen bodies of the Confederate soldiers which made a sort of rampart.
In obedience to his original orders, Greene took ground a little more to his left, occupying a line along a fence from the burning Mumma house to the road leading from the East Wood directly to the Dunker Church. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 505.] The two brigades with thinned ranks barely filled this s.p.a.ce, and Crawford"s division connected with them as well as it could. Batteries came forward on Greene"s left and right, and helped to sweep the grove around the church. Hill attempted to hold him back, and a bold dash was made at Greene, probably by Hill"s left brigades which were ordered forward to support Hood. Greene"s men lay on the ground just under the ridge above the burning house till the enemy were within a few rods of them, then rose and delivered a volley which an eyewitness (Major Crane, Seventh Ohio) says cut them down "like gra.s.s before the mower." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 506.] Those who escaped sought refuge in the wood behind the church, where the crowning ridge is some distance back from the road. Greene now dashed forward and gained the grove immediately about the church, where he held on for an hour or two. Crawford"s division, after several ebbs and flows in the tide of battle, was holding the western skirt of the East wood with one or two of its regiments still close to the turnpike fence on his right.
Meanwhile Goodrich had been trying to advance from the north end of the West Wood to attack the flank of the enemy there; but Early with his own brigade held the ledges along the ravine so stubbornly that he was making little progress.