Greene was calling for support about the Dunker Church, for he was close under the ridge on which Hill and Jackson were forming such line as they could, and he was considerably in advance of our other troops. Williams withdrew one regiment from Goodrich"s brigade and sent it to Greene, and directed Crawford to send also to him the Thirteenth New Jersey, a new and strong regiment which had been left in reserve, as we have seen, in a bit of wood northeast of the field of battle. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 476, 505.] Gordon"s brigade was withdrawn by Crawford to enable it to reorganize in rear of the East Wood, and Crawford"s own brigade held the further margin of it. It will thus be seen that the Twelfth Corps was now divided into three portions,--Greene"s division at the church, Crawford"s in the East Wood, and Goodrich"s brigade near the north end of the West Wood.
Meade had withdrawn the First Corps to the ridge at Poffenberger"s, where it had bivouacked the night before, except that Patrick"s brigade remained in support of Goodrich. The corps had suffered severely, having lost 2470 in killed and wounded, but it was still further depleted by straggling, so that Meade reported less than 7000 men with the colors that evening. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. ii. p. 349.] Its organization had been preserved, however, and the story that it was utterly dispersed was a mistake.
The Twelfth Corps also had its large list of casualties, increased a little later by its efforts to support Sumner, and aggregating, before the day was over, 1746.
But the fighting of Hooker"s and Mansfield"s men, though lacking unity of force and of purpose, had also cost the enemy dear. J. R.
Jones, who commanded Jackson"s division, had been wounded; Starke, who succeeded Jones, was killed; Lawton, who commanded Ewell"s division, was wounded. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. i. p. 956.] Lawton"s and Trimble"s brigades had been fearfully crippled in the first fight against Hooker on the plateau between the Dunker Church and the East Wood, and Hood was sent back to relieve them. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 923.] He, in turn, had been reinforced by the brigades of Ripley, Colquitt, and McRae (Garland"s) from D. H. Hill"s division.
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 1022.] When Greene reached the Dunker Church, therefore, the Confederates on that wing were more nearly disorganized than our own troops. Nearly half their numbers were killed and wounded, and Jackson"s famous "Stonewall" division was so completely broken up that only a handful of men under Colonels Grigsby and Stafford remained, and attached themselves to Early"s command. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 969.] Of the division now under Early, his own brigade was all that retained much strength, and this, posted among the rocks in the West Wood and vigorously supported by Stuart and the artillery on that flank, was all that covered the left of Lee"s army. Could Hooker and Mansfield have attacked together, or, still better, could Sumner"s Second Corps have marched before day and united with the first onset, Lee"s left must inevitably have been crushed long before the Confederate divisions of McLaws, Walker, and A. P. Hill could have reached the field. It is this failure to carry out any intelligible plan which the historian must regard as the unpardonable military fault on the National side. To account for the hours between daybreak and eight o"clock on that morning, is the most serious responsibility of the National commander. [Footnote: A distinguished officer (understood to be Gen. R. R. Dawes) who visited the field in 1866 has published the statement that at the Pry house, where McClellan had his headquarters, he was informed that on the morning of the 17th the general rose at about seven o"clock and breakfasted leisurely after that hour. (Marietta, Ohio, Sentinel.)]
Sumner"s Second Corps was now approaching the scene of action, or rather two divisions of it, Sedgwick"s and French"s, for Richardson"s was still delayed till his place could be filled by Porter"s troops. Although ordered to be ready to move at daybreak, Sumner emphasizes in his report the fact that whilst his command was prepared to move at the time ordered, he "did not receive from headquarters the order to march till 7.20 A. M." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 275.] By the time he could reach the field, Hooker had fought his battle and had been repulsed. The same strange tardiness in sending orders is noticeable in regard to every part of the army, and Richardson was not relieved so that he could follow French till an hour or two later. [Footnote: _Ibid_.]
Sumner advanced, after crossing the Antietam, in a triple column, Sedgwick"s division in front, the three brigades marching by the right flank and parallel to each other. French followed in the same formation. They crossed the Antietam by Hooker"s route, but did not march so far to the northwest as Hooker had done. On the way Sumner met Hooker, who was being carried from the field, and the few words he could exchange with the wounded general were enough to make him feel the need of haste, but not enough to give him any clear idea of the situation. When the centre of the corps was opposite the Dunker Church, and nearly east of it, the change of direction was given; the troops faced to their proper front, and advanced in line of battle in three lines, fully deployed and sixty or seventy yards apart, Sumner himself being in rear of Sedgwick"s first line and near its left. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p.
305.] As they approached the position held by Greene"s division at the church, French kept on so as to form on Greene"s left, [Footnote: _Id_., p. 323.] but Sedgwick, under Sumner"s immediate leading, diverged somewhat to the right, pa.s.sing through the East Wood, crossing the turnpike on the right of Greene and of the Dunker Church, and plunged into the West Wood. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 305.]
The fences there had been destroyed by the Confederates before the battle began, for the purpose of making room for their own manoeuvres as well as to make barricades in front of the cornfield.
Sedgwick"s right did not extend far enough north to be obstructed by the fences where the Twelfth Corps men had lain along them in repulsing Jackson. When he entered the wood, there were absolutely no Confederate troops in front of him. The remnants of Jackson"s men, except Early"s brigade, were cl.u.s.tered at the top of the ridge immediately in front of Greene, and Early was further to the right, opposing Goodrich and Patrick; Early, however, made haste under cover of the woods to pa.s.s around Sedgwick"s right and to get in front of him to oppose his progress. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 970.] This led to a lively skirmishing fight in which Early was making as great a demonstration as possible, but with no chance of solid success.
Sedgwick pushed him back, and his left was coming obliquely into the open at the bottom of the hollow beyond the wood, when, at the very moment, McLaws"s and Walker"s Confederate divisions came upon the field. The former had only just arrived by rapid marching from Shepherdstown beyond the Potomac; the latter had been hastily called away by Lee from his position on the lower Antietam opposite the left wing of Burnside"s Ninth Corps. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 857, 914.]
Walker charged headlong upon the left flank of Sedgwick"s lines, and McLaws, pa.s.sing by Walker"s left, also threw his division diagonally upon the already broken and retreating brigades. Taken at such a disadvantage, these had never a chance; and in spite of the heroic bravery of Sumner and Sedgwick with most of their officers (Sedgwick being severely wounded), the division was driven off to the north with terrible losses, carrying along in their rout Goodrich"s brigade of the Twelfth Corps which had been holding Early at bay.
Goodrich was killed, and his brigade suffered hardly less than the others. Patrick"s brigade of Hooker"s corps was in good order at the rocky ledges north of the West Wood which are at right angles to the turnpike, and he held on stubbornly till the disorganized troops drifted past his left, and then made an orderly retreat in line toward the Poffenberger hill. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 245.] Meade was already there with the remnants of Hooker"s men. Here some thirty cannon of both corps were quickly concentrated, and, supported by everything which retained organization, easily checked the pursuers and repulsed all efforts of Jackson and Stuart to resume the offensive or to pa.s.s between them and the Potomac. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 306.]
Sumner did not accompany the routed troops to this position, but as soon as it was plain that the division could not be rallied, he galloped off to put himself in communication with French and with headquarters of the army and to try to retrieve the situation. From the flag station east of the East Wood he signalled to McClellan, "Reinforcements are badly wanted; our troops are giving way."
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 134.] Williams was in that part of the field, and Sumner sent a staff officer to him ordering that he should push forward to Sedgwick"s support anything he could. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 477.] Williams in person ordered Gordon"s brigade to advance, for this, as we have seen, had been reorganized behind the East Wood. He sent the same order to Crawford for the rest of that division. Crawford had withdrawn his men in the East Wood to let Sedgwick pa.s.s diagonally along his front, and now advanced again to the west margin of the grove. [Footnote: _Id_., p.
485.] Gordon was ahead of him in time and further to the right, and again charged up to the turnpike fences. But the routed troops were already swarming from the wood across his front, and their pursuers were charging after them. Again the turnpike was made the scene of a b.l.o.o.d.y conflict, and the bodies of many more of the slain of both armies were added to those which already lined those fences.
Gordon"s men were overpowered and fell back in the direction they had come. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 495.] The enemy"s attack spread out toward Greene and toward Crawford, who was now at the edge of the East Wood again; but both of these held firm, and a couple of batteries on the rise of ground in front poured canister into the enemy till he took refuge again in the wood beyond the church. It was between nine and ten o"clock, probably about ten, [Footnote: The reports on the Confederate side fix ten o"clock as the time McLaws and Walker reached the field, and corroborate the conclusion I draw from all other available evidence.] when Sumner entered the West Wood, and in fifteen minutes or a little more the one-sided combat was over.
Sumner"s princ.i.p.al attack was made, as I have already indicated, at right angles to that of Hooker. He had thus crossed the line of Hooker"s movement in both the advance and the retreat of the latter.
This led to some misconceptions on Sumner"s part. Crawford"s division had retired to the right and rear to make way for Sedgwick as he came up. It thus happened that Greene"s division was the only part of the Twelfth Corps troops Sumner saw, and he led Sedgwick"s men to the right of these. Ignorant as he necessarily was of what had occurred before, he a.s.sumed that he formed on the extreme right of the Twelfth Corps, and that he fronted in the same direction as Hooker had done. This misconception of the situation led him into another error. He had seen only stragglers and wounded men on the line of his own advance, and hence concluded that Hooker"s Corps was completely dispersed and its division and brigade organizations broken up. He not only gave this report to McClellan at the time, but reiterated it later in his statement before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. [Footnote: C. W., vol. i. p. 368.] The truth was that he had marched westward more than a mile south of the Poffenberger hill where Meade was with the sadly diminished but still organized First Corps, and half that distance south of the Miller farm buildings, near which Goodrich"s brigade had entered the north end of the West Wood, and in front of which part of Williams"s men had held the ground along the turnpike till they were relieved by Sedgwick"s advance. Sedgwick had gone in, therefore, between Greene and Crawford, and the four divisions of the two corps alternated in their order from left to right, thus: French, Greene, Sedgwick, Crawford, the last being Williams"s, of which Crawford was in command.
It was not Sumner"s fault that he was so ill-informed of the actual situation on our right; but it is plain that in the absence of McClellan from that part of the field he should have left the personal leadership of the men to the division commanders, and should himself have found out by rapid examination the positions of all the troops operating there. It was his part to combine and give intelligent direction to the whole, instead of charging forward at haphazard with Sedgwick"s division. Both Meade and Williams had men enough in hand to have joined in a concerted movement with him; and had he found either of those officers before plunging into the West Wood, he would not have taken a direction which left his flank wholly exposed, with the terrible but natural results which followed. The original cause of the mischief, however, was McClellan"s failure to send Sumner to his position before daybreak, so that the three corps could have acted together from the beginning of Hooker"s attack.
But we must return to Sumner"s divisions, which were advancing nearer the centre. The battle on the extreme right was ended by ten o"clock in the morning, and there was no more serious fighting north of the Dunker Church. The batteries on the Poffenberger hill and those about the East Wood swept the open ground and the cornfield over which Hooker and Mansfield had fought, and for some time Greene was able to make good his position at the church. The Confederates were content to hold the line of the West Wood and the high ground back of the church, and French"s attack upon D. H. Hill was now attracting their attention. French advanced toward Greene"s left, over the open farm lands, and after a fierce combat about the Rullett and Clipp farm buildings, drove Hill"s division from them.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 323.] At what time the Confederates made a rush at Greene and drove him back to the edge of the East Wood is uncertain; but it must have been soon after the disaster to Sedgwick. It seems to have been an incident of the aggressive movement against Sedgwick, though not coincident with it.
It must certainly have been before French"s advance reached the Rullett and Clipp houses, for the enemy"s men holding them would have been far in rear of Greene at the church, and he must by that time have been back near the burnt house of Mumma and the angle of the East Wood. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 505.
Greene says that he held the ground at the church for two hours, and that his men were in action from 6.30 A. M. to 1.30 P. M. The length of time and hours of the day are so irreconcilable as given in different reports that we are forced to trust more to the general current of events than to the time stated.]
Richardson"s division followed French after an hour or two, [Footnote: Hanc.o.c.k says the division crossed the Antietam about 9.30. Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 277.] and then, foot by foot, field by field, from fence to fence, and from hill to hill, the enemy was pressed back, till the sunken road, since known as "b.l.o.o.d.y Lane," was in our hands, piled full of the Confederate dead who had defended it with their lives. Richardson had been mortally wounded, and Hanc.o.c.k had been sent from Franklin"s corps to command the division. Colonel Barlow had been conspicuous in the thickest of the fight, and after a series of brilliant actions had been carried off desperately wounded. On the Confederate side equal courage and a magnificent tenacity had been exhibited. Men who had fought heroically in one position no sooner found themselves free from the struggle of an a.s.sault than they were hurried away to repeat their exertions, without even a breathing-spell, on another part of the field. They exhausted their ammunition, and still grimly held crests, as Longstreet tells us, with their bayonets, but without a single cartridge in their boxes. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 840.] The story of the fight at this part of the field is simpler than that of the early morning, for there was no such variety in the character of the ground or in the tactics of the opposing forces. It was a sustained advance with continuous struggle, sometimes ebbing a moment, then gaining, but with the organization pretty well preserved and the lines kept fairly continuous on both sides. Our men fought their way up to the Piper house, near the turnpike, and that position marks the advance made by our centre. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 279.] The crest of the ridge on which the Hagerstown turnpike runs had been secured from Piper"s north to Miller"s, and it was held until the Confederate retreat on the 19th.
The head of Franklin"s Corps (the Sixth) had arrived about ten o"clock, and had taken the position near the Sharpsburg bridge, which Sumner had occupied in the night. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 376.]
Before noon Smith"s and Sloc.u.m"s divisions were both ordered to Sumner"s a.s.sistance. As they pa.s.sed by the farm buildings in front of the East Wood, the enemy made a dash at Greene and French. Smith ordered forward Irwin"s brigade to their support, and Irwin charged gallantly, driving the a.s.sailants back to the cover of the woods about the church. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 402, 409.] Franklin"s men then formed under the crest already mentioned, from "b.l.o.o.d.y Lane" by the Clipp, Rullett, and Mumma houses to the East Wood and the ridge in front. The aggressive energy of both sides seemed exhausted.
French and Richardson"s battle may be considered as ended at one or two o"clock. There was no fighting later but that on the extreme left, where Burnside"s Ninth Corps was engaged, and we must turn our attention to that part of the field.
CHAPTER XVI
ANTIETAM: THE FIGHT ON THE LEFT
Ninth Corps positions near Antietam Creek--Rodman"s division at lower ford--Sturgis"s at the bridge--Burnside"s headquarters on the field--View from his place of the battle on the right--French"s fight--An exploding caisson--Our orders to attack--The hour--Crisis of the battle--Discussion of the sequence of events--The Burnside bridge--Exposed approach--Enfiladed by enemy"s artillery--Disposition of enemy"s troops--His position very strong--Importance of Rodman"s movement by the ford--The fight at the bridge--Repulse--Fresh efforts--Tactics of the a.s.sault--Success--Formation on further bank--Bringing up ammunition--Willc.o.x relieves Sturgis--The latter now in support--Advance against Sharpsburg--Fierce combat--Edge of the town reached--Rodman"s advance on the left--A. P. Hill"s Confederate division arrives from Harper"s Ferry--Attacks Rodman"s flank--A raw regiment breaks--The line retires--Sturgis comes into the gap--Defensive position taken and held--Enemy"s a.s.saults repulsed--Troops sleeping on their arms--McClellan"s reserve--Other troops not used--McClellan"s idea of Lee"s force and plans--Lee"s retreat--The terrible casualty lists.
We have seen that the divisions of the Ninth Corps were conducted by staff officers of Burnside"s staff to positions that had been indicated by McClellan and marked by members of his staff. The morning of Wednesday the 17th broke fresh and fair. The men were astir at dawn, getting breakfast and preparing for a day of battle.
The artillery fire which opened Hooker"s battle on the right spread along the whole line, and the positions which had been a.s.signed us in the dusk of evening were found to be exposed, in some places, to the direct fire of the Confederate guns. Rodman"s division suffered more than the others, Fairchild"s brigade alone reporting thirty-six casualties before they could find cover. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 451.] My own tents had been pitched at the edge of a little grove of forest trees, and the headquarters mess was at breakfast at sunrise when the cannonade began. The rapid explosion of shrapnel about us hastened our morning meal; the tents were struck and loaded upon the wagons, horses were saddled, and everything made ready for the contingencies of the day. It was not till seven o"clock that orders came to advance toward the creek as far as could be done without exposing the men to unnecessary loss.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 424.] Rodman was directed to acquaint himself with the situation of the ford in front of him, and Sturgis to seek the best means of approach to the stone bridge. All were then to remain in readiness to obey further orders.
When these arrangements had been made, I rode to the position Burnside had selected for himself, which was upon a high knoll northeast of the Burnside bridge, near a haystack which was a prominent landmark. Near by was Benjamin"s battery of twenty-pounder Parrotts, and a little further still to the right, on the same ridge, General Sturgis had sent in Durell"s battery. [Footnote: _Ibid_.] These were exchanging shots with the enemy"s guns opposite, and had the advantage in range and weight of metal. At this point I remained until the order for our attack came, later in the day. We anxiously watched what we could see at the right, and noted the effect of the fire of the heavy guns of Benjamin"s battery. We could see nothing distinctly that occurred beyond the Dunker Church, for the East and West Woods with farm-houses and orchards between made an impenetrable screen. A column of smoke stood over the burning Mumma house, marking plainly its situation.
As the morning wore on, we saw lines of troops advancing from our right upon the other side of the Antietam, and engaging the enemy between us and the East Wood. The Confederate lines facing them now also rose into view. From our position we looked, as it were, down between the opposing lines as if they had been the sides of a street, and as the fire opened we saw wounded men carried to the rear and stragglers making off. Our lines halted, and we were tortured with anxiety as we speculated whether our men would charge or retreat. The enemy occupied lines of fences and stone walls, and their batteries made gaps in the National ranks. Our long-range guns were immediately turned in that direction, and we cheered every well-aimed shot. One of our sh.e.l.ls blew up a caisson close to the Confederate line. This contest was going on, and it was yet uncertain which would succeed, when one of McClellan"s staff rode up with an order to Burnside. The latter turned to me, saying we were ordered to make our attack. I left the hill-top at once to give personal supervision to the movement ordered, and did not return to it. My knowledge by actual vision of what occurred on the right ceased.
The question at what hour Burnside received this order, has been warmly disputed. The manner in which we had waited, the free discussion of what was occurring under our eyes and of our relation to it, the public receipt of the order by Burnside in the usual and business-like form, all forbid the supposition that this was any reiteration of a former order.
[Footnote: I leave this as originally written, although the order itself has since come to light; for the discussion of the circ.u.mstantial evidence may be useful in determining the value of McClellan"s report of 1863 where it differs in other respects from his original report of 1862 and from other contemporaneous doc.u.ments.
"HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, September 17, 1862,--9.10 A. M.
MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE: GENERAL,--General Franklin"s command is within one mile and a half of here. General McClellan desires you to open your attack. As soon as you shall have uncovered the upper stone bridge you will be supported, and, if necessary, on your own line of attack. So far all is going well.
Respectfully, GEO. D. RUGGLES, Colonel, etc."
This order appears in the supplementary volume of the Official Records, vol. li. pt. i. p. 844. From Pry"s house, where McClellan"s headquarters were that day, to Burnside"s, was over two miles as the crow flies. This establishes the accuracy of the original reports of both, which stated the hour of receipt at ten o"clock. It corroborates also the time of Franklin"s arrival on the field, and the connection of this with Burnside"s advance.]
If then we can determine whose troops we saw engaged, we shall know something of the time of day; for there has been a general agreement reached as to the hours of movement of Sumner"s divisions during the forenoon on the right and right centre. The official map settles this. No lines of our troops were engaged in the direction of b.l.o.o.d.y Lane and the Rullett farm-house, and between the latter and our station on the hill, till French"s division made its attack. We saw them distinctly on the hither side of the farm buildings, upon the open ground, considerably nearer to us than the Dunker Church or the East Wood. In number we took them to be a corps. The place, the circ.u.mstances, all fix it beyond controversy that they were French"s men or French"s and Richardson"s. No others fought on that part of the field until Franklin went to their a.s.sistance at noon or later.
The incident of their advance and the explosion of the caisson was ill.u.s.trated by the pencil of Mr. Forbes on the spot, and was placed by him at the time Franklin"s head of column was approaching from the direction of Rohrersville, which was about ten o"clock.
[Footnote: Forbes"s sketch is reproduced in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," vol. ii. p. 647, and is of historical importance in connection with the facts stated above.]
It seems now very clear that about ten o"clock in the morning was the great crisis in this battle. The sudden and complete rout of Sedgwick"s division was not easily accounted for, and, with McClellan"s theory of the enormous superiority of Lee"s numbers, it looked as if the Confederate general had ma.s.sed overwhelming forces on our right. Sumner"s notion that Hooker"s corps was utterly dispersed was naturally accepted, and McClellan limited his hopes to holding on at the East Wood and the Poffenberger hill, where Hooker"s batteries were ma.s.sed and supported by the troops that had been rallied there. Franklin"s corps, as it came on the field, was detained to support the threatened right centre, and McClellan determined to help it further by a demonstration upon the extreme left by the Ninth Corps. At this time, therefore, he gave his order to Burnside to cross the Antietam and attack the enemy, thus creating a diversion in favor of our hard-pressed right. His preliminary report of the battle (dated October 16, 1862) explicitly states that the order to Burnside to attack was "communicated to him at ten o"clock A.M." This exactly agrees with the time stated by Burnside in his official report, and would ordinarily be quite conclusive. [Footnote: See note, p. 334, _ante_. C. W., pt. i. p.
41; Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 31, 416.]
In the book published in 1864 as his official report of his whole military career, McClellan says he ordered Burnside to make this attack at eight o"clock. The circ.u.mstances under which his final published statements were made take away from them the character of a calm and judicial correction of his first report. He was then a general set aside from active service and a political aspirant to the Presidency. His book was a controversial one, issued as an argument to the public, and the earlier report must be regarded in a military point of view as the more authoritative unless good grounds are given for the changes. When he wrote his preliminary report he certainly knew the hour and the condition of affairs on the field when he gave the order to Burnside. To do so at eight o"clock would not accord with his plan of battle. [Footnote: _Id_., pp. 30, 55.]
His purpose had been to move the Ninth Corps against the enemy "when matters looked favorably" on our right, after an attack by Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner, supported, if necessary, by Franklin. But Sumner"s attack was not made till after nine, and Franklin"s head of column did not reach the field till ten. McClellan"s book, indeed, erroneously postpones Franklin"s arrival till past noon, which, if true, would tend to explain why the day wore away without any further activity on the right; but the preliminary report better agrees with Franklin"s when it says that officer reached the field about an hour after Sedgwick"s disaster. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. pp. 30, 61, 376.]
Still further, matters had at no time "looked favorably" on the right up to ten o"clock. The condition, therefore, which was a.s.sumed as precedent to Burnside"s movement, never existed; and this was better known to McClellan than to any one else, for he received the first discouraging reports after Mansfield fell, and the subsequent alarming ones when Sedgwick was routed. Burnside"s report was dated on the 30th of September, within two weeks of the battle, and at a time when public discussion of the incomplete results of the battle was animated. It was made after he had in his hands my own report as his immediate subordinate, in which I had given about nine o"clock as my remembrance of the time. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 424.] As I directed the details of the action at the bridge in obedience to this order, it would have been easy for him to have accepted the hour named by me, for I should have been answerable for any delay in execution after that time. But he then had in his possession the order which came to him upon the hill-top overlooking the field, and no officer in the whole army has a better established reputation for candor and freedom from any wish to avoid full personal responsibility for his acts. It was not till his report was published in the Official Records (1887) [Footnote: _Id_., p. 416.]
that I saw it or learned its contents, although I enjoyed his personal friendship down to his death. He was content to have stated the fact as he knew it, and did not feel the need of debating it.
The circ.u.mstances have satisfied me that his accuracy in giving the hour was greater than my own. [Footnote: Upon reflection, I think it probable that the order from McClellan was read to me, and that I thus got the hour of its date connected in my mind with the beginning of our attack.]
It will not be wondered at, therefore, if to my mind the story of the eight o"clock order is an instance of the way in which an erroneous recollection is based upon the desire to make the facts accord with a theory. The actual time must have been as much later than nine o"clock as the period during which, with absorbed attention, we had been watching the battle on the right,--a period, it is safe to say, much longer than it seemed to us. The judgment of the hour which I gave in my report was merely my impression from pa.s.sing events, for I hastened at once to my own duties without thinking to look at my watch; whilst the c.u.mulative evidence seems to prove, conclusively, that the time stated by Burnside, and by McClellan himself in his original report, is correct. The order, then, to Burnside to attack was not sent at eight o"clock, but reached him at ten; it was not sent to follow up an advantage gained by Hooker and Sumner, but to create, if possible, a strong diversion in favor of the imperilled right wing when the general outlook was far from rea.s.suring.
McClellan truly said, in his original report, that the task of carrying the bridge in front of Burnside was a difficult one.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 31.] The hill on which I have placed the station of General Burnside was the bolder and more prominent crest of the line of hills which skirted the Antietam on the east, and was broken by depressions here and there, through which the country roads ran down to the stream. Such a hollow was just at the south of Burnside"s position at the haystack on the Rohrback farm. In rear of him and a little lower down were the farm buildings, and from these a road ran down the winding hollow to the Antietam, but reached the stream several hundred yards below the bridge. Following the road, therefore, it was necessary to turn up stream upon the narrow s.p.a.ce between the hills and the water, without any cover from the fire of the enemy on the opposite side. The bluffs on that side were wooded to the water"s edge, and were so steep that the road from the bridge could not go up at right angles to the bank, but forked both ways and sought the upper land by a more gradual ascent to right and left. The fork to the right ran around a shoulder of the hill into a ravine which there reaches the Antietam, and thence ascends by an easy grade toward Sharpsburg.
The left branch of the road rises by a similar but less marked depression.
These roads were faced by stone fences, and the depth of the valley and its course made it impossible to reach the enemy"s position at the bridge by artillery fire from the hill-tops on our side. Not so from the enemy"s position, for the curve of the valley was such that it was perfectly enfiladed near the bridge by the Confederate batteries at the position now occupied by the National Cemetery. The bridge itself was a stone structure of three arches with stone parapets on the sides. These curved outward at the end of the bridge to allow for the turn of the roadway. On the enemy"s side, the stone fences came down close to the bridge.
The Confederate defence of the pa.s.sage was intrusted to D. R.
Jones"s division of six brigades, [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xix. pt. i. p. 804.] which was the one Longstreet himself had disciplined and led till he was a.s.signed to a larger command.
Toombs"s brigade was placed in advance, occupying the defences of the bridge itself and the wooded slopes above, while the other brigades supported him, covered by the ridges which looked down upon the valley. The division batteries were supplemented by others from the enemy"s reserve, and the valley, the bridge, and the ford below were under the direct and powerful fire of shot and sh.e.l.l from the Confederate cannon. Toombs"s force, thus strongly supported, was as large as could be disposed of at the head of the bridge, and abundantly large for resistance to any that could be brought against it. Our advance upon the bridge could only be made by a narrow column, showing a front of eight men at most; but the front which Toombs deployed behind his defences was three or four hundred yards both above and below the bridge. He himself says in his report: [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xix. pt. i. p. 890.] "From the nature of the ground on the other side, the enemy were compelled to approach mainly by the road which led up the river near three hundred paces parallel with my line of battle and distant therefrom from fifty to a hundred and fifty feet, thus exposing his flank to a destructive fire the most of that distance." Under such circ.u.mstances the Confederate position was nearly impregnable against a direct attack over the bridge; for the column approaching it was not only exposed at almost pistol-range to the perfectly covered infantry of the enemy and to two batteries which were a.s.signed to the special duty of supporting Toombs, having the exact range of the little valley with their shrapnel; but, if it should succeed in reaching the bridge, its charge across it must be made under a fire ploughing through its length, the head of the column melting away as it advanced, so that, as every soldier knows, it could show no front strong enough to make an impression upon the enemy"s breastworks, even if it should reach the other side. As a desperate sort of diversion in favor of the right wing, it might be justifiable; but I believe that no officer or man who knew the actual situation at that bridge thinks that a serious attack upon it was any part of McClellan"s original plan. Yet, in his detailed report of 1863, instead of speaking of it as the difficult task the original report had called it, he treats it as little different from a parade or march across which might have been done in half an hour.
Burnside"s view of the matter was that the front attack at the bridge was so difficult that the pa.s.sage by the ford below must be an important factor in the task; for if Rodman"s division should succeed in getting across there, at the bend of the Antietam, he would come up in rear of Toombs, and either the whole of D. R.
Jones"s division would have to advance to meet Rodman, or Toombs must abandon the bridge. In this I certainly concurred, and Rodman was ordered to push rapidly for the ford. It is important to remember, however, that Walker"s Confederate division had been posted during the earlier morning to hold that part of the Antietam line, supporting Toombs as well, [Footnote: Official Records, vol.