If they choose, the managers of any private corporation could exert a greater and more injurious political influence than these State trustees.
If the power is dangerous in State trustees, who must be selected by your Governor, it is far more dangerous in the hands of persons elected by stockholders of a private, money-making corporation, whose interests are in direct antagonism to the interests of the public.
This argument applies to corporate management only with a much greater force. Let corporate management be unmasked and it would make State management hide its face with shame. (See extract New York State Committee on Erie.)
"If the principle is to be established that a few interested parties of stock-jobbers, having no permanent interest, can, by the corrupt use of money or by violence, take and hold possession of a great railroad corporation, and reimburse themselves out of its treasury, it is time the matter was understood by the public. As to the payment of money to influence legislation connected with said company, or other irregularities, the testimony was enough to show that the railroad companies have been in the habit of expending large sums from year to year, either to secure or defeat the pa.s.sage of bills. It appears conclusive that a large amount, reported by one witness at $100,000, was appropriated for legislative purposes by the railroad interest in 1872, and that $30,000 was the Erie"s portion. In this connection the committee denounce the lobby roundly. It is further in evidence that it has been the custom of the managers of the Erie Railroad from year to year in the past to expend large sums to control elections and to influence legislation. In 1868 more than one million dollars was disbursed from the treasury for "extra and legal services." What the Erie has done, other great corporations are doubtless doing from year to year. We have here simply an acknowledgment, of the fact. Combined as they are, the power of the great moneyed corporations of this country are a standing menace to the liberties of the people. The railroad lobby flaunts its ill-gotten gains in the faces of our legislators, and in all our politics the debasing effect of its influence is felt."
This cry of political corruption against State management is but the resurrection of the old party ghost which has always been retained in the service of all political parties to frighten people that are naturally timid and conservative; and this terrible spectre has often been the means of delaying and defeating enterprises that were for the best interests of the people.
I remember, Mr. President, when this ghost was exhibited by the Democratic party in every town in this State; and the people were made to believe that the loan made by the State to the Boston and Albany (Western) Railroad would ruin the State; that every man"s farm was mortgaged at nine dollars per acre; and men believed it, for that was in times when the people followed party leaders through faith; when it was said that the true test of the political faith of a New Hampshire Democrat was to wake him up with the inquiry, "Who made you?" and if he answered promptly, "Isaac Hill, sir," he was to be trusted as one of the faithful.
The effect of this great outcry was to destroy confidence in the enterprise and the stock at one time could not be _given_ away for fear of a.s.sessments. And if the people at that time could have been guaranteed that the loss of the State should not exceed the four million loaned, they would have gladly given another million as a guarantee. But they could not rid themselves of the supposed burden, and the result has been the development of a great enterprise in the interests of the State in spite of their fears. This was in a measure to the credit of State management.
As to the efficiency of the plan, it remains to be tried; but in the language of the minority report we believe such a management would be efficient and reliable beyond that of ordinary railroad corporations.
It combines State control with corporate management.
The Governor and Council could be depended upon to appoint suitable persons as trustees. The railroad corporations would naturally appoint their most efficient agents as trustees. Such a board could find no difficulty in securing the services of the ablest railroad officers to direct and aid in the management.
As the plan has no precedent it cannot be judged from the record, and the prejudice existing against State management cannot fairly apply to this plan; but if it could have a fair trial we have no doubt of its efficiency and success; and we are not alone in this opinion, for this plan has received the full endors.e.m.e.nt of eminent railroad managers, successful and prominent manufacturers and merchants, and the Chairman of the Railroad Commissioners, together with many of our most enterprising and conservative citizens.
STATE PENSIONERS.
It is urged that the plan proposed creates a large cla.s.s of state pensioners to whom the revenues of the treasury are pledged. They are State pensioners in the same sense as any individual who leases property to the State for a fixed rent, is a State pensioner. Every railroad charter contains a provision for the acquisition of the corporate property by the State, by payment of its presumed value. As well say that all these charters are pension bills.
The minority bill simply provides that stockholders yielding their property to the State, shall have a remuneration for the property surrendered. It makes little difference to the individual whether his compensation comes in the form of the payment of a fixed sum or of an annual annuity. It does make some difference to the State, whether it increases a debt to payoff these stockholders at once, or pays such interest as the property acquired may be fairly presumed to earn. The guarantee does not exceed the dividends which the property may be expected to earn, and the advantage which a lease gives over a purchase by avoiding the transfer and changing of capital should not be overlooked.
In a word, these stockholders are pensioners only in the sense that they become ent.i.tled to secure annuities from the State for which they pay beforehand a full equivalent into the treasury.
THE BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED PLAN.
It makes absolutely certain the perpetual control of the Tunnel for the benefit of the people of the whole State.
It secures to the people by whose money it has been built, the ultimate value of the enterprise, whatever that value may prove to be.
It secures to the people an independent Western line, to be managed for the benefit of the people, free from any danger of combinations by which rates are fixed.
It secures to all corporations desiring to use the Tunnel, equal rights.
It secures a line stronger than any other, amply able to provide equipment and facilities, and to compete with powerful corporations in neighboring States.
It fixes the capital of the corporation without danger of inflation, and without risk of speculative control.
It enables the people to try fairly the experiment of cheap transportation.
It provides equally with the plan of the majority for the interchange of depots, by which the crossings at the north side of the city may be avoided.
If only one-half of these advantages can be gained the experiment is worth trying. If it succeeds and our expectations are fully realized, it will confer upon the people the greatest boon since the introduction of railroads.
Senators will bear me witness that I have never solicited their vote on any personal consideration, and in the decision of this great question, I can only appeal to you as legislators to record your votes in accordance with your convictions of duty to the people of this Commonwealth, and for the protection of her six hundred millions of industrial interests; unbiased by any local or personal interest, keeping in mind that there is no power but that of the State that is safe to trust in the great exigency that now exists.