(Lavoisier). Sceptical philosophers could, however, raise certain objections to either of these fundamental laws with as much success as against their combination into the single superior law of the "conservation of substance." As a matter of fact, dualistic philosophy still attempts to raise such objections, often under the guise of cautious criticism. The sceptical (in part also purely dogmatic) objections have a semblance of justification only in so far as they relate to the fundamental problem of substance, the primary question as to the connection between matter and energy. While freely recognising the presence of this real "boundary of natural knowledge," we can yet, within this boundary, apply quite universally the "mechanical law of causality."
The complicated "phenomena of mind," as they are called (more especially consciousness), fall under the "law of the conservation of substance"
just as strictly as do the simpler mechanical processes of nature dealt with in inorganic physics and chemistry. Compare note 16.]
[Footnote 8: _Kant and Monism_.
As recent German philosophy has in a large measure returned to Kant, and in some cases even deified as "infallible" the great Konigsberg philosopher, it may be well here to point out once more that his system of critical philosophy is a mixture of monistic and dualistic ingredients. His critical principles of the theory of knowledge will always remain of fundamental importance: his proof that we are unable to know the essential and profoundest essence of substance, the "thing in itself" (or "the combination of matter and energy"); that our knowledge remains subjective in its nature; that it is conditioned by the organisation of our brain and sensory organs, and can therefore only deal with the phenomena which our experience of the outer world affords us.
But within these "limits of human knowledge" a positive monistic knowledge of nature is still possible, in contrast to all dualistic and metaphysical fantasies. One such great fact of monistic knowledge was the mechanical cosmogony of Kant and Laplace, the "Essay on the Const.i.tution and Mechanical Origin of the Universe, according to the Principles of Newton" (1755). In the whole field of our knowledge of inorganic nature, Kant held firmly to the monistic point of view, allowing mechanism alone as the real explanation of the phenomena. In the science of organic nature also, on the other hand, he held monism to be valid indeed, yet insufficient; here he considered it necessary to call in the aid of final as well as of efficient causes. (_Cf_. the fifth lecture of my _Natural History of Creation_ on "The Evolution-Theory of Kant and Lamarck"; also Albrecht Rau"s _Kant und die Naturforschung: Eine Prufung der Resultate des idealistischen Kritikismus durch den realistischen Kosmos_, vol. ii., 1886.) Once thus on the downgrade of dualistic teleology, Kant afterwards arrived at his untenable metaphysical views of "G.o.d, Freedom, and Immortality." It is probable that Kant would have escaped these errors if he had had a thorough anatomical and physiological training. The natural sciences were, indeed, at that time truly in their infancy. I am firmly convinced that Kant"s system of critical philosophy would have turned out quite otherwise from what it was, and purely monistic, if he had had at his disposal the then unsuspected treasures of empirical natural knowledge which we now possess.]
[Footnote 9: _The Ether_.
In a thoughtful lecture on the relations between light and electricity at the sixty-second Congress of German naturalists and physicians in Heidelberg in 1889, Heinrich Hertz explains the scope of his brilliant discovery: "Thus the domain of electricity extends over the whole of nature. It comes nearer to ourselves; we learn that we actually possess an electric organ, the eye. Here we are brought face to face with the question as to unmediated _actio in distans_. Is there such a thing? Not far off from this, in another direction, lies the question of the nature of electricity. And immediately connected therewith arises the momentous and primary question as to the nature of the ether, of the properties of the medium that fills all s.p.a.ce, its structure, its rest or motion, its infinitude or finitude. It becomes every day more manifest that this question rises above all others, that a knowledge of what the ether is would reveal to us not only the nature of the old "imponderables," but also of the old "matter" itself and its most essential properties, weight and inertia. Modern physics is not far from the question whether everything that exists is not created from the ether." This question is already being answered in the affirmative by some monistic physicists, as, for example, by J. G. Vogt in his most suggestive work on _The Nature of Electricity and Magnetism_, on _The Basis of the Conception of a Single Substance_ (Leipsic, 1891). He regards the atoms of ma.s.s (the primal atoms of the kinetic theory of matter) as individualised centres of concentration of the continuous substance that uninterruptedly fills all s.p.a.ce; the mobile elastic part of this substance between the atoms, and universally distributed, is--the ether. Georg Helm in Dresden, on the basis of mathematico-physical experiments, had already at an earlier date arrived at the same conclusions; in his treatise on "Influences at a Distance mediated by the Ether" (_Annalen der Physik und Chemie_, 1881, Bd. xiv.), he shows that it requires only the postulate of one particular kind of matter, the ether, to explain influence at a distance and radiation; that is, as regards these phenomena, all the qualities ascribable to matter, except that of motion, are of no account; in other words, that in thinking of the ether we simply require to think of it as "the mobile."]
[Footnote 10: _Atoms and Elements_.
The evidences, numerous and important, for the composite nature of our empirical elements, have lately been compendiously discussed by Gustav Wendt in his treatise, _Die Entwicklung der Elemente: Entwurf zu einer biologischen Grundlage fur Chemie und Physik_[I] (Berlin, 1891); compare also Wilhelm Freyer"s _Die organischen Elemente und ihre Stellung im System_[II] (Wiesbaden, 1891), Victor Meyer"s _Chemische Probleme der Gegenwart_[III] (Heidelberg, 1890), and W. Crookes"s _Genesis of the Elements_. For the different views as to the nature of the atom, see Philip Spiller on "The Doctrines of Atoms" in _Die Urkraft des Weltalls nach ihrem Wesen und Wirken auf allen Naturgebieten[IV]_ (Berlin, 1886), (1. The philosophy of nature; 2. The doctrine of the ether; 3. The ethical side of the science of nature). For the const.i.tution of the elements out of atoms, see A. Turner, Die Kraft und Ma.s.se im Raume[V]
(Leipsic, 3rd ed., 1886), (1. On the nature of matter and its relationships; 2. Atomic combinations; 3. The nature of the molecules and their combinations. Theory of crystallisation).
Note I "The Development of the Elements: an Essay towards a Biological Basis for Chemistry and Physics."
Note II "The Organic Elements and their Place in the System."
Note III "Chemical Problems of the Day."
Note IV "The Primary Force of the Universe, its Nature and Action."
Note V "Force and Matter in s.p.a.ce."]
[Footnote 11: _World-Substance_.
The relation of the two fundamental const.i.tuents of the cosmos, ether and ma.s.s, may perhaps be made apparent, in accordance with one out of many hypotheses, by the following, partly provisional, scheme.]
World (=Substance=Cosmos).]
(Nature as knowable by Man.)]
Ether (="spirit") (mobile Ma.s.s (="body") (inert or or active substance). pa.s.sive substance).
Property of Vibration. Property of Inertia.]
Chief Functions: Electricity, Chief Functions: Gravity, Magnetism, Light, Heat. Inertia, Chemical Affinity.
Structure: dynamical; Structure: atomic, discontinuous, continuous, elastic substance, inelastic substance, not composed of atoms (?) composed of atoms (?)]
Theosophical: "G.o.d the Theosophical: "Created Creator" (always in motion). world" (pa.s.sively formed).]
"Influence of s.p.a.ce." "Products of s.p.a.ce condensation."]
[Footnote 12: _General doctrine of Evolution_.
The fundamental importance of the modern doctrine of evolution, and of the monistic philosophy based upon it, is clearly evidenced by the steady increase of its copious literature. I have cited the most important treatises on this subject in the new (eighth) edition of my _Natural History of Creation_ (1889). Compare, specially, Carus Sterne (Ernst Krause), _Werden und Vergehen: Eine Entwicklungsgeschichte des Naturganzen in gemeinverstandlicher Fa.s.sung_[VI] (3rd ed., Berlin, 1886); Hugo Spitzer, _Beitrage zur Descendenztheorie und zur Methodologie der Naturwissenschaft_ (Graz, 1886);[VII] Albrecht Ran, _Ludwig Feuerbach"s Philosophie der Naturforschung und die philosophische Kritik der Gegenwart_ (Leipsic, 1882);[VIII] Hermann Wolff, _Kosmos: Die Weltentwicklung nach monitisch-psychologischen Principien auf Grundlage der exacten Naturforschung_ (Leipsic, 1890).[IX]
Note VI "Growth and Decay: a Popular History of the Development of the Cosmos."
Note VII "Contributions towards a Theory of Descent, and towards a Methodology of the Sciences of Nature."
Note VIII "Ludwig Feuerbach"s Philosophy of Science, and the Philosophical Criticism of the Present Time."
Note IX "Cosmos: The Development of the Cosmos according to Monistic Principles on the Basis of Exact Science."]
[Footnote 13: _History of Descent_.
The idea and the task of phylogeny, or the history of descent, I first defined in 1866, in the sixth book of my _General Morphology_ (_vol_. ii.
pp. 301-422), and the substance of this, as well as an account of its relation to ontogeny or history of development, is set forth in a popular form in Part II. of my _Natural History of Creation_ (8th ed., Berlin, 1889). A special application of both these divisions of the history of evolution to man, is attempted in my _Anthropogenie_ (4th ed.), revised and enlarged, 1891: Part I. History of development. Part II. History of descent.]
[Footnote 14: _Opponents of the Doctrine of Descent_.
Since the death of Louis Aga.s.siz (1873), Rudolf Virchow is regarded as the sole noteworthy opponent of Darwinism and the theory of descent; he never misses an opportunity (as recently in Moscow) of opposing it as "unproved hypothesis." See as to this my pamphlet, _Freedom in Science and in Teaching_, a reply to Virchow"s address at Munich on "Freedom of Science in the Modern State" (Stuttgart, 1878; Eng. tr., 1892).]
[Footnote 15: _Cellular Psychology_.
See on this my paper on "Cell-souls and Soul-cells," in the _Deutsche Rundschau_ (July 1878), reprinted in Part 1, of _Collected Popular Lectures_; also "The Cell-soul and Cellular Psychology" in my discourse on _Freedom in Science and Teaching_ (Stuttgart, 1878; Eng. tr., 1892, p.
46); _Natural History of Creation_ (8th ed., pp. 444, 777); and _Descent of Man_ (4th ed., pp. 128, 147). See also, Max Verworn, _Psycho-physiologische Protisten-Studien_ (Jena, 1889), and Paul Carus, _The Soul of Man: An Investigation of the Facts of Physiological and Experimental Psychology_ (Chicago, 1891). Among recent attempts to reform psychology on the basis of evolutionary doctrine in a monistic sense, special mention must be made of Georg Heinrich Schneider"s _Der thierische Wille: Systematische Darstellung und Erklarung der thierischen Triebe und deren Entstehung, Entwickelung und Verbreitung im Thierreiche als Grundlage zu einer vergleichenden Willenslehre_[X] (Leipsic, 1880).
Compare also his supplementary work, ent.i.tled _Der menschliche Wille vom Standpunkte der neuen Entwickelungstheorie_[XI] (1882); also the _Psychology of Herbert Spencer_ and the new edition of Wilhelm Wundt"s _Menschen-und Thierseele[XII]_ (Leipsic, 1892).
Note X "Will in the Lower Animals: a Systematic Exposition and Explanation of Animal Instincts, and their Origin, Development, and Difference in the Animal Kingdom, as Basis of a Comparative Doctrine of Volition."
Note XI "The Human Will from the Standpoint of the Modern Theory of Evolution."
Note XII "Soul in Man and Brute."
[Footnote 16: _Consciousness_.
The antiquated view of Du Bois-Reymond (1872)--that human consciousness is an unsoluble "world-riddle," a transcendent phenomenon in essential ant.i.thesis to all other natural phenomena--continues to be upheld in numerous writings. It is chiefly on this that the dualistic view of the world founds its a.s.sertion, that man is an altogether peculiar being, and that his personal soul is immortal; and this is the reason why the "Leipsic ignorabimus-speech" of Du Bois-Reymond has for twenty years been prized as a defence by all representatives of the mythological view of the world, and extolled as a refutation of "monistic dogma." The closing word of the discourse, "ignorabimus," was translated as a present, and this "ignoramus" taken to mean that "we know nothing at all"; or, even worse, that "we can never come to clearness about anything, and any further talk about the matter is idle." The famous "ignorabimus" address remains certainly an important rhetorical work of art; it is a "beautiful sermon," characterised by its highly-finished form and its surprising variety of philosophico-scientific pictures. It is well known, however, that the majority (and especially women) judge a "beautiful sermon" not according to the value of the thoughts embodied in it, but according to its excellence as an aesthetical entertainment. While Du Bois treats his audience at great length to disquisitions on the wondrous performances of the genius of Laplace, he afterwards glides over, the most important part of his subject in eleven short lines, and makes not the slightest further attempt to solve the main question he has to deal with--as to whether the world is really "doubly incomprehensible." For my own part, on the contrary, I have already repeatedly sought to show that the two limits to our knowledge of nature are one and the same; the fact of consciousness and the relation of consciousness to the brain are to us not less, but neither are they more, puzzling, than the fact of seeing and hearing, than the fact of gravitation, than the connection between matter and energy. Compare my discourse on _Freedom in Science and Teaching_ (1878), pp. 78, 82, etc.]
[Footnote 17: _Immortality_.
Perhaps in no ecclesiastical article of faith is the gross materialistic conception of Christian dogma so evident as in the cherished doctrine of personal immortality, and that of "the resurrection of the body,"
a.s.sociated with it. As to this, Savage, in his excellent work on _Religion in the Light of the Darwinian Doctrine_, has well remarked: "One of the standing accusations of the Church against science is that it is materialistic. On this I would like to point out, in pa.s.sing, that the whole Church-conception concerning a future life has always been, and still is, the purest materialism. It is represented that the material body is to rise again, and inhabit a material heaven." Compare also Ludwig Buchner, _Das zunkunftige Leben und die moderne Wissenschaft_ (Leipsic, 1889); Lester Ward, "Causes of Belief in Immortality" (_The Forum_, vol. VIII., September 1889); and Paul Carus, _The Soul of Man: an Investigation of the Facts of Physiological and Experimental Psychology_ (Chicago, 1891). Carus aptly points out the a.n.a.logy between the ancient and the modern ideas with respect to light, and with respect to the soul.
Just as formerly the luminous flame was explained by means of a special fiery matter (_phlogiston_), so the thinking soul was explained by the hypothesis of a peculiar gaseous soul-substance. We now know that the light of the flame is a sum of electric vibrations of the ether, and the soul a sum of plasma-movements in the ganglion-cells. As compared with this scientific conception, the doctrine of immortality of scholastic psychology has about the same value as the materialistic conceptions of the Red Indian about a future life in Schiller"s "Nadowessian Death-Song."]
[Footnote 18: _Monistic Ethic_.
All Ethic, the theoretical as well as the practical doctrine of morals, as a "science of law" (_Normwissenschaft_), stands in immediate connection with the view that is taken of the world (_Weltanschauung_), and consequently with religion. This position I regard as exceedingly important, and have recently upheld in a paper on "Ethik und Weltanschauung," in opposition to the "Society for Ethical Culture"
lately founded in Berlin, which would teach and promote ethics without reference to any view of the world or to religion. (Compare the new weekly journal, _Die Zukunft_, edited by Maximilian Harden, Berlin, 1892, Nos. V.-VII.). Just as I take the monistic to be the only rational basis for all science, I claim the same also for ethics. On this subject compare especially the ethical writings of Herbert Spencer and those of B. von Carneri--_Sittlichkeit und Darwinismus_ (1871); _Entwickelung und Gluckseligkeit_ (1886); and more particularly, the latest of all, _Der moderne Mensch_ (Bonn, 1891); further, Wilhelm Streeker, _Welt und Menschheit_ (Leipsic, 1892); Harald Hoffding, _Die Grundlage der humanen Ethik_ (Bonn, 1880); and the recent large work of Wilhelm Wundt, _Ethik, eine Untersuchung der Thatsachen und Gesetze des sittlichen Lebens_ (Stuttgart, 2nd ed., 1892).]
[Footnote 19: _h.o.m.otheism_.
Under the term h.o.m.otheism (or anthropomorphism) we include all the various forms of religious belief which ascribe to a personal G.o.d purely human characteristics. However variously these anthropomorphic ideas may have shaped themselves in dualistic and pluralistic religions, all in common retain the unworthy conception that G.o.d (_Theos_) and man (_h.o.m.o_) are organised similarly and according to the same type (h.o.m.otype). In the region of poetry such personifications are both pleasing and legitimate.
In the region of science they are quite inadmissible; they are doubly objectionable now that we know that only in late Tertiary times was man developed from pithecoid mammals. Every religious dogma which represents G.o.d as a "spirit" in human form, degrades Him to a "gaseous vertebrate"
(_General Morphology_, 1866; Chap, x.x.x., G.o.d in Nature). The expression "h.o.m.otheism" is ambiguous and etymologically objectionable, but more practical than the c.u.mbersome word "Anthropotheism."]