In Chapter VII., he therefore directly compares the various kinds of enjoyment and misery, in order to know what of the first must be surrendered, and what of the second endured, in aiming at highest attainable happiness. Pleasures the same in kind are preferable, according as they are more intense and enduring; of a different kind, as they are more enduring and dignified, a fact decided at once by our immediate sense of dignity or worth. In the great diversity of tastes regarding pleasures, he supposes the ultimate decision as to the value of pleasures to rest with the possessors of finer perceptive powers, but adds, that good men are the best judges, because possessed of fuller experience than the vicious, whose tastes, senses, and appet.i.tes have lost their natural vigour through one-sided indulgence. He then goes through the various pleasures, depreciating the pleasures of the palate on the positive side, and s.e.xual pleasure as transitory and enslaving when pursued for itself; the sensual enjoyments are, notwithstanding, quite proper within due limits, and then, perhaps, are at their highest. The pleasures of the _imagination_, knowledge, &c., differ from the last in not being preceded by an uneasy sensation to be removed, and are clearly more dignified and endurable, being the proper exercise of the soul when it is not moved by the affections of social virtue, or the offices of rational piety. The _sympathetic_ pleasures are very extensive, very intense, and may be of very long duration; they are superior to all the foregoing, if there is a hearty affection, and are at their height along with the feeling of universal good will.
_Moral_ Enjoyments, from the consciousness of good affections and actions, when by close reflexion we have attained just notions of virtue and merit, rank highest of all, as well in dignity as in duration. The pleasures of _honour_, when our conduct is approved, are also among the highest, and when, as commonly happens, they are conjoined with the last two cla.s.ses, it is the height of human bliss.
The pleasures of _mirth_, such as they are, fall in best with virtue, and so, too, the pleasures of _wealth_ and _power_, in themselves unsatisfying. Anger, malice, revenge, &c., are not without their uses, and give momentary pleasure as removing an uneasiness from the subject of them; but they are not to be compared with the sympathetic feelings, because their effects cannot long be regarded with satisfaction. His general conclusion is, that as the highest personal satisfaction is had in the most benevolent dispositions, the same course of conduct is recommended alike by the two great determinations of our nature, towards our own good and the good of others. He then compares the several sorts of pain, which, he says, are not necessarily in the proportion of the corresponding pleasures. Allowing the great misery of bodily pain, he yet argues that, at the worst, it is not to be compared for a moment to the pain of the worst wrong-doing. The imagination, great as are its pleasures, cannot cause much pain. The sympathetic and moral pains of remorse and infamy are the worst of all.
In Chapter VIII. the various Tempers and Characters are compared in point of happiness or misery. Even the private affections, in due moderation, promote the general good; but that system is the best possible where, along with this, the generous affections also promote private good. No natural affection is absolutely evil; the evil of excess in narrow generous affection lies in the want of proportion; in calm extensive good-will there can be no excess. The social and moral enjoyments, and those of honour, being the highest, the affections and actions that procure them are the chief means of happiness; amid human mischances, however, they need support from a trust in Providence. The unkind affections and pa.s.sions (anger, &c.) are uneasy even when innocent, and never were intended to become permanent dispositions. The narrow kind of affections are all that can be expected from the majority of men, and are very good, if only they are not the occasion of unjust partiality to some, or, worse, ill-grounded aversion to others. The rest of the chapter is taken up in painting the misery of the selfish pa.s.sions when in excess--love of life, sensual pleasure, desire of power, glory, and ease. He has still one "object of affection to every rational mind" that he must deal with before he is done with considering the question of highest happiness. This is the Deity, or the Mind that presides in the Universe.
Chapter IX., at great length, discusses the first part of the subject--the framing of primary ideas regarding the Divine Nature. He proves the existence of an original mind from design, &c., in the world; he then finds this mind to be benevolent, on occasion of which he has to deal with the great question of Evil, giving reasons for its existence, discovering its uses, narrowing its range as compared with good, and finally reducing it by the consideration and proof of immortality; he ends by setting forth the other attributes of G.o.d--providence, holiness, justice, &c.
In Chapter X., he considers the Affections, Duty, and Worship to be exercised towards G.o.d. The moral sense quite specially enjoins worship of the Deity, internal and external; internal by love and trust and grat.i.tude, &c., external by prayer, praise, &c. [He seems to ascribe to prayer nothing beyond a subjective efficacy.] In the acknowledgment of G.o.d is highest happiness, and the highest exercise of the moral faculty.
In Chapter XI., he closes the whole book with remarks on the Supreme Happiness of our Nature, which he makes to consist in the perfect exercise of the n.o.bler virtues, especially love and resignation to G.o.d, and of all the inferior virtues consistent with the superior; also in external prosperity, so far as virtue allows. The moral sense, and the truest regard for our own interest, thus recommend the same course as the calm, generous determination; and this makes up the supreme cardinal virtue of Justice, which includes even our duties to G.o.d.
Temperance in regard to sensual enjoyments, Fort.i.tude as against evils, and Prudence, or Consideration, in regard to everything that solicits our desires, are the other virtues; all subservient to Justice. In no station of life are men shut out from the enjoyment of the supreme good.
Book II. is a deduction of the more special laws of nature and duties of life, so far as they follow from the course of life shown above to be recommended by G.o.d and nature as most lovely and most advantageous; all advent.i.tious states or relations among men aside. The three first chapters are of a general nature.
In Chapter I., he reviews the circ.u.mstances that increase the moral good or evil of actions. Virtue being primarily an affair of the will or affections, there can be no imputation of virtue or vice in action, unless a man is free and able to act; the necessity and impossibility, as grounds of non-imputation, must, however, have been in no way brought about by the agent himself. In like manner, he considers what effects and consequents of his actions are imputable to the agent; remarking, by the way, that the want of a proper degree of good affections and of solicitude for the public good is morally evil. He then discusses the bearing of ignorance and error, vincible and invincible, and specially the case wherein an erroneous conscience extenuates. The difficulty of such cases, he says, are due to ambiguity, wherefore he distinguishes three meanings of Conscience that are found, (1) the moral faculty, (2) the judgment of the understanding about the springs and effects of actions, upon which the moral sense approves or condemns them, (3) our judgments concerning actions compared with the _law_ (moral maxims, divine laws, &c.).
In Chapter II., he lays down general rules of judging about the morality of actions from the affections exciting to them or opposing them; and first as to the degree of virtue or vice when the ability varies; in other words, morality as dependent on the _strength_ of the affections. Next, and at greater length, morality as dependent on the _kind_ of the affections.
Here he attempts to fix, in the first place, the degree of benevolence, as opposed to private interest, that is necessary to render men virtuous, or even innocent, in accordance with his principle that there is implanted in us a very high standard of necessary goodness, requiring us to do a public benefit, when clear, however burdensome or hurtful the act may be to ourselves; in the second place, the proportion that should be kept between the narrower and the more extensive generous affections, where he does not forget to allow that, in general, a great part of human virtue must necessarily lie within the narrow range. Then he gives a number of special rules for appreciating conduct, advising, _for the very sake of the good to others that will result therefrom_, that men should foster their benevolence by the thought of the advantage accruing to themselves here and hereafter from their virtuous actions; and closes with the consideration of the cases wherein actions can be imputed to other than the agents.
In Chapter III., he enters into the general notion of Rights and Laws, and their divisions. From _right_ use of such affection or actions as are approved by the moral faculty from their relation to the general good, or the good of particular persons consistently with the general good, he distinguishes the _right_ of a man to do, possess, demand, &c., which exists when his doing, possessing, &c. tend to the good of society, or to his own, consistent with the rights of others and the general good, and when obstructing him would have the contrary tendency. He proceeds to argue, on utilitarian principles, that the rights that seem to attend every natural desire are perfectly valid when not against the public interest, but never valid when they are against it.
Chapter IV. contains a discussion upon the state of Nature, maintaining that it is not a state of anarchy or war, but full of rights and obligations. He points out that independent states in their relation to one another are subject to no common authority, and so are in a state of nature. Rights belong (1) to individuals, (2) to societies, (3) to mankind at large. They are also natural, or advent.i.tious, and again perfect or imperfect.
Chapter V. Natural rights are antecedent to society, such as the right to life, to liberty, to private judgment, to marriage, &c. They are of two kinds--perfect and imperfect.
Chapter VI. Advent.i.tious rights are divided into Real and Personal (a distinction chiefly of legal value.) He also examines into the nature and foundation of private property.
Chapter VII. treats of the Acquisition of property, Hutcheson, as is usual with moralists, taking the _occupatio_ of the Roman Law as a basis of ownership. Property involves the right of (1) use, (2) exclusive use, (3) alienation.
Chapter VIII. Rights drawn from property are such as mortgages, servitudes, &c., being rights of what may be called partial or imperfect ownership.
Chapter IX. discusses the subject of contracts, with the general conditions required for a valid contract.
Chapter X. Of Veracity. Like most writers on morals, Hutcheson breaks in upon the strict rule of veracity by various necessary, but ill-defined, exceptions. Expressions of courtesy and etiquette are exempted, so also artifices in war, answers extorted by unjust violence, and some cases of peculiar necessity, as when a man tells a lie to save thousands of lives.
Chapter XI. Oaths and Vows.
Chapter XII. belongs rather to Political Economy. Its subject is the values of goods in commerce, and the nature of coin.
Chapter XIII. enumerates the various cla.s.ses of contracts, following the Roman Law, taking up _Mandatum, Depositum_, Letting to Hire, Sale, &c.
Chapter XIV. adds the Roman _quasi-contracts_.
Chapter XV. Rights arising from injuries or wrongs _(torts)_. He condemns duelling, but admits that, where it is established, a man may, in some cases, be justified in sending or accepting a challenge.
Chapter XVI. Rights belonging to society as against the individual. The perfect rights of society are such as the following:--(1) To prevent suicide; (2) To require the producing and rearing of offspring, at least so far as to tax and discourage bachelors; (3) To compel men, though not without compensation, to divulge useful inventions; (4) To compel to some industry, &c.
Chapter XVII. takes up some cases where the ordinary rights of property or person are set aside by some overbearing necessity.
Chapter XVIII. The way of deciding controversies in a state of nature by arbitration.
Book III.--Civil Polity, embracing Domestic and Civil Rights.
Chapter I. _Marriage_. Hutcheson considers that Marriage should be a perpetual union upon equal terms, "and not such a one wherein the one party stipulates to himself a right of governing in all domestic affairs, and the other promises subjection." He would allow divorce for adultery, desertion, or implacable enmity on either side. Upon defect of children, some sort of concubinage would be preferable to divorce, but leaving to the woman the option of divorce with compensation. He notices the misrepresentations regarding Plato"s scheme of a community of wives; "Never was there in any plan less provision made for sensual gratification."
Chapter II. The Rights and Duties of Parents and Children.
Chapter III. The Rights and Duties of Masters and Servants.
Chapter IV. discusses the Motives to const.i.tute Civil Government. If men were perfectly wise and upright, there would be no need for government. Man is naturally sociable and political [Greek: xon politikon].
Chapter V. shows that the natural method of const.i.tuting civil government is by consent or social compact.
Chapter VI. The Forms of Government, with their respective advantages and disadvantages.
Chapter VII. How far the Rights of Governors extend. Their lives are more sacred than the lives of private persons; but they may nevertheless be lawfully resisted, and, in certain cases, put to death.
Chapter VIII. The ways of acquiring supreme Power. That government has most divine right that is best adapted to the public good: a divine right of succession to civil offices is ridiculous.
Chapter IX. takes up the sphere of civil law. (1) To enforce the laws of nature; (2) To appoint the form &c., of contracts and dispositions, with a view to prevent fraud; (3) To require men to follow the most prudent methods of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce; (4) To prescribe rules in matters morally indifferent, where uniformity is advantageous. Opinions should be tolerated; all except Atheism, and the denial of moral obligation.
Chapter X. The Laws of Peace and War, belonging now to the subject of International Law.
Chapter XI. (concluding the work) discusses some cases connected with the duration of the "Politick Union."
This bare indication of topics will suffice to give an idea of the working out of Hutcheson"s system. For summary:--I.--The Standard, according to Hutcheson, is identical with the Moral Faculty. It is the Sense of unique excellence in certain affections and in the actions consequent upon them. The object of approval is, in the main, benevolence.
II.--His division of the feelings is into calm and turbulent, each of these being again divided into self-regarding and benevolent. He affirms the existence of pure Disinterestedness, a _calm_ regard for the most extended well-being. There are also _turbulent_ pa.s.sions of a benevolent kind, whose end is their simple gratification. Hutcheson has thus a higher and lower grade of Benevolence; the higher would correspond to the disinterestedness that arises from the operation of _fixed ideas_, the lower to those affections that are generated in us by pleasing objects.
He has no discussion on the freedom of the will, contenting himself with mere voluntariness as an element in moral approbation or censure.
III.--The Summum Bonum is fully discussed. He places the pleasures of sympathy and moral goodness (also of piety) in the highest rank, the pa.s.sive sensations in the lowest. Instead of making morality, like health, a neutral state (though an indispensable condition of happiness), he ascribes to it the highest positive gratification.
IV.--In proceeding upon Rights, instead of Duties, as a basis of cla.s.sification, Hutcheson is following in the wake of the jurisconsults, rather than of the moralists. When he enters into the details of moral duties, he throws aside his "moral sense," and draws his rules, most of them from Roman Law, the rest chiefly from manifest convenience.
V. and VI.--Hutcheson"s relation to Politics and Theology requires no comment.
BERNARD DE MANDEVILLE. [1670-1733.]
MANDEVILLE was author of "The Fable of the Bees; or, Private Vices, Public Benefits" (1714). This work is a satire upon artificial society, having for its chief aim to expose the hollowness of the so-called dignity of human nature. Dugald Stewart considered it a recommendation to any theory of the mind that it exalted our conceptions of human nature. Shaftesbury"s views were ent.i.tled to this advantage; but, observes Mandeville, "the ideas he had formed of the goodness and excellency of our nature, were as romantic and chimerical, as they are beautiful and amiable." Mandeville examined not what human nature _ought to be_, but what it really _is_. In contrast, therefore, to the moralists that distinguish between a higher and a lower in our nature, attributing to the higher everything good and n.o.ble, while the lower ought to be persecuted and despised, Mandeville declares the fancied higher parts to be the region of vanity and imposture, while the renowned deeds of men, and the greatness of kingdoms, really arise from the pa.s.sions usually reckoned base and sensual. As his views are scattered through numerous dissertations, it will be best to summarize them under a few heads.
1. _Virtue and Vice_. Morality is not natural to man; it is the invention of wise men, who have endeavoured to infuse the belief, that it is best for everybody to prefer the public interest to their own.
As, however, they could bestow no _real_ recompense for the thwarting of self-interest, they contrived an _imaginary_ one--honour. Upon this they proceeded to divide men into two cla.s.ses, the one abject and base, incapable of self-denial; the other n.o.ble, because they suppressed their pa.s.sions, and acted for the public welfare. Man was thus won to virtue, not by force, but by flattery.
In regard to praiseworthiness, Shaftesbury, according to Mandeville, was the first to affirm that virtue could exist without self-denial.
This was opposed to the prevailing opinion, and to the view taken up and criticised by Mandeville. His own belief was different. "It is not in feeling the pa.s.sions, or in being affected with the frailties of nature, that vice consists; but in indulging and obeying the call of them, contrary to the dictates of reason."