2107. Distinction between Derision and Jesting.--Moderate jesting at another"s expense is not derision, nor sinful, if it is justified by a reasonable motive. (a) Thus, a serious motive for jesting at another is fraternal correction. To ridicule a person who is making a fool of himself is often the best way to correct him, for many persons are less moved at being called wicked than at being called absurd. Similarly, a satirical rebuke sometimes serves to abash a person who has an exalted opinion of himself. In such cases a truth spoken in jest is an act of charity to a sinner. (b) A playful motive for jesting at another is recreation. The good-natured exchange of banter about trivial defects between persons who enjoy this give and take is a reasonable form of amus.e.m.e.nt in itself; indeed, it pertains to the virtue known as _eutrapelia_. But some persons who enjoy a jest at the expense of another are extremely sensitive to ridicule and fly into a rage if fun is poked at themselves, or even if they suspect that someone is laughing at them.
2108. Even jesting whose purpose is good may be sinful on account of the offensive or immoderate way in which it is conducted (see 2010).
There are three general forms of jest, but they do not const.i.tute distinct species of sin when jest is unlawful, since the difference between them is accidental as far as morality is concerned.
(a) Thus, jest of the mouth is one that is made by words or laughter.
(b) A jest of the face is made by the expression of the countenance (e.g., by wrinkling up the nose, sticking out the tongue).
(c) A jest of act, or practical joke, is some trick played on another, horseplay, and the like.
2109. The Sinfulness of Derision.--(a) When the derider makes light of a grave evil, he commits a mortal sin, for he shows grave contempt towards the person derided, treating the latter as if he were entirely worthless--one whose misfortunes were matters for joke. Indeed, derision is a more serious injury than contumely, for the contumelious person treats the evil of his neighbor as something serious, whereas the derider makes sport of it and is thus more insulting. In Scripture grave punishment is threatened to deriders: "G.o.d shall scorn the scorners" (Prov., iii. 34). But if an evil grave in itself is commonly looked upon as light on account of the inferior condition of the person who has the defect (viz., because he is an infant or an idiot), there is no grave sin of contempt.
(b) When the derider makes light of an evil that is really light, there is no contempt shown, but there may be serious embarra.s.sment caused to the person derided. For the peace of a good conscience is a great blessing ("Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience," II Cor., i. 12; "A secure mind is like a continual feast," Prov., xv. 15), and that which disturbs it can be a serious distress and harm. If the b.u.t.t of the joke does not take the matter much to heart, the sin is venial. But should he suffer great mental pain or disturbance on account of the ridicule, the quality of the sin is disputed. Some think that mortal sin is committed, if the derider foresees the serious evil that will ensue; but others hold that the sin is venial, since it is the over-sensitiveness of the person derided that accounts for his great discomfiture of mind.
2110. The gravity of the sin of derision is increased by the object against whom it is directed; for the greater the reverence due a person, the greater the injury shown by making a mockery of him.
(a) Thus, the worst form of derision is that which is directed against G.o.d, and it is not distinct from blasphemy. Hence, Isaias (IV Kings, xix. 6) calls the deriders of the G.o.d of Israel blasphemers, and St.
Luke (xxii. 64, 65) says that the soldiers who gave Our Lord a mock coronation spoke in blasphemy.
(b) Next in gravity is derision of parents, and Scripture declares the special horror of this sin: "The eye that mocketh at his father, let the ravens of the brooks pick it out and the young eagles eat it"
(Prov., x.x.x, 17).
(c) Finally, there is a special enormity in derision of saintly persons, for virtue deserves honor, and those who dishonor it deter men, as far as in them lies, from cultivating or esteeming it.
2111. Cursing.--Cursing in general is the speaking of evil for some person or thing, that is, in order that the evil spoken may befall him or it. Thus, it differs from contumely and derision, which are the speaking of evil to another, and from defamation and whispering, which are the speaking of evil against another. Cursing is also different from prediction of evil, and some pa.s.sages in the Imprecatory Psalms, though couched in terms of malediction, are prophecies of the future, rather than curses. An example is Psalm cviii, which foretells the fate of the traitor Judas. Cursing is expressed in two ways:
(a) imperatively, when one p.r.o.nounces with authority that punishment is to be inflicted or evil visited upon some person or object. In this way G.o.d decrees eternal or temporal penalties against sinners, judges sentence criminals, and the Church anathematize the contumacious;
(b) optatively, when one who has not the power or authority to command punishment, expresses the wish that misfortune or evil of some kind may overtake a person or thing. Examples are: "Bad luck to you," "May you break your leg," "The devil take you," "G.o.d d.a.m.n you." A curse made in the form of a prayer is called an imprecation.
2112. When Cursing Is Not Sinful.--Cursing a person is not sinful when the evil which is ordered or wished is not intended as to the evil that is in it, but as to some good; for so the intention is directed to good, not to evil.
(a) Thus, evil may be ordered on account of the good of justice that is in it, as when a judge decrees capital punishment, which in its physical being is an evil, but morally is the vindication of justice and therefore a good. Some of the curses made by holy men in the Bible are of this character: they proclaim the just sentence of G.o.d, as when Elias called down fire from heaven upon his persecutors (IV Kings, i), and Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him (IV Kings, ii. 24); or they express the submission of the human will to the just decree of G.o.d: "And the Levites shall p.r.o.nounce with a loud voice, "Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law," and all the people shall say, "Amen"" (Deut., xxvii. 14, 26).
(b) Evil may be desired, if the intention takes in only the good of public or of private utility that is contained in it, as when one hopes a jury will find a dangerous criminal guilty, if one has in view, not the sufferings or death of the criminal, but the safety of the community. It is right, therefore, to wish confusion and defeat to the enemies of religion, of the Church, or of one"s country; it is lawful to pray G.o.d to visit a sinner with sickness that he may thereby be reformed or prevented from harming others. But in wishing evils one must remember that it is not always lawful to do what one wishes may happen in some lawful manner, nor is it lawful to wish a greater evil as a means of escape from a lesser evil (see 1308 sqq.).
2113. Sinfulness of Cursing.--Cursing a person is sinful when the evil ordered or wished is intended precisely as it is the hurt or loss of this person.
(a) From its nature this sin is mortal, since it shuts out the curser from heaven ("Neither cursers nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of G.o.d," I Cor., vi. 10), and it is essentially opposed to charity, being the natural expression of hatred (see 1296). But, other things being equal, optative cursing is less serious than defamation, for it is less harm to another to wish him evil (e.g., that he be defamed) than to inflict that evil on him.
(b) From the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter, cursing becomes at times a venial sin. The act is imperfectly deliberate when one curses in a sudden fit of temper; it is imperfectly intentional, when one curses in fun or from habit and does not really wish that the evils p.r.o.nounced should be fulfilled. The curses, "Go to h.e.l.l," "G.o.d d.a.m.n you," are usually not meant or understood to express a wish that the person addressed be consigned to eternal punishment.
Hence, they are generally in themselves venial sins only. But it should be remembered that venial curses of this kind may become mortal by reason of scandal (e.g., when parents habitually address such curses to their children, or other superiors to their subordinates), or by reason of irreverence (e.g., when children curse their parents). The matter of a curse is light when the evil spoken is harmful only in a small degree (e.g., to wish that a person may lose a small sum of money).
2114. Rules for Deciding as to Gravity of the Sin.--Persons who have expressed a grave curse against a neighbor are sometimes in doubt whether there was enough ill-will in the curse to make it a mortal sin.
For such doubts theologians give the following rules:
(a) if the reason for doubting is that after the curse one cooled off and hoped that no evil would happen to one"s neighbor, mortal sin was committed during the curse, but the bad disposition quickly pa.s.sed away;
(b) if the reason for doubting is that one is not sure about the state of mind one was in during the curse, a good index of that state of mind will be the feeling one has towards the person who was cursed. Thus, if one is well disposed towards that person, the presumption is that the curse was not meant except as an expression of anger; but if one is hostile to that person, the presumption is rather that the evil in the curse was really intended. If one is indifferent as regards the person whom one cursed, the presumption will follow what one is accustomed to desire in one"s curses, whether that be to give forceful expression to displeasure or to manifest a malevolent hatred.
2115. Circ.u.mstances Which Change the Moral Species of Cursing.--There are certain circ.u.mstances of person and objects which change the moral species of cursing, and which must therefore be mentioned in confession.
(a) Thus, by reason of difference in the persons cursed the species is changed, for where special love or reverence is owed a special sin is committed by hatred or irreverence. The gravest curse is that against G.o.d, which is the sin of blasphemy (see 887 sqq.). Next in wickedness is the curse against one"s parents, which is a sin of impiety.
(b) By reason of difference in the evils that are desired, the species is also changed, since the essential malices of the will and of the deed are the same (see 90, 242). In this respect cursing differs from contumely and detraction, for in these sins the evils spoken are not pleasing, but rather displeasing to the speaker (see 2103). Hence, he who wishes death to his neighbor commits murder in his heart, he who wishes loss of property is a thief at heart, etc. But if one curses a neighbor in a general way, without mentioning any particular evil, one sins by hatred.
2116. Numerical Multiplication in Sins of Cursing.--(a) By reason of the specific difference in the evils wished (e.g., death, disgrace, poverty), one is guilty of several sins by one and the same act; for, though the act is physically one, it is morally many, as was said in the previous paragraph. But some authors add that only one sin is committed if all the evils wished are united in the mind as expressions of the one sin of hate or as means of the one purpose of injury (see 217).
(b) By reason of the different persons cursed, one is also guilty of several sins by one and the same act, or at least is guilty of one sin that is equivalent to many; for he who curses a whole family or group, formally and expressly intends evil to each member, and thus he differs from a thief who steals from many persons, but does not will individual injuries (see 218).
2117. The Cursing of Evil.--(a) It is not sinful to curse evil as such, that is, to wish that sin or wrong may be defeated. Hence, it is lawful to pray against the evil spirits, the enemies of G.o.d and man. But it is sinful to curse any creature of G.o.d, even though he is among the lost, for the nature of every creature is good, since it comes from G.o.d.
(b) It is not sinful to curse evil tropologically, that is, to curse a creature of G.o.d that is taken to represent evil, as being its cause (e.g., Job cursed the day of his birth, the beginning of many evils), or location (e.g., David cursed Mount Gelboe, the spot where Saul and Jonathan were slain), etc. But it would be a sin to curse these creatures of G.o.d in themselves.
2118. It is not sinful to curse an irrational creature on account of its relation to man, if there is a sufficient reason to curse man himself (see 2112), either on account of the good of justice (e.g., when G.o.d cursed the earth as a punishment on Adam, when Christ cursed the fig-tree as a sign of the curse on Judea), or on account of the good of utility (e.g., when one wishes that the liquor ordered by a drunkard may be lost).
2119. Unlawful Cursing of an Irrational Creature.--(a) It is unlawful to curse an irrational creature, considered precisely as a creature of G.o.d, for in so doing one reflects on G.o.d Himself, and incurs the guilt of blasphemy.
(b) It is unlawful to curse an irrational creature, considered precisely in relation to man, if there is no just cause to curse man.
Thus, if one wishes that a neighbor"s cattle may die, intending only the harm that will be done the neighbor, one is guilty of sinful cursing (see 2113).
(c) It is unlawful to curse an irrational creature, considered precisely in itself, for such an act is vain and useless. Those who curse the inclemency of the weather, the infertility of the soil, the stubbornness of mules or other animals, the uselessness of a tool, etc., do not generally speaking commit a grave sin, since they intend only to voice their impatience with conditions that are displeasing.
2120. Murmuring.--Murmuring is the expression of unjust discontent or complaint by inarticulate sounds or by secret words.
(a) It is unjust, and so it does not differ essentially from the sins of speech given above. If it is an injustice to honor, it is reducible to contumely; if it is an injury to fame, it pertains to defamation, etc. The injustice of murmuring results either from the thing complained of (e.g., a child murmurs against the just orders of its parents), or from the manner of the complaint (e.g., a subordinate complains against an unjust order, but angrily, contemptuously, or uselessly).
(b) It is made by inarticulate sounds (e.g., by whistling, grunting), or by secret words (e.g., in whispered, inaudible manner). This is an accidental difference between murmuring and other vocal sins.
2121. Fraud.--Having discussed the various kinds of injustice that are committed in involuntary commutations, we now pa.s.s on to the study of those injustices that are done in voluntary transactions (see 1748).
These vices can be reduced to the following:
(a) injustices perpetrated against a person who is entirely unwilling (viz., theft and robbery), as when one steals an object that had been entrusted to one as a pledge or loan, or compels another, by fear or violence, to sign a contract unfavorable to himself and which he does not wish to agree to. It is unnecessary to speak of theft and robbery in contracts, since the same principles apply to them as to theft and robbery outside of contracts (see 1890 sqq.);
(b) injustices perpetrated against a person who is partly willing, since he consents to a contract, but is also partly unwilling, since unfairness or fraud is used against him. These injuries are of two general kinds: fraud, a sin committed in buying and selling and other contracts in which payment is made for some valuable consideration; usury, a sin committed in the loan of money in which payment is made for something that is nonexistent.
2122. Definition of Fraud.--By fraud (see 1677-1679) we here understand any unlawful conduct on the part of one party to a contract that puts the other party under a disadvantage in agreeing to the contract (e.g., misrepresentations about the excellence of merchandise), or that takes away the equality that should exist between the parties (e.g., an excessive price charged for merchandise; see 1750). The contract of sale is the type of all onerous contracts (see 1749), and to it all the others, whether certain or aleatory, can be reduced, for in every one of them there is a thing that is purchased (e.g., in aleatory contracts the hope of securing some prize), and a price that is paid for the object of purchase. Hence, it will suffice to speak of the frauds that are committed in sales, and the same principles that govern these can be applied to other kinds of contract.
2123. Two Kinds of Injustices in Sales.--Equality between the buyer and the seller requires that each give the other a good equivalent for what he receives. Hence, the injustices committed in sales are reducible to two kinds: (a) injustices in the prices charged or paid; (b) injustices as to the goods furnished or taken.
2124. Injustice Regarding the Price.--Sin is committed in reference to the price charged as follows:
(a) by fraud, when one of the parties uses deception against the other party in order to charge more or pay less than is fair; for one who is party to a contract has the right that no lying or trickery be used against him, a contract being an agreement to which knowledge and consent are requisite;
(b) by overcharge or underpayment; for sale has for its purpose the mutual advantage of the buyer and seller, and hence one of them should not be overburdened for the advantage of the other, but the burdens and benefits should be equally distributed. Hence, it is unjust to sell an object for more than it is worth, or to buy it for less than it is worth.
2125. The Criteria of a Just Price.--(a) The const.i.tutive norm of a just price is not merely subjective, that is, the fairness does not depend on the arbitrary wishes or on the special needs of the contractants, or on some monopoly which controls the prices; it is objective, that is, founded on the value of the thing sold, its capacity to be of benefit and satisfaction to its possessor, its rarity, the amount of labor put into its production and care, etc.
(b) The manifestative norm for commodities that are in common use (such as the necessities of life and the more usual luxuries) is the common judgment expressed either in law (legal price) or in the free custom of buyers and sellers at a particular place and time (market price); for objects that are not in common use and that have no settled price (e.g., rare archeological finds, ancient doc.u.ments or paintings) the norm is the prudent and free judgment of the parties, or the decision of an expert chosen by them.