2442. Martyrdom.--As judgment is the chief act of justice (see 1727), so martyrdom is the chief act of fort.i.tude, and in a sense the most perfect of all acts. For martyrdom is defined as "the voluntary acceptance for the sake of G.o.d of a violent death inflicted out of hatred of virtue." Martyrdom belongs to fort.i.tude which produces it, to love of G.o.d which commands it (I Cor., xiii. 13), and to faith which attracts it. Merely as an act of courage, it is inferior to some other acts, since fort.i.tude is not the highest virtue, and the goods for which martyrdom is undergone must be preferable to martyrdom itself.
But in two ways martyrdom is the greatest act of virtue.
(a) Thus, internally it has charity for its end, and "greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (John, xv. 13); it is the greatest sign of love of G.o.d.
(b) Externally it is a profession of faith in the superiority of the invisible and future to the visible and present goods, and no more efficacious proof of this faith can be given than martyrdom (Job, ii.
4; II Cor., iv. 11).
2443. Kinds of Martyrdom.--The word martyrdom is sometimes used loosely or less accurately, and hence we distinguish the following kinds of martyrdom:
(a) false martyrdom is death suffered in an evil cause, as when one dies for erroneous principles or doctrines (e.g., for anarchy), Martyrdom is testimony of blood given to the truth, not to error, and hence it is not the suffering but the cause that makes the martyr.
Improper martyrdom is death suffered for some purely natural good, as when a person dies for the cause of science or of a political party, or in defense of natural truths about G.o.d but without a religious motive;
(b) true and proper martyrdom, which is not the virtue but the crown of martyrdom, is death inflicted on an infant out of hatred for Christ, as in the case of the Holy Innocents. This is baptism of blood for infants, as the virtue is for adults, supplying the place of baptism of water (Matt., x. 39);
(c) the virtue of martyrdom in the sight of G.o.d (theological martyrdom) is either in desire or in act. Martyrdom of desire, which is the wish to die for G.o.d, may have the same essential glory as martyrdom in act, but it lacks the accidental glory, since it does not really suffer the trial (see 89-93). Martyrdom in act, which is external suffering for justice"s sake, has three degrees: the lowest degree is suffering that lacks one or other of the essential conditions (see 2444) for supreme self-sacrifice (imperfect martyrdom), the higher degree has all the essential conditions (perfect martyrdom), while the highest degree has also the accidentals that are most suitable for martyrdom (complete martyrdom);
(d) the virtue of martyrdom in the sight of the Church (canonical martyrdom) is that which, in addition to the conditions for perfect martyrdom, possesses also external indications sufficient to prove their existence and character.
2444. Conditions for Martyrdom.--Since martyrdom is a virtue and the supreme testimony, it must have the following conditions:
(a) the cause of the martyrdom must be faith (e.g., persecution because the martyr is a Catholic), or some virtue containing a profession of faith, inasmuch as a divine good (e.g., chast.i.ty) or a human good (e.g., the truth of a science, the safety of one"s country) is defended for the sake of G.o.d;
(b) the persecutor must act from hatred of virtue, but it is not necessary that he be an unbeliever, or that he avow his hatred of virtue as the motive of persecution, or that he p.r.o.nounce or execute the sentence of death himself;
(c) the martyr must accept martyrdom willingly (actual or virtual intention suffices, and perhaps also habitual); he must be free from guilt that provoked the sentence, and must be in the state of grace or at least repentant; he must die from a virtuous motive, not from vainglory, despair, or other sinful reason. Some make non-resistance a condition for what we called perfect martyrdom, while others make it a condition for what we called complete martyrdom; according to the former opinion the crusaders or other soldiers dying in a just war cannot be called martyrs of religion, but according to the second opinion they may be ranked with the martyrs;
(d) the punishment inflicted on the martyr must be death, either instant (as in decapitation) or delayed (as in gradual starvation, death by slow poisoning, mortal wounds, imprisonment or other hardship), Hence, those who are not put to death, but who are tortured, mutilated or imprisoned (e.g., St. John the Evangelist), are confessors of the faith, but only in an imperfect sense are they martyrs. Some believe that suffering is necessary for perfect martyrdom, and hence that those who are put to death painlessly are not, strictly speaking, martyrs; but others--and with better reason, it seems--deny this. Those who are not killed (e.g., persons who die from disease contracted while attending the sick or from austerities), or who are killed by themselves (e.g., the Circ.u.mcellions who thought to win martyrdom by suicide), are not martyrs (on the cases of Sts. Apollonia and Pelagia, see 1856).
2445. Practical Questions about Martyrdom.--(a) The Desire of Martyrdom.--A general desire for or the willingness to suffer martyrdom if the necessity should arise is required for salvation (I John, iii.
16; Rom., x. 10). Apart from necessity, a special desire of martyrdom is not of precept, since martyrdom is an act of perfection; but such a desire is of counsel, since it is encouraged by Christ (I Peter, ii.
21), and many Saints have prayed for martyrdom.
(b) The Choice of Martyrdom.--Regularly it is not lawful to offer oneself freely for martyrdom, for to do so gives the tyrant an occasion of committing injustice, and as a rule there are not sufficient reasons of public or private good for permitting his sin (see 103 sqq.).
Exceptionally it is lawful, when there is no danger that one will be overcome and there are urgent reasons for the act, such as the glory of G.o.d or the peace of the faithful.
(c) Provocation of Martyrdom.--Regularly it is not lawful to bring on a persecution by aggression (e.g., by destroying idols), since generally this will make one guilty of complicity and presumption. But there are exceptional cases, when the good of souls demands attack on evils (Dan., xiv. 26; Matt., xiv. 3, 4). It is not provocation of persecution, however, to live virtuously (Tob., ii. 8, 9), or to reprove a persecutor after one has been apprehended (II Mach., viii.
15-17; Acts, vii. 51-54).
(d) Flight from Martyrdom.--Flight is sometimes sinful, sometimes obligatory, sometimes optional, according to circ.u.mstances, as was explained in 1005, 1006.
2446. Sins Opposed to Fort.i.tude.--(a) Number.--The vices opposed to fort.i.tude are four, two of excess and two of defect, according as fear and confidence are not regulated as to time, place, manner and other circ.u.mstances in the way of moderation. He who fears when or as he should not, is timorous (e.g., one who kills himself because he fears the hardships of life, one who neglects religion out of human respect); he who does not fear when or as he should, is insensible (e.g., one who exposes himself to peril of death for the sake of excitement). He who does not dare when or as he should, is cowardly (e.g., a superior who does not correct as he should); he who dares when or as he should not, is foolhardy (e.g., a superior who corrects when there is no chance of a good result).
(b) Malice.--These sins _per se_ are venial, since excess or defect in emotions, which in themselves are indifferent, is not a serious disorder. But they become mortal if they lead to grave evil (e.g., if from fear of persecution one becomes a pagan), or to grave danger (e.g., if from foolhardiness one exposes oneself to death or mutilation). Insensibility and foolhardiness are caused by pride or vainglory, by contempt for life or for the strength of others. Timidity and cowardice diminish culpability, though they do not remove it.
2447. The Parts of Fort.i.tude.--As has been said above, the parts of a virtue are subjective, integral and potential (see 1635, 1636).
(a) Fort.i.tude has no subjective parts, for it is concerned with a very specialized matter, namely, the danger of death; and hence there is no room for differences of kind, although there are differences of degree (e.g., greater courage is needed to face an ignominious or cruel death than to face death amid applause or with little suffering).
(b) The integral parts of fort.i.tude are those that are necessary for the perfect functioning of its offices in reference to major dangers (i.e., of death). Now, the first act of fort.i.tude, namely, attack, requires greatness of soul (which makes one love the best things and despise all that is opposed to them) and greatness of deed (which makes one perform generously what was n.o.bly willed). The second act of fort.i.tude, namely, endurance, requires patience (that the soul he not thrown into dejection by difficulties) and steadfastness (that the soul be not turned aside from its purpose or wearied by long-continued opposition).
(c) The potential parts of fort.i.tude are the four just named, but as exercised in reference to minor dangers.
2448. Greatness of Soul.--Greatness of soul or n.o.bility (Latin, _magnanimitas_) is a virtue that inclines one to aspire after excellence in things most honorable, but to esteem and use honors themselves with moderation.
(a) The first act of this virtue is aspiration. It desires the higher manifestations of every virtue--the things that are more difficult and that befit a generous and elevated spirit, such as great austerity, great labor, great sacrifice, etc. Thus, it resembles fort.i.tude, for both virtues are exercised in difficult circ.u.mstances.
(b) The second act of this virtue is moderation. It esteems honors at their true worth, for it is greatly concerned to possess the higher honors (i.e., good repute before G.o.d and G.o.dly men), knowing that these are solid and lasting, but it is less concerned about lower honors (i.e., the esteem and applause of the world), knowing that these are frail, fleeting, and common to good and bad alike. Hence, the great of soul are not elated in prosperity or dejected in adversity. This virtue here differs from fort.i.tude, since fort.i.tude is concerned with dangers, which are unpleasant, while greatness of soul is occupied with honors which are pleasant.
2449. Comparison between Greatness of Soul and Humility.--Greatness of soul and humility are different, but not contrary.
(a) Thus, greatness of soul makes one regard oneself as worthy of great things, when one is indeed worthy of them on account of gifts bestowed by G.o.d (Luke, i. 46). Hence, the great of soul put the good above the profitable, they do not busy themselves unduly about lesser things, they are slow to ask and quick to grant favors, they are not outdone in generosity, they are not subservient before the mighty, and they are familiar only with friends. But if they are truly great of soul, they are also humble, knowing that the good is from G.o.d, and that of themselves they are weak and sinful.
(b) Greatness of soul makes one regard oneself as superior to lower things, for it makes one loathe anything that would be unbecoming the gifts one has received from G.o.d. Hence, as St. Thomas says, the n.o.ble character does not flaunt his ideals, nor obtrude himself into places or offices of honor; he does not complain or remember injuries; he is not haughty with inferiors but gentle and considerate with all; in manner he is quiet and unhurried, speaks sincerely, and is not much given either to praise or to blame others. But though the n.o.ble person despises all that is petty, he is not proud; and hence he can see the good that is in others, and he reveres those who are superior to himself.
2450. Vices Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Excess.--The vices opposed to greatness of soul by excess are such as desire great deeds, or honors, or fame, when or where or how they should not be desired.
(a) Excessive desire of great deeds is presumption, which attempts to do greater things than one is able to perform (cfr. 1075 sqq.), This happens in conceited persons who overestimate their own abilities, taking on themselves offices for which they are incompetent or exercising powers for which they have no authority; also in vulgar persons who mistake their fortuitous advantages, such as wealth or influence or birth, for character and ability. Presumption is a mortal sin when its cause is a grave sin (e.g., lack of faith) or when its effects are very harmful (e.g., when one who is ignorant presumes to teach or practise medicine, when one who is morally frail presumes to enter occasions of sin). There is no sin if one attempts too much in good faith and from inculpable ignorance.
(b) Excessive desire of honors (see 2010, 2011, 2351) is ambition, or an inordinate hankering after distinctions and deference. The great of soul desire honors when these are due to their station or when there is a just reason, such as the glory of G.o.d or the advantage of the neighbor (Matt., v. 15, 16; Heb., v. 4). The ambitious, on the contrary, seek to be honored beyond their deserts (e.g., when an ignorant man longs for academic degrees, a tyrant wishes to be respected on account of his tyranny, an inferior man seeks to perpetuate himself in temporary elective offices, a rich man or athletic hero expects that he will be revered above those who are eminent for virtue or learning), or they seek honor for its own or their own sake, like the Pharisees who loved the first places at feasts and the first chairs in the synagogues, and salutations in the market place, and to be called by men Rabbi (Matt., xxiii. 7; cfr. I Tim., iii. 1 sqq.; Matt., xx. 25).
This sin, being excessive desire of something indifferent, is not _per se_ mortal; but it is made mortal either by a cause that is seriously sinful (e.g., if one"s whole life is but a mad chase for preferments) or by a result that is seriously harmful (e.g., if one commits or is ready to commit serious injustice or uncharitableness to win a coveted dignity). Ambition is cured chiefly by charity, for charity is not ambitious (I Cor., xiii. 5; cfr. Gal., v. 13).
(c) Excessive desire of praise or celebrity is vanity (see 2028, 2269).
The great of soul desire the good opinion of their fellow-men (see 1575 sqq.), but they also desire that their good reputation be well founded, and their motive is the glory of G.o.d or the spiritual profit of man.
The vain, on the contrary, are eager for admiration and praise for which there is no justification (e.g., those who wish to be praised for virtues they do not possess) or which are valueless (e.g., those who fish for compliments over things of no great importance, such as good looks or dress, or who wish to appear learned among the uneducated, or who crave notoriety), or seek admiration without a proper motive (e.g., those who advertise themselves for self-glorification alone). Vanity, like ambition, is _per se_ only a venial sin, but it becomes mortal on account of its cause (e.g., when the motive is to conceal crimes that are planned), or its results (e.g., when the desire to be famous makes one boast of one"s crimes, or refuse to repair injuries done to others, or neglect the honor of G.o.d), or its matter (e.g., when one is vain about a reputation for skillful injustice). Vanity is one of the capital sins (see 268 sqq.), since it is one of the motives that chiefly lead men into sin; for all desire excellence, and in consequence the love of renown is one of the chief incentives to action. Even the ambitious crave honors because of the glory honors bring. The offspring of vanity includes the sins by which a man seeks unlawfully to show off his good points, or to prove that he is not inferior and thus capture popularity or glory. In the first cla.s.s are the publication by word or deed of one"s own true or pretended exploits (boasting hypocrisy), the cultivation of novelties and eccentricities designed to attract attention (such as singularity in opinion, in p.r.o.nunciation, in dress, etc.). In the latter cla.s.s are sins of intellect which make one hold obstinately to one"s views (stubbornness), sins of will which make one resist desires of others (discord), sins of word which make one loudly dispute (contention), sins of deed which make one refuse to yield to authority (disobedience).
2451. Vice Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Defect.--The sin opposed to greatness of soul by defect is pusillanimity (littleness of soul), which does not desire great things when one should desire them.
(a) Pusillanimity is sinful, because it excludes n.o.bility of soul, springs from a lazy ignorance of one"s own ability and worth and from a false fear of failure, and leads to the loss of great things that could be done for G.o.d and humanity. The Scriptures reprove Jonas, who fled from the great task set for him by G.o.d (Jonas, i. 1 sqq.), and the fearful servant who hid his talent in a napkin (Matt, xxv. 24 sqq.).
Pusillanimity is not to be confused, therefore, with humility; for humility excludes the unreasonable or immoderate desire of excellence, whereas pusillanimity represses even that desire of greatness which is reasonable and moderate. Indeed, meanness of spirit may be a.s.sociated with pride on account of obstinate refusal to take upon oneself what is commanded (Prov., xxvi. 16). Thus, Moses and Jeremias showed humility by their fears of unworthiness (Exod, iii. 11; Jerem., i. 6), but they would have sinned by pusillanimity, and also by pride, had they held out against G.o.d"s charge to them.
(b) Pusillanimity is _per se_ a venial sin (see 2450), but it may become mortal on account of its matter or consequences, as when one is so self-depreciative as to neglect grave obligations of correcting abuses. It is essentially more evil than presumption, for it turns one away from things and pursuits that are n.o.ble, and is thus more opposed to greatness of soul; but radically presumption is more evil, as it springs from pride (Ecclus., x.x.xvii. 3). The dread of attempting great deeds or pursuits is sometimes no sin at all, as when it is due to inculpable ignorance of what one can do or what one deserves, or from a fear that overpowers judgment, or from bodily disease, or from a sense of inferiority caused by education, excessive repression and habit (Col., iii. 21).
2452. Greatness of Deed.--Greatness of deed is the execution of the great things to which one is inclined by greatness of soul.
(a) The virtue is a general one, if it includes every kind of n.o.ble performance; it is a special one, if restricted to princely generosity in the expenditure of large sums for great works (virtue of magnificence or munificence). The munificent person spends large sums from his purse in behalf of the worship of G.o.d (e.g., in building churches, monasteries, etc.), and for the common good (e.g., in founding schools, in endowing educational inst.i.tutions, hospitals, etc.). This virtue resembles fort.i.tude by the grandeur of its accomplishment; it falls short of fort.i.tude, since it deals not with sacrifice of self but with sacrifice of goods. The Mcenases and the generous patrons of religion are among the greatest benefactors of humanity, for without them the best things would often languish for want of support.
(b) The vices opposed to this virtue are meanness by deficiency and vulgarity by excess. The mean man is unable to do things on a great scale, and prefers to ruin a n.o.ble work rather than make the proper outlay (e.g., after planning a beautiful church, he will spoil it by using cheap materials). The vulgar man, on the contrary, is avid for ostentation, or heavy expenditure when there is no call for it. He is liberal to works of less importance (e.g., his own usual personal needs or comforts), but penurious with works of great importance (e.g., charitable causes); or he lavishes money needlessly on great works, as when his residence is over-ornamented and offensive to good taste, or when his wedding breakfast is served with profuse extravagance and waste in order to make a display of wealth. _Per se_, these sins are venial, but they may be mortal on account of circ.u.mstances. Munificence is the virtue of the rich, but even the poor may have the merit of this virtue, by a good intention, especially when they show liberality to great enterprises according to their means.
2453. Patience.--Patience is a virtue which from the love of moderation so controls the sadness caused by present afflictions that this pa.s.sion neither excessively disturbs the internal powers of the soul nor produces anything inordinate in the external conduct. Hence it differs from the following:
(a) from temperance, for, although temperance also regulates sadness, the sadness with which it deals is caused by lack of pleasures, while that with which patience deals is caused by the presence of evils, especially of those brought on by annoyances from others;
(b) from the endurance of fort.i.tude, for fort.i.tude regulates fear of death, while patience regulates sadness caused by evils of whatever nature, such as sickness, bereavements, loss of money, persecution;
(c) from longsuffering and constancy, for the matter of these virtues is a good which cannot be obtained except by long waiting or a good which must be continually exercised, whereas the matter of patience is an evil that has to be endured in the present. But since the delay of a desired good causes sadness (Prov., xiii. 12), and since continuance in good is irksome to the flesh, both longsuffering and constancy are included under patience.
2454. The Greatness of Patience.--(a) Its Rank.--Patience is less than the theological virtues, and also is inferior to prudence and justice, which perfect one in goodness; it is also less than fort.i.tude and temperance, which preserve from the greatest impediments to goodness; for the office of patience is only to preserve one from lesser impediments, namely, the common adversities of life. But, on the other hand, patience is a part of fort.i.tude--a potential part, because it does not connote the supreme heroism of fort.i.tude, and an integral part, because courage in the face of death is bettered by the serenity which patience imparts.