(b) When two commands differ formally, it can be presumed, unless the opposite is manifest, that the legislator wishes them to be complied with by distinct acts. Example: If a confessor imposes a fast as a penance, this penance cannot be performed on a fast day; for the motive of the law of fast is general, that of the sacramental penance is particular.
467. Simultaneous fulfillment by several acts of several obligations is sometimes possible, sometimes impossible. For the acts prescribed by different laws are either capable or incapable of being done at the same time. Thus, it is possible to hear a Ma.s.s and to say a penance of some Hail Marys at the same time. But it does not seem easy for an ordinary person to give attention to four or more Ma.s.ses at the same time.
(a) If the acts do not impede one another and the legislator is not unwilling, several laws can be fulfilled at the same time. Example: If two Ma.s.ses are being said on adjoining altars, one can hear both--the one to satisfy the Sunday obligation, the other to perform a penance received.
(b) If the acts impede one another, or if the legislator wishes his laws to be fulfilled at distinct times, the different obligations cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Examples: If a distracted person has received a penance to hear six Ma.s.ses, he cannot hear them all at once, on account of the division of attention necessary. If the confessor told a person to hear Ma.s.s "three times," the latter cannot satisfy by hearing three Ma.s.ses at one time.
468. When a law prescribes not only what is to be done, but when it is to be done, the time must be observed. But the obligation does not always cease with the expiration of the time.
(a) If the time set by the law is a limit beyond which the obligation ceases, he who has not complied within that time has no further obligation. Examples: He who did not fast on Christmas Eve, would not be obliged to fast on Christmas Day. He who did not hear Ma.s.s on Sunday, would not be obliged to hear Ma.s.s on Monday.
(b) If the time set by the law is not a limit to terminate the obligation, but a date fixed in order to insist on the obligation, he who has not complied within the prescribed period, is nevertheless still obliged. Examples: He who has not made the Easter duty by Trinity Sunday, is obliged to receive Communion after Trinity. He who has not paid a debt on the day required by law, is bound to pay it after that day.
469. It depends on the intention of the lawgiver whether the time he prescribes for fulfillment is a limitation of the obligation or not.
The intention of the lawgiver is known either from the words or purpose of the law, or from custom.
470. If the law declares that some duty must be performed within a determined period, allowing freedom for earlier or later performance within the period, the following points must be considered. (a) A person is not obliged to comply early, if he intends to comply before the period has ended. (b) He is obliged to comply early, if he foresees that later he will not be able to do what is required. Examples: If a person who has not made his Easter duty has the opportunity to receive Communion on Easter Sunday, and will not have another such opportunity till Christmas, he is obliged to receive on Easter Sunday. But, if he can communicate any Sunday during the Paschal time, he is not bound to do so on one of the early Sundays. If one can hear an early Ma.s.s, but not another Ma.s.s, on a holyday, one must hear the early Ma.s.s.
471. Just as one may not delay fulfillment until after the time set by law, so neither may one antic.i.p.ate fulfillment before the time determined, unless the law may be considered to allow this. Examples: If a person has heard Ma.s.s on Sat.u.r.day, he has no right to make this count for the following day. A rosary said before confession cannot be considered as performance of the penance, if in confession one is given the rosary to say.
472. It is held that a cleric who said the Breviary in the morning, just before he was ordained subdeacon and undertook the obligation of the Office, satisfied by that antic.i.p.ated recitation; likewise, that a traveller who heard Ma.s.s in a place where a holyday of obligation of the general law was not in force, has satisfied by antic.i.p.ation, if later in the morning he reaches as his destination a place where the holyday is observed. For in both these cases the law intends that the Office be said, or the Ma.s.s be heard within the day.
473. If a person who is now able to do what the law requires, foresees that he will not be able to do this when the time set by the law arrives, he is not obliged to antic.i.p.ate fulfillment, even when he has the privilege of antic.i.p.ation. Examples: A cleric who at 2 p.m. is able to antic.i.p.ate Matins for tomorrow, and who knows that later, on account of an operation, he will not be able to say his Office, is not bound to antic.i.p.ate; for no one is obliged to use a privilege. A person who is able to hear Ma.s.s on Sat.u.r.day, and who knows that all of Sunday must be spent on the train, is not obliged to hear Ma.s.s on Sat.u.r.day, though of course this is the better thing to do.
474. The internal acts concerned in the fulfillment of a law are: (a) those in the intellect, such as knowledge; (b) those in the will, such as consent, motive.
475. Knowledge of what one is doing is sometimes necessary, sometimes unnecessary for the fulfillment of a law.
(a) If the law is prohibitive, knowledge is not necessary, since nothing more is required by the law than the omission of what is forbidden. Example: He who ate no meat on a day of abstinence has fulfilled the law, even though he was unconscious all day.
(b) If the law is preceptive of a payment to be made, knowledge is not necessary, since the law requires nothing more than the effect of an external act. Example: He who pays his taxes while intoxicated fulfills his obligation, even though he does not know what he is doing.
(c) If the law is preceptive of an act to be performed, knowledge is required, for it is supposed that the act will be exercised in a human manner. Example: He who sleeps all during Ma.s.s on Sunday does not fulfill his duty, for the law intends that one a.s.sist at Ma.s.s in a human way (i.e., with consciousness of what is being done).
476. Fulfillment of a law is not morally good and meritorious, unless it is voluntary (see 97 sqq.); but the legal obligation is sometimes satisfied even by an unwilling fulfillment.
(a) When the law commands a payment to be made, one may will the contrary of what is commanded and yet fulfill one"s obligation.
Example: He who pays his taxes unwillingly and under compulsion satisfies the law, which requires not an act, but its effect.
(b) When the law forbids something, it is possible that one does not will the omission commanded and yet fulfills one"s obligation. Example: He who intends to eat meat on a day of abstinence which he thinks is a meat day, but, being unable to find what he wants, omits the meat, satisfies the law, which requires only that one omit what is forbidden and have no will to violate the law.
(c) When the law commands that an act be performed, one must perform the act willingly, since the law being for humans intends that fulfillment be made in a human manner. Examples: He who is dragged to church and forcibly detained there during Ma.s.s, does not satisfy the law of sanctifying the Sunday, since force makes his a.s.sistance at Ma.s.s involuntary (see 52). A child that goes to church only to escape punishment satisfies its duty, if, in spite of reluctance, it really intends to hear Ma.s.s, for fear does not necessarily make an act involuntary (see 41 sqq.).
477. As to the intention required in fulfilling a law, it is to be noted that one must have, at least implicitly, the intention of doing what the law prescribes, in the case given in the third section (c) of the preceding paragraph. Example: He who goes to church on Sunday while Ma.s.s is being said with no other purpose than that of hearing the music or of waiting for a friend, does not satisfy the Sunday duty, since he does not at all intend to hear Ma.s.s.
478. The following kinds of intention, though to be recommended, are not necessary for the fulfillment of a law.
(a) It is not necessary, as a rule, that one intend to satisfy one"s obligation, for human lawgivers have not generally the power or the intention to command acts that are purely internal (see 374, 426).
Examples: He who hears Ma.s.s on a holyday not intending to perform his duty, as he does not know that it is a holyday, has satisfied the law.
He who says the rosary out of devotion and then remembers that he has an obligation of saying it because of a promise made or of a penance received, can regard the rosary said as a fulfillment of his obligation.
(b) It is not necessary that one intend that which the lawgiver had in mind as the purpose of the law; for "the end of the law is not a part of the law." Example: A person who takes only one full meal during Lent, observes the letter of the law; but he misses its spirit if he eats or drinks greedily, daintily or copiously, in order to avoid the mortification intended by the law.
479. If one intends to perform what a law prescribes, but at the same time expressly intends not to satisfy, by that performance, the obligation imposed, one"s act is sufficient or insufficient for fulfillment according to the source from which the obligation arises.
(a) If the obligation arises from the will of the lawgiver, the act is a sufficient fulfillment, since the human lawgiver, as said in the previous paragraph, does not concern himself with what is purely internal. Example: If a person hears Ma.s.s on Sunday out of devotion, intending to hear another Ma.s.s in satisfaction of the Sunday duty, he is not bound to hear a second Ma.s.s, as he has already done all that the law requires.
(b) If the obligation arises from one"s own will, as in the case of a promise or a vow, the act above described is not sufficient fulfillment; for, as the obligation arose from the will, so also the mode of fulfillment is to be determined by the will. Example: One who has vowed to hear Ma.s.s, and who now while hearing Ma.s.s expressly determines that not this but another Ma.s.s will be in satisfaction of his vow, is bound by his vow to hear another Ma.s.s.
480. As to virtuous dispositions in fulfilling a law, it is to be observed that, while a good lawgiver always wishes them, he does not always require them as a duty of obedience. The virtuous dispositions referred to are of two kinds: (a) habitual, that is, the permanent spiritual condition of the soul, such as the state of grace, the habit of charity, etc.; (b) actual, that is, the good manner in which the commanded act is done, such as devout attention in hearing Ma.s.s, heartfelt contrition in making confession, freedom from vain-glory in fasting, etc.
481. Virtuous dispositions are or are not commanded according as that which is prescribed is or is not a mixed, or a purely external act (see above, 426).
(a) When a mixed act is commanded by law, the virtuous disposition that the nature of the case calls for, but nothing further, is strictly prescribed. Hence, the law of Easter Communion requires that Communion be received in the state of grace, the law of yearly confession that the penitent be truly contrite, the law of Sunday Ma.s.s that there be sufficient attention to the Ma.s.s; but more perfect dispositions (such as freedom from venial sin in the communicant, perfect contrition in the penitent, the state of grace in him who hears Ma.s.s) are not required for the fulfillment of the laws we are considering.
(b) When a purely external thing is commanded, the law does not require internal dispositions, and hence one who performs what is required is not obliged to repeat it on account of the imperfect way he obeyed.
Example: He who fasts while he is not in the state of grace is not obliged to fast again to make good what was lacking in his previous disposition.
482. Of course, what was said in the preceding paragraph has to do only with single laws, and with what is strictly needed for the fulfillment of the law. Hence: (a) he who sins because of the way in which he fulfills one law, violates another law (e.g., one who is willingly, though not entirely, distracted at Ma.s.s, obeys the church law of a.s.sistance at Ma.s.s on Sunday, but he disobeys the divine law that he worship G.o.d devoutly);
(b) he who has less devotion in obeying a law than he might have had, does not deserve reprehension as a transgressor, but his conduct is less praiseworthy.
483. Interpretation.--The meaning of interpretation and its various species were explained above in 315 sqq.
484. As to the force of interpretation of church laws, the following points must be noted:
(a) Authentic interpretation given in the form of law has the force of law; if it is merely declarative of words of the law certain in themselves, it does not need promulgation and is retroactive; if it is supplementary, it needs promulgation and is not retroactive, since it is a new law (Canon 17, 2);
(b) Authentic interpretation given in the form of judicial sentence or of rescript in a particular matter has not the force of law; and it obliges only the persons and affects only the things concerned (Canon 17, 3);
(c) Usual interpretation has the force of law when it is given through a legitimate custom (see above, 391 sqq.), for "custom is the best interpreter of law";
(d) Doctrinal interpretation has not the force of law, since it does not proceed from the lawgiver. Its value depends on the reasons and the authority by which it is supported. When all the doctors agree, their interpretation is morally certain; when they disagree, the various interpretations have more or less probability.
485. Rules for Doctrinal Interpretation.--(a) The words must be understood in their proper sense according to text and context, unless this be impossible; if doubtful, they must be judged according to parallel places in the Code, the circ.u.mstances, reason of the law, and the mind of the lawgiver (Canon 18).
(b) Things that are burdensome should be understood in their most restricted sense (Canon 19), things that are favorable in their widest sense. Thus, the censure p.r.o.nounced against simony is understood in the narrow sense of simony against the divine law; a privilege granted to the clergy is understood in the wide sense as given to all the clergy.
(c) Things that remain obscure should be understood in the sense that is least burdensome to subjects.
(d) A particular law derogates from a general law; but a general law does not derogate from a previous particular law, unless derogation is expressly mentioned in the general law; for the particular law is considered an exception to the general law (Canon 22).
486. Authentic interpretations of ecclesiastical laws are given by the legislator, his successor, or one delegated by either (Canon 17, 1).
(a) The Pope is the authentic interpreter of all ecclesiastical laws. A special commission appointed by the Pope interprets the general law of the Code. (b) The bishop is the authentic interpreter of diocesan laws made by himself or by his predecessors.
487. Cessation of Obligation.--The ordinary ways in which a law ceases to be obligatory for an individual are: (a) on the part of the subject, that he ceases to be subject to the law (exemption), or is unable to observe it (excuse); (b) on the part of the lawgiver, that he removes the obligation for the individual (dispensation).
488. As to exemption from Church laws note: (a) he who ceases to be subject to the law (e.g., one who has received a privilege of exemption, or who has departed from the place where the law is in force), is of course not obliged by the law; (b) neither is he guilty of any fault if he brought about his freedom only just before the law became effective and with the sole purpose of being exempt; for the law does not oblige that one remain subject to it.