41. Fear is a disturbance of mind caused by the thought that a future danger is impending. It is an obstacle to consent in various ways: (a) it lessens or takes away freedom of judgment, inasmuch as it hinders or suspends the reasoning processes; (b) it lessens the voluntariness of choice, inasmuch as it makes one decide for what is not of itself agreeable.
42. An act done under fear that impeded the use of judgment is: (a) involuntary, if the fear was so great that one was temporarily out of one"s mind. Example: t.i.tus is so panic-stricken at the thought that a wild animal is pursuing him that he fires a revolver in every direction; (b) less voluntary, if the fear prevents one from thinking with calmness and deliberation. Example: Caius is being questioned by a stern examiner who demands an immediate reply. Fearing to hesitate, Caius gives what he knows is a "bluffing" answer.
43. The acts of one who is under fear are of various kinds.
(a) Acts are done with fear, when the fear is concomitant--i.e., when it is not willed and does not cause the act, but is merely its occasion or would rather prevent it. Examples: Julius is ordered under pain of death to drink a gla.s.s of wine, a thing he was intending to do and which he would have done even without any threats. Balbus walks along a lonely road, because he must get home, but he trembles at the thought of robbers. Caius, a highwayman, at the point of the revolver, forces Balbus to hand over his purse, but he fears that the police may arrive before he has secured the money. t.i.tus, a business man, makes a trip by air, because he must reach another city without delay, but he has some apprehensions about his safety. All these men act, not because of, but apart from or in spite of their fears.
(b) Acts are done through fear, when fear causes an act that would not otherwise be performed. The fear may be antecedent (i.e., unwilled) or consequent (i.e., willed). Examples: Balbus, in the case mentioned above, surrendered his purse because of involuntary fear which was caused by the revolver of the robber. Claudius makes an act of sorrow for sin because of voluntary fear which he produces by thinking of the punishment of h.e.l.l.
44. The effects of fear, which do not take away the use of reason, on the voluntariness of acts are as follows.
(a) Acts done with fear are not made really involuntary on account of the fear that accompanies them, for they are done for their own sake, not out of fear or as a consequence of fear. They may be called relatively involuntary in the sense that, by reason of fear, they are comparatively unpleasant, unless one enjoys the thrill of danger.
Examples: Balbus, Caius and t.i.tus, in the cases mentioned above, acted with perfect willingness. Whether they enjoyed their experiences or not, depends on their att.i.tudes towards adventure and excitement.
(b) Acts done through fear are voluntary simply and absolutely, for the act done under the impulse of fear is what the agent considers here and now as most desirable. Examples: Balbus" surrender of his purse and Claudius" act of contrition are just what these two men wish to do as best suited to the circ.u.mstances.
(c) Acts done through fear are involuntary in a certain respect, if the agent can retain his inclination towards the opposite of the act and still avoid what he fears; otherwise, they are in no way involuntary.
Examples: Balbus retains his liking for the money taken from him by force, and hence the surrender of it to the highwayman, although voluntary, if all things are considered, is not voluntary, if only the money itself is considered. Claudius, on the contrary, retains no liking for his sins, for he knows that, if he does, he will defeat the purpose of his act of sorrow, which is to escape the pains of h.e.l.l; hence, his contrition, although the result of fear, is in no respect involuntary.
45. Pa.s.sion is a movement of the sensitive appet.i.te towards its object through love, desire, hope, or its repose therein through delight. It tends towards good, as fear tends away from evil (see 117 sqq.).
Pa.s.sion is an obstacle to consent in the following ways: (a) it takes away voluntariness (i.e., the quality of proceeding from an internal principle with knowledge of the end of the act), whenever it is so intense as to prevent knowledge; (b) it diminishes liberty (i.e., the quality of being perfectly voluntary, or indifferent as between many acts), even when it does not prevent knowledge.
46. Spiritual appet.i.tes fortify the reason, but the opposite is true of sensible appet.i.tes; for these latter draw all the attention to things that are lower and away from those that are higher, and impede the exercise of imagination and other senses that serve the reason. In extreme and rare cases pa.s.sion may be so intense as to distract from or prevent altogether the exercise of reason, or to produce insanity.
Thus, we sometimes hear of persons losing their minds through affection for money, or of performing irrational deeds under the excitement of joy.
47. With reference to the will, pa.s.sion is twofold. (a) It is antecedent, when it precedes the act of the will and causes it. In this case the pa.s.sion arises not from the will, but from some other cause (e.g., the bodily state, as when a sick man longs for food that is forbidden). (b) Pa.s.sion is consequent when it follows the act of the will and results from it. This may happen either without the will choosing the pa.s.sion (as when the very vehemence with which the will desires some object causes a corresponding sensitive emotion to awaken), or because the will has deliberately aroused the emotion in order to be able the better to act through its coperation.
48. Antecedent pa.s.sion makes an act more voluntary, since it makes the will tend with greater inclination to its object; but it likewise makes an act less free, since it impedes deliberation and disturbs the power of choice. Example: A man who takes extreme delight in sports, plays voluntarily, but is less free than if he were not so immoderately inclined that way.
49. Consequent pa.s.sion which results naturally from an intense act of the will does not increase the voluntariness of the act, since it is not its cause; but it does show that the act of the will is intense, for it is only that which is willed vehemently that overflows from the will and affects the emotions.
50. Consequent pa.s.sion which results from the deliberate choice of the will increases the voluntariness of the act that follows, since the act is performed with greater intensity on account of the pa.s.sion that has been deliberately excited.
51. What has been said about the pa.s.sions that tend to sensible good can be applied also to the pa.s.sions that are concerned with sensible evils, such as hatred, sadness, aversion, boldness, anger. If they are antecedent, they increase the voluntariness of an act, but diminish its freedom; and, if they cause a pa.s.sing frenzy or insanity, they take away all responsibility. If they are consequent, they either increase the willingness of the act, or indicate that it is willed with great intensity.
52. Violence, or coercion, is the use of force by an external agent to compel one to do what one does not want to do. Its effects on voluntariness are: (a) it cannot affect the internal act of the will, else we should have the contradiction that the act of the will was both voluntary, as proceeding from the will, and involuntary, as proceeding from external coercion; (b) it can affect external acts, such as walking, and so make them involuntary. If a boy is driven to school, the violence makes his going involuntary, but it does not make his will not to go to school involuntary.
53. Habits.--Characteristic of habits is a constant inclination, resulting from repeated acts, to perform similar acts (see 133 for definition of habit). Its effect[s] on the voluntariness of acts are:
(a) if the habit is in a sense involuntary, i.e., caused by free acts but retracted by a sincere act of contrition, it diminishes or even takes away voluntariness. If the actual advertence to the act is imperfect, the voluntariety is diminished; if advertence is totally absent, all voluntariety is taken away. Thus a drunkard who retracts his habit and makes an act of true contrition may again fall into sin because of the acquired dispositions to drink. Then the sins are less voluntary or at times, owing to total lack of advertence, may be regarded solely as material sins.
(b) if the habit is voluntary, i.e., acquired by free acts and not retracted, it increases the voluntariness in respect to the inclination to act. Should all advertence and deliberation be taken away, a rare occurrence, it diminishes the liberty of the act and consequently its morality as good or bad. Voluntariety, however, is not taken away entirely, since the habit itself was freely willed and hence acts flowing from it are voluntary in cause (see 35.). If sufficient advertence remains, the habit diminishes the freedom of the act owing to the impeding of reason; but this diminution of liberty is in accord with the will of the individual who freely contracted and conserves the habit to have facility in acting. Accordingly, absolutely speaking, a voluntary habit increases the voluntariety of acts caused by that habit and consequently increases their goodness or evil. Thus St. Thomas a.s.serts that one who sins from habit sins from certain malice, i.e., not from ignorance or pa.s.sion, but from the will"s own choice.
54. Natural propensities are inclinations that arise from bodily const.i.tution or physical condition (e.g., a strong native attraction to temperance or to intemperance not acquired by frequent acts). Natural propensities have the same kind of influence on the willingness of an act as involuntary habits (see 53.).
55. Pathological states are diseases of the brain or nerves that react upon the intellect and the will, such as various kinds of neuroses and psychoses, hysteria and epilepsy. The influence of pathological states on the voluntariness of acts seems similar in kind to that ascribed to antecedent pa.s.sion (see 48.). Caution must be observed in applying these principles to particular kinds of mental diseases.[1]
[1] In doubt whether an act a.s.sociated with a pathological state is free or not, the rule of moralists is lenient. When the act is sinful, it is not imputed as gravely sinful, for man is innocent until proven guilty. If the act is good, it is presumed voluntary and free and, consequently, meritorious. See Prummer, D.M., O.P., _Manuale Theologiae Moralis_ (Barcelona: Herder, 1946), I. n.93.
56. Two Kinds of Voluntary Acts.--Having discussed human or voluntary acts in general, we shall now indicate in particular the acts that are of this kind. There are two cla.s.ses of voluntary acts: (a) those elicited by the will; (b) those commanded by the will.
57. Acts Elicited by the Will.--The first cla.s.s of acts under the control of the will are those that are performed by the will itself--i.e., that are begun and completed in that power of the soul.
58. There are three acts of the will that are directed to the end the will has in view, viz., wish, intention and fruition. Wish is the love or inclination of the will towards the end without any reference to the means by which it is to be obtained: this is the first act of the will.
Intention is the direction of the will to the gaining of the end through certain means. Fruition is the enjoyment of the end after it has been gained: this is the last act of the will.
59. There are three acts of the will that are directed to the means and that follow after intention, viz., consent, election, and use. Consent follows upon the counsel of the intellect, and is an act of the will agreeing to several means as suitable for the intended end. Election follows after a practical judgment of the intellect about the means consented to, and is an act of the will which chooses one of the means in preference to the others, as being most suitable for gaining the intended end. Use is the act by which the will directs and moves the other powers to employ the particular means that has been chosen.
60. Acts Commanded by the Will.--The second cla.s.s of acts that are under the control of the will are those that proceed, not from the will itself, but from the other powers under the direction of the will.
61. Acts commanded by the will are of various kinds: (a) intellectual acts, such as judgment, reasoning, etc., performed under the direction of the will, (b) sensible acts such as sight, hearing, imagination, the pa.s.sions of love, hate, etc.; (c) external corporal acts, such as walking, writing, etc. None of the foregoing acts need be commanded by the will, as they may be indeliberate (see 23).
62. The following kinds of acts are not subject to the control of the will: (a) intellectual acts, such as the a.s.sent of the reason to self-evident truths, as regards the specification of the act; (b) sensible acts, such as the pa.s.sions considered as arising from bodily dispositions before they are adverted to; (c) acts of the vegetative life, such as digestion and growth; (d) bodily movements, such as the circulation of the blood and the beating of the heart.
Art. 3: ACTS AS MORAL
(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 18-20.)
63. In order that an act be a means by which man may tend to his Last End, it is not sufficient that it be human (proceeding from knowledge and will); it must also be morally good.
64. Definition.--Morality is the agreement or disagreement, of a human act with the norms that regulate human conduct with reference to man"s Last End. The act which is in agreement with those norms is morally good; the act which is in disagreement with them is morally bad. An act that neither agrees nor disagrees with the norms of morality, is called morally indifferent.
65. The const.i.tutive norm of morality is that which gives an act its moral quality. (a) Proximately, this is the relation of agreement or disagreement of the act to the rational nature of man considered in its entirety and with reference to its true happiness; (b) remotely, this norm is the relation of the act to G.o.d, the Last End of man.
66. Hence, that which makes an act morally good is its agreement with the nature of man as a rational being destined for heaven, and its promotion of the glory of G.o.d, which is the purpose of all creation.
67. The manifestative norm of morality is that through which the moral quality of acts is known. (a) Proximately, this is right reason, which is the superior faculty and guide of the will; (b) remotely, it is the divine intellect, from which reason receives its light.
68. The preceptive norm of morality is that which points out duty with respect to good and evil. (a) Proximately, it is conscience; (b) remotely, it is the law of G.o.d.
69. The species of morality are three: (a) an act is morally good when it is in harmony with the norms of morality mentioned above (e.g., prayer, works of charity); (b) an act is morally bad when it is out of harmony with those norms (e.g., blasphemy, injustice); (c) an act is morally indifferent when, if considered in the abstract, it neither agrees nor disagrees with moral norms (e.g., walking, riding, etc.).
70. The Sources of Morality.--The sources from which the morality of an act is derived are its own tendencies and modes, in so far as they have a relation of agreement or disagreement to the standards of morals.
These sources are: (a) the object of the act, from which it derives its essence (e.g., G.o.d is the object of charity); (b) the circ.u.mstances of the act, by which it is modified accidentally (e.g., fervor is a circ.u.mstance of the act of charity); (c) the purpose or end of the agent, which is the chief circ.u.mstance (e.g., to please G.o.d, as the purpose of a work of charity).
71. The object of an action is that to which it primarily and naturally tends as to its term and end, and from which it is named. Thus, an alms is directed immediately and of its own nature to the relief of the poor (end of the act); it is only secondarily and from the direction given it by the agent that it tends to generosity and edification, since the agent may give stingily, or from a bad motive (end of the agent).
72. The circ.u.mstances are all those conditions, different from the object, that affect the morality of the act. The chief moral circ.u.mstances are: (a) the time (i.e., the duration, the character of the day, as a holyday, fast-day, etc.); (b) the place (i.e., in public or in private, in church or elsewhere, etc.); (c) the manner (i.e., the advertence or inadvertence, the cruelty, etc.); (d) the quant.i.ty or quality of the thing done (e.g., that an alms is large or small, that the person who is helped is more or less deserving, etc.); (e) the purpose of the agent (e.g., that an alms is given to honor G.o.d); (f) the quality or condition of the agent (e.g., that the giver of an alms is poor himself); (g) the means used (e.g., that a benefactor"s own money is used against himself).
73. With reference to their influence on the moral character of acts, circ.u.mstances are divided as follows: (a) circ.u.mstances that change the kind of morality, by making what was good to be bad, what was indifferent to be good or bad, what was venial to be mortal, what belonged to one cla.s.s of mortal sins to take on another character, etc.; (b) circ.u.mstances that change the degree of morality, by making a good act more or less good, or by making a bad act more or less bad.
74. The purpose or end of an action is the reason which induces the agent to act. It is the chief circ.u.mstance of an act, and hence is treated as a separate source of morality.
75. The end or purpose is twofold. (a) It is the total end when it alone is intended, so that the action is done with no other aim in mind. Thus, if one helps the poor only to practise charity, the total motive is charity. (b) The end is partial when it is intended along with another motive of equal or unequal force. Thus, if a person helps the poor in order to relieve them and also to benefit temporarily by his charity, the a.s.sistance of others is only a partial motive of his act; and if he would not give alms except in view of the personal advantage he expects, charity becomes the secondary motive.
76. Good Acts.-An act is said to be entirely good when all its elements--its object, circ.u.mstances and purpose--are in conformity with the standards of morality. Thus, an alms given to one in need, in a considerate manner, and purely out of love for G.o.d, is good in every respect. Furthermore, the fact that the circ.u.mstances and purpose of the act are good increases the goodness derived from the object of the act.