126. Though the pa.s.sions are physically good and in their nature morally indifferent, they may have physical reactions or moral consequences that are harmful or evil. These dangers may be physical, mental or moral.
(a) Physical Dangers of the Pa.s.sions.--It is a well-known fact that there is a close connection between the pa.s.sions and the nerves, heart, and bodily organism in general, and that strong or persistent emotion can work great detriment to the health, producing disease, unconsciousness, or even death.
(b) Mental Dangers of the Pa.s.sions.--It is admitted by all that the pa.s.sions disturb the judgment, and can even take away the use of reason. For they act upon the body or the senses, and these in turn affect the mind in a way similar to what happens in sleep or intoxication. Thus, love makes one blind to the defects of the object of one"s love; fear makes one magnify the evil of what is dreaded; melancholy unbalances the mind, etc.
(c) Moral Dangers of the Pa.s.sions.--It is likewise a matter of common experience that the pa.s.sions are a source of many temptations and sins.
Often they are antecedent (i.e., not premeditated or willed), as when they arise from bodily states over which one has no control or from imaginations strongly fixed in the mind, and at the same time tend to that which is not according to right reason, rebelling against the law of the mind. Thus, a person whose health is bad is easily dispirited, and this feeling occasions temptations to despair; one whose memory is haunted with the image of a lost parent becomes a prey to sadness, which makes it difficult to perform duties with zest and diligence.
127. A pa.s.sion may become morally bad on account of the physical or mental evils connected with it. (a) Thus, a person has duties to his own well-being, and he indirectly wills (see 35 sqq., 94 sqq.) to neglect these duties, if he indulges harmful pa.s.sions. Example: Semp.r.o.nia grieves immoderately over the death of her mother, with the result that her health and mental vigor are impaired. (b) A person also has duties with respect to the life, health, and happiness of his neighbor, and he chooses to neglect these duties if he unjustly provokes emotions in others, foreseeing injurious consequences (see 96 sqq.). Examples: t.i.tus so vexes Balbus by petty annoyances that the latter loses appet.i.te and sleep, and becomes an invalid. Semp.r.o.nia so exasperates her father by long-continued unfilial conduct that the latter becomes insane. Caius appeals to prejudices in order to have injustice done to a rival.
128. As to pa.s.sions that incite to evil or deter from good, we must observe the following: (a) if the pa.s.sion is consequent, one is placing oneself or others in danger of sin, and one"s conduct must be judged according to the principles given in 258 sqq. (Examples: t.i.tus likes to brood over his troubles, although this causes temptations to neglect duty; Semp.r.o.nia makes remarks to a hot-headed acquaintance which are a provocation to great uncharitableness); (b) if the pa.s.sion is antecedent, it const.i.tutes a temptation which one is bound to resist (see 252 sqq.). Example: Balbus has a natural dislike for Caius, and often feels impelled to judge him rashly or treat him unjustly.
129. Antecedent or involuntary pa.s.sions, as well as other involuntary acts of imagination, thought and will, tending to evil, are sometimes called "first motions of the soul," as distinguished from consequent or voluntary pa.s.sions and acts, which are known as "second motions of the soul." The first motions are of two kinds: (a) those that precede all deliberation and consent, actual or virtual (_motus primo-primi_), and these are free from all sin; (b) those that precede full deliberation and consent, but follow on partial deliberation (_motus secundo-primi_). These latter are venial sins.
Most theologians since the Council of Trent maintain that the inordinate movements of pa.s.sion which precede the advertence of reason, such as l.u.s.t, envy, sloth, etc., are not sins. The Council of Trent defined that the _fomes peccati_ has never been understood by the Church to be truly a sin in the baptized, but has been called sin by St. Paul in the sense that it is from sin and inclines to sin (Council of Trent, fifth session). On the basis of this text some authors argue that it is of faith that the inordinate motions called _primo-primi_ are not sins for the baptized. The condemnation of both the fiftieth proposition of Baius: _The evil desires to which reason does not consent, and which man endures unwillingly (_invitus_), are prohibited by precept_; and his fifty-first: _l.u.s.t, or the law of the members, and evil desires of it, which men suffer unwillingly, are true disobedience of the law_; is interpreted as establishing as certain the non-sinfulness of such movements in infidels. (See Merklebach, O.P., _Summa Theol_. Mor., Vol. I, n. 448).
St. Thomas taught otherwise that such inordinate movements of pa.s.sion are venial sins (_Summa. Theol_. I-II, q. 74, a. 3, ad 2um; _de Malo_ q. 7, a. 6. ad 4m; _de Veritate_, q. 25, a. 5). Although they precede the deliberation of reason, they attain to the order of moral acts, however imperfectly, insofar as sensuality in man by its nature is made to be subject to reason. Reason can and ought to control these motions, but fails to do so owing to the great number of them possible to occur.
Hence they are not involuntary, but indirectly voluntary as sins of omission (_II Dist_. 24, q. 3, a. 2; _de Veritate_, q. 25, a. 5; _Quodlib_. IV, q. 11, a. 1). Since these movements are indirectly voluntary, St. Thomas" teaching does not conflict with the Council of Trent which speaks of the _fomes_ as habitual dispositions and not of its acts which St. Thomas considers. Clearly, too, his teaching does not fall under the condemnation of the propositions of Baius; with Baius the motions are involuntary, but for St. Thomas indirectly voluntary.
St. Thomas distinguishes the motions of sensuality differently from modern manualists. For him the motions-_primo-primi_ arise from corporal dispositions which are not under the control of reason and hence can not be sins. Motions-_secundo-primi_ arise from some apprehension of the internal senses proper to the pa.s.sions and can, at least if taken singly, and ought to be ruled by reason. Thus, they are moral acts (_de Malo_, q. VII, a. 6, ad 8um; _II Dist_. 24, q. 3, a. 2).
130. Bodily suffering or sickness is sometimes called a pa.s.sion of the body, but, unlike the pa.s.sions of the soul, it is a physical evil.
Morally considered, it is indifferent in itself, but it has contacts with morality in various ways. (a) Thus, it may receive morality from the will. Examples: Sufferings endured with resignation are acts of virtue; sickness or pain inflicted upon others is imputable to the unjust cause. (b) It may affect the morality of the act of the will.
Examples: Severe toothache or other exquisite pain is an extenuating circ.u.mstance in sins of grumbling, for the suffering draws so much attention to itself that deliberation on other things is much diminished; weakness of stomach may be a moral advantage in freeing one from temptations to over-eating.
131. Though the pa.s.sions are good in themselves, they are often morally dangerous. The regulation of the pa.s.sions through the virtues of fort.i.tude and temperance will be treated later on, but we shall indicate here some natural means by which, G.o.d helping, their first motions may be controlled. (a) Thus, if a pa.s.sion is not strong, it may be repressed directly by command of the will. Example: The impulse to anger may sometimes be checked by the command of silence. (b) If a pa.s.sion is strong, it may be combated through other activities which are its opposites or which, through the amount of energy they call for, will diminish proportionately the force of the pa.s.sion. Examples: In time of fear one can fall back on thoughts of confidence; in time of mourning one can seek joy or alleviation in the society of friends or in the repose of sleep. Study or other strenuous occupation is an excellent means to overcome impetuous pa.s.sion.
(c) If a pa.s.sion is persistent, it may be diverted to some lawful object vividly represented and held in the imagination and thoughts.
Examples. Those who are inclined to love immoderately the world or the things that are in the world should direct their love to divine goodness. Those who are inclined to be too fearful of men should think how much more G.o.d is to be feared.
Question II
GOOD AND BAD HABITS
132. Having considered human acts and the pa.s.sions, we now pa.s.s to a consideration of the principles from which acts proceed proximately.
These principles are, first, the faculties, powers or forces of the soul (such as the intellect, will, sense, appet.i.te, and vegetative powers); and, secondly, the habits which permanently modify the faculties. For some faculties may be turned in various directions, either favorably or unfavorably, as regards their ends, and it is the stable bent given to a faculty that is called a habit. Thus, the intellect may be directed towards its end, which is truth, by the habit of knowledge; or away from that end by the habit of ignorance.
Likewise, the will may be directed towards or away from its end, which is good, by virtue or vice. The faculties are treated in Psychology, but the habits, since they turn the faculties towards good or evil, must be considered in Moral Theology, as well as in philosophy.
Art. 1: HABITS IN GENERAL
(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 49-54.)
133. Definition.--A habit is a perfect and stable quality by which a being is well- or ill-affected in itself, or with regard to its motions. It differs from mere disposition or tendency, which is an imperfect and transitory quality. Thus, a sallow complexion is a habit; a blush, a disposition.
134. Division.--Habits are variously divided, as follows:
(a) From the viewpoint of their subject, they are either ent.i.tative or operative, according as they affect directly the nature or the powers of a being. Thus, in the soul there are the ent.i.tative habit of sanctifying grace and operative habits like science and virtue; while in the body are ent.i.tative habits of health, beauty, etc.
(b) From the viewpoint of their object, habits are good (i.e., virtues) or evil (i.e., vices);
(c) From the viewpoint of their cause, habits are infused or acquired, according as they are supernaturally produced by G.o.d, or are naturally obtained by man through repeated acts, or result from nature without repeated acts. Faith in a baptized infant is an infused habit; knowledge obtained through study is an acquired habit; the perception that the first principles of truth are to be granted is natural.
135. Operative acquired habits are defined as qualities not easily changed, by which a faculty that is able to act in various ways is disposed to act in one way with ease, readiness and pleasure. Thus, by training a man acquires a correct carriage, and is able to walk straight without difficulty.
136. Operative infused habits are enduring qualities that give to a faculty the power to perform acts that are supernatural. Thus, the infused virtues of faith, hope and charity give to the intellect and the will the ability to elicit acts with reference to supernatural truth and good. Facility and prompt.i.tude with respect to these acts come through the use of the infused power.
137. Strengthening and Weakening of Habits.--Habits are increased: (a) extensively when they are applied to more objects--thus the habit of science grows as it is applied to more truths; (b) intensively, when they are rooted more firmly in their subject and become easier to exercise. This last comes about when intense acts of a habit are frequently repeated. Thus, a habit of virtue or vice becomes a second nature, and it is exercised with ever greater delight and resisted with ever-increasing difficulty.
138. The infused habits cannot be diminished, but they can be destroyed (see 745). As to the acquired habits, they are weakened and destroyed chiefly in two ways: (a) by acts opposed to them, especially if these acts are earnest and frequent--thus, evil custom is overcome by good custom, and vice-versa; (b) by long discontinuance or disuse. Thus, a person who has learned a foreign language will forget it, if he fails to speak, read or hear it. The knowledge of first principles, speculative or moral, is not lost, however, through forgetfulness, as experience shows.
139. Accidentally, a habit may be corrupted through injury of an organ that is necessary for the exercise of the habit. Thus, right moral judgment may be lost if certain areas of the brain are affected.
140. Habits and Morality.--The importance of habits in man"s moral life is very great. (a) Habits are an index to a man"s past career, for the ease and facility he now possesses through them is the result of many struggles and efforts and difficulties overcome, or of defeats and surrenders and neglected opportunities. (b) Habits const.i.tute a man"s moral character. Morally, a person is the sum of his moral habits and dispositions grouped around the central interest or idea of his life.
He who would know himself, therefore, cannot do better than to examine what are his habits, and which is the predominant one among them. (e) Habits are a prophecy of the future. Habits are not irresistible and do not destroy freedom, but they produce such ease and readiness for acting in one particular way that the probabilities are, when habits are strong, that a person will continue to follow them in the future as he has done in the past, thus progressing or deteriorating, as the case may be.
141. Duties as regards Habits.--(a) Bad habits should be avoided and those that have been formed should be destroyed (see 138). The means to accomplish these victories are divine help obtained through prayer and the other instrumentalities of grace, watchfulness through self-examination, and the cultivation of a spirit of self-denial, as well as attack made on the habit that is forming or already formed (see 255 sqq.)
(b) Good habits should be acquired, and those already possessed should be exercised and put to the best advantage. The means to this end, in addition to those that are supernatural, are especially a realization of the importance of good habits, a great desire to have them, and constant and regular effort to practise them (see 137).
Art. 2: GOOD HABITS OR VIRTUES
(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, qq. 55-70.)
142. Definition.--A virtue is a good habit of the free powers of the soul, that is a principle of good conduct, and never of conduct that is evil. Hence, the following are not virtues: (a) an occasional inclination to good, for this is not a fixed habit; (b) good habits of the body or of the vegetative powers, etc. (such as beauty and health), for these are not free; (c) knowledge of the right or affection for it without any reference to practice, for virtue is a principle of right living; (d) habits that can be applied indifferently to good or bad conduct, such as human opinion.
143. Division.--The virtues are divided: (a) according to their different causes, into infused and acquired virtues (cfr. 134 sqq.);(b) according to their different objects, into intellectual, moral and theological virtues.
144. The intellectual virtues are those habits that perfect the intellect with reference to its good--i.e., truth, speculative or practical.
145. The speculative virtues are three: understanding, knowledge and wisdom.
(a) Understanding or intelligence is the habit of perceiving truths that are not in need of proof, as being self-evident. Axiomatic truths or first principles are the object of this virtue.
(b) Knowledge or science is the habit of perceiving truths that are learned from other truths by argumentation, and that are ultimate in some category of being. The object of this virtue embraces the various sciences (like astronomy) which are conclusions from principles.
(c) Wisdom is the habit of learning through reasoning the truth that is absolutely ultimate; it is the knowledge of things in their supreme cause, G.o.d. Examples are theology and philosophy in their highest sense.
146. The practical intellectual virtues are two: prudence and art.
(a) Prudence is an intellectual virtue which indicates in individual cases what is to be done or what is to be omitted, in order that one may act according to the requirements of good morals.