1193. Internal Effects of Charity.--There are three acts of the soul that result from love, viz., joy, peace, mercy. (a) The joy of charity is a repose or delight of the soul in the perfections of G.o.d and in the union of self and the neighbor with Him: "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy" (Gal., v. 22). (b) The peace of charity is the harmony of man with G.o.d, self and the neighbor: "There is much peace to those that love Thy law" (Ps. cxviii. 165). (c) Mercy is an inclination of the will to relieve the misery of another; it follows from charity, for love of the brotherhood "weeps with them that weep" (Rom., xii. 10, 15).
1194. Joy.--The precept of charity includes a precept of joy, and hence the Apostle says: "Rejoice in the Lord always; again, I say, rejoice"
(Philip., iv. 4, 5). This joy of charity has the following properties: (a) it is about good, not about iniquity, and it is not unrestrained; it rejoices "in the Lord"; (b) it should not be discontinued or interrupted by sin, but should rejoice "always." It may, however, be mixed with sorrow over sin or the delay of entrance into the presence of G.o.d ( Rom., xii. 15; Ps. cxix. 5), for only in heaven will joy be filled (John, xv. 11). St. Paul spoke of himself as "sorrowful, yet always rejoicing" (II Cor., vi. 10).
1195. Peace.--The precept of charity also includes a precept of peace, and our Lord commands: "Have peace among yourselves" (Mark, ix. 49).
Peace, like joy, has two properties: (a) it should be genuine (i.e., it should be a contentment and agreement based on right), for there is a false peace, of which Christ says: "I am not come to bring peace"
(Matt, x. 34), which rests in a good that is only apparent, and which does not exclude great evil and anxiety (Wis., xiv. 22), (b) peace is constant, for, as long as charity remains, there are friendly relations with G.o.d and man, and order in the interior of the soul. Perfect tranquility, it is true, is found only in heaven. On earth, disturbances may arise in the lower part of the soul, or from without, but the will continues in the peace of G.o.d (II Cor., i. 4).
1196. Reconciliation of a sinner to G.o.d is effected through an act of perfect charity: "He who loves Me, will be loved by My Father and I will love him" (John, xiv. 21). (a) Thus, sin is washed away, even before Baptism or absolution, when the sinner makes an act of love of G.o.d joined with a desire, at least implicit, of receiving the Sacrament of Baptism or Penance. The act of love is not the cause, but the final disposition introducing justification. (b) The punishment of sin is forgiven, when one makes an act of love, or performs a good deed out of love of G.o.d; but the degree of remission corresponds to the fervor of the charity.
1197. Does the precept of peace demand unanimity of judgments?
(a) In matters of greater importance, there should be agreement in judgments; else, there will not be that harmony of wills, desiring the same things and disliking the same things, which const.i.tute peace. In necessary things, therefore, there should be unity of judgments: "I beseech of you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you, but that you be perfect in the same mind and in the same judgment" (I Cor., i. 10).
(b) In matters of slight importance, difference of opinion does not remove friendship, for each one thinks that his judgment will better serve the good that is sought alike by all. We find that even very holy men have disagreed on matters of opinion--for example, Paul and Barnabas on the question whether or not Mark should be taken on the second missionary journey (Acts, xv. 37), Jerome and Augustine on the status of Mosaic observances after the death of Christ. Disputes may offend against charity, however, if they become too personal or too heated, as sometimes happens even to minds occupied with heavenly things (e.g., theologians, spiritual writers).
1198. Reconciliation with enemies is necessary, in order that peace may be maintained. It includes: (a) internally, the putting away of thoughts and feelings contrary to concord; (b) externally, signs of renewed charity, if there has been an open breach.
1199. The duty of reconciliation does not necessitate the forgiveness of every kind of wrong suffered from an enemy--that is, it does not always oblige one freely to remit the consequences of an enemy"s acts.
There are three kinds of wrong: (a) offenses, which are such contradictions offered to the will of another as do not trespa.s.s on any strict right or occasion any damage. Example: Balbus, who is in great distress, asks his friend t.i.tus to secure employment for him. t.i.tus could easily do this favor, but he refuses; (b) injuries, which are violations of the strict right of another, but without damage. Example: Claudia addresses Caia in very disrespectful language when no witnesses are present; (c) damages, which are the taking from another of what is his, or harm done to him as regards his soul, his life, his fame, or his fortune. Examples are theft, scandal, a.s.sault and slander.
1200. Whether an offender asks pardon or not, one is obliged to forgive the offense--that is, to put aside all aversion, indignation and hatred: "Forgive us our trespa.s.ses, as we forgive them that trespa.s.s against us" (Matt., vi. 12). But, granting that one desires salvation for the offender as for others, shows the common signs of charity, and is not prompted by hatred, the following are not required: (a) that one so pardon the offense as to take the offender back to the same special friendship as may have existed before; (b) that one overlook an injury so as not to require satisfaction (and hence, without acting against charity, Gaia may insist on an apology from Claudia for the disrespectful language used by the latter); and (c) that one renounce rest.i.tution or reparation for damage done one. No one is obliged to give to another what is one"s own, and, if there is no other way of securing one"s rights, one may have recourse to court. If the result of prosecution will be punishment of the offender rather than rest.i.tution (as in case of libel or slander), it is not uncharitable to prosecute the offender, if one"s motive is the fulfillment of justice, the prevention of the same wrong to others, or the honor of one"s family (Lev., xix. 17).
1201. There are cases, however, in which charity requires one to forgive a debt of satisfaction or rest.i.tution, namely, when this would impose too heavy a burden on the offender, compared with the benefit that would be derived therefrom. (a) Thus, rest.i.tution should not be insisted on, when the offender is repentant and can ill afford to pay the debt, and the party offended can easily get along without the payment. (b) Punishment should not be insisted on, if the harm done the offender or his family will be out of proportion to any good that may result. (c) Prosecution should not be used, if a wrong can be amicably adjusted out of court (I Cor., vi. 1).
1202. Who should make the advances towards reconciliation after a rupture of charitable relations? (a) If only one party was the offender, he should normally make the first move towards reconciliation. It is of counsel, but not of precept, that the innocent party ask for reconciliation, unless the circ.u.mstances require that he should do so, as when the offended party can much more easily make the advances, or when great scandal will arise, or when the offender will become hardened in hate and lose his soul, if the party offended does not make efforts for peace. (b) If both parties were offenders, he who offended more seriously should make the advances. (c) If both offended equally, he who was first to disturb the peace should also be first to work for its restoration. (d) If it does not appear which of the parties was more to blame in any of the foregoing ways, both are equally bound.
1203. The manner of seeking reconciliation is as follows: (a) Reconciliation can be sought either in person, or through an intermediary who is a friend to both parties. (b) It can be sought either explicitly (by expressing regret and asking pardon), or implicitly (by a friendly conversation or favors shown). Generally speaking, an inferior (e.g., a child) should explicitly request reconciliation with a superior (e.g., a parent); but it will suffice for a superior to seek forgiveness from an inferior implicitly.
1204. The time for seeking reconciliation is the earliest possible moment: "If thou offer thy gift at the altar, and there thou remember that thy brother hath anything against thee, leave there thy offering before the altar, and go first to be reconciled to thy brother, and then coming thou shalt offer thy gift" (Matt, v. 23, 24). (a) Thus, internal reconciliation (i.e., repentance on the part of the offender and forgiveness on the part of the one offended) should not be delayed, and should precede any sacred action, such as offering a gift to G.o.d, if this latter is to be acceptable and meritorious. (b) External reconciliation (i.e., asking pardon and making satisfaction) and the manifestation of forgiveness should be attended to as soon as the circ.u.mstances of time and place permit. The resolve to be reconciled externally is included in internal reconciliation, but prudence dictates that one wait for the suitable occasion, lest precipitation make matters worse.
1205. Mercy.--From charity results mercy, for he who loves his neighbor as a friend in G.o.d, must grieve over the latter"s sorrows as if they were his own. Our Lord commands: "Be ye merciful, as your Heavenly Father is also merciful" (Luke, vi. 36). But not all compa.s.sion is true mercy or supernatural.
(a) Thus, as regards the object that causes sorrow, true mercy grieves over the evils that befall another against his will, such as sickness, failure in an enterprise, or undeserved misfortune. But wilful evil, such as sin, provokes not mercy, but rather indignation, although one may compa.s.sionate sinners on account of the ills their sins bring on them (Matt., ix. 36).
(b) As regards the internal cause of sorrow or sympathy, supernatural mercy arises from the love of charity for the one suffering; natural mercy, from the fear one has that a similar evil may overtake oneself, or that oneself may suffer loss on account of another"s misfortune.
(c) As regards the act of mercy, it is to be noted that it proceeds from the will, regulates the emotions, and is itself regulated by reason. Thus, mercy differs from the sensible distress a refined person experiences at the sight of suffering, which, though good in itself, may never lead to a wish to alleviate sorrow. Thus, also, it differs from unregulated sympathy, which bestows help or forgiveness indiscriminately, without thought of the greater evils that may result; it differs from sentimentality, which does not restrain tears and other emotional expressions within due bounds. The virtue of mercy has a care for the interests of justice, but mere pity, like prejudice, blinds the mind to what is true and right.
1206. The causes of an unmerciful spirit are: (a) lack of charity towards one who is in misery; (b) pride or too much prosperity, which makes one feel that others suffer justly, or that one is above their condition (Prov., xxviii. 4); (c) great misfortunes or fears that have hardened one"s disposition, or made one self-centered.
1207. Mercy Compared with the Other Moral Virtues.--(a) Mercy, if taken for the emotion of sympathy as regulated by reason, is inferior to prudence and justice, which are perfections of the higher powers of the soul (i.e., of the intellect and will). (b) Mercy, if taken for an act of the will disliking the misery of another and moving one to remove that misery, surpa.s.ses the other moral virtues; indeed, it may be said to be something divine, and hence more than a virtue. Certainly, it is the greatest of the virtues that have to do with the neighbor, for of its nature it implies freedom from some defect and the relief of that defect in others, which is not the case with other virtues. Thus, while prudence directs acts and justice renders to others their due, these do not of themselves remove ignorance or dest.i.tution in a neighbor.
1208. Mercy Compared with Charity.--(a) In itself (i.e., considered precisely as to its essential notes of freedom from misery and relief given to the miserable), mercy is the greatest of the virtues. For, carried to its highest development, freedom from defect means infinite perfection; while relief of defect in others means that, out of infinite love for the Supreme Good, relief is poured out by G.o.d on His creatures. Thus, in G.o.d mercy is an extension of the love G.o.d has towards His own goodness, for the benefit of creatures, and is greater than charity: "The mercy of G.o.d is above all His works" (Ps. cxliv. 9).
(b) In its subject (i.e., considered precisely as to the perfection it brings to its possessor), mercy is inferior in creatures to charity.
For it is better to be united by love to the Supreme Good than to remove evil in a creature: "Above all these things have charity" (Col, iii. 14). Mercy is the sum of the Christian religion as far as external works are concerned, but charity is the sum of Christianity as regards internal acts.
1209. The Obligation of Mercy.-(a) The natural law itself inculcates mercy, but those not influenced by divine revelation have not highly esteemed it or practised it. Thus, Plato wished that all the poor might be sent into exile. Virgil thought that freedom from pity was a sign of wisdom; Seneca called mercy a vice of the soul; Nietzsche taught that compa.s.sion has no place in the morality of the superman.
(b) The divine law commands mercy, especially in the New Testament.
a.s.sistance of the poor, the widows, the orphans, the sick, the captives, the slaves and other unfortunates is everywhere insisted on: "I will show thee what the Lord requireth of thee: verily to do justice, and to love mercy, and to walk solicitous with thy G.o.d"
(Mich., vi. 8).
1210. External Effects of Charity.--Three external effects of charity will now be considered-beneficence, almsgiving and fraternal correction. These are not distinct virtues, but only separate acts pertaining to the virtue of charity and proceeding--like love, joy and peace--from the same motive of love of G.o.d. (a) Thus, beneficence naturally results from charity, since one of the acts of friendship is to do good to one"s friend; (b) almsgiving is one of the special ways in which beneficence is exercised; (c) fraternal correction is a species of spiritual almsgiving.
1211. Beneficence.--Not every act of helping others is virtuous, nor is all virtuous a.s.sistance called beneficence. (a) Thus, to a.s.sist others in evil is maleficence, nor is it virtuous to help them with an evil purpose. Examples: To give money to criminals to help them defeat the law is partic.i.p.ation in crime. To give presents to others in order to receive a return of favor from them is cupidity (Luke, xiv. 12). (b) To a.s.sist others or to give to them out of compa.s.sion for misery, is mercy; to do so out of a sense of obligation, is justice; to do so out of love of G.o.d, is beneficence.
1212. Beneficence is a duty, and like charity should be universal: "While we have time, let us work good to all men" (Gal., vi. 10); "Do good to them that hate you" (Matt., v. 44). But this does not mean that no discrimination is to be used in beneficence, or that impossibilities are required.
(a) Not every kind of activity in which others are engaged is deserving of a.s.sistance, not every kind of suffering of others may be removed.
Examples: Criminals or enemies of the State are not to be a.s.sisted in their wrongdoing, but one may attempt to bring them to better conduct; one who has been justly sentenced to prison may not be aided to escape, but he may be visited and consoled and given religious a.s.sistance.
(b) Not all can be helped individually; even the richest and most generous person can benefit only a small percentage of those who are deserving. Charity requires, however, that one be so disposed that one would help all individually, if it were possible, and that one does help all generally, by praying for both Catholics and non-Catholics.
1213. Since it is impossible to help all individually, beneficence should be regulated by the order of charity (see 1174 sqq.), and particular good should be done to those with whom on account of conditions of time or place one is more closely a.s.sociated. Hence, the following general rules are given:
(a) In benefits that pertain to a particular kind of relationship; one should give the preference, other things being equal, to those with whom one has that relationship. Examples: To make a banquet for another is a benefit pertaining to friendship, and hence should be shown to one who is a friend, rather than to one who is a business a.s.sociate, but not an intimate. To support another person is a benefit pertaining to kinship, and hence should be shown to a parent, rather than to a stranger.
(b) In benefits given to those with whom one has the same kind of relationship, one should give the preference, other things being equal, to those nearer in relationship. Example: In dispensing alms, one should help one"s own family rather than distant relatives.
1214. If other things are not equal, the foregoing rules must sometimes be reversed.
(a) When the common good is involved, preference should be given those who represent it, even though others are nearer to one as regards private good. Hence, a citizen should help the fortunes of his adopted country rather than those of his mother country; in a civil war one should aid rather one"s comrades than one"s kinsmen who are on the opposite side.
(b) When a supreme good of a private person is at stake, one should prefer to help him, even if a stranger, rather than another who is a friend, or relative, but who is not in the same distress. Example: One should give one"s loaf to a man dying of starvation rather than to one"s own father, who is hungry but not starving.
(c) When the means with which a benefit is bestowable belong to another, one must prefer to give back what belongs to the other, even if this person is a stranger, rather than use it for the good of a friend or relative. Thus, if a person has stolen money or has borrowed money from a stranger, he must return it to the owner, rather than make a present of it to his own wife. An exception would be the case in which the wife was in dire necessity, whereas the owner was not; but the duty of rest.i.tution would remain for the future.
1215. No general rule can be laid down for all cases in which one party is nearer to self and the other party more in need, and many such cases have to be decided according to prudent judgment in view of all the circ.u.mstances. It should be noted that, though wife and children are nearer to one than parents, the latter have a greater claim on charity when they are in equally extreme necessity, on account of the supreme benefit of life received from them. But ordinarily one is bound rather to provide for one"s children (II Cor., xii. 14).
1216. Almsgiving.--Almsgiving is defined: "a.s.sistance to one who is in need, given out of compa.s.sion and for the love of G.o.d." Hence, this act pertains to various virtues. (a) It is elicited by the virtue of mercy, which means that compa.s.sion for misery is the immediate principle which produces almsgiving. (b) It is commanded by the virtue of charity, which means that love of G.o.d is the remote principle or end of an alms, for, as said above (see 1205), mercy itself is an effect of charity (I John, iii. 17). (c) Secondarily, it may also be commanded by other virtues. Thus, if a person gives an alms to satisfy for his sins, he performs an act of justice; if he gives in order to honor G.o.d, he performs an act of religion; if he gives without undue grief over the loss of what he gives, he practises liberality.
1217. Qualities Recommended for Almsgiving.--(a) Alms should not be given ostentatiously (Matt, vi. 2 sqq.), though it is often edifying that they receive publicity (Matt., v. 16); (b) they should be given cheerfully (II Cor., ix. 7).
1218. Forms of Almsgiving.--(a) In the strict sense, an alms is a gift made without any obligation of payment or return; (b) in a wide sense, almsgiving includes selling on credit as a favor to a poor customer, a loan granted at a low rate of interest or without interest, help in securing employment, etc. Thus, if a poor man is sufficiently helped by the use of an article, there is no need of making him a present of it.
1219. Almsgiving is to be distinguished, also, from mere giving. (a) Thus, a.s.sistance given the poor out of a bad motive (e.g., to lead them away from their religion, to induce them to crime) is sinful; (b) a.s.sistance given the poor out of a merely natural good motive (e.g., pity for their sufferings) is philanthropy, but not charity (I Cor., xiii. 3), and may coexist with the state of hatred of G.o.d.
1220. Corporal alms, in the form of bodily necessaries given freely in themselves or in their money equivalent, are of as many kinds as there are bodily needs. (a) Hence, the common necessities of food, drink, clothing and shelter should be provided as alms to the starving and to those who lack sufficient clothing, or who are without a home. (b) Special necessities, whether internal (such as sickness) or external (such as persecution or imprisonment), should be relieved or a.s.suaged by remedies, visits, protection or relief. (c) The necessity of the body after death is that it be cared for with the honor which the memory of the deceased deserves, and hence burial of the dead is numbered among the corporal alms.
1221. Thus, there are seven corporal works of mercy. (a) Those that pertain to the needs of the body during life are mentioned by our Lord in Matt., xxv. 35, 36. (b) The burial of the dead is praised in scripture as a good work, as we see in the cases of Tobias (Tob., i, ii, xii), and of those who buried our Lord (Matt, xxvi. 12, xxvii. 57 sqq.).
1222. Spiritual alms, consisting of a.s.sistance given those who suffer want in mind or spirit, are either prayers, by which divine aid is asked for them, or various acts by which human aid is conferred. These acts are also of two kinds, and const.i.tute seven spiritual works of mercy.
(a) The defects from which a soul suffers, and which are not moral, include ignorance in the intellect, doubt in the practical judgment, and sadness in the affections; and hence the acts of almsgiving for such cases are instruction, counsel, and comfort.
(b) The defects of soul which are moral are the guilt of sin and its consequences--that is, the offense given and the burdens that result for the sinner or others. The corresponding spiritual alms are admonition against sin, pardon of the offense done to self, patience in bearing with the difficult ways of others, especially if they err through infirmity, or willingness in helping them to bear the consequences of their errors (Rom., xv. 1).