1658. The Gift of Counsel.--The Gifts of the Holy Ghost supplement the theological virtues by ministering to them; but they supplement the moral virtues, of which prudence is the first, by aiding and perfecting them. The Gift that corresponds directly to prudence is Counsel, for both are concerned with the direction of human acts, prudence directing by the standard of human reason and counsel by the Holy Ghost Himself.
1659. Definition.--Counsel is defined as "an infused habit which makes the soul prompt to receive and act upon the enlightenment offered by the Holy Ghost about the means to be chosen with a view to its own eternal salvation."
(a) Counsel is different from the virtue of wise deliberation spoken of in 1646; for, while the virtue enables one to do good in a human manner and from one"s own motion (e.g., by seeking advice, by making inquiries, etc.), the Gift enables one to do good in a superhuman manner and under the motion of the Holy Ghost (i.e., by hearkening to the advice offered by G.o.d).
(b) Counsel is different also from the charism of good counsel, which makes certain persons remarkable as advisors or directors. Thus, Mathathias when dying said to his sons: "I know that your brother Simon is a man of counsel; give ear to him always, and he shall be a father to you" (I Mach., ii. 65). St. Antoninus of Florence was so successful in guiding those who came to him with their difficulties that he was called "Antoninus of the Counsels." The Gift is intended to benefit its possessor, and it is therefore had by all the just; but the charism is for the benefit of others, and is freely bestowed according to the will of G.o.d only on certain individuals who have a special mission of directing or a.s.sisting their neighbors.
1660. Subject-Matter of Counsel.--The subject-matter of the Gift of Counsel embraces all that pertains to salvation, both the things that are necessary and are commanded and the things that are not necessary and are only counselled.
1661. The Gift of Counsel may direct one at times to courses that are singular and extraordinary. But, since the Apostolic rule is that one should not believe every spirit but should prove the spirits whether they are from G.o.d (I John, iv. 1; I Thess., v. 21), persons who feel called to unusual kinds of life should submit their ideas to the judgment of the Church: "Arise and go into the city, and there it shall be told thee what thou must do" (Acts, ix. 7).
1662. The Beat.i.tude and Fruits that Correspond to the Gift of Counsel.--(a) Counsel directs one to all the means that are useful for the attainment of life eternal, but especially to acts of mercy, for, as St. Augustine remarks, without mercy shown to others we cannot be freed from our own evils. Cognate to Counsel, therefore, is the Fifth Beat.i.tude: "Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy"
(Matt., v. 7).
(b) Counsel is practical, and hence its ultimate result will be action of some kind. The acts which its fa.r.s.eeing view puts especially into exercise are acts of mercy, and acts of mercy have sweetness and agreeableness when accompanied by a sympathetic love of the afflicted and a cheerful and generous service of their needs. There belong to mercy, then, the two delightful acts or fruits of the Spirit mentioned in Gal., v, 22, and called goodness (i.e., internal benevolence) and kindness (i.e., external beneficence).
1663. The Sins Against Prudence.--There are two cla.s.ses of sins opposed to prudence. (a) Manifestly opposed to it are those sins that consist in a want of the acts or conditions requisite for prudence. These may be called sins of imprudence or sins that offend prudence by way of non-use. (b) Seemingly allied with prudence are those sins that consist in a wrong application of the acts or conditions of the virtue. These may be called sins of pseudo-prudence, or sins that offend against prudence by way of abuse. We shall speak first of imprudence and then of pseudo-prudence.
1664. Kinds of Imprudence.--There are three kinds of imprudence. (a) Negatively considered, imprudence is nothing more than the absence of prudence, and it is not necessarily a sin. Thus, children and young people through no fault of their own are negatively imprudent, though of course their lack of prudence may be traced back to original sin.
(b) Privatively considered, imprudence is the failure to have the habitual prudence that one is bound and able to possess. This failure is due to the fact that one has taken no pains to educate oneself through study, sermons, instructions, etc., so as to be able to act prudently when the occasion arises. Privative imprudence is therefore reducible to the sin of negligence, although negligence itself, as being opposed to carefulness (1634), is also against prudence, as we shall see.
(c) Contrarily considered, imprudence is the voluntary omission of some act or condition demanded by prudence (as when one is so taken up with amus.e.m.e.nts that one makes no effort to deliberate on an important matter or deliberates with undue haste), or the voluntary commission of an act exclusive of an act or condition of prudence (as when one expressly contemns deliberations or decides to act against the rules of prudence). This kind of imprudence is a mortal sin when it leads away from things necessary for salvation; otherwise it is a venial sin.
1665. Sinfulness of Imprudence.--Is imprudence a general sin, that is, a sin which is included in every kind of sin?
(a) Imprudence is not included in every kind of sin in the sense that it forms a part of the very nature of every kind of sin; for, just as prudence has its own special acts (i.e., to direct according to reason), distinct from those of other virtues, so has imprudence its own special defects that do not belong to other kinds of sin.
(b) Imprudence is included in every kind of sin in the sense that everyone who sins acts imprudently in sinning; for, just as one does not act virtuously unless prudence directs one, so one does not act sinfully unless there is some defect in the deliberation, or decision, or direction given by reason.
1666. It should be noted that, while the defects against deliberation, decision, and direction are so many different kinds of imprudence, they do not form species of sin distinct from the motivating sin if they are all directed to one evil purpose. Hence, if a person has deliberated badly, decided badly, and directed badly in the matter of striking a priest, he needs to confess but one sin, namely, that of laying sacrilegious hands on a cleric.
1667. The Sin of Haste.--The sin of haste or precipitancy pa.s.ses over or hurries over the processes of deliberation that ought to precede action; it devotes little or no attention to memory of past experiences, understanding of present conditions, or conjecture of future possibilities; it does not give to a question the proper amount of study or of consultation. It is of two kinds, ordinary and rash.
(a) Ordinary precipitancy results from a strong inclination of the will or of the pa.s.sions, as when a person speaks in anger before he has thought of the serious consequences of his words, or marries without reflection, or purchases an article the worth of which he does not know, or agrees to something about which he is in the dark, etc. Both Holy Writ and popular proverbs strongly condemn this sin.
(b) Rash precipitancy results from contempt of the law, as when one so despises an ordinance as to violate it without the slightest hesitation or reflection. This sin pertains to pride as well as to imprudence. In various censures the word "rashness" or "temerity" is used as here given, as when excommunication is p.r.o.nounced against rash violators of the law.
1668. The Sin of Thoughtlessness.--The sin of thoughtlessness or inconsideration is a neglect or contempt of the means of arriving at a wise decision. It is a failure, therefore, to make use of right understanding, which looks well at the particular case before it and studies and measures it in the light of first principles.
(a) He is guilty of thoughtlessness, then, who fails to do what he can to judge rightly about his duty; nor is he excused if he leaves the whole matter to G.o.d, for it is temptation of G.o.d to expect that He will provide when man does not do his own part (Prov., iv. 25).
(b) He is not guilty of thoughtlessness who has not the opportunity of judging, or who lacks sufficient knowledge, or who is taken unawares; nor is he guilty of temptation of G.o.d, if in such difficulties he commits all to Providence. Thus, when various nations were gathered together to fight against Juda, King Josaphat prayed: "As we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to Thee" (II Par., xx. 12). And Our Lord promised special help to the disciples for cases of need when they were unable to help themselves (Matt., x. 19).
1669. The Sin of Inconstancy.--The sin of changeableness or inconstancy is committed when, owing to anger, jealousy or other inordinate pa.s.sion, the reason repudiates things that had been rightly decided on and fails to act on judgments that had been rightly made (Is., x.x.xvii.
3). From inconstancy result incontinence (i.e., instability in the face of pleasure) and effeminacy (i.e., instability in the face of sadness).
1670. Causes of the Sins of Haste, Thoughtlessness, and Inconstancy.--(a) Every inordinate desire brings on these sins by diverting the mind from a good to an evil object. Experience shows that the avaricious, the ambitious, the angry, the jealous, etc., do not listen to reason, but act imprudently: "Where envying and contention is, there is inconstancy" (James, iii. 16).
(b) Desire of pleasure, especially of venereal pleasure, is most fatal to prudence by extinguishing the judgment of reason. The intellect is immaterial and is occupied with abstract truth, whereas sensual delights are immersed in the material and sensible. Hence, carnal sins are more injurious to prudence than spiritual sins. The sensual man not merely does not listen to reason, but he does not even hear it. Venus steals away the reason, said Aristotle, and this truth is well exemplified in King Solomon.
1671. The Sin of Negligence.--The sin of negligence is opposed to carefulness or diligence, and consists in the failure of the reason to direct properly an act, or some circ.u.mstance of an act, to which one is obliged.
(a) Negligence is a general sin in the sense that it has no special matter of its own, such as a pa.s.sion to be moderated (as is the case with temperance and fort.i.tude) or an action to be regulated (as is the case with justice). The acts of reason should extend to every kind of matter, and hence a person may be negligent (and likewise inconstant, thoughtless, hasty) with reference to any kind of action or pa.s.sion.
(b) It is properly a special sin, as being the opposite of carefulness, which is a special act of prudence.
1672. Negligence is distinct from the following sins: (a) from laziness and lukewarmness, which are defects of the external act, while negligence is a defect of the internal act (see 1326, 1327); (b) from sins of omission, which pertain to external acts and are results of negligence, and are opposed to some other virtue than prudence (e.g., negligence in paying debts is against justice); (c) from inconstancy, which fails to command an act to which one is bound, as though one were impeded, while negligence fails because there is a want of promptness in the will. The inconstant man is easily diverted from his course; the negligent man is slow in getting under way.
1673. The Sinfulness of Negligence.--(a) It is a mortal sin when some act or circ.u.mstance necessary for salvation is omitted on its account (e.g., when a debtor puts off from day to day the payment of a bill, and in consequence causes a great injury), or when it proceeds from contempt or preference of the creature to G.o.d. (b) It is a venial sin when the act or circ.u.mstance omitted is not necessary for salvation (e.g., when a judge causes a slight injustice by reason of his procrastination), or when it proceeds from a want of fervor.
1674. False Prudence.--So far we have considered the sins of imprudence; now we shall speak of the sins of false prudence, which turn to wrong objects the acts that prudence employs for good, or which use inordinately the care that prudence employs in moderation. Thus, there are several kinds of imitation-prudence.
(a) Prudence is in love with the good of virtue as the end of life; the prudence of the flesh is in love with some pleasure or utility, and makes this good the center of attraction for all its acts.
(b) Prudence deliberates and judges about good and lawful means for its end; astuteness deliberates and judges how it may make use of evil means, and it employs trickery and fraud to perform what it decides on.
(c) Prudence is chiefly concerned about the spiritual, but its concern is not excessive; solicitude for temporal things or for the morrow is more anxious about the things of this world, or is unduly anxious about spiritual things.
1675. The prudence whose end is bad is the sin of those Who counsel, judge, and direct well as to the means for securing temporal goods which they have made the supreme purpose of their lives. This sin is given the one general name, "prudence of the flesh," from Rom., viii.
6, where the aspirations of the flesh are contrasted with the aspirations of the spirit. But it is also sometimes distinguished according to the different kinds of created things in which false prudence puts its desire, or according to the different kinds of allurements to such created goods.
(a) Thus, those who aim chiefly at internal goods (i.e., bodily pleasures, health, etc.) are said to have the prudence of the flesh, while those who long mostly after externals (such as fine clothes, jewelry, estates, etc.) are said to have the prudence of this world: "The children of this world are more prudent in their generation than the children of light" (Luke, xvi. 8).
(b) We may also divide prudence about a wrong end into earthly, animal and devilish, according to the threefold source of temptation, as was explained above in 1623.
1676. Sinfulness of the Prudence of the Flesh.--(a) If prudence of the fiesh be understood in its stricter meaning as designating the condition of those who make the things of this world the be-all and the end-all of existence, it is a mortal sin; for it is impossible that one should have two last ends or serve two masters whose interests are opposite: "The wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to G.o.d, for it is not subject to the law of G.o.d, neither can it be" (Rom., viii. 7).
(b) If prudence of the flesh be taken in a less strict sense as signifying the behavior of those who make G.o.d the supreme end of their lives, but who in some affair plan shrewdly for a particular end that does not entirely square with right reason, it is then a venial sin. An example is a host who is very practical in buying supplies and making all the arrangements for a banquet at which the guests will conduct themselves with too much hilarity.
(c) If prudence of the flesh be used in a wide or improper sense as signifying the care of the body and other temporal things for the sake of a good end, it is not sinful, but virtuous. Thus, a person who is careful about his diet in order that he may conserve his health and be enabled to work more efficiently and fruitfully, is virtuously prudent.
The use of the term "prudence of the flesh," for these last two cases is inaccurate and misleading.
1677. Astuteness, Trickery and Fraud.--The prudence whose means are bad is the sin of those who skillfully plan and carry out wicked ways and methods of securing some desired end, even though it be a good end.
(a) The planning of wicked means through which some design can be successfully achieved is the sin of astuteness, and the persons who are well-fitted for such things are known as schemers and plotters. The counsel of the Jews against Christ (Matt., xxvi. 3-5) and the bribery of the sepulchre guards (Matt., xxviii. 12-14) are examples of astuteness.
(b) The carrying out of astute plans may be done either by violence or by stealth; but, as evil loves to hide itself and to pose as good lest its success be endangered, schemers usually resort to trickery and fraud. Lord Bacon"s essay on "Dissimulation" is a good description of the method of worldly policy.
1678. Trickery in general is the secret employment of sinful means with the view to impose on others and thus gain some advantage one has in mind. Hence, it has a wide application and includes fraud as well as other uses of unlawful means. But trickery may be distinguished from fraud as follows:
(a) trickery is the execution of an astute plan by words calculated to deceive or circ.u.mvent another person. Words are the chief means of communication between men, and hence trickery is more usual than fraud.
Examples of trickery are the artful traps prepared for Our Lord by the Pharisees when with apparent respect they asked His views about the condemnation of the adulteress (John, viii. 3 sqq.) and the payment of tribute (Matt., xxii. 17), their purpose being to obtain evidence that He spoke against the Law;
(b) fraud is the execution of astute plans by means of dishonest actions, as when a person cheats by not observing the rules of a game, or defrauds by selling inferior goods, or imposes on others by pa.s.sing himself off as their friend, etc.
1679. Trickery may be used for good as well as evil ends, and thus St.
Paul disowns the practice of persuading men to embrace the Faith by appealing to their prejudices or by toning down the Gospel: "We renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor adulterating the word of G.o.d; but by manifestation of the truth commending ourselves to every man"s consciousness in the sight of G.o.d"
(II Cor., iv. 2).