(c) For Injury Done to Goods of Body or Personal Goods.--According to one view no rest.i.tution is due for merely personal injuries, since the damage cannot be repaired by a good of the same kind as that which was taken away (e.g., the murderer cannot give back life to his victim); but according to another view rest.i.tution is due for these injuries, since justice requires that every kind of damage be repaired as far as possible (see 1751 and 2090).
1803. Rest.i.tution for Various Kinds of Damage Done to Persons.--(a) For Bodily Injury by Unjust Homicide or Mutilation.--The offender (or his heirs) is obliged to rest.i.tution to the victim (or his heirs or dependents) for spiritual loss (such as death without the Sacraments), probably for personal loss (such as pain, facial disfigurement), and for real losses due to the injury (such as hospital expenses, loss of support by the widow and orphans). The spiritual loss is compensated by spiritual goods, such as suffrages for the departed, the personal loss by compensation suited to the circ.u.mstances (e.g., money employment), the real loss by payment of medical expenses, loss of time, support lost by dependents, etc. The offender is not liable for damages of which he is not the unjust cause (e.g., the alms that will be lost by poor persons on account of homicide, since they have no strict right to the alms), or the efficacious cause (e.g., the pay that will be lost by creditors on account of homicide, for as a rule the slayer cannot foresee this), nor for damages which the injured person clearly condones.
(b) For Bodily Injuries by Fornication or Adultery.--In case of fornication the offender owes rest.i.tution to the person seduced and also at times to the latter"s parents, and both sinners are bound to support their illegitimate child. The form of the compensation will depend much on circ.u.mstances, but in general it should be either marriage with the person seduced or some kind of pecuniary compensation. It should be noted that a promise to marry, even though it is canonically valid, gives no action to enforce marriage, but even an invalid engagement gives rise to action for unjust material damages, such as loss of chance to marry or loss of money spent in view of the marriage (see Canon 1017). In case of adultery the guilty party or parties are bound to make rest.i.tution to the injured husband if an illegitimate child is being reared at his expense, and also to the legitimate children for injuries to their strict rights, as in the diminished inheritance received from their parents on account of the illegitimate child. A child is not obliged to accept the word of his mother that he is illegitimate, but if he is certain about his illegitimacy, he may not take that to which he is not ent.i.tled. In rest.i.tution for fornication or adultery, care must be taken to preserve the good names of all the parties concerned.
(c) For Injuries of Soul.--In case of unjust and efficacious damage to physical goods (e.g., when one by fraud or force administers to another drugs or intoxicants that take away the use of reason or self-control, when a professor neglects his office of teaching or teaches error), rest.i.tution is certainly due for any material damages that result, and probably for the personal injury alone. In case of damage to spiritual goods, by inducement to commit sin or by dissuasion from good, rest.i.tution is due when the influence exerted was unjust (e.g., by fraud, force, threats), not when it was merely uncharitable (e.g., by advice, persuasion, request, example). Rest.i.tution for spiritual damage may be made negatively, that is, by removal of the unjust influence; but if a person who was seduced has in consequence become a hardened sinner, it seems that rest.i.tution should be made positively, that is, by counsels, requests, prayers to G.o.d, and other prudent means calculated to recall the injured party to a life of virtue.
Art. 4: THE VICES OPPOSED TO COMMUTATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 63-78.)
1804. The Vice Opposed to Distributive Justice.--Favoritism (i.e., acceptance of persons, partiality) is defined as "a species of injustice which moves one to distribute the common goods or burdens of society, not according to merit or fitness, but according to some other and impertinent standard."
(a) The common goods include offices, honors, functions, while the common burdens include taxes, contributions, and penalties.
(b) The common goods of which we now speak are those that belong to society and that must be portioned out to its members justly. Hence, there is no question of goods that belong to private persons, which the owners are not obliged to give to others unless it be in virtue of charity or liberality. A rich man is not guilty of acceptance of persons, if he bestows his largesses on those who are less in need or less deserving, but more acceptable to himself; and G.o.d is not unjust when he gives unequal graces to those who are equally sinners (Matt., xx. 14, 15).
(c) The right standard of just distribution is merit or fitness, as when an applicant is appointed to the post of teacher or superior on account of good character and knowledge. Any other standard which leaves merit and fitness out of consideration is unjust, as when a public official selects for offices or honors, not those who have worked the hardest or who give the most promise, but those who have more money or who are related to himself.
1805. The Sinfulness of Favoritism from Revelation.--In Holy Scripture favoritism is reproved ("How long will you judge unjustly and accept the persons of the wicked?" Psalm lxxi. 2), and impartiality is praised ("Thou art a true speaker and teachest the way of G.o.d in truth, neither carest Thou for any man, for Thou dost not regard the person of man,"
Matt., xxii. 16; "Masters, know that the Lord both of servants and you is in heaven, and there is no respect of persons with Him," Eph., vi.
9). Distributive justice is commanded in many pa.s.sages of Holy Writ ("Consider not the person of the poor, nor honor the countenance of the mighty; but judge thy neighbor according to justice," Levit. xix. 15; "There shall be no difference of persons, you shall hear the little as well as the great, neither shall you respect any man"s person," Deut., i. 17; "Thou shalt not accept persons nor gifts," Deut., xvi. 19; cfr.
James, ii. 1 sqq.).
1806. The Sinfulness of Favoritism from Reason.--Favoritism transgresses a divine command and subst.i.tutes personal will for right in the treatment of subjects by superiors. Hence, it is morally evil, for disobedience is sinful in the high as well as in the low, and violation of rights is unjust whether the rights be of the community or of the individual.
1807. The Gravity of the Sin of Favoritism.--(a) From its nature, favoritism is a mortal sin; for it is a form of injustice (see 1746), and indeed it is no less damaging than commutative injustice (e.g., theft) and is often accompanied by the latter. (b) From its matter and from the lack of deliberation or consent it may be venial. Thus, if favoritism is shown in a trifling matter (e.g., in conferring a post that is unremunerative and unimportant) or in a small degree (e.g., in preferring an applicant who is only slightly less worthy), there is only venial injustice.
1808. Distributive injustice is also frequently accompanied by commutative injustice.
(a) Thus, a first cla.s.s of common goods that are distributed are those intended primarily for the common good, and only indirectly and secondarily for the good of individuals, such as public offices, dignities, and benefices. He who distributes these offices unfairly, by appointing unworthy persons, or by appointing the less worthy when he is under contract to appoint the more worthy, violates commutative justice and is held to rest.i.tution to the community; but the worthy or more worthy persons slighted had no strict right, and hence no rest.i.tution is due them, unless there was a compact with them or unjust means were used to exclude them (see 1755).
(b) A second cla.s.s of common goods are those that are intended primarily for the benefit of individuals, such as a fund created for the relief of the dest.i.tute or afflicted or pensions set aside for those who have deserved well of society. He who distributes these goods unfairly is guilty of commutative injustice against private persons, since the goods were destined for them, and they had a right _ad rem_ to the goods, and hence to these persons rest.i.tution is owed.
1809. Favoritism in Spiritual Matters.--(a) Partiality in granting favors is sinful, and gravely so when the matter is serious. Examples are the grant to the unworthy of the power of Orders or of jurisdiction, the concession of permissions and dispensations to one"s friends that are denied to others. (b) Partiality in imposing burdens is also sinful, as when a prelate issues an onerous command, and grants exemption to his friends. But if the thing commanded is obligatory already by reason of law, it should be observed in spite of the favoritism of the prelate.
1810. Who is to be considered as more worthy for appointments in spiritual matters?
(a) The more worthy person is the one who will better serve the common good in the office. Hence, the more pious or the more learned man is not necessarily the more worthy, for another may have greater industry, influence, executive ability, initiative, prudence, experience, etc., and so be better suited to fill the position. But no person should be considered as worthy of spiritual offices unless his moral character is good, and excellence in temporal things does not compensate for negligence in spiritual matters.
(b) The more worthy person is the one who is more available when the appointment has to be made. Hence, the one who is better gifted for the office is not necessarily the more worthy, for another may be better known and it may be impossible to make investigations and comparisons at the moment.
1811. Opinion of the Applicant or Appointee about His Own Fitness.--(a) The applicant need not think that he is worthy or the most worthy; indeed, according to St. Thomas, it would be presumptuous for him to think so highly of himself, and he would thus become unworthy. It suffices, then, that the applicant have in mind only to try for the office, leaving the decision about fitness to the examiner or appointer.
(b) The acceptor who feels that he is unworthy or less worthy is not guilty of injustice; for he is not the judge of his own abilities and may rely on the judgment of those who appoint him. Moreover, he can trust to divine grace and his own efforts to make up for any deficiency or inferiority of which he is conscious. But it seems that, if the appointee were absolutely certain that his appointment was unjust, he would be bound to surrender his office, if this were possible.
1812. Favoritism in Secular Matters.--Do the conclusions in reference to ecclesiastical offices apply also to secular offices?
(a) In both cases distributive justice is violated by favoritism, for the standard followed is not merit or fitness, and thus the more worthy persons are injured. The opinion that civil society has dominion of public offices and therefore the right to distribute them at will, without regard to the merits or fitness of persons selected, is not probable; for civil rulers, like spiritual rulers, should consider themselves as ministers and dispensers only (I Cor., iv. 1), and even if they had dominion over offices, they would be bound to use that power for the benefit of the public for whom they rule.
(b) In both cases also commutative justice is violated in some instances, the offense being either against society or against individuals (see 1755, 1808). Thus, an official who appoints a subordinate knowing that he will oppress and rob, is responsible and bound to rest.i.tution to the victims as being a coperator in injustice.
1813. Favoritism in Marks of Esteem or Honor Shown to Others.--(a) There is no favoritism if honor and esteem are shown to those who deserve it on account of their virtue or position. Hence, it is not unjust but just to show special marks of veneration to holy persons, and even to those who are not holy, but whose authority or age deserves respect (such as rulers and prelates, parents and aged men).
(b) There is favoritism if honor and esteem are shown to those who have no genuine claim to it on account of goodness or rank. Thus, wealthy men are worthy of special respect on account of goodness when they employ their riches in useful ways, or on account of preeminence in the community in rank, ability, influence, etc., and he who shows special courtesy or attention to the wealthy for reasons such as these is not a respector of persons. But if mere wealth is worshipped, sinful favoritism is shown, as when a villainous rich man is honored and a worthy poor man is despised, or well-dressed persons are conducted honorably to comfortable seats in church and good persons whose attire is poor are treated with contempt (James, ii).
1814. Favoritism in Judges (Umpires, Arbitrators) and the Like.--(a) In the course of a trial there may be favoritism in matters left to the judge"s discretion. This does not happen, however, when the discretionary power is intended for the judge"s own benefit (e.g., when on a free day he decides to hear one side rather than the other), but when it is meant for the benefit of the litigants (e.g., when he grants to one side a longer time for preparation of its case than to the other side and for no reason pertinent to the matter at issue).
(b) In the sentence p.r.o.nounced there is favoritism, if the decision is not based on the merits of the litigants, but on extraneous considerations, such as the fact that one of the parties is a friend or relative of the judge or arbitrator, or belongs to the same political party or business, etc.: "It is not good to accept the person of the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment" (Prov., xviii. 5). If the arguments are about evenly balanced on both sides, it would be favoritism to decide in favor of one against the other. Alexander VII condemned the proposition that a judge may take money in such a case of doubt to decide for one party (Denzinger, n. 1126).
1815. The Vices against Commutative Justice.--These vices can be cla.s.sified under two general heads: (a) the vices committed in involuntary commutations (see 1748), which include deeds against the person (such as homicide, mutilation, imprisonment) and against property (such as theft and rapine), and unjust words, whether spoken during judicial process (by judges, advocates, witnesses, etc.), or outside of judicial process (such as contumely, detraction, etc); (b) vices committed in voluntary commutations (see 1748), which include fraud and usury.
1816. Homicide.--Life destroyed is either that of an irrational being (i.e., of a plant or beast) or of a rational being. In the latter case we have homicide, which is defined as follows: "an act or omission of a human being that is the efficacious cause (see 1763) of the death of a human being." A parent who denies his child the food, remedies or climate which it needs and which he can afford commits homicide by omission; a physician who practises abortion commits homicide by act.
The following distinctions of homicide have a bearing on its substantial morality (i.e., its lawfulness or unlawfulness):
(a) in reference to the intention, homicide is either voluntary or involuntary, and voluntary homicide is intended either as a punishment or as a defense;
(b) in reference to the slayer, homicide is either the act of a public or of a private person, of a cleric or of a layman;
(c) in reference to the person slain, homicide is either the killing of one who is guilty or of one who is innocent, either the killing of a neighbor or of self (suicide);
(d) in reference to the manner, homicide is either direct or indirect, according as the action from which death results is from its nature (_finis operis_) productive of death or of some other effect. Thus, it is directly homicidal to practise embryotomy (i.e., the destruction of the vital organs of a fetus) or abortion (i.e., the ejection of a fetus at a stage of development when it is unable to live outside the mother), but it is not directly homicidal to give a pregnant woman remedies necessary for her life, although harmful to the fetus; for the object or purpose of the former is to kill, of the latter to cure.
1817. Other distinctions of homicide have a bearing on its added or accidental malice.
(a) A new species of sin is added to that of injustice when other virtues are offended against. Thus, the virtue of piety is violated when the victim is a person to whom the slayer owed special respect and devotedness, as in parricide, regicide, fratricide, uxoricide; the virtue of religion is offended when murder is committed in a church.
(b) An aggravating circ.u.mstance is added by the greater deliberation with which the homicide is planned, or the greater treachery or cruelty with which it is executed (e.g., a.s.sa.s.sination, death by starvation).
Some circ.u.mstances, however, may be morally indifferent, such as the fact that the victim is killed by one kind of poison rather than another.
1818. The Killing of Animals (or Vegetation).--(a) In itself, the killing of animals is not sinful; for animals are made for the use of man. Hence, it is lawful to kill, not only harmful animals, such as those that prey on human beings or breed pestilence or destroy property, etc., but also other animals, when their death is necessary for some good purpose, such as the provision of food, clothing or medicine for man.
(b) In its circ.u.mstances, the killing of animals may be sinful, and even gravely sinful, as when one kills the animals of one"s neighbor (Exod, xxii. 10, 11), or hunts against the law, or injures society by prodigal destruction of animal or plant life, or kills animals in cruel ways. The skinning of animals alive, in order to secure finer-looking furs to satisfy the vanity of women, is an inhuman barbarism of the worst type that should be reprobated by everybody.
1819. When Homicide Is Lawful.--Killing of human beings is lawful in two cases. (a) It is lawful when the common safety requires that the State inflict death for a crime (capital punishment); for just as it is lawful to amputate a gangrenous member which threatens to destroy the body, so is it lawful to remove from human society by death an individual who menaces the safety of the community. (b) It is lawful when the safety of an individual demands that he kill an unjust aggressor (self-defense); for a man owes his first duty to his own life in such a case, and the aggressor in making a deadly attack voluntarily a.s.sumes the risk of being killed. It is more correct, however, to say here that it is lawful to defend one"s life with resultant death to the offender (as will be explained below, in 1826, 1828, 1834).
1820. Arguments for the Lawfulness of Capital Punishment.--(a) Scripture.--In the Old Testament the death sentence was prescribed for certain more serious crimes, such as murder ("whosoever shall shed man"s blood, his blood shall be shed," Gen., ix. 6); in the New Testament Our Lord recognizes that the power of a judge to sentence to death comes from above (John, xix. 10), and St. Paul declares that princes do not wield the sword without reason, but act as ministers of G.o.d when they punish evil-doers (Rom., xiii. 4).
(b) Tradition.--The Church has always taught the lawfulness of capital punishment and rejected contrary errors, as in the case of the Waldensians condemned by Innocent III.
(c) Reason.--The State has both the duty and the right to promote the common good and to defend it against its enemies, whether by war against external foes or by coercive measures against internal disturbers of the peace. Now, the experience of all the centuries and of all countries has shown that, generally speaking, the lives of law-abiding persons and the general peace are not sufficiently protected unless the supreme penalty be appointed for certain crimes.
1821. Though lawful, capital punishment is not always necessary; for it is a means to an end, and it may be omitted, therefore, when the end can be obtained by the use of other and less severe means.
(a) Thus, a general suspension of the capital punishment is lawful in a community whose members are peaceful and not inclined to violence or other crimes subversive of law and order. Whether such ideal conditions exist today may be doubted, and indeed some countries that abolished the death penalty have found that this proved an incentive to crime and they were forced to restore the former laws.