(b) The killing of the innocent, if it is indirect and unintentional, is not sinful when there is a serious reason for performing an act from which the killing results; for it is lawful to perform an act from which two effects follow, if the good is intended but the evil only permitted, and there is a sufficient justifying reason (see 103 sqq.).
1845. Unlawful killing of the innocent is a most heinous crime.
(a) It is an injury to the rights of G.o.d over human life, and is forbidden in the Fifth Commandment of the Decalogue: "Thou shalt not kill" (Exod., xx. 13). To judges the special command was given: "The innocent and just person thou shalt not put to death" (Exod., xxiii.
7). The man-slayer destroys the image of G.o.d, a crime so detestable that in Scripture G.o.d declares that He will revenge the blood of man, even though shed by a beast (Gen., ix. 5; Exod., xxi. 28).
(b) It is a most grave sin against the individual, for it deprives him of his chief natural good and the means of securing and enjoying many great spiritual goods. If the person killed desired or asked for death, no injustice is done to him, since he waived his right, but uncharitableness is committed, since the neighbor"s life should be loved, and the uncharitableness is greater according as the person is more worthy of love. Scripture numbers murder among the sins that cry to heaven for vengeance (Gen., iv. 10, ix. 5).
(c) It is an outrage against society, for such killing unduly deprives the community of one of its members, causes scandal and disturbs the peace. Hence, the law has always inflicted the severest punishment on slayers of the innocent.
1846. Since the end does not justify the means, the following ends do not justify the direct and intentional killing of innocent persons:
(a) the public good does not excuse, for example, if an enemy were to threaten destruction against a city unless it put to death an innocent person who dwelt in its borders. The criminal on account of his lawlessness is an obstacle to the common good, but the law-abiding citizen promotes the common good and it would be harmful to the public peace if he could be put to death without any fault of his own. The State is for the citizen, not the citizen for the State. But if the common safety depended on the sacrifice of one man"s life, charity and patriotism would require this man to make the sacrifice spontaneously (see 1169); that is, he should deliver himself to the enemy, and were he to refuse, it seems the community would have the right to deliver him. Similarly, it is not lawful to kill hostages, even though the enemy has broken faith, or killed one"s subjects;
(b) the private good of other individuals does not excuse; for example, it is not lawful to kill a maniac lest he do harm to those around him, at least unless the conditions of unjust aggression are fulfilled.
Similarly, it is not lawful to kill a woman with child, in order to baptize the child;
(c) the private good of the individual himself does not excuse; for example, it is not lawful to shoot or poison those who are mortally wounded or suffering from an incurable disease, or who are old and helpless, in order to spare them suffering. But one may give a person at the point of death a medicine that may hasten the end, if there is good hope that it will cure him and other remedies are futile, for the purpose is not to kill but to cure (see 2485). It is lawful also for embalmers to puncture the heart or sever an artery of a person who seems to be dead, if there are certain signs of his death, for the purpose is not to kill this person, but to free his friends from fear that he is buried alive.
1847. Indirect or Unintentional Killing of the Innocent.--Indirect and unintentional killing of the innocent is lawful (1872) only when there is a reason of sufficient gravity (i.e., one of a value proportionate to the life of the innocent person).
(a) The public safety is such a sufficient reason. Thus, in time of war it is lawful to attack a city, even though the death of many non-combatants will result, or to charge the enemy, even though innocent persons have been placed by the latter as a shield to his front ranks.
(b) Private safety from death is not a sufficient reason, if it does not compensate for the loss, or if it is secured unlawfully (see 104).
Thus, if Balbus cannot escape from an unjust aggressor without running down and killing an unbaptized infant or a man whose life is very necessary for the community, the temporal life of Balbus does not compensate for eternal life lost by the infant in the first instance, and the mere private good of Balbus does not compensate for the public good sacrificed in the second instance. Again, if Caius cannot escape from drowning without pushing a shipwrecked companion from the only plank which is insufficient for both, or if Semp.r.o.nius who has been sentenced to death for crime cannot escape execution unless he kills his guard, the means of securing safety are unlawful.
(c) Private safety from death is a sufficient reason, if it compensates for the loss and is secured lawfully. Hence, if the life of the innocent person is only of equal importance, self-defense against an unjust aggressor by means of flight that will involve the innocent person"s death does not make one guilty of homicide (e.g., t.i.tus is speeding in his car in order to escape a pursuer bent on murder and he cannot avoid hitting and killing a cripple who crosses the road). If self-defense is conducted by means of attack, one may use violence against the aggressor (e.g., one may shoot at him, although an innocent person whom he is using as a shield will be killed), but not against the innocent person (e.g., one may not shoot at the innocent person in order to deprive the aggressor of his shield, nor may one hold the innocent person before one in order that he receive the a.s.sailant"s bullet).
1848. Destruction of the Unborn.--(a) Direct and intentional destruction of this kind is unlawful and is known as feticide, when the fetus is killed within the womb, or abortion, when a non-viable fetus is expelled from the womb. It is not abortion to hasten the birth of a viable fetus (i.e., one which is about six or seven months old and can live outside the womb), since the child can be kept alive, but grave reasons are required to make it licit, since it presents a risk to the child"s life. But to deliver or expel a non-viable fetus is abortion.
Every direct abortion is regarded by the Catholic Church as murder and is penalized with the censure of excommuuication (Canon 2550, 1). It might be argued that the direct killing of what is surely a human being is murder, but when does the fetus become a human being? The ancient theory of Aristotle, followed by St. Thomas and most medieval authors, maintains that the embryo did not become human until some time after conception, an opinion that still has great probability physically.
Others maintain that animation is simultaneous with conception. Since we do not know the exact moment of animation, the moment of conception must be accepted in practice as the beginning of human life.
Probabilism is ruled out in this instance, for there is no doubt about the law and its application: we must not directly kill what is probably a human being. Accordingly, abortion is considered to be murder. Hence, even in the case of a girl who has been raped--although it is a probable opinion that measures may be taken to remove the s.e.m.e.n from-her body--it would be gravely sinful to give any treatment which would abort an impregnated ovum.
(b) Indirect and unintentional killing, or rather permission of death, is not unlawful in such a case, when there is a proportionately grave reason, such as the life of the mother. Thus, it is permissible to give the mother a remedy necessary to cure a mortal disease (e.g., medicinal drugs, baths, injections, or operations on the uterus), even though this will bring on abortion or the death of the fetus; for the mother is not obliged to prefer the temporal life of the child to her own life. But the baptism of the child must be attended to, for its salvation depends on the Sacrament, and the eternal life of the child is to be preferred to the temporal life of the mother, if the conditions of 1166 are verified.
(c) Contemporary moral opinion considers that in tubal pregnancies (ectopic gestation) the tube itself is in a pathological condition long before rupture of the tube, as experts in obstetrics teach, and hence can be excised as a diseased organ of the human body. As such, the excision of such a tube would be in itself a morally indifferent act and, granting verification of the other conditions for the principle of double effect, could be licitly performed. (For a history of the moral question, medical testimony and full argumentation see Chapter X of _Medical Ethics_ by Charles J. McFadden, O.S.A.) Some theologians, however, believe that the tube cannot be removed unless it can be proved in each case that a pathological condition, placing the woman in danger of death, exists. The first view is accepted as sufficiently safe to be followed in practice. (See Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., _Morals in Politics and Professions_, p. 118.)
1849. It is unlawful positively to kill the mother in order that the unborn child may be saved or baptized. When a caesarean section offers the sole chance of saving the mother"s life, it is permitted. It is seriously doubtful whether a mother is morally obliged to undergo the operation in situations where a threat to her life exists. In this case, if baptism in the uterus is possible without increasing the danger to the mother"s life, it should be attempted. When a caesarean section does not offer any chance of saving the mother"s life, but will directly contribute to her death, the operation should not be performed. One must await the death of the mother and then observe the norm of Canon 746; "Immediately after the death of a pregnant woman, a caesarean section should be done in order that the fetus may be baptized." The procedure to be followed is outlined in medical-ethics books. (See McFadden op. cit., pp. 244 ff.)
1850. Direction in Cases of Doubt, Ignorance, or Error.--(a) In case of doubt, if there are positive and solid reasons for believing that an operation performed to save a woman"s life will not be destructive of the life of a fetus, the operation seems lawful; for in doubt, the woman, as the certain possessor of life, has the presumption.
(b) In case of ignorance or error (e.g., when a penitent asks whether a certain operation is permissible, or a surgeon in good faith performs an operation that is not lawful), either a truthful answer should be given to questions, or silence should be observed when an admonition would only be harmful (e.g., if to require the Caesarean operation from a dying mother would have no other result than to make her die in bad faith instead of good faith).
1851. Canonical Penalties for Homicide and Abortion.--(a) Homicide, if voluntary, produces irregularity (Canon 985, n. 4) and subjects the guilty party to exclusion from legitimate ecclesiastical acts or to degradation from the ecclesiastical state (Canon 2354). Moreover, a church is violated by the crime of homicide (Canon 1172). (b) Abortion of a human fetus, when the effect is produced, brings irregularity on those who procure it and also on the coperators (Canon 985, n. 4).
Moreover, those who procure abortion effectively, the mother not excepted, incur excommunication _lat sententi_ reserved to the Ordinary, and, if clerics, they are to be deposed (Canon 2350).
1852. Suicide.--Suicide, or the killing of oneself, is, like homicide in general, of various kinds.
(a) Thus, in reference to the intention, it is voluntary or involuntary, according as it proceeds from knowledge and choice, or as it is committed without realization of what is done or without the intention to produce death. Examples of involuntary suicide are a person who is temporarily insane on account of impending calamity and drowns himself, and a person who, attempting to frighten another by pretending to hang himself, actually strangles to death. It would be a mistake to say that no person who commits suicide is free, but no doubt a large percentage of those who kill themselves are not responsible for their act.
(b) In reference to the mode, suicide is direct, if that which is done tends from its nature to the death of the person who does it (e.g., firing a pistol into one"s brain); it is indirect, if that which is done tends from its nature to another end (e.g., to struggle with a criminal who is firing a revolver). Direct suicide is committed in many ways, all of which can be reduced to positive (e.g., the eating or drinking of deadly poison) and negative (e.g., the refusal to eat or drink anything).
1853. The difference between direct and indirect suicide is also explained as follows: (a) direct suicide is an act or omission that has but one effect, namely, death (e.g., taking deadly poison); (b) indirect suicide is an act or omission that has two effects, one of which is the peril of death. This peril of death is certain, if death always follows (e.g., jumping from the roof of a skysc.r.a.per); proximate, if death usually follows (e.g., jumping from a third- or fourth-story window); remote, if death now and then follows (e.g., jumping from a second-story window).
1854. Sinfulness of Suicide.--Voluntary and direct suicide is always a most grave sin, if committed without due authority (i.e., the command of G.o.d).
(a) It is a grave injury against the rights of G.o.d, for it usurps His authority, refuses Him the service He desires, spurns the gift He has bestowed, dishonors the image of G.o.d (Gen., ix. 6), and destroys the property of G.o.d: "Thou, O Lord, hast the power of life and death"
(Wis., xvi. 13).
(b) It is an offense against society, for the community has a right to be benefited by the lives of its members, and to receive a return for the protection and a.s.sistance it affords them. Moreover, death by suicide is usually felt as a great sorrow and disgrace by the relatives of the departed, and it has a demoralizing effect on many persons of suggestible minds. The fact that the death of this or that man is not felt as a loss by a family or the State, but rather as a relief, is no argument; for if suicide were left to human decision, how many fatal mistakes would be made (see 460)! Persons valuable to society would rashly kill themselves, fearing in a mood of depression that they were worthless; others who could contribute nothing in material ways would destroy themselves and deprive their fellow-men of an example of fort.i.tude, or at least of the opportunity of showing charity and mercy to the needy.
(c) Direct and voluntary suicide is a sin against the deepest natural inclination, for self-preservation is called the first law of nature (see 298), and also against that love of self which charity requires (see 1136 sqq.). Since charity to self is more obligatory than charity to the neighbor, suicide is a more serious sin than other forms of homicide. Nor is it excused by the desire of some good for self. The suicide does not better himself by his act, for, since he has not fulfilled his trust in this life, what can he expect in the next life?
He escapes the lesser evils of physical miseries or moral temptations, but he incurs the greater evils of physical death and of moral cowardice and defeat, to say nothing of his punishment in the hereafter.
1855. Coperation in Suicide.--Coperation in suicide has the guilt of unlawful homicide. (a) Thus, those who incite, advise, command, or a.s.sist another to commit suicide are guilty of moral murder. (b) Those who carry out together a suicide pact are guilty both of suicide and of moral murder.
1856. Permission or Authorization to Commit Suicide.--(a) Divine authority could command or permit suicide, since G.o.d has the power over life and death. But whether G.o.d has ever done this is uncertain. Some argue for the affirmative from the death of Sampson, who pulled down the house upon himself saying: "Let me die with the Philistines"
(Judges, xvi. 30), and of Razias who killed himself to escape ill-usage (II Mach., xiv. 37 sqq.), and from the acts of certain female martyrs who from love of G.o.d or from the desire to preserve chast.i.ty rushed to their deaths. But others think that invincible ignorance may explain these cases. The act of Sampson may also be understood as indirect suicide lawfully committed for the public good of his country.
(b) Human authority, according to some authors, could authorize a condemned malefactor really guilty of a capital crime to execute himself; for, they argue, there is little difference between opening one"s mouth to swallow poison administered by an executioner and taking it with one"s own hands, as was done by Socrates. Others deny that G.o.d has given the State the authority to order suicide, and they declare that it is both unnecessary and inhuman to force a condemned man to be his own executioner. Still others believe that the State could command self-execution, at least in necessity, but that such a punishment is so strange, cruel and unnatural that it should be avoided; for, if it is shocking to ask a father to execute his child, much more shocking would it be to ask a man to kill himself. The argument is inconclusive which says that because it is lawful to perform an act preparatory for death, but which is indifferent and would never cause death (such as opening the mouth for poison), it is also lawful to perform the act which inflicts death (such as taking the poison).
1857. Indirect Suicide.--Indirect suicide is committed when one is the cause of an act or omission, indifferent in itself, but from which one foresees as a result that one"s life will be lost or notably shortened, This kind of "suicide" is lawful when and if the conditions for a case of double effect are present--in other words, if there is a proportionately grave reason for permitting the evil effect (see 103 sqq.). The following reasons are considered sufficient:
(a) the public good, for the welfare of society is a greater good than the life of an individual. Eleazar is praised because he exposed himself to death in order to deliver his people (I Mach., vi. 43 sqq.).
It is not sinful, then, but rather obligatory for a soldier to advance against the enemy or to blow up an enemy fortification, though it be certain that his own death will result; nor is it wrong for a pastor to go about ministering to his flock during a pestilence, though it be certain that he will fall a victim to the plague. Explorers and experimenters may also risk their lives for the advancement of science;
(b) the good of another suffices for indirect suicide, when he is in extreme spiritual need. Indeed, there may be an obligation of charity to risk one"s life for the salvation of a soul (see 1166). Hence, it is lawful to go as a missionary to a country whose climate is so trying that strangers die there after a few years;
(c) the higher good of self (i.e., the good of virtue) justifies indirect suicide, when there is an urgent reason for exercising a virtue in spite of the peril of death. Thus, for the sake of charity a shipwrecked pa.s.senger may yield his place in the life-boat to his parent, wife, friend, or neighbor; for the sake of faith, one may refuse to flee in time of persecution (see 1006), or may refuse and should refuse to take food or drink offered as a mark of idolatry; for the sake of chast.i.ty a virgin, at the peril of her life, may jump from a high window or resist the a.s.sailant, although it does not seem that this is obligatory if no internal consent will be given to the rape; for the sake of justice, a criminal in the death house who has an opportunity to escape from prison, may decide to remain and be executed, or a malefactor condemned to die by starvation may refuse to take food secretly brought him; for the sake of mortification, one may practise moderate austerities, as by fastings, watchings, scourgings, hair-shirts, etc., which sometimes shorten life, though generally they lengthen it;
(d) the preferable temporal good of self suffices, that is, one may risk the danger of death to escape another danger that is more likely to happen or more terrible. Thus, a man in a burning building may leap from a high window, even though death from the fall is almost certain, for death by burning is more terrible; a prisoner who is about to be tortured to death may make a break for liberty if he sees a chance of escape, for death is more certain if he remains. On the same principle, one may engage in hazardous but useful occupations, such as working on high buildings, or as a diver or miner, for it is better to live a shorter time with employment and the necessities of life, and to be of service to the public, than to live a longer time without these advantages. But a worker should not undertake dangerous tasks for which he is unfitted or unprepared, and the employer is bound to safeguard the lives of the workers.
1858. The same reasons are not sufficient in all cases. (a) Thus, the greater the risk of death, the more serious the reason required. Hence, to save the money one has it might be lawful to jump from a second-story window, but not from a higher window when the fall would most likely kill one. (b) The more immediate the danger of death, the more serious the reason required. Thus, to save money one might lawfully enter a quarantined house, but the risk would not be permitted if the house were tottering in an earthquake. (c) The more notable the shortening of life, the greater the reason needed to permit it. Thus, if the practice of a certain mortification or labor reduces the expectancy of life for a few years, a lesser reason suffices than if it reduces the expectancy for ten or more years.
1859. Indirect suicide is unlawful and has the guilt of self-murder when the reason for risking death is frivolous or insufficient or sinful.
(a) Examples of insufficient reasons are found in the cases of persons who engage in occupations or actions that are very dangerous to life or limb but of little public or private value, as when for the sake of performing a feat a man walks a tight-rope, p.r.i.c.ks himself with pins and needles, or puts his head into a lion"s mouth. But if the performer is very skillful and has no other means of livelihood, it seems that he may exercise his art for the sake of entertainment.
(b) Examples of sinful reasons for risking death are found in persons who abbreviate their lives by over-eating, drunkenness, habitual indulgence in strong spirits, or immoderate pa.s.sion of any kind; and also in those who refuse to make use of the ordinary means for the preservation of health (see 1566 sqq.) or of the ordinary remedies against disease (see 1571). It is not necessary that one be anxious to live long (see 1063), but it is obligatory to use the normal means for the preservation of life, and those who notably neglect these means are guilty of indirect suicide.
1860. Is it suicidal to refuse a surgical operation p.r.o.nounced necessary for life?
(a) If the operation is likely to be successful and there is no good reason for refusing it, it seems that one may not refuse it without the guilt of indirect suicide, although one might be excused on account of good faith.
(b) If the success of the operation is doubtful, or if there is a good reason for refusing, one who refuses is not guilty of suicide. Among the good reasons are spiritual ones (e.g., modesty, the fear of falling into blasphemy or despair under the pain are given by some writers) and temporal ones (e.g., the poverty that would be brought upon the patient"s family or the hardship that would result for the patient himself).
1861. Canonical Penalties for Suicide.--(a) Those who attempt suicide are irregular _ex delicto_ (Canon 985, n. 5). (b) If they die, they are not given ecclesiastical burial unless they gave signs of repentance before death (Canon 1240, n, 3), and, if they recover, they are subject to various penalties (Canon 2350, 2). (c) If it is doubtful whether a person committed suicide, or was responsible, the doubt is decided in his favor, provided no scandal is likely.