1956. Doubt in Civil Cases.--In civil cases, if it is uncertain after the investigation for whom the decision should be given, the following rules seem to be just:
(a) if the parties are unequal in claim, the decision should be for the one whose claim is more weighty; for the judge is appointed by society to investigate the truth of a controversy and to decide according to the merits of the case. Thus, decision should be for the party Whose arguments are of at least equal strength--but who has legitimate possession (for "possession is nine points in law"), or whose case enjoys the favor of the law (e.g., in Canon Law, the cases of widows, wards, minors), or for the party whose case is stronger and more probable. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that a judge may decide for the side whose arguments are less probable (Denzinger, n. 1152);
(b) if the parties are equal in their claims, some think that property in dispute should be equally divided between the contestants, others that the parties should be persuaded to compromise, or, if this is impossible, that the decision may be given for either one of them. But if positive law regulates the manner of proceeding in such a case, its provisions should be followed. Thus, in Canon Law, if a judge is in doubt as to which one of two compet.i.tors has possession, he may grant it to both of them indivisibly, or he may command them to deposit it with a sequester, pending the settlement of the dispute (Canon 1697).
1957. What should be decided when the defendant has possession with probable t.i.tle and the plaintiff has more probable t.i.tle?--(a) If the possession is not certain, or not certainly legitimate, decision should be for the plaintiff, for uncertain possession does not create any presumption of right and hence the more probable case prevails.
(b) If the possession is certainly legitimate, the common opinion is that decision should be for the defendant; for certain possession is not overcome by more probable, but only by certain arguments for the plaintiff. Some authors, however, believe that the judge should decide for the plaintiff, since possession prevails only when the arguments are of equal strength on both sides; or at least that he could decide for him, since it is probable that the plaintiff by presenting a more convincing case has sufficiently established his right to eject the defendant.
1958. The Standard by Which a Judge Should Weigh the Evidence.--(a) When the proving force of an argument is settled by the law itself, the legal rule should be followed. Thus, in Canon Law certain kinds of proofs are expressly declared to be demonstrative (e.g., a public instrument not contested, Canon 1816), while other proofs are held to be insufficient or only of partial value (e.g., certain kinds of testimony, Canon 1756). Likewise in civil law public doc.u.ments are prima facie evidence, oral interpretation of a written doc.u.ment which contradicts its language is not admitted, etc.
(b) When the proving force of an argument is left to the discretion of the judge, he must follow his conscience, that is, he must sincerely and impartially decide to the best of his ability the value of the argument, whether it is decisive, or likely, or Weak. Thus, in judging circ.u.mstantial evidence a juryman must use his own common sense and intelligence in determining whether the premises are doubtful or the inference illogical; in estimating testimony a judge must bear in mind the quality of the witnesses and the character of their testimony.
1959. The Moral Obligation of a Judicial Sentence that Is Certainly Just.--(a) It is binding in conscience; for it is merely the application of law to a particular case, and law obliges (see 377). (b) It obliges in virtue of legal justice when the case is only penal, and hence he who is fined by court is held as a duty of obedience to pay the fine; it obliges in virtue of commutative justice when the case is about a strict right, and hence if the court requires an heir to pay a legacy, the latter must make rest.i.tution for neglect of this duty (see 1728).
1960. The Moral Obligation of a Judicial Sentence that Is Certainly Unjust.--(a) If the sentence is unjust because it is the application of an unjust law, it produces no obligation in those cases in which the judge cannot lawfully apply the law (see 1949); for an unjust law does not oblige in conscience _per se_, but only _per accidens_ (see 377, 461). (b) If the sentence is unjust because it is not based on the law or the evidence, or because the trial was not conducted fairly, it produces no obligation _per se_, but there may be an obligation _per accidens_, as when scandal or great public disturbance will otherwise result. Hence, one who through plain injustice is deprived of an inheritance has the right to occult compensation (see 1928), while the other party is bound to rest.i.tution of the inheritance (unless he is in good faith or has prescribed) and also to damages, if he went to law in bad faith.
1961. The Moral Obligation of a Judicial Sentence in Case of Doubt.--(a) If the doubt is about fact or law, not about the right of the judge to give sentence (see 1955 sqq.), the sentence may be safely followed; for it is the office of the judge to settle doubtful matters, and to promote the common welfare by ending litigation. Thus, in doubtful criminal cases the judge sometimes acquits a guilty man, and in doubtful civil cases he sometimes awards property to one who has no right to it; but these sentences are not unjust, since they are based on rules which long experience has shown to be necessary for the public welfare. (b) If the doubt is about the justice of the sentence, there is an obligation of conscience to observe the judgment, since the presumption favors the judge. Were this not so, the authority of tribunals of justice would be at an end, for almost everyone who loses a case thinks that he has been treated unjustly. But one may enter an appeal, where this is allowed by law.
1962. When a Judge Is Bound to Rest.i.tution.--A judge is bound to rest.i.tution when he causes unjust damage to the community or to litigants (see 1762 sqq.), and hence he must either recall his unjust act, or repair to the best of his ability the harm done. But the conditions for unjust damage must be verified (see 1763).
(a) Thus, the judge"s act must be objectively unjust, that is, in violation of a strict right under commutative justice. This happens when he conducts the trial unjustly (e.g., when he neglects the essential procedure, tries without an accuser, and the like) or when he pa.s.ses unjust sentence (e.g., condemns without proof of fact or crime, or in spite of evidence for innocence, votes for acquittal when there is no reasonable doubt of guilt, imposes penalties that are insufficient or excessively severe, or awards property to one who to his knowledge has no right to it).
(b) The judge"s act must be efficaciously unjust, that is, it must be the real cause of the loss sustained by the other person. Hence, there is no duty of rest.i.tution if loss does not result (e.g., if the party who is in the right wins in spite of unfairness on the part of the judge), or if loss cannot be traced to the judge"s action (e.g., when a judge is not entirely impartial in his charge to the jury, but his words do not influence them, as they would have given an unfair verdict anyway).
(c) The judge"s act must be subjectively unjust, that is, the judge must be seriously responsible for the damage on account of his culpable ignorance, negligence, or malice. Even though he has made mistakes through excusable inadvertence or error, he becomes seriously responsible for damage, if, foreseeing it, he does not do what is in his power to avert it (see 1769).
1963. When a Judge Is Not Bound to Rest.i.tution. A judge is not bound to rest.i.tution, however, for violations of virtues other than commutative justice.
(a) Thus, charity is offended, but not justice, if the judge has personal hatred against a person before him, but does not permit this to influence his conduct or decisions.
(b) Legal, but not commutative, justice is offended, if the judge is negligent about exemplary damages, provided the common good does not suffer; for there does not seem to be any strict right to the fine before sentence has been given. This is disputed, however, by some moralists, who hold that the judge is under contract with the community in this matter, and hence that he offends commutative justice, if he is habitually and to notable amounts indulgent about fines.
1964. Kinds of Accusation.--From injustice committed by judges we pa.s.s now to that committed by accusers. It should be noted that there are two kinds of accusation: (a) extrajudicial accusation is that which is brought before a superior in order that he may correct or restrain, without recourse to judicial process, a subject who is delinquent. This is evangelical or canonical correction, which was discussed in 1293, 1289; (b) judicial accusation, with which we are now concerned, is that which is brought before a judge, in order that redress may be obtained through judicial process against an accused person.
1965. Judicial accusation is also made in two ways. (a) The accuser sometimes does not act as one of the two antagonistic parties, and does not a.s.sume the burden of proving his accusation. He makes an official complaint or denunciation, and then drops out of the case, leaving it to the magistrate or other officer to examine whether a process should be inst.i.tuted and the informer summoned as a witness. (b) The accuser is sometimes one of the two antagonistic parties during the process, and he then a.s.sumes the burden of proving his accusation. In Canon Law there are two kinds of processual accusers, the actor in civil cases and the accuser (an official known as the _promotor just.i.ti_) in criminal cases. In American law, the accuser in cases of private wrong is known as the plaintiff; in cases of public wrong he is the District Attorney or public prosecutor.
1966. The Duty of Judicial Accusation or Denunciation.--(a) If a wrong has been committed which is directly prejudicial to the common welfare (e.g., treason, counterfeiting, banditry), there is an obligation to make accusation, for each member of society is held to come to its a.s.sistance when its peace and order are endangered, and this is done by coperating with the tribunals of justice. Duty to one"s family also requires that one prosecute, when this is necessary in order to protect its members against some great evil.
(b) If a wrong has been committed which is not immediately prejudicial to the common welfare, there is not _per se_ an obligation of accusation; for the purpose of accusation is to obtain punishment or the correction of a wrong--an end that should not be waived when the common good is at stake, but which may be waived when private interests are concerned. But _per accidens_, or by reason of circ.u.mstances, there is often an obligation of denouncing or accusing private wrongs.
1967. Cases in Which There Is a Duty of Making Complaint about Private Wrongs.--(a) Such complaint is obligatory in virtue of commutative justice, when by reason of his office, oath, or function a person is under contract to accuse violators of the law; and hence serious negligence in such a person entails the duty of rest.i.tution for any damage caused through his fault. Examples here would be a watchman who fails to report thefts, a man serving on the grand jury who does not vote for an indictment when he should, a prosecutor who is careless.
The obligation is grave when the danger or injury to the common good is serious.
(b) This complaint is obligatory in virtue of legal justice, when there is a positive precept of the law which requires that accusation be made. The civil law rarely obliges to this as a duty of conscience, but there are a number of cases in Canon Law in which it is a duty of conscience to denounce (e.g., when there has been a _sollicitatio ad turpia_).
(c) This complaint is obligatory in virtue of charity, when without serious inconvenience one can thereby save a neighbor from a grave evil, such as unjust sentence of death or infamy: "Deliver them that are led to death" (Prov., xxiv. 11); "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner" (Psalm lx.x.xi. 4).
1968. Is a Malefactor Bound to Accuse Himself?--(a) As a rule, he is not bound to confess guilt, either explicitly or implicitly, for this is too much opposed to natural inclination, and hence is not demanded by law (see 552). This seems to be true even though an accused has unjustly declared himself innocent, and has not been questioned further or has been acquitted; for legal justice obliges the accused to give a true answer only when he is being questioned (see 1978). In Canon Law those who would sustain damage from their own testimony are not bound to take the witness stand, and hence persons who reasonably fear that their evidence will subject themselves or their relatives to infamy, vexation or other disadvantage cannot be forced to testify (Canon 1755, n. 2). In civil law one may not be convicted on one"s own testimony alone, unless the confession was voluntary, that is, made neither under fear, nor with the hope of favor, nor as the result of any species of coercion (Robinson, _Elementary Law_, 608).
(b) In exceptional cases, one would be bound to accuse oneself, namely, if there were a grave and urgent necessity of the community which outweighed the loss that would follow from self-accusation (see 1576, 1577). Self-accusation is also a duty when one is the gravely culpable cause of the punishment of an innocent person, if there is no other lawful way of freeing him, and the self-accusation will not bring on one a much more serious evil than that which the innocent person suffers.
1969. Ethical Conditions for Lawful Accusation or Denunciation.--(a) There must be no injury to the common welfare. Hence, if the order and peace of society would be disturbed by the accusation of a crime which was private and from which no further damage could be antic.i.p.ated, it would be better to leave this occult crime unpunished rather than bring on greater evils to the public.
(b) There must be no injury to private welfare. Hence, if the accuser does not believe that his accusation is just, or if he knows that there is no suitable evidence for his charges, or if he is excluded by law from making an accusation (e.g., when his knowledge has been derived from the confessional or in other confidential ways), it would be unjust to accuse; if the offender offers to make full satisfaction for a private wrong and has already amended, or was not accustomed to commit such wrongs, or if the loss he will suffer from the accusation will be far in excess of the wrong he has done, it would be uncharitable to make formal accusation (see 1200, 1201).
1970. Persons Who May Not Act as Accusers.--Generally speaking, the following persons are naturally incapable of acting as accusers: (a) those who are guilty of greater misdeeds or who are infamous, since it is unbecoming for them to accuse; (b) those who are enemies of the other party, since they are swayed by spite or revengefulness; (c) those who are near relatives of the other party, since it is unnatural for them to attack their own flesh and blood.
1971. In Whose Favor May One Denounce a Private Wrong?--(a) One may denounce it in one"s own favor, for one is not obliged to sacrifice one"s right to redress, and hence accusation is permissible (see 1199).
Those who are considered as one person with the injured party may accuse for him, such as parents, husband, wife, children.
(b) One may denounce a private wrong in favor of an innocent third party, as when an innocent person is being hara.s.sed by oppression, even though one can defend him only with notable inconvenience to oneself (see 1967).
(c) One may denounce a private wrong in favor of the guilty party himself, as when he is guilty of offenses that are harmful only to himself (e.g., drunkenness, impurities), if he has a bad reputation already or his delinquencies are manifest.
1972. Accusation and Fraternal Correction.--Whether obligatory or permissible accusation should be preceded by a fraternal correction is controverted among moralists. But perhaps the two opposite views may be reconciled as follows:
(a) _per se_, that is, in view of the purpose of accusation (punishment, vindication of justice, example), there is no duty of previous fraternal admonition, since the purpose of the admonition is the amendment of the wrongdoer (see above, 1289, 1293);
(b) _per accidens_, that is, in view of the circ.u.mstance that there may be hope of correcting the wrongdoer and of averting evil, and that punishment may not be very necessary to the public welfare, previous fraternal correction for secret delinquencies may sometimes be a duty of charity.
1973. Unjust Accusation.--Injustice in accusation is committed in the following ways: (a) injury is done the accused when a crime is falsely imputed to him through malice (calumny), or through a too great readiness to believe rumors (rashness); (b) injury is done the community if one whose duty it is to conduct a prosecution makes only a sham attack or colludes with the defense (prevarication), or if without good reason he abandons the prosecution (tergiversation).
1974. Cessation of Duty of Accusation.--The duty of accusation ceases: (a) when accusation is found to be unjust, for example, when the prosecutor discovers the accused is really innocent, etc. (see 1969); (b) when accusation is found to be useless, for example, when one discovers that the authorities are already aware of the fact about which one intended to give information, or when one perceives that the charge cannot be substantiated.
1975. The Defendant.--The party who is required to make answer to the charges of the plaintiff or prosecutor is known as the defendant or the accused. We shall now speak of the ways in which he may be guilty of injustice, and shall consider the following cases: (a) the defendant in civil cases; (b) the accused in criminal cases who is innocent; (c) the accused in criminal cases who is guilty.
1976. The Duties of the Defendant in Civil Cases.--(a) Before Sentence.--If the cause of the plaintiff is clearly just, the defendant as a matter of justice should recognize the claim and withdraw from the case. But a defendant may take exception to arguments offered by the plaintiff which, though actually valid, are not juridically made.
(b) After Sentence.--If the cause of the plaintiff is clearly just but loses in court, the defendant is obliged in conscience to pay the claim, even though the plaintiff does not appeal the case; he is also obliged in conscience to indemnify the plaintiff for the expenses of litigation, if the latter lost the case on account of unjust means employed by the defendant.
1977. The Duties of One Who Has Been Arrested on a Criminal Charge.--(a) If the accused person is innocent, he may take to flight or even offer positive resistance, provided he does no injury to those who attack him, and public scandal or disorder does not result from the resistance. This is according to natural law, which permits one to use self-defense against unjust aggression; but since the positive law requires the accused to submit to arrest that is not manifestly unlawful and empowers the officers to employ force against those who resist, it seems that generally the accused should permit himself to be taken under protest, if he cannot escape.
(b) If the accused person is guilty, he may take to flight, since he has not yet been sentenced as guilty nor officially deprived of his liberty; but he may not offer resistance to those who are sent to apprehend him, since their aggression against him is not unjust. The accused person, if not yet convicted, may even use indifferent means to escape from prison, such as sawing his way out or eluding the vigilance of the guards; but he may not employ sinful means, such as bribery of officials.
1978. Duty of the Accused to Plead Guilty, if Questioned by the Judge.--(a) If the accused is innocent, he may not plead guilty, as is clear. If to escape most grave evils he did plead guilty, he would be guilty of lying (if under oath, of perjury), but not of self-defamation; for, as the owner of his reputation, he has the right to sacrifice it in order to escape greater evils. Neither would he be guilty of suicide, according to some, if the death penalty were the consequence of the confession; for his purpose would be to avoid what he dreaded more than death.
(b) If the accused is guilty, he must reply truthfully, if the judge has the right to ask the question; for if the judge has the right to question, the accused has the obligation to answer, even though unpleasant things will befall him in consequence.
(c) If the accused is guilty, but the judge has no right to ask about his guilt (that is, if the judge does not question juridically or according to law, or if he questions from a false presumption of guilt), or if the accusation cannot be proved juridically, the accused is not obliged to answer. He may keep silence or evade the truth, but it is not lawful to lie.
1979. Legal Right of a Judge to Question a Prisoner about His Guilt.--(a) According to older legislation a judge had this right, and could enforce it by torture, when the common good was involved and the guilt of the prisoner was likely on account of infamy or manifest indications of crime or half-proof of guilt. In itself, this practice was not opposed to natural law and had some good results; but it was open also to many abuses. Some moralists teach that a judge cannot impose a grave obligation of confessing guilt in capital or similar cases, if the accused has otherwise a hope of escape and no great evil is likely to befall the common interests by reason of an acquittal.
They argue that human law cannot oblige so rigorously as a rule.
(b) According to modern civil legislation the right of exacting a confession is denied to a judge. Thus, according to American law no person may be compelled "in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" (Const.i.tution, Article V). In American law the plea of not guilty is not a lie, even though the accused knows that he is guilty, for, as everyone understands, the plea means either that one is innocent or that one is using the privilege of not confessing. Neither is it considered a lie to say that an unprovable charge is a calumny, for an accusation that cannot be proved juridically is juridically a calumny.
(c) The general law of the Church rules for ecclesiastical processes that, when the judge questions the parties-litigant, they are obliged to answer and to confess the truth, unless the question is not legitimate (e.g., questions about irrelevant or privileged matters, or questions made in a captious or leading manner), or the answer would incriminate the parties themselves (Canon 1743). Neither is an ecclesiastical judge permitted to put an accused in a criminal case under oath to tell the truth (Canon 1744). An instruction of the Holy Office of 1866 required that the guilty party in a case of solicitation should confess, but the instruction was directive rather than preceptive. Particular law (e.g., the statutes of a Religious Inst.i.tute) might perhaps prescribe confession by an accused, but most Const.i.tutions of Religious Inst.i.tutes bind only under penalty, and, as for the rest, an ecclesiastical superior could at most advise, but could not impose, confession by an accused.
1980. Rights and Duties of Accused in Conducting His Own Defense.--(a) In Reference to Judge or Attorneys.--The accused, if questioned, may not conceal the truth by lies, ambiguities, or half-truths, since these are evil means, nor may he use evasion if he is lawfully interrogated.