(c) A lawyer should not refuse a just cause, merely because the person he is asked to a.s.sist is indigent or not in favor. Commutative justice does not oblige him to offer his services to one in need of them; but there is a duty of legal justice to give his best efforts if he is appointed as counsel for a poor person, and also at times a duty of charity to do this if he is asked for legal help by one who is in need.
1998. The precept about works of mercy, being affirmative, does not oblige for every instance, but only when the due circ.u.mstances of time, place, opportunity, etc., are present. Hence, a lawyer is not obliged by charity to devote himself to every deserving case that is presented to him (see 1227). (a) Thus, as to place, charity does not require that one go about looking for the needy, but that one help those who are at hand. (b) As to time, charity does not require that one take care of future needs, but that one help those who are in present distress. (c) As to persons, charity does not require that help be given to all alike, for some have a greater claim on one"s charity than others (I Tim., v. 8). (d) As to need, charity does not command that help be given those who can easily help themselves, or who can obtain it from third parties who are better fitted to bestow it.
1999. Charity does not oblige to works of almsgiving, if the inconvenience to the donor is out of proportion to the distress from which the donee is rescued (see 1158). The inconveniences that correspond with the various degrees of distress are thus explained by theologians:
(a) if distress is extreme (e.g., a prisoner is about to be sentenced to death unjustly), a proportionate inconvenience is, according to some, a grave loss, or, according to others, the loss of at least a part of the necessaries of one"s state (see 1231, 1251);
(b) if distress is very grave or grave (e.g., an accused man will be sentenced unjustly to a long and harsh imprisonment), the loss of goods without which one"s state of life cannot be maintained so becomingly is, according to one opinion, not excessive; but, according to another view, any notable loss or inconvenience is excessive;
(c) if distress is ordinary (e.g., an accused will be unjustly sentenced to a small fine), the loss of goods that are purely superfluous is, according to some, a proportionate inconvenience, but others think that only such a.s.sistance need be given as will cause no inconvenience whatever, such as advice or other service given during spare times.
2000. When Is a Cause to Be Regarded as Unjust?--(a) In civil cases the suit or defense is unjust when it clearly has no moral right. A lawyer who recommends litigation in a case of this kind is unjust to the adverse party, if that party loses; he is unjust to his client, if the client loses and is thus put to unnecessary expense. Generally speaking, a Catholic lawyer ought not to accept a divorce case. The lawyer"s position is different from that of a judge. Occasionally a judge cannot refuse a case without serious inconvenience to himself (see 1949, 1997); the lawyer, however, is free to accept or refuse these cases. The general prohibition is founded on the fact that in this country most divorce cases are means to an invalid remarriage.
Some theologians argue that since it is the remarriage, not the divorce, that is intrinsically evil, a lawyer might accept a divorce case for a very grave reason, e.g., to relieve desperate financial conditions. In practice, however, owing to the danger of scandal, the exception would be rare. Exceptions which are possible include cases where divorce is sought for a marriage that is invalid _coram ecclesiam_, e.g., civil marriage of Catholics, or simply for the settlement of civil effects Where no danger of remarriage is involved.
In all cases involving Catholics, the lawyer should bear in mind the necessity imposed upon Catholics by the Third Council of Baltimore to consult ecclesiastical authorities before seeking civil separation from bed [and board.]
(b) In criminal cases the prosecution is unjust if the accused is clearly innocent. But the defense is not unjust, even though the accused is known to be guilty, for both natural and positive law give the accused a right of defense, and hence he may choose or may be given an advocate, in spite of his guilt.
2001. Duty of a Lawyer When the Justice of a Cause Is Doubtful.--(a) In a civil cause, the lawyer may act, whether for the plaintiff or for the defendant. He may even take a case whose justice seems less probable, for the purpose of the trial is to settle the doubt, and not infrequently the cause that seemed doubtful or less probable at the outset is vindicated by the examination. Some moralists distinguish for cases in which the doubt is one of fact between the defendant and the plaintiff: if the former"s case is less or equally probable, they say, one may take it, but not so if this is true of the latter"s case.
(b) In a criminal case, when life, reputation or other grave issue is involved, the common opinion is that a lawyer may not prosecute if the case of the people is doubtful or less probable, but he may defend, as was just said, even though he is certain that the accused is guilty.
The office of the prosecutor is not necessarily to secure a conviction, but to see that justice is upheld, while the office of the defender is to take care that an accused person is deprived of no right or protection that he should have under the law.
2002. If a lawyer through ignorance takes an unjust case, thinking it just, he is excused or not excused according to the character of his ignorance (see 28, 249). (a) Thus, antecedent ignorance excuses from sin and rest.i.tution; (b) concomitant ignorance excuses from rest.i.tution, but not from sin; (e) consequent ignorance excuses from neither sin nor rest.i.tution, if it is cra.s.s or affected, but it diminishes responsibility, if it is only slightly sinful.
2003. Duty of a Lawyer Who Discovers that a Case Is Really Unjust.--(a) A lawyer who took a case in the belief that it was just, but discovers that it is really unjust, owes it to himself to abandon the case, for he cannot honorably coperate with iniquity. The same principle applies, if a client insists upon unjust courses in the support of his case, even though the cause itself be just.
(b) The lawyer owes it to his client in the hypothesis we are considering to preserve the latter"s confidence inviolate (see 1988).
He should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon the case; but since the client"s case is unjust, he may not recommend a compromise, except perhaps in reference to expenses.
2004. Lawyer"s Duties towards Client.--Since every contract depends on the mutual consent of the contractants, and since the purpose of the person who retains a lawyer is to receive honest advice and a.s.sistance and to give in return a fair compensation, it follows that the lawyer"s duty to a client is to give what is thus expected and not to exact more than this deserves.
(a) Before the case the lawyer should be perfectly candid with the client as to the advisability of litigation or of the employment of himself as counsel in the case. If there is a reason why he would be a less desirable advocate in the case, he should speak of this, so that his consultant may have freedom of choice. He should also study the question presented to him, and give his honest opinion on the strength of the case. If a fair and amicable adjustment outside of court can be made, the lawyer should recommend that this be done, and if it is not clear which party is right, he should advise a compromise.
(b) During the case the lawyer should be faithful to the interests of his client and diligent in the affairs for which he is engaged. Loyalty demands that the advocate give his undivided devotion to his client (e.g., he may not give a.s.sistance to the adverse party, he may not receive gifts or compensations from that party; see Code, Canons 1666, 2407), and that he respect the client"s confidences (e.g., he may not use to the client"s disadvantage the information given him). Diligence requires that the lawyer use his best ability and efforts to the end that the client, no matter how poor or unpopular or persecuted, may receive all the remedies or defenses that the law grants him, and that his case may be terminated with all possible speed.
(c) After the case he should be honest in his charges and true to the confidence that was reposed in him. The compensation for the lawyer"s services should be just, that is, a fair return for what he gave. The amount of the fee should be fixed, therefore, by such standards as the law or custom, or by the value of that which the lawyer devotes to the case (e.g., his time and labor, his loss of other employment or prospects, the risk he takes in undertaking the case), or of that which the client receives (e.g., the amount which he gains, the benefit he receives). The wealth of a client does not justify an excessive charge, but the poverty of the client makes it a duty of charity at times to lessen the charges or to make no charges at all (see 1236-1239). It is clear that a lawyer should not compensate himself from the client"s business contrary to the latter"s just wishes.
2005. Lawyer"s Duties towards Other Parties.--The duties of the lawyer to his client do not exempt him from certain duties to other persons who have a part in the trial; for he is responsible to his own conscience and cannot act on the principle that he must win at any cost, or that the client takes all the blame for anything dishonorable that is done.
(a) Thus, respect is due to the judge and politeness to the opposite party, his lawyers and witnesses. Abusive language and improper personalities, therefore, should not be resorted to, and customary courtesies should be shown.
(b) Truth and fair dealing are due to those to whom or against whom the pleading is directed. It is contrary to truthfulness to cite statutes or decisions that are no longer in force, to misquote laws, testimony or the language of opponents, to a.s.sert as a fact what has not been proved, to introduce false witnesses or doc.u.ments, to coach clients or witnesses in untrue stories, to resort to quibbles or sophistry, etc.; it is unfair to attempt to gain special favor from a judge or a jury, to make improper statements or remarks with a view to influencing the jury or the bystanders or the public; to conceal the arguments upon which one relies until the opposition has no opportunity to reply; in a word, to practise any of the tricks of pettifoggery.
2006. Concealment of Truth in Presenting a Case.--Is concealment of the truth in the presentation or defense of a case sinful?
(a) If concealment is not unjust or mendacious, it is lawful. Indeed, a lawyer should conceal such facts as would be harmful to his own case (e.g., incidents that are really of no moment, but that would create prejudice against his client), or as he has learned in confidence. This is not unjust, since the opposite party has no right to the knowledge, and it is not deception, since it does not cause but merely permits others to draw erroneous conclusions. Neither is an advocate bound in justice to point out to the opposition matters favorable to their case, of which they are ignorant or which they do not notice.
(b) If concealment is unjust or mendacious, it is unlawful. Thus, if a lawyer discovers that serious fraud has been practised or that the court or the opposition has been harmfully imposed upon, he is unjust if he takes advantage of this through silence. Similarly, a prosecutor is unjust if he suppresses facts or testimony or papers that would establish the innocence of an accused person.
2007. The Sinfulness of Introducing False or Corrupted Doc.u.ments.--(a) Truthfulness is sinned against by this practice, whether the doc.u.ment be entirely fict.i.tious or a copy subst.i.tuted for an original that has been lost, or an authentic instrument has been changed or interpolated (see 1980 a, 1991).
(b) This practice is also against legal justice, since the law requires that no misrepresentations be made about the evidence produced. Indeed, this is a very serious matter, for, if it were ever permissible to tamper with doc.u.mentary evidence, a way would be opened to frauds innumerable to the great detriment of the public.
(c) Commutative justice is offended by this form of dishonesty, if the cause defended is not certainly just; for the opposite party, since justice is perhaps on his side, has the right that he be not defeated by untruthful means. But if the cause defended is certainly just, there is not _per se_ any violation of commutative justice, since the adverse party is not deprived of anything that is his, but is rather prevented from doing injustice; _per accidens_, though, there might be commutative injustice (e.g., if the use of a forged exhibit was known to be risky and did actually lose the case for a client).
(d) Charity to self is violated by this deception, since a lawyer should not value his client"s interests above his own conscience, reputation and prospects.
2008. When a Lawyer Is Bound to Rest.i.tution.--(a) Unjust damage obliges to rest.i.tution (see 1763), and hence a lawyer must indemnify his client or the opposite party for the losses either one suffers through his unjust conduct. The client has a right to rest.i.tution if he was put to unnecessary expense because his lawyer did not tell him the case was hopeless or too risky, or if he lost a case because the lawyer was very incompetent or negligent or helped the opposite party, or if he was injured in his reputation or prospects by the violation of his confidences. The opposite party is ent.i.tled to rest.i.tution if he lost a right or was condemned because the lawyer unjustly took the case against him, or if he suffered other injuries because the lawyer employed foul means to his disadvantage. If a lawyer acts as the mandatary of his client in the use of injustice, the duty of rest.i.tution rests primarily on the client and secondarily on the lawyer (see 1783); if the lawyer alone is guilty, he is responsible for all the damage done. There is no duty of rest.i.tution if only legal justice is violated (e.g., if some deception is practised in order to win for the side that is in the right), or if charity is wronged (e.g., if one refuses to take the case of a person who is in need).
(b) Unjust possession also obliges to rest.i.tution (see 1770), and hence a lawyer who appropriates goods of his client against the latter"s right, or who charges exorbitant rates for his services, or who drags out a case for lucre"s sake, or who has not refunded when he withdrew from a case, should restore his ill-gotten goods. If the amount of a fee is settled by law, an attorney who takes more than the legal sum does not necessarily incur the duty of rest.i.tution. All will depend on the character of the law, whether it is penal or preceptive, and if preceptive, whether it obliges in virtue of legal or of commutative justice.
2009. Unjust Words.--We shall now take up the injustice that is done through words spoken outside of a judicial process, or the cla.s.ses of verbal injustice that are not peculiar to courts, but are committed on all sorts of occasions, public and private. The princ.i.p.al sins here are distinguished according to the different injuries intended by the sinful speaker, and are as follows:
(a) sinful words that signify or effect in another person the evil of guilt, thereby depriving him of benefits that are connected with virtue. Some evil speakers deprive their neighbor of tributes that are paid to virtue by others, such as honor (injury by contumely), fame (injury by defamation), friendship (injury by whispering); while other evil speakers deprive a person of the tribute of virtue paid by his own conscience, namely, self-respect and peace of mind (injury by derision);
(b) sinful words that signify or effect against another person the evil of punishment. The words are known under the general name of cursing.
2010. Contumely.--Contumely is unjust dishonor shown to a person in his presence.
(a) It is unjust, and hence those are not guilty of contumely who speak words that are not honorable to persons deserving of reproof (e.g., in Luke, xxiv. 25, Our Lord calls the two disciples "foolish and slow of heart"; in Gal., iii. 1, St. Paul addresses the Galatians as "senseless"). Similarly, it is not contumelious to call another person by a name that sounds somewhat disrespectful, if this is done in banter or pleasantry and will be taken in good part by the other and do no harm. Thus, to send a comic valentine or good-naturedly to ridicule some of the spectators at a farce is not contumelious as a rule, since most persons are not galled by these gibes, nor are the jokes taken seriously as a rule by the public. But care must be exercised both in serious and playful rebukes to keep within moderation. St. Augustine declares that even in corrections one should use reproachful terms sparingly and only in case of great necessity.
(b) Contumely is dishonor, and so it is distinguished from injurious words that offend some other right (e.g., detraction offends reputation). Honor is an external manifestation of the respect felt for another"s excellence or superiority in some natural or supernatural perfection given by G.o.d, such as virtue, authority, n.o.bility, rank, wealth, etc. Contumely, therefore, is either negative, as when one ostentatiously refuses to show another the honor due him (e.g., the salute or t.i.tle or deference which custom allows him), or positive, as when one manifests signs of disrespect (e.g., names derogatory to virtue or intelligence, or which mean that the person addressed is vile and contemptible).
(c) Contumely is shown to another in his presence, that is, it is an affront directed to his person immediately (e.g., the mockery of Eliseus by the little boys near Bethel, in IV Kings, ii, 23), or mediately (e.g., the dishonor of David"s amba.s.sadors by the Ammonites, in II Kings, x), or at least to his knowledge (e.g., the enemies of St.
Paul in Phil., i. 17, who spoke of him insultingly in the expectation that their words would be carried to him).
2011. Are all persons deserving of honor? (a) If honor be taken in its strictest sense for reverence shown to a person who is one"s superior in some good quality, or for veneration for the proper excellence of mankind (viz., virtue), then honor cannot be shown except to those who are more exalted than oneself or to those who are virtuous. (b) If honor be taken in its wider and more usual sense for respect for a good quality, natural, moral or supernatural, in which a neighbor is more worthy at least than some others, then honor can be shown to every rational creature (except the d.a.m.ned, who are irretrievably wicked and outside the pale of friendship); for there is no one, however bad or lowly, in whom there is not something that deserves respect. St. Paul exhorts Christians to be beforehand in honoring one another (Rom., xii.
10), and he urges that each esteem the other as better than himself (Philip., ii. 3).
2012. Various Forms of Contumely.--(a) By reason of the signs used or the external form it takes, contumely is either in words (e.g., the names "thief," "lunatic," "b.a.s.t.a.r.d") or in deeds that are equivalent to word (e.g., offensive cartoons or caricatures, insulting valentines or postcards, "poisoned pen" letters, lampoons, scurrilous or opprobrious gestures or acts, sardonic grins, mimicry).
(b) By reason of the thing signified or the contemptible quality that it ascribes to another contumely is also distinguished into reproach, which accuses another of sin (e.g., of drunkenness), revilement (_convicium_), which ascribes to another either a fault or its consequences (e.g., drunkenness or imprisonment, or diseases of alcoholism), taunting (_improperium_), which twits another with misfortunes or inferiority (e.g., his lowly origin or poverty or the favors one formerly showed him).
2013. Manner of Confessing Contumely in the Sacrament of Penance.--(a) Circ.u.mstances that are of an essential kind, that is, those that change the species or add a new species, must be mentioned (e.g., the fact that contumely was blasphemous or calumnious or scandalous or directed against a cleric or parents). (b) Circ.u.mstances that are merely accidental, such as those given in the previous paragraph, need not be mentioned, for they are merely various ways of committing the same sin of contumely.
2014. The Sinfulness of Contumely.--(a) From its nature contumely is a grave sin of injustice, for it robs one of honor, which is more prized than any other external possession, since it is a testimony to virtue and to the esteem of fellowmen honestly earned. Hence, men will often sacrifice health or wealth or life itself to save honor. He who calls his brother a fool is deserving of h.e.l.l (Matt., v. 22), and the contumelious are cla.s.sed with those who are delivered over to a reprobate sense (Rom., i. 30). But, as sins of the tongue are imputable only in so far as they express the mind of the speaker, contumelious words are gravely sinful only when they proceed from a direct purpose to inflict serious disgrace (e.g., t.i.tus applies to Balbus an epithet that is not regarded as very abusive, but his purpose is to manifest his supreme contempt), or from an indirect intention to effect this (e.g., Claudius jokingly addresses Semp.r.o.nius by a very disgraceful t.i.tle, not meaning any great harm, but knowing that Semp.r.o.nius will feel this deeply or that in the eyes of the bystanders he will be greatly dishonored).
(b) From the imperfection of the act or the smallness of the matter, contumely is made a venial sin. Thus, if one who is suddenly carried away by anger or who is not thinking of what he says calls another person a very vile name, there is not sufficient advertence for a grave offense; and if one who is acting with full deliberation addresses another in language that is only slightly disrespectful, there is not sufficient harm done to const.i.tute a mortal sin.
2015. The gravity of the matter in contumely depends, not only on the character of the signs of disrespect, but also on the persons concerned.
(a) Thus, the less the respect which the offender owes the offended party, the less the offense. Hence, for a subordinate to call his superior a liar or an a.s.s is a more grievous fault than for a superior to give the name to his subordinate.
(b) The less authoritative the word of the person who utters contumely, or the less evil animus that attaches to his speech, the less the dishonor and the sin. Thus, fishwomen were once notorious for vituperation, but little attention or weight was given to their words.
A person of that character, then, might commit only a venial sin by a very abusive word, whereas a person of more respectable character would sin mortally by using the same expression. Similarly, when parents or teachers berate their subjects as fools, blockheads, dunces, etc., there is generally no bad spirit behind these exclamations, and hence the use of such expressions is not very sinful, even when correction is not being made.
2016. Is the gravity of contumely lessened by the fact that the offended person feels the injury less?
(a) If the contumely is felt less because the dishonor itself is less, the gravity of the sin is of course lessened, for example, if the person offended is less deserving, or the person who offends is not taken seriously (see 2015).