(c) Today the system of benefices is the rule, while first-fruits and t.i.thes are rare, though recognized by Canon Law. In some countries where benefices have been confiscated, part compensation is made in the form of pensions; in other countries (e.g., in the United States) the free-will offerings of the faithful is the usual system.
2186. Obligation of Contributing to the Support of the Clergy.--(a) Natural Law.--Those who serve the common welfare, whether in spiritual or in temporal matters, should be supported by those whom they serve; for, as their time and labor is given to others, it is a duty of justice that these latter make a return for the benefits received.
Hence, just as citizens are naturally bound to contribute to public officials, so are the faithful naturally bound to contribute according to their means to the ministers of religion.
(b) Divine Law.--Our Lord commanded His disciples to depend for their maintenance on those to whom they preached ("For the laborer is worthy of his meat," Matt., x. 10); and hence St. Paul says (I Cor., ix. 13, 14): "They who work in the holy place eat the things that are of the holy place, and they that serve the altar partake with the altar. So also the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel."
(c) Church Law.--The Canons reaffirm what is of natural and divine law, namely, that the faithful are obliged to support the clergy (Canon 1496); and as to the manner of making contributions they sanction local customs, such as parish payments (Canon 463) and t.i.thes and first-fruits (Canon 1502), command the payment of _cathedratic.u.m_ (Canon 1504), etc.
2187. The Church, the Apostolic See, individual churches and moral persons of ecclesiastical law have the right to the temporal means requisite for their mission; and hence the faithful have the duty to contribute to necessary church causes, such as divine worship, the spread of the Gospel, and charity (Canons 1495 sqq.).
2188. Quality of the Obligation of Contributing to the Church.--(a) The obligation is one of justice as well as of religion, for there is a quasi-contract between the faithful on the one side and the Church and its ministers on the other side, the latter being obliged to give spiritual ministries and benefits, the former to supply the temporal sustenance and means. Hence, St. Paul compares the salaries given to the clergy to the wages or fruits paid to the laborer. It is not strange that those who sow spiritual things for others, should reap from the temporal things of the latter: for a soldier does not serve at his own expense; a planter, a shepherd, a plowman, and a thresher expect a share from their labors; indeed, even the animal that serves man is worth its keep (cfr. I Cor., ix. 4 sqq.).
(b) The obligation is grave, because it arises both from justice and from religion (see 1748, 2148). He who refuses to contribute to the Church evades payment for services given him and also denies to divine worship his share of support.
2189. Att.i.tude Towards Persons Refusing to Contribute.--The duties of the priest towards those who refuse to contribute their share to the support of the Church may be defined as follows:
(a) as to absolution, it should not be denied unless there is certainty that the penitent is in grave sin. Hence, according to Kenrick and the common opinion, unless there is a law fixing a tax or the delinquent church member is inflicting severe privation on the church or heavy burdens on others who have to contribute more than their share, the confessor should not enjoin payment under pain of denial of absolution.
Apart from these cases, the Church, for the sake of souls, does not insist upon her right, as we see in the dealings of St. Paul with the Corinthians who neglected to give towards his support. The Apostle did not correct these men, although he would have done so had he considered them guilty of mortal sin;
(b) as to rest.i.tution, it seems it should not be insisted on. One who has guiltily refused to pay his church dues has offended justice, it is true, but the Church is concerned more with spiritual than with temporal things, and rather than place an obstacle to the conversion of a sinner or occasion scandal to the weak, she prefers to forego what is really her due (see 1487);
(c) as to administration of the Sacraments or sacramentals, it should not be denied to those who are unable or unwilling to pay the customary fees. The recipient of the rites disgraces himself by unwillingness to do what others do, but religion itself would be degraded if the rites were refused for reasons of money.
2190. Those to Whom Religious Contributions Are Due.--(a) The entire Church should contribute to the support of the Pope, the Pastor of the whole flock of Christ, who is charged with the welfare of all. In the Old Law the Levites themselves were obliged to pay t.i.thes to the high-priest (Num, xviii. 26 sqq.); but the amount to be given to Peter"s Pence is left to the generosity and religious devotion of the contributors. (b) Each individual church or body in the Church should contribute to its own bishop or superior a just amount for necessary uses, as determined by law or lawful custom.
2191. Vows.--A vow is a promise made to G.o.d to perform that which is better.
(a) It is a promise, that is, an agreement by which one binds oneself under obligation to another to do or omit something (Eccles., v. 3, 4), Thus, a vow differs from deliberation about doing good or the purpose to do it, for it includes in addition to deliberation and purpose the decree of the reason which places one under the moral necessity of performing one"s promise. Thus, persons who make good resolutions or who promise themselves that they will carry out certain good courses (e.g., a drunkard who takes the pledge to abstain from intoxicants) do not sin against a vow when they break their resolutions. Even a promise or resolution made under oath is not necessarily a vow; and hence one who swears to observe chast.i.ty may be freed from the obligation by an ecclesiastical superior who has not the power of dispensing from a vow of chast.i.ty (see 2234, 2262).
(b) A vow is a promise made to G.o.d; that is, the person who takes the vow intends to honor G.o.d and to bind himself to G.o.d. A vow may be made in honor of the Blessed Virgin or other Saint, in the sense that one vows to G.o.d what one promises to the Saint, or that one calls on the Saint to witness or to a.s.sist the vow, or that one offers the vow princ.i.p.ally to G.o.d and secondarily to the Saint. Hence, if one were to make a promise to a Saint (e.g., if a girl promises perpetual virginity to the Blessed Virgin) with no thought about G.o.d or no thought of obliging oneself before G.o.d, the act would be a promise pertaining to the virtue of veneration (_dulia_), but it would not be an act of religion or a vow. Promises made to living persons even under solemn circ.u.mstances (e.g., a death-bed promise made to a dying mother) are sacred, but they have not the nature of a vow.
(c) A vow is a promise to perform that which is better; that is, since a vow is a free promise made to G.o.d, to whom only good is pleasing and to whom the lesser good is less pleasing, a vow does not promise G.o.d what is evil or entirely indifferent or less pleasing. It would dishonor a human being to promise him something offensive, it would not honor him to promise something vain or useless, it would not show him special honor to promise to do something less agreeable to him. Hence, it would be irreligious to take a vow to steal, or to count one"s steps, or to prefer marriage itself to celibacy. Certain solemn promises are called vows (e.g., the vows of Baptism, the marriage vows), but they are not vows in the strict sense as here understood, for they do not promise that which is better, the promisors having no intention to place on themselves the obligation of religion.
2192. The Various Kinds of Vows.--(a) By reason of its object, a vow is either personal (i.e., the promise of some act or omission, such as a fast or the avoidance of an occasion of sin), real (i.e., the promise of some payment or object, such as an alms), or mixed (i.e., the promise of some action and some object, such as pilgrimage to a shrine with an offering).
(b) By reason of its subject, a vow is either singular (i.e., made by a physical person) or common (i.e., made by a moral person or community).
(c) By reason of its duration, a vow is either temporary (e.g., a vow taken for one year) or perpetual (i.e., a vow taken for life).
(d) By reason of its manner, a vow is either absolute (e.g., an unconditional vow of chast.i.ty) or conditional (e.g., a vow to go on pilgrimage, if one recovers one"s health; a vow to enter religion, if parents consent). A conditional vow is either non-penal, as in the example just given, or penal, in which the promise is that one shall undergo a penalty if fault is committed (e.g., a vow to say the Rosary every time one uses profane language, to fast every time one becomes intoxicated, to give alms every time one is dishonest).
(e) By reason of its form a vow is either express (i.e., externally manifested by words or other signs) or tacit (i.e., externally a.s.sumed by reason of some office to which it is annexed, as when one takes the subdiaconate in the Latin Church, to which is attached the duty of celibacy. (It must be noted, however, that some authors consider celibacy arising from the subdiaconate as a duty arising from ecclesiastical law and not from a vow.) The express vow in turn is explicit (i.e., manifested by signs that immediately express the vow, as when the vower mentions poverty and chast.i.ty) or implicit (i.e., manifested by signs that express another vow which includes the implicit vow, as when the vower mentions only obedience according to the rule, but the rule includes the other two vows of poverty and chast.i.ty). An explicit vow is either determinate (i.e., one in which the thing promised is definitely indicated, as when one vows a pilgrimage) or disjunctive (i.e., one in which the vower promises to perform at his will one or more out of a number of things indicated, as when he vows either to make a pilgrimage or to perform a fast).
(f) By reason of its position before the Church, a vow is either private (i.e., one made without the intervention or acceptance of the Church, as when a person in danger of shipwreck makes a vow for his safety) or public (i.e., one made before the Church and accepted in its name by an ecclesiastical superior, as in the essential vows made in approved Orders or Congregations). The public vow is either simple or solemn, according as the Church has determined for different religious inst.i.tutes.
2193. Vows in Canon Law.--The canonical dispositions in reference to vows in general will be found in Canons 1307-1315, while religious vows are treated in the section on religious (Canons 492 sqq.), and the effects of vows on matrimony are declared in Canons 1072, 1073, 1058. A fuller treatment of the canonical aspects of vows than can be given here will be found in commentaries on these parts of the Code.
2194. Distinction between Solemn and Simple Vows.--Is the distinction between a solemn and a simple vow one of divine or one of ecclesiastical law?
(a) As to accidental solemnity (i.e., the conditions of time, place, age, fitness, rubrics, etc.), the solemn vow depends on the Church, for there is no doubt that the Church has the right to determine these matters as circ.u.mstances may require. Hence, the Church may appoint conditions for the validity of a solemn vow, and she may also change these conditions as she sees fit.
(b) As to the essential solemnity (i.e., the internal characteristic that distinguishes the solemn from other vows), the solemn vow depends, not on the law of the Church, but on the divine law, since, unlike other vows, it is not a mere promise of acts, but an irrevocable giving over to G.o.d of one"s person itself and an internal spiritual consecration or espousals accepted by the Church. This is denied, however, by some authorities, who place the difference between the solemn and the simple vow in the different juridical effects which they produce in Canon Law, the solemn vow making acts opposed to it invalid and the simple vow rendering opposed acts illicit, but not invalid (see Canon 579). All agree that the Church may for just reasons dispense even in solemn vows.
2195. Knowledge and Deliberation Necessary for Valid Vow.--In the intellect of him who takes a vow there must be such knowledge and deliberation as are required for making an important contract, for he who takes a vow a.s.sumes a grave obligation (see 1883). The rule given by many is that the deliberation which suffices for a mortal sin suffices also for a vow, but this does not appear to be exact, since a mortal sin may be committed when there is only a confused perception of the gravity of the sin (see 177).
(a) Thus, a vow is invalidated by substantial ignorance or error (e.g., t.i.tus, thinking his gold watch is bra.s.s, vows to give it as an alms; Balbus, thinking that a distant sanctuary is not very far off, vows to make a pilgrimage to it; Claudius, being wrongly informed that his father is sick, makes a vow to go on a pilgrimage for his father"s recovery), but not by ignorance or error that is merely accidental (e.g., Semp.r.o.nius, thinking that a sanctuary which is four miles away is only three miles distant, vows to go there on pilgrimage, but he would have made the vow, even though he had known the true distance; Caius, intending chiefly to perform an act of religion, and secondarily to visit a friend, vows a pilgrimage to a neighboring town, not being aware that the friend has moved elsewhere). The vows of religion, according to the common opinion, are not invalidated on account of ignorance or error about accidentals, even though the vows would not have been taken had these accidentals been known; for the common good demands that the religious state, like the married state, have stability, and that those who enter it intend to accept all the obligations that go with it.
(b) A vow is invalidated by the absence of full deliberation (e.g., vows made by children who have not the perfect use of reason, by persons who are only half-conscious or who are delirious or laboring under a hysterical delusion or fixed idea, by persons who act on the impulse of the moment without full advertence to the import or force of the vow), but not by the absence of long or studious deliberation (e.g., a vow is valid if one has thought over its meaning and obligation, even though one has done this hurriedly and without reflection on the details and has regretted the vow soon after its p.r.o.nouncement).
2196. Freedom of Will Necessary for Valid Vow.--In the will of the person who takes a vow there must be freedom of choice, and the absence of such impediments as take away self-determination or consent.
(a) Thus, the natural law itself invalidates a vow made under force or under such fear as takes away the power of giving due deliberation to the vow.
(b) The natural law, according to many, invalidates a vow made under fear that is grave (though not disturbing to the reason), and that is produced unjustly and with a view to coerce one into making the vow.
The reason for this opinion is that G.o.d cannot accept a promise to Himself caused by injustice, nor can one be held to a promise made under unjust pressure.
(c) The positive law (see Canon 1307, 3) invalidates a vow given under grave and unjust fear. Many canonists interpret this law as meaning that even when the unjust fear is not employed as a means to force one into taking the vow, but does in reality cause one to take the vow, the promise is null in both forums in virtue of Canon Law.
2197. Cases in Which Fear Does Not Invalidate a Vow.--(a) All admit that fear does not invalidate when it proceeds from a natural cause (e.g., vows made during a storm at sea) or an internal cause (e.g., vows made under the influence of fear that one will fall into sin without the protection of the vow); for in these cases one chooses a lesser burden to avoid a greater one, and the thing chosen is involuntary, not simply, but only in a certain respect (see 44).
(b) It is commonly admitted that fear does not invalidate when it proceeds from an external and just cause (e.g., if a guilty person were threatened with the penalties of law unless he vowed not to repeat the offense), since the cause of the vow is then internal rather than external, namely, the guilt of the person who takes the vow and his wish to evade punishment.
2198. Vows of Doubtful Validity.--In the following cases it is disputed whether fear invalidates a vow.
(a) It is disputed whether fear unjustly caused invalidates in the forum of conscience when it is light (e.g., t.i.tia constantly importuned by her parents to enter religion makes a vow to follow their wishes).
Some answer in the negative, because a fear that is slight both in itself and in its influence on the vower cannot be considered as the real cause of the vow. Others answer in the affirmative, because light reasons do move persons to take grave steps, and it is not reasonable to think that G.o.d will accept a vow brought on by unjust, though light, fear.
(b) It is also disputed whether grave fear unjustly caused invalidates, when the person who causes the fear intends to force the vower, not to the vow, but to something else (e.g., Balbus threatens to kill Caius unless the latter pays a large sum of money, and Caius vows to give the money to religion if he escapes the danger). Some hold for the affirmative and refer to Canon 1307, mentioned above. Others hold for the negative because the vow is taken, not to accommodate the aggressor, but to honor G.o.d and benefit self. This is the interpretation given the pre-Code legislation. Still others distinguish, affirming invalidity for the case in which fear is the cause of the vow and denying invalidity for the case when fear is only the occasion of the vow.
2199. The Intention Necessary for a Valid Vow.--As was said in the explanation of the definition, a vow must include a will to bind oneself, that is, the intention to make a vow.
(a) The object of this intention is the obligation itself, not its fulfillment. Hence, he who makes a vow, but intends not to oblige himself, vows invalidly; for he has two contrary intentions and (unless the intention to vow is stronger) the substance of the vow is excluded.
On the contrary, he who makes a vow, intending not to fulfill it, vows validly but illicitly, since he really intends to oblige himself, but he sins by his purpose not to keep his vow (see 1883).
(b) The quality of the intention must be such that the character of the vow as a deliberate act and a sincere agreement to obligation will be preserved. Hence, an habitual intention (e.g., Claudius intending to take a vow on the morrow p.r.o.nounces the words of promise while asleep) does not suffice, because the act made with such an intention is not deliberate or human. Likewise, an external intention (e.g., Balba forced by her parents to enter a convent takes the vows, intending only the external rite) and an indirect intention (e.g., Semp.r.o.nius, foreseeing that if he drinks certain liquors he will bind himself by vow to a number of things, takes the drinks and makes the vows) are not sufficient, because with them there is no real agreement to obligation.
On the other hand, it suffices to have an actual but implicit or tacit intention (e.g., t.i.tus receives subdeaconship intending the obligations annexed to the office, but not knowing that celibacy is a duty vowed by subdeacons), or a virtual intention (e.g., Caius intended to make religious profession, but at the moment of p.r.o.nouncing the vows he is distracted and gives no attention to the words), for in either case there is a human act and real agreement to obligation (see 2164, 2165).
2200. The Matter of a Vow.--(a) A vow is a free promise, and hence its matter must not be something necessary. (b) A vow is made to G.o.d, and hence its matter must not be something that is not pleasing to Him.
2201. Vows that Promise Something Necessary.--(a) If the necessity is absolute, because a certain thing must be or cannot be, a vow is invalid. A vow to die is null, because death is a necessity; a vow to avoid venial sin, deliberate and indeliberate, is null, because it is impossible without a special privilege from G.o.d to keep such a vow; a vow that one"s child shall enter religion is also null, because one has no power over that which depends on the will of another. The vows made by communities do not oblige their successors or posterity as vows, but only as laws or customs having the force of law, or as contracts to which agreement is given, etc.
(b) If the necessity is hypothetical, because a certain thing must be done or omitted if one is to observe the natural or positive law, the vow is valid. For though it is necessary to observe a commandment (e.g., to avoid intoxication), it is not necessary to add to the existent obligation the new obligation of religion. The most suitable matter for a vow, however, is something that is of counsel, but not of precept, for example, to practise celibacy.
2202. When Fulfillment of Vow Is Only Partly Possible.--(a) If the vower intended that his promise should be an entire one obliging him to fulfillment of all the items, the vow is invalid, since its fulfillment as intended is impossible. Thus, if one vowed to go on foot to a place of pilgrimage but was unable to accomplish the journey on foot, or vowed to go to Rome and became unable to go the full distance, there would be no obligation.
(b) If the vower intended that his promise should be severable, the difficulty can be settled as follows: he is held to nothing if the matter is severable but the princ.i.p.al part impossible (e.g., if he vowed to go on a pilgrimage and also to go barefooted, he is not bound to go barefooted an equal distance if the pilgrimage becomes impossible). He is held to the part that is possible, if it is really severable and was intended as the princ.i.p.al part of the vow (e.g., if he vowed to go on a pilgrimage and to go barefooted, but is unable to go barefooted).
(c) If the intention of the vow-maker is uncertain, it seems he is held to perform what is possible (e.g., if one has vowed to pay for the erection of a church but becomes unable to pay for more than a part of the expense); but if there is a good reason to presume that he intended an entire vow, or a severable vow whose chief part has become impossible, one may decide the doubt in the sense of that presumption (cfr. 465).