2223. Who Can Make a Vow?--Every person living in the state of mortal existence, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, is able to take a vow, unless there is an impediment of natural or positive law.
(a) Natural law excludes vows made by those who are not masters of their own acts or who have not the use of reason; for, since a vow is a law which one knowingly places on oneself, it cannot be made by those who have not the right of disposition over their acts or who do not understand the meaning of the obligation. Hence, religious and other subject persons are restricted as to the right of making vows, while infants and insane persons are utterly incapable of making a vow.
(b) Positive law of the Church has laid down certain conditions for the validity of public vows (e.g., age, performance of the novitiate, etc.), and hence those persons in whom the conditions are not found are incapable of taking these vows. The power of binding and loosing has been given the Church, and the regulations on public vows exercise this power for the benefit of the Church as a whole and of the persons who take vows, As to private vows, it is a matter of dispute whether the Church has the power to appoint conditions for them, since they are internal acts (see 426), but it seems that no such conditions have ever been made.
2224. Twofold Dependence on the Will of Another.--Those who are not masters of their own acts are unable to vow on account of their subjection to or dependence on the will of another. There is a twofold dependence of this kind.
(a) There is a dependence of the will of the subject, as in the case of religious who have vowed obedience to their rule and superiors, and in the case of those who have not attained the age of p.u.b.erty and who must be guided and ruled by their father or guardian. This dependence means, not that the subject must have the positive consent of the superior for every act, but that he must not will or do anything contrary to the just will of the superior.
(b) There is a dependence of the matter of the vow, when it is subject to the wishes of another person, as happens in the case of those who have obligations to others. Thus, a wife cannot make a vow of chast.i.ty without the consent of her husband, otherwise she infringes upon conjugal rights; a servant cannot make a vow to spend in visiting churches time for which he is paid; a son who lives with his parents and is not emanc.i.p.ated cannot vow to give his earnings in alms, for he owes them to his family.
2225. The Validity of Vows Made by Subjects.--(a) If the vow is against the rights of another person, it is invalid without his consent. Thus, if a wife makes a vow of chast.i.ty without her husband"s consent, the vow obliges her to ask his consent, but it has no force if he refuses his consent.
(b) If the vow is against the subjection due another, it is invalid if he denies his consent. Thus, if a religious vows an act for which according to his rule permission must be sought, the vow has no actual force until the permission is obtained; if he vows an act that is good in itself, but absolutely forbidden in his rule (e.g., if a novice bound to remain in the cloister vowed to go on a pilgrimage), the vow is null, since it is better to keep the rule.
(c) If the vow is neither against the right of another nor against the subjection due, it seems that the vow is valid without the knowledge and consent of the superior. Thus, if a religious privately vows to do what is commanded in a particular law or rule, or what is counselled by his superiors, or what is good and not forbidden, the vow is valid until annulled by the superior; for, as was said in the previous paragraph, the subject is not bound to have the positive consent of his superior for all acts, and it is supposed now that the thing vowed is not detrimental to the rights of the superior or others.
2226. Cessation of Vows.--Since a vow is a private law, it may cease, just as a law ceases in certain cases (see 500 sqq.). There are, therefore, two ways in which a vow ceases or ceases to oblige.
(a) The vow ceases from within, or from internal causes, when the matter of the vow has so changed as to be detrimental or useless, or the purpose of the vow is no longer served by the vow. For the nature of a vow is that it promotes a better good to the greater glory of G.o.d.
It is clear also that a temporary vow ceases when the time limit fixed to it has expired, and that a conditional vow ceases if the condition is not fulfilled (e.g., one vows an alms of thanksgiving if one"s mother recovers from sickness, but she dies).
(b) The vow ceases from without, or from external causes, when it is removed or suspended by the authority of G.o.d to whom it was made (dispensation) or by the authority of one who has power over the will of the vower or over the matter of the vow (annulment), or even by the authority of the vower himself in so far as belongs to him the right to subst.i.tute some equal or better work for the work vowed (commutation).
2227. Public vows do not cease from intrinsic causes, for this would be productive of many disadvantages to religious communities and to those who take vows in them. The chief cases in which private vows cease for internal reasons are as follows:
(a) They cease on a substantial change in the thing promised, for then the subject-matter has become morally different. There is a substantial change if the matter of the vow has become illicit (e.g., t.i.tus vowed an alms to a beggar, but he learns that the beggar will use the alms to become drunk), or if it has become useless (e.g., Claudius vowed not to visit a certain house on account of the bad language used there, but the guilty parties have now moved away), or if it has become an obstacle to a greater good (e.g., Balbus vowed to go on a pilgrimage, but an epidemic has broken out and it is better for him to remain home and care for the sick), or if it has become impossible (e.g., Semp.r.o.nius vowed to give an alms, but lost his money and cannot afford to keep the promise). Some also think there is a substantial change when circ.u.mstances are so different that, had the vower been able to foresee them, he would not have taken the vow.
(b) They cease on the disappearance of the princ.i.p.al reason that induced the vower to make his promise. Thus, if Caius vows a sum of money to an inst.i.tution solely because it is poor and it becomes wealthy before he has fulfilled his vow, his obligation is at an end (see Canon 1311).
2228. Annulment of Vows.--The annulment of a vow is made in two ways, directly and indirectly. A full treatment of this subject will be found in commentaries on Canons 1312, 499, 88, 89, 675, 501.
(a) Direct annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the vower which, by affecting immediately the vower"s act, recalls the vow and makes it of no force. Hence, this kind of annulment may be exercised by all those who have such private authority over the will of the vower as to be able either to confirm or to cancel his acts.
Private authority over the will of another is contained in the paternal power of the father over his children, in the domestic power of the husband over his wife, and in the governing power of a religious superior over his subjects. The paternal power may be exercised to annul the vows of children (at least, of those who have not reached p.u.b.erty), since these children are incompetent to decide for themselves. The governing power also may annul directly the private vows of professed subjects made after profession, since these subjects have made a quasi-contract of submission in this matter. The domestic power of the husband, according to some, cannot directly annul the post-matrimonial vows of the wife, since the wife is competent to direct herself in these affairs, and has made no engagement of subjection in their regard; but others argue that at least positive law (Num., x.x.x. 2-17; Eph., v. 24) gives the husband this authority. The paternal power in this matter is had, not only by the father, but also by those who take his place (such as the guardian or the mother); the governing power is had by religious superioresses, by immediate and other regular superiors, by bishops in reference to their non-exempt communities, and by the Pope in reference to all communities.
(b) Indirect annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the vower which, by affecting the matter or object of the vow, suspends the obligation produced by the vow. Hence, this kind of annulment may be exercised by all those who have a right over the matter of the vow, when and as long as the vow is prejudicial to their right. Thus, the Pope may annul a vow of any of the faithful that is detrimental to his rights or the rights of the Church; parents may annul the vows even of their children who have attained p.u.b.erty, when these vows interfere with family order; religious superiors may annul the vows of novices that are harmful to religious discipline; husbands and wives may annul each other"s vows that trespa.s.s on conjugal rights; a master may annul a vow of his servant that keeps the servant from performing work due the master.
2229. Reason Necessary for Annulment of a Vow.--Is a just reason necessary for annulment of a vow? (a) For validity it is not necessary that there be a just reason, since there is always the implicit condition in a vow: "unless the superior or other person whose consent is necessary refuses." (b) For lawfulness it is necessary that there be a just reason, for it is not lawful to deprive G.o.d of honor promised Him, unless one has a good reason to do so (see Canon 1312). But the sin committed by one who annuls or who asks for annulment without sufficient reason does not regularly exceed a venial sin.
2230. Differences between Direct and Indirect Annulment.--(a) Direct annulment extinguishes a vow, since it affects the act of vowing itself, and hence, if a father annuls the vow of his son who has not reached the age of fourteen, the vow ceases entirely. Indirect annulment, on the contrary, only suspends a vow, since it affects only the matter of the vow and this matter may be withdrawn from the power of him who annuls. Thus, if a master annulled the vow of his cook to hear Ma.s.s daily, the vow would revive when the cook took service elsewhere.
(b) He who has power to annul directly may exercise the power even though he granted permission for the vow, or promised not to annul it, or gave his approval to it; for he retains his power over his subject and may change his own decision. But he who has only indirect power of annulment more probably may not annul once he has given his permission or ratification to a vow; for his power is only over the matter of the vow, and this, after he has consented to its dedication to G.o.d, is no longer under his control.
2231. Dispensation.--A dispensation is the relaxation of a vow granted in the name of G.o.d by one who has competent jurisdiction.
(a) It is a relaxation, that is, it removes the obligation (see 401).
Thus, a dispensation differs from a mere declaration or interpretation that a law is not binding.
(b) It is a relaxation of the vow, that is, the dispensation, at least in modern practice, takes away not only the obligation but also the vow itself. It is not merely a suspension or a commutation, but a total removal of the vow.
(c) It is granted in the name of G.o.d; that is, the dispenser acting for G.o.d remits the promise that was made to G.o.d. Thus, a dispensation differs from an annulment, for the latter is made by the annuller in his own name on account of the authority he has over the will of the vower or over the matter of the vow.
(d) It is given by one who has competent jurisdiction, that is, public spiritual authority in the Church over the external forum. For, as a vow is an obligation to G.o.d, it cannot be removed without the act of those whom G.o.d has appointed as His representatives in spiritual matters. Here again a dispensation differs from an annulment, for the latter requires, not the power of jurisdiction, but only dominative or domestic power.
2232. Reasons Sufficient for a Dispensation.--A dispensation is granted in the name of G.o.d, and therefore, unlike an annulment, it requires a just reason for its validity; for the remission of a religious promise cannot be satisfactory to G.o.d, unless there exists a justifying reason.
A dispensation conceded for insufficient reasons is invalid, even though all the parties concerned were in good faith; but, in doubt, the presumption is that the reasons were sufficient. The reasons sufficient for a dispensation can be reduced to two cla.s.ses: (a) the public good of the community or of the Church (e.g., if a person bound by vow leads a dissolute life to the scandal of the public); (b) the private good of the vower (e.g., if he finds the observance of the vow too difficult, if he took the vow without much deliberation or with such fear as is insufficient to nullify, see 2195, 2196).
2233. Sinfulness of an Unnecessary Dispensation from Vows.--(a) The superior who grants the dispensation is guilty if he is certain that there is no sufficient reason for it, or if he doubts whether there is any reason for it. But he dispenses validly and lawfully, if he is certain that there is a reason for the dispensation, but doubts whether the reason is sufficient (see 407), Usually, a superior who has been asked for a dispensation should not be anxious about his right to give it, for the very insistence of the subject indicates that the vow has become harmful or useless.
(b) The subject is guilty if he asks for a dispensation while knowing that he has no right to ask for it, or if he uses it while knowing that there was manifestly no sufficient reason for it. But in case of doubt whether the reason was sufficient, the subject should be guided by the judgment of the superior, not by his own, for the decision belongs to the superior.
2234. Persons Who Have the Power of Dispensation.--The Church has the power to dispense both public and private vows, for Our Lord gave this power when He said: "Whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, shall be loosed in heaven" (Matt., xvi. 19), and the power thus given has been exercised from the beginning (see 314). Those who have the power of dispensation are the following:
(a) the Pope, since he is the Vicar of Christ, has the fullness of dispensing power. He may dispense from every dispensable vow, solemn vows included, and there are certain vows from which he alone may dispense. The vows reserved to the Pope or his delegate are almost all public vows and the two private vows of perfect and perpetual chast.i.ty and of entrance into a Religious Order of solemn vows. The two latter vows are reserved, however, only when made absolutely and with perfect freedom by one who has completed his or her eighteenth year;
(b) local Ordinaries (and superiors with quasi-episcopal jurisdiction, such as regular prelates) can dispense from the non-reserved vows. In certain cases, such as urgent necessity or a doubtful vow, they can also dispense from the two private vows reserved to the Pope. These matters are treated more fully by canonists, especially in connection with Canons 258 and 1045. It is the common opinion that regular confessors who have the privileges of Mendicants can dispense, either in confession or outside of confession, from all non-reserved vows not made princ.i.p.ally for the advantage of a third party and accepted by him. Parish-priests and other confessors may dispense from a vow of chast.i.ty discovered at the last moment when all preparations have been made for marriage (see Canon 1045).
2235. Dispensation from Religious Vow of Chast.i.ty.--Does the Church dispense from the vow of chast.i.ty taken in religious profession or in the reception of Sacred Orders?
(a) There are no known examples of public dispensation of priestly celibacy for the sake of contracting marriage, but dispensations are granted from the religious vow of chast.i.ty.
(b) There have been cases in which subdeacons and deacons were permitted to marry for the sake of some common good of the Church or of a nation, and in which the marriages of priests were validated, as at the time of the Anglican Schism and of the French Revolution. But the clerics thus dispensed were forbidden the exercise of their clerical powers.
2236. Dispensation from a Vow Made for the Benefit of a Third Party.--(a) If the promise is gratuitous and not yet accepted by the third party, the dispensation can be given; for in such a case the only obligation is one arising from the vow, and the Church can dispense from vows. Hence, if one vowed to have Ma.s.ses said for the soul of a deceased person or to give alms to the poor without determining any particular persons, the vows can be dispensed.
(b) If the promise is gratuitous and accepted by the third party, but is made chiefly in honor of G.o.d and only secondarily for the benefit of the third party, it is probable that the dispensation can be given. For that which is secondary in the promise should follow that which is primary, and here the vow, which is the primary intention, is dispensable.
(c) If the promise is gratuitous and accepted, but the purpose to benefit the third party is not subordinate to the purpose to make a vow, or if the promise is onerous, the dispensation cannot regularly be given. The reason is that in these cases there is question not only of a vow but also of a contract, not only of an obligation to G.o.d but also of an obligation to man, and justice demands that the rights of a party to a contract be not taken away without his consent. Thus, a vow of stability made on entrance into a Congregation cannot be dispensed without the consent of the Congregation itself, for the vow was also a contract between the Congregation and the vower. There are exceptions, however, as when the third party renounces his right, or when the Pope, in virtue of his supreme authority over ecclesiastical goods or of his dominative authority, grants a dispensation for which there are just and sufficient reasons.
2237. Persons Who May Be Dispensed from Vows.--(a) Dispensation may be granted to subjects and, in certain cases, even to non-subjects. Thus, a superior whose faculty is not restricted may dispense himself (see 403); but it is advisable that dispensation be always sought from another person on account of the danger of self-deception. A local Ordinary also has the power to dispense, not only his own subjects, but also outsiders who are in his territory (see Canon 1313).
(b) Dispensation may be given either in the confessional or outside of the confessional, unless the contrary is stipulated in the faculty. It is more suitable, however, that it be given in the confessional.
(e) Dispensation may not be granted except to those who are willing to accept it, and in this respect it differs from an annulment, which may be made even against the will of the vower. The reason for this is that the vower placed the obligation on himself freely (see 403). This holds at least as regards the dispensation of a private vow.
2238. Commutation of Vows.--The commutation of a vow is the subst.i.tution of some good work for the one promised by vow with the transfer of the religious obligation to the new work. Commutation differs from annulment and dispensation, for these take away the obligation while commutation only changes the matter, the obligation of the vow remaining unchanged. Thus, if the vow to make a pilgrimage is commuted into prayers, one is no longer obliged to make the pilgrimage, but one is bound under vow to say the subst.i.tuted prayers. The power of the Church to commute vows is clear from what was said above about the power of dispensation, for he who can do what is greater can also do what is less.
2239. Kinds of Good Works that May Be Subst.i.tuted for Vows.--(a) The good work can be a better work than the old one, that is, a work which, if not more difficult, is more pleasing to G.o.d and more spiritually advantageous to the vower. Hence, if one has vowed to give an alms to a poor stranger, the vow may be commuted, if the stranger has not accepted the promise, in favor of another stranger who is poorer or in favor of one"s father who is also poor.
(b) The good work may be a work equally good, that is, one which morally speaking has the same difficulty or spiritual value. Thus, one prayer may be exchanged for another of equal length, one alms for another of equal amount, one pilgrimage for another of equal distance.
But equality is to be determined, not mathematically but morally, and hence one kind of work may be exchanged for another, one kind of vow for another, and it is not necessary that the works be of exactly the same worth. In fact, the new work, which objectively is only equal, is subjectively better, since it is more advantageous to the vower.
(c) The good work may be a work less good, that is, one which is clearly less difficult or meritorious, as when a Ma.s.s is commuted into a Rosary.
2240. Persons Who Have Authority to Commute a Vow.--(a) The commutation of a non-reserved vow into something better or equally good may be made by the vower himself, if there are no rights of a third party to forbid this. For the ends of the original vow (viz., the honor of G.o.d and the spiritual welfare of the vower) are thus better or at least equally served. But ordinarily one should not commute one"s own vows, since for most persons it is not an easy matter to decide what is a better or an equal good. How many understand the respective rank of the virtues? And even if one does know, for example, that religion is better than temperance, one cannot decide from this alone that a Rosary is an equal or a better subst.i.tute for a fast. One who wishes commutation for his vow, therefore, should consult his confessor or another priest.
(b) The commutation of a vow into something less good can be granted only by the one who has a special faculty; for this kind of commutation partakes of the nature of a dispensation, inasmuch as it relaxes to some extent the original vow. Those who have the power of dispensing (e.g., regular confessors who have the privileges of Mendicants) have also the power of commuting; but those who have only the power of commuting may not change a vow into something that is of notably less value. A good rule to follow in commuting a vow into something less is that more frequent reception of the Sacraments be the subst.i.tute ordered. The limitations on dispensations by reason of the rights of third parties (see above 2236) apply also to commutations.
2241. The Cause Required for Commutation of a Vow.--(a) For commutation into something better no cause is required, since the new work is its own justification. (b) For commutation into something of equal value, some cause is required, since it is a mark of inconstancy and therefore displeasing to G.o.d to give over one"s promises without good reason. But a light reason is sufficient, such as greater devotion or less danger of violating the vow. (c) For commutation into something of less value, a proportionate reason is necessary, not only for lawfulness, but also more probably for validity, since this kind of commutation is a partial dispensation. But the reason need not be so serious as that needed for a full dispensation.