2350. Malice of Sins against Piety.--(a) The moral malice is distinct from that of other sins, since injustice committed against the debt owed to the human principle of existence has a special character of wrong, as being opposed to a special kind of right. Parricide and matricide have always been looked on as having a peculiar enormity among sins of homicide; and similarly, disrespect to father and mother are greater evils than disrespect to persons who have no like claim to honor. Hence, he who has struck his father must mention the circ.u.mstance of relationship in confession, since it is a circ.u.mstance that changes the species of the sin. But he who has struck his fourth cousin need not confess the relationship, for distant kinship, though an aggravating circ.u.mstance, does not give the injury the character of impiety.
(b) The theological malice of the sin is grave from the sin"s nature, since piety ranks next to religion and is the object of a special commandment and promise from G.o.d. But the sin may be venial on account of lightness of the offense (e.g., when young children answer back or speak saucily to their parents, but without contempt) or on account of the lesser importance of the person offended (e.g., when a brother slaps his brother, the sin is not as serious as when a child strikes his parent). Children who have been seriously disrespectful to their parents are obliged to beg pardon; but to impose the obligation regularly in confession is deemed unwise, since insistence may only lead the penitent to new sins, and moreover the forgiveness of parents may generally be presumed when there is amendment.
2351. The Virtue of Reverence.--This virtue is known in Latin as _observantia_, because its object is persons of authority, whom it carefully observes in order to revere their dignity and to learn their commands. It is defined as "a moral virtue which inclines one to render to persons of higher position the tribute of honor and obedience that is due their authority."
(a) It is a moral virtue, that is, one concerned immediately with the direction of human acts. Reverence belongs to justice because it renders to others what is due them.
(b) The persons to whom it does justice are those of higher position, that is, superiors who rule over us or over others, and men distinguished for virtue, knowledge or other excellent qualities that make them fit to govern. Superior here does not mean that the person who receives reverence must be in every way better than the person who shows reverence (e.g., he who is superior in jurisdiction owes some reverence to a subject who is more learned or virtuous than himself), or that there must be inequality between the one who gives and the one who receives reverence (e.g., two distinguished persons of equal rank and merit owe mutual reverence to each other on account of the superiority which each has to many others).
(c) The reason for reverence is the authority vested in these persons, that is, the excellence of their state, which gives them a higher dignity than others, and their office of ruling, which empowers them to direct a subject to his proper end. Here we see that reverence is a distinct virtue, for, while piety and reverence are both forms of veneration, the motive of each is different. Thus, a child owes to his father piety, because from the father was received the beginning of his life, and reverence, because from the father is received direction to his end. Again, a subject owes the rulers of his country both piety and reverence: piety, as regards their relation to the common good and the nation (e.g., when the ruler is given his special salute), reverence, as regards their personal rank and glory (e.g., when a.s.sistance is given the ruler to lessen the burden of his office).
(d) The first tribute paid by reverence is honor, which is a testimony given to worth, and is offered to the dignity or rank of the superior.
Honor differs from reverence as the effect differs from the cause, or the means from the end; for it is reverence that prompts one to show honor, and honor is meant to excite in others reverence for the person honored. The debt of honor is due those who are superior in jurisdiction, from legal justice; it is due to those who are superiors, but not in jurisdiction, not from legal justice, since the law does not enforce it, but from moral obligation, since it is decent and becoming.
(e) The second tribute of reverence is obedience, which is submission to law, and is offered to the ruling power of the superior. This tribute of reverence is paid only to one"s own ruling superior, since others have no power to impose upon one their will or precept.
2352. Species of Honor.--(a) As to kinds, there is common honor which is shown to all and by all (e.g., G.o.d honors the Saints, and Tobias and Mardochaeus were honored by their sovereigns), and the special honor of homage which includes submission and is shown only by inferiors or servants to their superiors or masters.
(b) As to modes, there is honor in general and praise, which is a special form of honor; Praise is given in speech or writing; honor is shown not only by words, but also by deeds (e.g., by salutations, prostrations) and things (e.g., by monuments, presents, banquets, t.i.tles).
(c) As to motives, there is civil honor (i.e., the respect shown to the temporal authority of rulers, teachers, employers, etc.), religious honor (i.e., the respect shown to the spiritual authority of the Pope, bishops, priests, etc.), and supernatural honor (i.e., the respect given to the virtue of holy men). This last honor is known as _dulia_ (service) when offered to the Saints who reign with Christ in heaven, as _hyperdulia_ (superior service) when offered to the Mother of G.o.d.
2353. Obligation of Showing Honor to Deserving Excellence.--(a) Common honor should be given to all who are not irrevocably evil and malignant, that is, it should be shown to all creatures, the d.a.m.ned excepted. For, as was said above, there is no one who is not possessed of superiority in some respect, and it is even reasonable to believe that the most unpromising person is better than oneself in some quality or other. Hence, the Scriptures admonish us to honor all (I Peter, ii.
17), to be beforehand in giving honor to one another (Rom., xii. 10), and humbly to believe that others are superior (Phil., ii. 3). But in bestowing honor, while one should have at least in general an honorable opinion of others, the duty of external honor does not oblige at all times or in all circ.u.mstances; and the same kind of honor is not to be given by or to all persons. Those who show the ordinary signs of charity (as they should) in greetings, salutations, courtesies, and the like, comply sufficiently with the duty of common honor.
(b) Special honor should be given all those who have a right to it: "Tribute to whom tribute is due, honor to whom honor is due" (Rom., xiii. 7). Thus, rulers and prelates should be given the respect due their station, even though personally they are wicked, for in the honor given their rank reverence is shown to G.o.d, whose ministers they are, and to the community which they represent. There is a moral, though not a legal, obligation to honor men distinguished for holiness for their own sakes since, while honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue, it is a distinguished mark of recognition, and for the sake of others, since virtue in honor is like a lamp placed upon a stand and shining for many (Matt., v. 15).
2354. Obligation of the Religious Cult of Dulia.--(a) There is no strict duty of giving veneration to the Blessed Virgin, the Angels, Saints, images, or relics, for absolutely speaking it suffices for salvation to adore G.o.d. But it is of faith that the cult of these holy persons and things is lawful and useful; hence he who should neglect it would not merely disregard the earnest advice of the Church, but he would also deny to G.o.d"s friends and heroes the honors they deserve (Ecclus., xliv. 1; Heb., xi), and would deprive himself of precious helps of intercession and inspiration. Some believe it is at least venially sinful never to invoke the Blessed Virgin, and surely there would be sin--and perhaps even grave sin, _per accidens_--if the neglect was scandalous or perilous to salvation.
(b) There is an obligation in performing acts of cult to make the veneration suitable to the dignity of the object (e.g., to the Mother of G.o.d belongs _hyperdulia_, to the Saints of G.o.d _dulia_; to holy persons is given absolute cult, to holy objects relative cult) and conformable to the laws of the Church (e.g., the t.i.tles of Venerable, Blessed, Saint are conferred only by the Church; public cult may be performed only by those authorized to act in the name of the Church and only by such rites as have been approved). It is lawful privately to pray to infants who died after Baptism, and, according to many, to the souls in Purgatory; but it would be superst.i.tious to give to the d.a.m.ned or false saints the cult that belongs only to the canonized Saints.
2355. Obedience.--Obedience is a moral virtue annexed to justice which inclines one to comply promptly and willingly with the command of one"s superior, because it is a command and obligatory.
(a) Obedience is prompt and willing, and so it differs from forced or unwilling or tardy submission and from servile and politic obedience (which would not obey were it not for fear or self-interest), for these lack either the good will or the good motive required by virtue. Note also that the virtue of obedience differs from the vow of obedience in this, that the vow obliges to the external performance of a command, while the virtue includes also internal submission.
(b) It is shown to a superior. Between equals there is not obedience in the strict sense, though one of them may out of charity or friendship yield to what the other desires.
(c) It is compliance with a command, that is, with a law or precept imposed by authority. Some authorities hold that it is an act of obedience to fulfill the known will of a superior, even though it has not been imposed as obligatory; but others see in such a fulfillment, not obedience, but the perfection or spirit of obedience. Thus, if a son knows that his father wishes him to perform a certain work, but has received no orders to do it and leaves it undone, this omission according to the first opinion is disobedience, while according to the second it is a want of the spirit of obedience.
(d) It obeys precisely because the superior"s will has been expressed as a command. It is this intention that sets off obedience from other acts of virtue about commanded matters. There is a material obedience which is a circ.u.mstance of other virtues and may be called a general virtue (e.g., when one keeps the first commandment out of love for G.o.d, there is charity; when one keeps the seventh commandment out of love of honesty, there is justice). The formal obedience of which we now speak is a peculiar and distinct virtue, because it keeps the law simply because it is law and as such should be kept.
2356. Power of Jurisdiction and Dominative Power.--There are two kinds of power that confer moral authority to impose a command--the power of jurisdiction and dominative power.
(a) The power of jurisdiction is had by one who rules in a perfect society (Church or State), which has supreme authority and the right to impose laws.
(b) Dominative power is had by one who rules in an imperfect society, which has dependent authority and the right to impose precepts only.
This power arises either from the very nature of society as a body composed of superior and subjects (e.g., in the family the children are necessarily subject to the father), or from agreement between the parties concerned (e.g., the wife by marrying becomes subject to her husband, the servant by taking employment becomes subject to the employer, the religious by entering a community or by vowing obedience becomes subject to the superior).
2357. Degrees of Obedience.--Ascetical authors distinguish three degrees of obedience: (a) external obedience, which performs with exactness the thing commanded though there is no heart or willingness in its act; (b) internal obedience, which joins willingness to external submission though the judgment doubts the wisdom or value or good faith of the command; (c) blind obedience, which submits the judgment itself to the superior"s judgment, provided of course the thing ordered is not clearly sinful (Matt, ix. 9; Gen., xxii. 3 sqq.; Matt., ii. 13 sqq.).
2358. Comparison of Obedience with the Other Virtues.--(a) Obedience, as was explained above (2355), is distinct from the other virtues on account of its different formal object. Its act is found sometimes joined with other virtues (e.g., to fast during Lent in order to keep the law is an act of obedience, but it is also an act of temperance if actuated by love of moderation, or an act of religion if offered as homage to G.o.d); but obedience may be separate from other virtues, as when a superior commands or forbids something indifferent in order to try a subject"s obedience (e.g., to take a walk solely because it has been commanded is an act of obedience only).
(b) Obedience is less perfect than the theological virtues, since it belongs to the moral virtues, which are not directly concerned with G.o.d Himself but with the means to union with Him (I Tim., i. 5). Among those moral virtues that consist in contempt of temporal things, obedience which serves G.o.d in all things has a certain preeminence, inasmuch as it contemns for G.o.d"s sake the n.o.blest human good, one"s own will, whereas the other virtues contemn lower goods (those of the body and external things); on the other hand, obedience is inferior to religion, since, while obedience consists in veneration of the law, religion consists in veneration of G.o.d Himself. But acts of worship performed without devotion or without regard for G.o.d"s will are not to be compared with respectful obedience, since the former are sins and the latter is both religious and obedient; hence, it is said that obedience is better than sacrifice (I Kings, xv. 22), which means that internal devotion is to be preferred to mere external worship.
Spiritual writers praise obedience as the guardian of all the virtues and the safe road in which they walk (Prov., xxi. 28).
2359. Comparison of Acts of Obedience.--(a) All acts of obedience are of the same species, since in spite of diversity of superiors or of laws there is always in obedience the same essential character on account of the motive. Whoever may be the superior or whatever may be the law, the reason for obedience is always the authority that commands and the obligation that it imposes. Thus, whether one obeys G.o.d, or the Church, or the State, or parents, the virtue is always one and the same.
(b) All acts of obedience are not of the same perfection, for circ.u.mstances (e.g., the willingness, the duration, the difficulty) add to the merit of obedience. It should be noted, however, that to obey by performing what one likes is not necessarily less virtuous than to obey by performing what one dislikes; for the thing liked may be something hard that appeals to few and may be performed from a spirit of willing obedience, whereas the thing that is disliked may be something easy and may be performed with less willingness.
2360. The Duty of Obedience.--Since obedience is obligatory because a superior has the right to command, the extent of the duty depends on the extent of the superior"s authority.
(a) Thus, G.o.d must be obeyed in all things that He commands, for He is Lord of all and cannot command what is unlawful: "Let us do all that the Lord has spoken and we shall be obedient" (Exod., xxiv. 7). Man is not bound, however, to wish all that G.o.d wishes in particular, since G.o.d wishes things from the viewpoint of the universal good, and the creature from the viewpoint of the limited good known to him (e.g., it is not lawful for man to wish the d.a.m.nation or the misfortune of those whom G.o.d will permit to suffer these evils); but man is bound to wish that which G.o.d desires him to wish (e.g., that his neighbor will not be lost, that his father will not now die). Neither is man bound to perform what G.o.d proposed to him as a counsel. In certain instances (Gen., xxii. 2; Exod., xii. 36; Osee, i. 2) it appears that G.o.d commanded sin, but only a foolish or blasphemous person would interpret the facts in that impossible sense. In the physical order, a miracle wrought by G.o.d is not contrary to the law of nature established by Him, but to the usual course of nature; and similarly the commands referred to were not contrary to the laws of virtue, but to the usual manner of virtue, as was explained in 308 sqq.
(b) Man must be obeyed in all those things in which he has lawful authority to command, first, because G.o.d Himself requires this and he who resists resists G.o.d (Rom, xii. 2); next, because without obedience the peaceful order of society cannot be maintained. Even though the superior be wicked or an infidel, obedience is due him, for it is given him, not in his personal, but in his official capacity (Matt, xxiii. 2, 3). The Scriptures command obedience to all cla.s.ses of lawful superiors, whether ecclesiastical (Heb, xiii. 17), civil (t.i.tus, iii.
1; I Peter, ii. 13), or domestic (Eph, vi. 1, v. 22-24, vi. 5-8).
2361. When Obedience Is Not Lawful or Obligatory.--Obedience to a human superior is not lawful or not obligatory in those matters in which the superior has no authority to command.
(a) It is not lawful to obey a human superior when his command is clearly contrary to the command of a higher superior, and therefore unlawful. Thus, one may not obey any human superior when he orders sin, even a venial sin, for we must obey G.o.d rather than man (Acts, v. 29; Rom., iii. 8); neither may one obey a subordinate official who commands something clearly opposed to the law or to the regulations of his own superior. It does not belong to the subject, however, to sit in judgment on his superior, and hence, unless the unlawfulness of a command is manifest, the subject must presume that it is lawful.
(b) It is not necessary to obey a human superior when his command exceeds his competency, or when he orders things over which he has no control. Thus, G.o.d alone has authority over the internal action of the soul and over the natural state of the body; and as regards these things all men are equal, one indeed being less perfect mentally or bodily than another, but none being subject to another in these matters. Divine law regulates the interior (e.g., the command to believe, the prohibition to covet), but human law is confined to external acts; divine law can regulate things pertaining to the nature of the body (e.g., G.o.d could command an individual to marry, or to observe virginity, or to abstain from all food), but human law is concerned with external things, in which men are unequal, and it cannot take away natural rights to life or the means thereto (see 292 on Inalienable Rights). Moreover, even as regards external acts and things, the authority of a superior is limited by the bounds which its nature gives it; for example, temporal authority cannot command spiritual acts, a ruler placed over one territory or group cannot command for others, a const.i.tutional body cannot make laws beyond the powers conferred by its const.i.tution, ecclesiastical laws or customs rejected by the Code cannot be enforced, etc. It is clear, too, that no superior may command the execution of what is physically or morally impossible, and generally a subject should not be required to practise heroic virtue (e.g., to expose his life to danger; see 374). If a command is plainly ridiculous (that is, if it lacks a reasonable motive), it would be more perfect to obey, but it seems it would not be a sin to disregard it.
2362. Obedience in Cases Where There Is Normally No Obligation.--If a superior oversteps his authority, the subject may obey when the matter is lawful and the motive of submission is good. In certain cases it is even obligatory to obey a superior in matters over which normally he would not have authority. Such cases are the following:
(a) on account of a vow or other free and moral agreement, a subject is held to obedience in matters pertaining to the nature of the body (e.g., when he has made a vow of virginity). The Church cannot impose virginity, but he who has vowed to observe it, must fulfill the conditions and precautions necessary for its observance, and can be ordered so to do;
(b) on account of circ.u.mstances, such as scandal or danger of great evils, it is sometimes necessary to yield submission to a command that is not of itself obligatory (see 376, 377).
2363. Internal Actions and Human Superiors.--Internal actions in themselves do not fall under human authority, and hence the Apostle says: "Judge not before the time until the Lord come, who will make manifest the counsels of the heart" (I Cor., iv. 5). But in two ways these actions may be dealt with authoritatively by human superiors.
(a) Thus, in the internal forum and there alone, internal acts themselves are subject to a human superior; for the confessor knows and acts there, not as man, but as the representative of G.o.d, and hence he may pa.s.s on and prescribe internal thoughts and desires just as G.o.d may pa.s.s on them and prescribe them.
(b) In the external forum, the Church deals with internal acts in so far as they enter into an external act as a necessary ingredient of its goodness or malice, as when she commands a devout communion or p.r.o.nounces censure against judges who are swayed by fear or favor. This question was treated above in 426.
2364. Obligation of the Vow of Obedience.--(a) The vow obliges a religious to observe the commands of superiors that are given according to the rule which the religious professed. Hence, there would be no obligation in virtue of the vow of performing commands that are not authorized explicitly or implicitly in the rule (e.g., if a cloistered religious were bidden to engage in hospital work), nor, unless otherwise vowed, of keeping each prescription of the rule or const.i.tutions. A command to accept a relaxation from the rule is obligatory, unless the dispensation is clearly invalid (cfr. 2225, 2237).
(b) The obligation is grave only when superiors command in a grave matter and with the intention of imposing a grave precept. The intention of a superior is indicated by a form of words and other circ.u.mstances which the rule or const.i.tutions prescribe for the imposition of a grave precept.
2365. Sins against Obedience.--Since obedience is a moral virtue and therefore observes a mean, there is both an excess and a defect that it avoids.
(a) Thus, the sin of excess is not found in the quant.i.ty of obedience, for the more obedient a subject is, the more is he worthy of praise. It is found, therefore, in other circ.u.mstances of the act of submission, as when one obeys a person or a command which one should not obey.
Sinful submission is just as foreign to obedience as superst.i.tion is to religion; cringing submission or servility in matters where one should think and judge for oneself is only a simulacrum of obedience.
(b) The sin of defect is found in disobedience to a lawful command.
This sin may also be said to include both excess and defect--the former because the subject follows his own desires more than he should, and the latter because the superior does not receive what he is ent.i.tled to (see 1711 sqq.).
2366. Definition of Disobedience.--Disobedience is the transgression of the lawful command of a superior.