(b) There is positive concealment of the truth, when one gives a reply in language that is obscure to the listener or obscure in itself. If the listener has no right to the truth, it is not wrong to speak to him in words which he will not understand (e.g., in technical or scientific terms); for if he is deceived, he can blame only his own impertinence or dullness. The case is more difficult, however, if the reply is obscure in itself, that is, if use is made of ambiguity or mental reservation.
2399. Mental Reservation.--Mental reservation is an act of the mind by which a speaker restricts or limits his words to a meaning which they do not naturally or clearly convey; or it is an internal modification of an external speech delivered without any or without clear external modification. There are two kinds of mental reservation.
(a) Strict mental reservation is that in which the internal modification is manifested by nothing external, neither by the natural sense of the words (i.e., the meaning that ordinarily attaches to them) nor by their accidental sense (i.e., the meaning they receive from their context, such as the circ.u.mstances of time, place, usage, person who questions, person who is questioned, etc.). Example: t.i.tus, who struck Balbus with a club, denies that he hit him, meaning that it was the club which hit Balbus directly.
(b) Broad mental reservation is that in which the internal modification can be perceived, at least by a prudent person, either from the natural sense of the words (because they are known to be capable of different meanings), or from the context (because circ.u.mstances indicate that the words are not to be taken in their obvious sense). Example: Claudius accidentally ran against and wounded Semp.r.o.nius and the latter thinks that someone struck him a blow. Claudius denies that he struck Semp.r.o.nius, or declares to those who have no right to ask that he knows nothing about the matter.
2400. Lawfulness of Mental Reservation.--(a) Strict mental reservation is unlawful and has been condemned by the Church (see Denzinger, nn.
1174-1178). The reasons are, first, that it is a lie, since it employs words that do not at all express what the speaker has in mind, and his mental reservation cannot give them a significance they do not possess; secondly, that, if it were lawful, every dishonest person could easily escape the guilt of lying and yet deceive at will. According to Scripture the sophistical speaker is hateful (Ecclus., x.x.xvii. 23), but the just man speaks and swears without guile (Ps. x.x.xiii. 14, xxiii. 4).
(b) Broad mental reservation is unlawful when there is a reason that forbids its use, or when there is no sufficient reason to justify its use. Reservation is forbidden when a questioner has the right to an answer free from all ambiguity, for example, when a pastor questions parties preparing for marriage, when a person who is about to be inducted into office is asked about his freedom from disqualifications, when a witness in court is interrogated about matters on which he can testify, when one party to a contract seeks from the other necessary knowledge about the contract; for in all these cases injury is done by concealment of the truth. Reservation is not justified, unless it is necessary in order to secure some good or avoid some evil, whether spiritual or temporal, whether for self or for another, and the end compensates by its importance for the deception that may be caused.
Apart from such necessity mental reservation is, to say the least, a departure from the virtue of Christian sincerity or simplicity, which pertains to truthfulness and which forbids one to conceal the truth from others when there is no good reason for concealment (Matt, v. 37).
Moreover, the friendly relations of mankind would be impaired if it were lawful to speak equivocally even when trifling things are discussed or when there is no reason to be secretive.
(c) Broad mental reservation is lawful when there is a sufficient reason for it, such as the public welfare (e. g., the preservation of state secrets or of military plans), spiritual welfare (e.g., the prevention of blasphemy or intoxication), bodily welfare (e.g., the prevention of death or murder), or financial welfare (e.g., the prevention of robbery). But the reservation must be necessary, as being the only lawful means that will secure the end (e.g., one should not use reservation when evasion or silence will suffice); and it should not be injurious to the rights of another (e.g., it should not be employed against the common good, in favor of a private good). The reason for the present conclusion is found in the principle of double result (see 103 sqq.) and in the fact that a broad mental reservation is not intrinsically evil, since it contains no lie or insincerity and causes no injury to individuals or society. There is no lie, because the words correspond with the thought, either from their natural signification (in case of double-meaning words), or from their accidental signification (in case of words whose meaning is varied by the context); there is no insincerity, for the aim is only to conceal a truth that should not be made known; there is no injury to the listener or questioner, since, if he is deceived, this is due to his own heedlessness or dullness or unjustified curiosity; there is no injury to society, since the general welfare demands that there be some honest means of eluding unjust inquiries and of protecting important secrets.
Our Lord Himself, who is infinitely above all suspicion of duplicity or insincerity, may have used broad mental reservations when He declared (John, vii. 8-10) that He would not go up to Jerusalem, that the daughter of Jairus was not dead but sleeping (Matt., ix. 24). Other cases of mental reservation in Scripture are found in Eliseus (IV Kings, vi. 19).
2401. When Is Broad Mental Reservation Lawful?--There is general agreement that broad mental reservation is lawful in the following cases:
(a) it is lawful and obligatory when one is bound to keep the truth from the person who asks it. Hence, those who are questioned about secrets which sacramental or professional confidence forbids them to disclose (e.g., confessors, doctors, lawyers, statesmen, and secretaries) should deny knowledge, or, if hard-pressed, even the facts. The answer, "I do not know" or "No," in these cases simply means: "I have no personal or communicable knowledge." In war time a government has the right to censor the news in order to keep information from the enemy. A reason of charity might also make it obligatory to disguise the truth by mental reservation (e.g., when a clear reply given to the question of a sick person would only weaken a slender hope of saving his life, or when exact information given to a gunman would enable him to overtake an intended victim);
(b) it is lawful when a reasonable local custom permits one to withhold the truth. Thus, an accused person, even though guilty, has the right to plead not guilty, which means that he does not confess guilt; a person who has a visitor at an unseasonable hour may send word that he is not at home, which means that she is not at home to visitors, a person who is asked for an alms or a loan which he cannot conveniently grant may answer, according to many, that he has not the money, which means that he has no money to spare for those purposes (see 2251).
2402. Ambiguous Answers.--Are ambiguous answers which are not given according to the questioner"s mind, and for which there are no reasonable justifications, to be cla.s.sed as lies?
(a) If the answer, even in the setting of its context, retains its ambiguity or can be interpreted in two ways, there is not strictly speaking a lie, for the words signify, though obscurely, what is in the speaker"s mind. But this is a form of insincerity known as equivocation or quibbling, which many regard almost as disreputable as plain lying.
The pagan oracles that made predictions that would suit any turn of events and politicians who so word themselves as to be on opposite sides at the same time are examples of equivocation.
(b) If the answer, though verbally susceptible of two senses, is contextually limited to one sense, it is a lie; for it does not express the speaker"s mind. Thus, if t.i.tus knows that Balbus is good physically or mentally but not morally, he equivocates by answering that Balbus is good, if from the circ.u.mstances this indicates only that in some way or other Balbus is good; but t.i.tus lies by answering that Balbus is good and restricting his meaning to physical goodness or industry, if the question propounded referred to moral goodness.
2403. Simulation or Pretence.--A special form of untruthfulness is simulation or pretence, which uses external deeds or things to signify the contrary of what one thinks or intends internally.
(a) Simulation uses external deeds or things, and thus there is an accidental difference between lying and simulation, the one being untruthfulness in word and the other untruthfulness in deed (see 1678 sqq.).
(b) It employs deeds or things to signify. Unlike words, deeds and things were not meant princ.i.p.ally to signify, and hence not all conduct at variance with one"s ideas is simulation. One may act without any thought of the impression the act makes on others (e.g., when one keeps sober, not from wish, but from necessity). And even when an act is done with the intention to influence others by it, the purpose may be, not to signify, but to conceal something (e.g., Josue fled from the troops of Hai to keep them from a knowledge of his plans, Jos., viii. 1 sqq.; David feigned insanity to conceal his ident.i.ty, I Kings, xxi. 11.
sqq.). Thus, simulation teaches error, and dissimulation hides truth from those who have no right to it. That dissimulation is generally recognized as lawful is seen from such examples as stratagems, ambushes, camouflage in war, disguises in detective work, and concealment of marriage by couples not ready for housekeeping.
(c) It signifies the contrary of what one has in mind, as when one who is sad laughs and jokes to make others think he is happy, or one who is well apes the actions of a sick man so as to appear unwell, or when one who hates his neighbor treats him as a friend in public. A special form of simulation is hypocrisy, which makes a show of virtue that one does not possess at all or in the degree pretended. There is no simulation if the exterior corresponds with what one has is mind, for example, at Emmaus Christ made as though He would go farther (Luke, xxiv. 28), but He meant not to stop without an invitation.
2404. The Sinfulness of Simulation.--(a) In general, simulation is a sin, since it is nothing else than an acted lie. But deeds, with the few exceptions of bows, nods, gestures and the like, are not from their nature signs of thoughts, and those employed to serve as signs are more indeterminate and equivocal than words; hence, it is not always as easy to decide that an act is simulatory as to decide that a word is a lie.
Thus, it is not simulation to make use of false hair, false teeth, or false jewelry as means of protection or of adornment, there being no intention to mislead; neither is it simulation for a wicked cleric to wear the clerical garb, for the dress signifies primarily his state, and not necessarily his personal moral character.
(b) In particular, simulation by hypocrisy and treachery is detestable; for hypocrisy prost.i.tutes works of virtue to the ign.o.ble ends of applause or lucre or worse, while treachery uses the intimacy or marks of friendship as means for betrayal. The most stinging rebukes of Our Lord were given the hypocritical Pharisees ("Blind guides, whited sepulchres, serpents, generation of vipers," Matt., xxiii. 23 sqq.), and among the saddest words of Christ are those addressed to Judas ("Dost thou betray the Son of man with a kiss?" Luke, xxii. 48).
Against the former he p.r.o.nounced woes, and He declared that it were better if the latter had never been born (Matt., xxvi. 24).
2405. Sinfulness of Hypocrisy.--(a) Hypocrisy in its strictest sense is the simulation of one who wishes to seem but not to be virtuous. This sin is mortal, since it cares nothing for virtue, and its external pretense is but a mockery. It is this hypocrisy that is so scathingly denounced in Scripture.
(b) Hypocrisy in a less strict sense is the simulation of one who is in mortal sin, but wishes for some reason to appear virtuous or to lead a double life. The sin is mortal or venial according to the motive; for example, to act the hypocrite in order to seduce another is a mortal sin, though, if the motive is only vanity, the sin is venial. It should be noted that it is not hypocrisy for a just cause to conceal one"s sin by dissimulation; indeed, Isaias severely blames those who scandalize others by flaunting their wickedness before the public (Is, iii. 9).
(c) Hypocrisy in the widest sense a.s.sumes the appearance of a high degree of sanct.i.ty above that requisite for salvation, as when a person of ordinary goodness tries to gain the reputation of miracle-worker, or to pa.s.s as one better than others in faith, zeal, humility, etc. This sin is not mortal in itself, but it may become mortal on account of some motive, some means, or some other circ.u.mstance. There is no hypocrisy at all, however, in showing oneself for the virtue one really has; on the contrary, he lies, who being good pretends that he is not good, or who being free of a vice pretends that he is guilty of it.
2406. Self-Glorification and Self-Depreciation.--Two forms of lying about self are self-glorification and self-depreciation.
(a) Braggadocio is untruthful self-glorification, as when one pretends to be of royal descent, or makes a display of wealth beyond one"s means, or poses as an authority on matters of which one is ignorant, or tries by bluff to make one"s defects seem perfections. This sin is mortal when the lie is seriously injurious to G.o.d or others (Ezech., xxviii. 2, Luke, xviii. 11), or when the motive is gravely sinful, such as grave arrogance, ambition, or avarice.
(b) Feigning of defects (irony) is untruthful self-depreciation, as when one falsely denies a good quality which one possesses (e.g., an excessively humble man denies the good deeds that others ascribe to him, though he knows they are real), or when one falsely admits a bad quality which one lacks (e.g., a person who wishes to curry favor accuses himself of misdeeds which he knows never happened). This sin is usually less than braggadocio, since as a rule its purpose is to avoid offense to others; but it may be serious sin on account of some circ.u.mstance, as when one speaks ill of self in order to scandalize or seduce another. At times the feigning of defects is a concealed braggadocio, as when one dresses in rags, hoping by this expedient to acquire repute as a person of great spirituality (Prov., xxvi, 25; Matt., vi. 16; Ecclus., xix. 23).
2407. Infidelity and Violation of a Secret.--It remains to speak of the vices of infidelity and violation of secret (see 2388 a). As to the former, since it has been discussed elsewhere (1877 sqq., 1888, 1889; see also the matter on Promissory Oaths), it will suffice here to ask the question: Is the breach of a promise freely given a sin?
(a) If observance of the promise is due from fidelity only, there is no legal fault, but there is moral fault, and hence the breach of the promise is a sin. The malice is essentially the same as that of untruthfulness (see 2395), for both the liar and the promise-breaker show themselves unreliable, the former because his words do not square with his mind and the latter because his deeds do not live up to his plighted word. Breach of promise, then, seems _per se_ to be a venial sin, though there are often circ.u.mstances (such as damage done) that make it mortal.
(b) If observance of the promise is not due even from fidelity, on account of the presence of some defect, there is no moral obligation to keep the promise and no sin is committed by not keeping it. The defects referred to are such as make the promise lack force from the beginning (e.g., if it was immoral or extorted by force), or deprive it of the force it had (i.e., inability on the part of the promisor or loss of right on the part of the promisee). The promisor is unable to keep the promise, if the thing promised has become physically impossible (e.g., he no longer has the strength or the means to perform what he promised), or morally impossible (e.g., the thing promised has become unlawful, or a notable change has taken place which, could it have been foreseen, would have prevented the promise). The promisee loses his right if the sole or princ.i.p.al reason that dictated the promise has ceased, or if the promise has become useless to the promisee, or if the promisor has been released, or if the promisee forfeits his claim by his own perfidy towards the promisor (see 2256 sqq., 1889).
2408. Definition of a Secret.--A secret is a matter (e.g., an invention, valuable information, concealed virtues, the fact that a crime has been committed) known privately by only one person or by so few that it is neither public property nor notorious. Moralists distinguish the following kinds of secrets:
(a) a natural secret, which is one that cannot be revealed without causing injury or annoyance to another, as when the revelation will harm a person in his reputation, honor, influence property. It is called natural for it arises from the very nature of the matter of the secret and not from any promise or contract.
(b) a promised secret, which is one that a person has promised, but only after he had already learned it, to guard inviolate. It makes no difference whether the promisor learned the secret from the promisee or from some other source;
(c) an entrusted or committed secret, which is one that a person promised (and before he learned it) to keep from others. The promise here is either implicit or explicit. An implicit promise of secrecy is one that is demanded by the confidential nature of communications between two parties (professional secret), as when physicians, lawyers, priests, parents, or friends are told of private matters on account of their position or relationship. An explicit promise is one that is given in express terms, as when A says to B: "I have a matter of great importance to tell you, but you must first promise that you will keep it secret"; and on B promising, A confides to him the secret.
2409. Sinfulness of Violating a. Secret.--A secret is the property of its owner, and to it he has a strict right; for if it is a good secret (such as an original idea or discovery), it is the product of his labor or at least a possession which he has lawfully come by; if it is an evil secret (such as a crime of which he has been guilty), it may not be made known without infringing on his right of reputation. It is no more lawful to violate the right to a secret than to violate the right to property, and, as there are three kinds of injuries to property, so there are three kinds of injuries to a secret.
(a) Thus, the right of possession is injured by those who by fraud or force or other illegal means deprive another of his secret (e.g., by secretly intercepting private letters, by making a person drunk in order to learn a secret).
(b) The right of use is injured by those who on acquiring knowledge of a secret guide themselves or others by it to the detriment of the owner"s rights.
(c) The right of disposition is injured by those who reveal a secret which they were obliged not to reveal.
2410. Prying Into Others" Secrets.--To seek to discover the secrets of others is not lawful unless the following conditions are present:
(a) one must have a right to the knowledge. Hence, if there is question about a crime that has been committed or that is about to be committed, one has a right to investigate in order to prevent harm to public or private good; in war one may try to discover the plans of the enemy.
But it is not lawful to pry into purely personal matters, to fish from others natural or confidential secrets which they are bound to keep, to steal from another the thoughts, plans, inventions, etc, which are his own;
(b) one must use only honest means to discover secrets to which one has a right (1504). Thus, it does not seem lawful generally to inebriate another in order to learn his secret, and it is certainly sinful to resort to lies or simulation or immorality.
2411. Reading Another"s Letters or Papers.--When is it lawful to read the letters or other papers of another person?
(a) This is lawful when the writings are not intended to be secret to anyone, as when a circular is meant for public use, when greetings are written on a postcard which all may read, and when a letter is left open and thrown away or otherwise abandoned. But a sealed letter, or one left open in a private room, or one lost in a public place, is secret. If a letter or ma.n.u.script has been torn up by its owner and thrown away on the street or other public place, it does not seem lawful to piece the fragments together and read the writing, for, though the paper has been abandoned, the owner by destroying it has indicated his will to keep the contents secret.
(b) It is also lawful to read the writing of others that are not secret as regards oneself, as when one has received a just permission from the writer to peruse a letter written by him, or when one may presume such permission on account of friendship with the writer, or when rule or lawful custom gives the superior of an inst.i.tution the right to inspect the correspondence of his subjects. Exception must be made for exempted matter for which there is no permission, such as letters containing conscience matters and letters directed to higher religious superiors (see Canon 611).
(c) It is also lawful to read the writings of others that are meant to be secret, if one has a right to know what is in them: for in such a case the owner would be unreasonable if he wished to exclude one from the knowledge. Thus, the public authority (e.g., in time of war) has the right to open and read letters and private papers, when this is necessary for the common good; parents and heads of boarding schools may examine the correspondence of their subjects, though parents should respect conscience matter and others should not read family secrets; private individuals have the natural right, as a measure of self-defense, to read another"s letter, when there is a prudent reason for thinking that it contains something gravely and unjustly harmful to themselves (such as conspiracy, a trap, calumny).
2412. Lawfulness of Utilizing Knowledge of Secret.--One is said to use the knowledge obtained from a secret when one guides one"s conduct by the knowledge, doing or omitting what one would not otherwise do or omit. Is this use of a secret lawful?
(a) If there was a promise not to use the secret, such use is unlawful (see 2414). Breach of promise is then, in case of a merely promised secret, an act of infidelity at least, and in case of an entrusted secret an act of injustice. Thus, when one consults a professional person, there is a tacit understanding that the knowledge communicated will not be used against one"s interests or without one"s consent, and hence a lawyer would be unjust if, on learning in the course of work for a client that the latter"s business was not prosperous, he gave word of this to one of the client"s creditors.
(b) If there was no promise not to use the secret, the use of it is nevertheless unjust, if it infringes a strict right (e.g., to make money from a secret process on which another has a patent, to get knowledge of another"s information and plans through reading his letters and thereby to prevent him from securing a vacant position), or if it is equivalent to unjust revelation of a secret. The use is uneharitable if it harms another person without necessity (e.g., to take away one"s trade from a deserving merchant solely because one has learned that on one occasion he was accidentally intoxicated).