(c) If there was no promise to avoid use and no harm will be done by use, it is lawful to use a secret for a non-necessary good (e.g., to raise the price on one"s property when one accidentally learns through overhearing a secret conversation that the property is worth the higher price), and it is obligatory to use it for a necessary good (e.g., to a.s.sist a neighbor when one is told under secret that he is in dire need of one"s charitable help). Even though harm will result to another by use of the secret, use is not sinful if it infringes no right and could be sacrificed only at great inconvenience to oneself, as when one has discovered by one"s own industry some important truth in an art or science which another had previously discovered but had neglected to make his own by exclusive right, or when one learns under secret that another person is one"s enemy and has to be watched and avoided.
2413. The Sin Committed by Stealing or Unduly Using the Secret of Another.--(a) From its nature (cases of mere fidelity excepted) the sin is mortal, as being a violation of commutative justice or of charity.
Injury to property rights, whether in goods or in knowledge, is violation of a strict right (see 1890, 1894). The sin is aggravated by the greater import of the secret or by the greater damages or displeasure caused.
(b) From the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter the sin may become venial, as when one thoughtlessly reads another person"s letters, or opens correspondence without authority, feeling morally sure that there is nothing confidential in it, or makes use of an unimportant secret without permission.
2414. The Obligation of Keeping a Secret.--(a) The natural secret obliges _per se_ under grave sin; for violation of it offends charity and justice by saddening and harming a neighbor. The sin may become venial on account of lightness of matter, as when little sadness or harm is caused.
(b) The promised secret obliges ordinarily under light sin only; for as a rule the promisor intends to obligate himself in virtue of fidelity alone (1888), and the obligation of fidelity, as said above (see 2407), is not grave. But exceptionally the obligation may be grave, as when the promisor intended to bind himself in virtue of justice and under grave sin, or when the secret is natural as well as promised.
(c) The entrusted secret obliges _per se_ under grave sin; for there is a duty of commutative and of legal justice to keep it, on account of the rights of contract and of the common good that are involved. The violator of an entrusted secret injures private good by disregard for contract, and he injures public good by weakening confidence in officials or professional persons to whom others must go for advice or a.s.sistance. Violation of a committed secret may be only a venial sin on account of the lightness of the matter. Thus, some think it is not a serious injustice to reveal a secret to one very discreet person, if the person whose secret is made known is not very much opposed to this and no other damage will result (see 2065).
2415. Comparison of Secrets as Regards Binding Force.--(a) The promised secret obliges less than the natural or the entrusted, as was said in the previous paragraph. (b) The natural secret obliges less _per se_ than the entrusted secret, for the safeguarding of the latter is agreed to in an onerous contract, while no engagement is made to keep the former. (c) Some entrusted secrets are more sacred than others. Thus, a secret confided from necessity is more binding than one confided without necessity; a secret one has sworn to keep is more obligatory than a secret one has given one"s word of honor to keep; a professional secret is more imperious than a private secret; a state secret is far more important than any secret of private individuals. The most inviolable of all secrets is that of the confessional, because its violation is always a sacrilege.
2416. Cases Wherein It Is Not Necessary to Keep a Secret.--(a) If there has been no obligation from the time the secret was learned, it is not necessary to keep it. Thus, if a merely promised secret was accepted under compulsion and revelation will be advantageous and not harmful, it does not seem necessary to keep the secret.
(b) If the obligation of the secret has ceased, it is not necessary to be silent. Examples are cases in which secrecy was promised only for a certain s.p.a.ce of time, or in which a matter formerly secret has become public, or in which the owner of the secret wishes it to be divulged, or in which he has not kept faith with the possessor of the secret, provided of course that in these cases no injury or unnecessary harm is done by making known the secret. Similarly, if the recipient of the secret cannot keep it without grave harm (e.g., death) to himself, he is not bound by it, unless charity (see 1165, 1236) or justice calls for the contrary. Commutative justice would demand silence (though many make exception for a most grave reason, regarding a promise to the contrary as prodigal) if there had been an express contract to guard the secret at all risks; legal justice would demand it, if the safety of the republic were involved.
2417. Cases Wherein It Is Not Lawful to Keep a Secret.--(a) If a secret cannot be kept without greater harm to the common good, it may not be kept, for legal justice requires that private good be subordinated to public safety. The violation of secrets is a harm to the public good and a greater harm than ordinary evils against the community (such as the escape of a guilty person); but it is a less harm than serious evils against the people (such as menace to public health, sedition, or treason). The possessor of a natural or promised secret must make it known at the command of lawful authority, as in court; but the superior has no right to question about entrusted secrets of a necessary kind, and this is usually recognized by positive law in the protection extended to professional communications.
(b) If a secret cannot be kept without greater harm to the private good of the owner of the secret, distinction is made between a non-entrusted and an entrusted secret. In the former case the secret may not be kept, for charity bids one to help a neighbor escape a greater evil, and the owner of the secret would be unreasonable if he were opposed to its revelation (see 501 sqq.). In the latter case, some are of the opinion that the secret should be kept, if it is professional (since the public good then takes precedence over the private good of the owner of the secret), but this is denied by others. Example: t.i.tus knows that Balbus is about to marry with a secret impediment that will nullify the marriage, but he cannot persuade Balbus to disclose this impediment to the pastor.
(c) If a secret cannot be kept without greater harm to the private good of a third party (i.e., one other than the owner of the secret), distinction is made between cases, according as injury is or is not done by the owner of the secret to the third party. If no injury is done the third party, the secret should be kept (e.g., if one knows in confidence that Semp.r.o.nius has made an invention which will supersede an invention made by Claudius, one is not at liberty to make this known to the latter, for Semp.r.o.nius has done no injury to Claudius). If, however, injury is done the third party by the owner of the secret when the secret is kept, one should not keep the secret; for charity requires that one help an innocent person to escape from harm, even if this has to be done at the expense of harm to the guilty cause of the harm. Examples: If one knows as a secret that A, B and C have conspired to murder D tomorrow night, and one cannot otherwise prevent the murder, one should if possible break the secret, at least by sending warning to D that his life is in danger tomorrow night. If a doctor knows that a man who is about to contract marriage is syphilitic and pretends that he is sound, and if the doctor cannot persuade this man to make the facts known to the intended wife, the doctor himself should give notice to the woman, according to some authorities, unless the laws of the country forbid such use of professional knowledge.
2418. What should the possessor of an entrusted secret do, if from the secret he knows that the one who entrusted it is guilty of a crime for which an innocent third person is about to be convicted and sentenced?
(a) If the guilty party is responsible for the plight of the innocent party (e.g., because he falsely accused him or threw suspicion on him), natural law would require the possessor of the secret to make known the true state of affairs; for the guilty party is then the unjust cause of damage and is bound to accuse himself (see 1763). Revelation of the true culprit would not be necessary, however, if there was some other way of saving the innocent person.
(b) If the guilty person is not responsible for the difficulty in which the innocent person finds himself, not having used any means to bring the latter into suspicion, some believe that the secret should be kept, since the guilty person has then the right to keep his secret and therefore has also the right that his confidants keep it (see 1968).
But others, while granting that the guilty person is not obliged to accuse himself, deny that the confidant is not obliged to accuse him; for the right of the guilty that his secret be kept and the right of the innocent that he be not deprived of life or liberty are in conflict and unequal, and he who prefers the former right does an injury to the innocent person (see 288).
2419. The previous question was concerned with an innocent third party.
If the holder of the secret is also the accused, it seems he is not obliged, unless perhaps when he agreed to it, to prefer the inviolability of the secret to his own justification; for the acceptance of a secret does not mean that one binds oneself to grave hardship for its preservation (see 2418). The thing to do would be to warn the guilty person to escape in time, and then to exculpate oneself by making known the truth.
2420. Lawfulness of Revealing a Secret Learned by Stealth or Force.--Is it lawful, in order to avert some great evil, to use or reveal against the interests or wishes of its owner a secret which one has learned by stealth (e.g., by spying, eavesdropping, wiretapping, unauthorized inspection of papers) or by force? Various answers are given to this question, but to us the following seems the best:
(a) if the stealth or force would not be unjust here and now, because the owner of the secret has a duty to disclose it (e.g., on account of the public good, on account of the extreme need of a private person), or the other party has a right to seek after it (e.g., because he cannot otherwise defend himself against the unjust vexation of the owner of the secret), the answer is in the affirmative; for in such a case there is only applied the principle of lawful occupation or of lawful self-defense (see 1920 sqq., 1819). But if the stealth or force is excessive in its manner or productive of unnecessary harm, it is sinful and induces the duty of rest.i.tution, nor is there any right to make such use or such revelation of a secret as is sinful in itself (e.g., on account of calumnies, scandals, disorders);
(b) if the stealth or force would be unjust here and now, the answer is in the negative; for in such a case there is real theft of a secret, a person"s most intimate possession, and a continuation of the original injury by the use of the stolen property against its owner, or at least an unlawful conversion of property. Hence, if there is no grave or proportionate reason for the use of the secret, or if other and simpler methods can be employed, the secret may not be used. Those who play the detective ostensibly for other reasons but really for purposes of blackmail or other personal advantage, are therefore in the same cla.s.s as thieves and are bound to rest.i.tution; their sin is _per se_ mortal, for secrets are usually esteemed more highly than money, and it would be seriously detrimental to the public weal if the practice of using secrets unlawfully obtained (e.g., by secretly taking down privileged communications or state secrets) were permissible.
2421. The Virtues of Affability and Liberality.--These two virtues, though they are not so important as those that preceded, are still most useful to human life (see 2143). Affability (friendliness, politeness) is a virtue which inclines a person to show himself in serious matters properly agreeable to others in order thus to fulfill a duty to society.
(a) Affability has for its object to be agreeable to others, that is, in looks, manner, words and deeds to treat them with kindness and consideration, and so to give them pleasure. Affability is more than mere civility, which avoids rudeness and observes necessary proprieties, but does not manifest a gracious spirit. The gentleman, according to Cardinal Newman ("Idea of a University," Discourse viii, 10), is one who does not inflict pain and whose great concern is to make others at their ease and at home. The true gentleman is considerate for all his company, guards against unseasonable allusions or topics, is seldom prominent in conversation and never wearisome, makes light of his own favors, never speaks of himself except when compelled, avoids personalities and insinuations of evil, and is indulgent towards opponents.
(b) Affability is as agreeable as is becoming, or proper; that is, it observes the golden mean, attending to moderation and circ.u.mstances, suiting its deportment to the time, place, occasion, and persons and observing the recognized laws of etiquette for social, official, business, religious, domestic and other relations. Indeed, there are times when affability should not be shown, as when it is necessary to display severity and displeasure, or even to sadden others, for the sake of some higher good (II Cor., vii. 8, 9).
(c) Its purpose is to fulfill a social duty. Without affability the ways of life are made rougher and more difficult for all, and therefore, since man is a social being, it becomes obligatory that each one should so conduct himself towards others as to avoid the displeasing and to cultivate the pleasing. Thus, affability is less than friendship (see 1110), since it does not include special benevolence and is shown to friend and foe alike; but it is more than polish, for it consists not merely in external good manners but chiefly in an internal sense of responsibility to society and of deference to its requirements. Affability is at its best, however, when prompted by friendship and Christian charity. A modic.u.m of courtesy, if accompanied by sincerity and goodness of heart, is more appreciated than profuse compliment and ceremony behind which there is little genuineness or little affection.
(d) Affability regulates conduct in serious matters, for the regulation of amus.e.m.e.nts or recreations pertain chiefly to modesty and falls under temperance rather than justice. Aristotle calls the virtue directive of games _eutrapelia_, which may also be called reasonable relaxation, urbanity, or pleasantness.
2422. Offices of Affability.--All, and especially the clergy, should practise courtesy, imitating St. Paul, who became all things to all men, in order to gain all to Christ (I Cor., ix. 22), and following his advice to be without offense to Jew or Gentile or to the Church of G.o.d (I Cor., x. 32). The offices of affability can be reduced to the negative and the positive, as follows: (a) the negative offices are the avoidance of excess (adulation) and defect (surliness); (b) the positive offices are the observance on special occasions of the appropriate forms and usages and on all occasions the exercise of a gentle and thoughtful regard for the feelings of others.
2423. The Sins against Affability.--(a) Adulation is the vice of those who in the effort to please others go beyond what is proper, of the complaisant man who aims to gratify by merely conventional or extravagant compliments, and of the flatterer who seeks to win favors for himself by expressions of fulsome admiration. Adulation is shown by exaggerated debas.e.m.e.nt of self (servility, obsequiousness), as well as by exaggerated exaltation of others (toadyism). The sin of adulation is not grave from its nature, being only an excessive will to please; but circ.u.mstances sometimes make it grave, such as its matter (e.g., when one compliments another"s sins, Is., v. 20), its effect (e.g., when the person flattered will be made proud), or its purpose (e.g., when the flatterer means to seduce the other person, Prov., xxvii. 6). Like to adulation in its exaggeration, but unlike it in manner, is the display of friendliness by offensive familiarity or boisterous conduct.
(b) Surliness is the sin of those who are ungracious in their manners, not because of hate or anger, but because of a desire to be unpleasant and to make others yield to themselves. The surly man is always ready to contradict or argue, he is hard to please, sensitive, sour in visage, gruff in words, and much given to complaint or sullen silence.
Surliness is _per se_ worse than adulation but not a mortal sin; for it is farther removed from affability than adulation, but does not necessarily inflict a severe wound on charity. But the smooth palaverer is usually a more dangerous character than the morose man (Ps. cxl. 5).
Like to surliness is the boorishness of those who from cynicism or laziness despise refinement, or from greed neglect proper manners at table. But entirely different from surliness is that dignity which can be reserved without being distant or hard of approach, and that seriousness which can be grave or silent without being ungracious.
2424. Liberality.--Liberality is a virtue that moderates the love of riches and inclines one in ordinary affairs to bestow one"s own goods upon others willingly, when and as right reason may dictate.
(a) It moderates the love of riches; that is, it makes one value and esteem money at its true worth. In this respect it pertains at least improperly to temperance inasmuch as the love of money is a pa.s.sion.
Liberality is thus distinguished from mercy and beneficence. These virtues are open-handed from charity, and give because another is in need or is loved; liberality, on the contrary, may be without charity and its bounty may be shown even to those who are not in need or who are not liked, for it is free in using money precisely because it does not prize external things excessively.
(b) It inclines one to bestow one"s own possessions, or freely to communicate them. In this respect liberality is a.s.signed to justice, since its object is external things as owed by a certain moral debt to others. Since liberality consists primarily in a generous inclination, even the poor may have this virtue; in fact, the poor oftentimes, being less wedded to money, are far more disposed to liberality than the rich.
(c) It functions in ordinary affairs, for there is a special virtue of magnificence that makes wealthy men spend money lavishly in enterprise of the greatest moment.
(d) The beneficiary of liberality is another, for no special virtue is needed to make one use money freely for one"s own needs or comfort.
(e) Liberality bestows gladly, but according to right reason, for there is no merit in unwilling gifts, and no virtue in gifts bestowed unsuitably as to time, place, purpose, person, quant.i.ty, quality, etc.
Liberality, then, is not inconsistent with prudence about temporal affairs, that is, with economy which adapts expenditures to income, with thrift which puts something by for the future, and with frugality which spares unnecessary expenses on self, especially in the matter of luxuries (see 1681 sqq.).
2425. The Importance of Liberality.--(a) Liberality is not the greatest virtue. It is less than temperance, for temperance regulates the pa.s.sions in reference to the body, while liberality regulates them in reference to externals; it is less than fort.i.tude and justice, which serve the common good, whereas liberality regards individuals; it is less than the virtues that are concerned with divine things, for liberality has to do directly with temporals.
(b) Liberality is one of the most useful of virtues since it disposes one to use money well in the service of G.o.d and humanity, and gives one an influence that can be employed for good (Ecclus., x.x.xi. 28).
According to Aristotle, the virtues that chiefly attract fame are first bravery, next justice, and then liberality. Moreover, this virtue of generosity is one of the surest indexes of internal religion and charity, as being the natural expression of devotion and benevolence (see 2185, 1211), while miserliness is a sign of coldness towards G.o.d and man.
2426. Vice of Avarice.--The vice which is opposed to liberality by defect in giving is avarice, which, properly speaking or as distinguished from theft and robbery, is an immoderate desire, love or delight entertained in respect to external corporal goods, such as lands or money.
(a) The Absolute Malice of Avarice.--This sin is _per se_ venial, since it is only an excess in the love of a thing that is in itself indifferent and lawful; but it becomes mortal if the affection for money is so great that one is prepared to sacrifice grave obligations for its sake (e.g., to stay away from church rather than contribute to religion or the suffering poor). It is not merely carnal, since not concerned with bodily pleasure; nor merely spiritual, since riches are not a spiritual object; hence, it stands midway between spiritual and carnal vices.
(b) The Comparative Malice of Avarice.--In regard to deformity, avarice is not worse than other sins, but rather the contrary. The less the good to which a vice is opposed, the less the deprivation caused by the vice; and hence since external goods, to whose proper esteem avarice is opposed, are less important than divine or human goods, it follows that avarice is not so sinful as irreligion, homicide, theft, etc. In regard to shamefulness, however, avarice is worse than other sins. The less valuable the created good that a vice pursues, the more disgraceful the vice; and hence since the miser sets his heart on external things, which are the lowest of all goods, preferring them to goods of body and of soul (e.g., to health, education) and even to divine goods, he is rightly regarded as more contemptible than other sinners. Some forms of avarice, too, are more despicable than others. Thus, in some persons avarice shows itself in their fear to consume or expend for their own necessary uses (parsimony, penuriousness); in others it shows itself by an unwillingness to give to others (stinginess, n.i.g.g.ardliness), or a willingness to live at the expense of others (sponging); finally, the most disgusting form of avarice is seen in those who cannot bear to part with their possessions either for their own sake or for the sake of others, and find their happiness in mere possession (miserliness).
In regard to influence, avarice has a pre-eminence among sins that causes it to be numbered among the seven capital vices. A capital vice is one of the chief sources of evil attraction that produces other sins, and it is clear that immoderate love of riches is one of the most prolific of sins. All are drawn to happiness, and money seems to secure the requisites for happiness (Ecclus., x. 16); hence we see that for the sake of holding to money men become hard of heart (Matt., xxiii.
14; Luke, xvi. 21), for the sake of acquiring it they become carnal and restless in mind (Ecclus., xiv. 9; Matt., xiii. 22) and have recourse to deeds of violence (III Kings, xxi. 2), of deception (Acts, xxiv.
26), of perjury (Matt., xxviii. 12 sqq.), of fraud (Luke, xvi. 4 sqq.), and of treachery (Matt., xxvi. 15). Avarice is at the same time one of the most dangerous of sins, for it will lead a man to sell even his own soul (Ecclus., X. 10) and to commit any enormity (I Tim., vi. 9), and one of the most incurable, for the miser never has enough (Prov., x.x.x.
15, 16) and is always able to make believe that his avarice is prudence or some other virtue (Wis., xv. 12).
2427. Vice of Prodigality.--The vice opposed to liberality by excess in giving is prodigality, which is an insufficient regard for temporal things and an extravagant bestowal of them on others.
(a) It is an insufficient care for temporal things: that is, as the miser loves money too much, so the prodigal esteems it too little; as the miser is over-anxious to get and keep money, so the prodigal is careless about earning or saving.
(b) It is an extravagant bestowal of temporal things; that is, the prodigal gives more than he should, or else the circ.u.mstances do not call for his gift, as when he gives when or where or to whom he should not give.
2428. The Sinfulness of Prodigality.--(a) From its nature it is venial.
The prodigal is not the absolute owner of his goods, but a steward who is held to administer them according to reason. But his sin is not grave, since it does not injure others and the goods of which he deprives himself are of the lowest kind.
(b) From its circ.u.mstances it may be mortal. Thus, it is made mortal on account of the purpose (e.g., extravagant presents made with a view to seduction or bribery), or the consequences (e.g., wastefulness which makes one unable to pay debts or a.s.sist a relative who is in grave need), or the special obligation of devoting superfluities to charity, as when one squanders the excess revenues of a benefice (see 1252).