(c) The Subject-Matter of s.e.x Education.--The fundamentals of s.e.x instruction include such points as the diversity of s.e.x, its origin from G.o.d and its dignity, the beginning of life in plants and animals, the organs of reproduction, the functions of maternity and paternity, the grave reasons that demand s.e.xual morality, respect for womankind, the great sinfulness of masturbation and fornication, the meaning of p.u.b.erty and its accompaniments in male and female, the possibility and healthfulness of continence, the moral dangers of the world and the social diseases to be guarded against, and the hygienic aids to chast.i.ty.
(d) The Method of Instruction.--It is clear that not all the details just mentioned can be imparted at one time, for young children would not understand or there would be scandal of little ones; but, while fiction and exaggeration should be avoided, a strictly scientific and technical instruction is not necessary or generally advisable. It is clear also that parents, and especially mothers, are naturally suited for the delicate task of early guardians of chast.i.ty, though the later instruction should be supplemented in catechism cla.s.s, sermon, school, and an individual advice given in confession. It would be impossible in brief s.p.a.ce to outline sufficiently a program of s.e.x instruction, but parents and persons who are about to marry should read, study and apply some of the excellent books prepared for their guidance.
2633. Duties of Children.--The duties of children to their parents can also be cla.s.sed under those of charity and piety.
(a) Duties of Charity.--Children owe their parents a special internal and external love (see 1176 sqq.). Those children sin gravely who hate their parents or wish them serious evil, or who treat them with great unkindness or neglect, or bring them great sorrow or worry, or who never visit or write to them.
(b) Duties of Piety.--Children must respect and a.s.sist their parents (see 2347, 2348). It is a serious sin to have contempt for one"s parents, or to show them serious dishonor in words (e.g., by injurious or mocking names), in signs (e.g., by laughing at them, mimicking them), in deeds (e.g., by striking them, speaking against them), in omission (e.g., by refusing to acknowledge them or show them the usual marks of courtesy). It is not disrespect, however, for a child to dislike or protest against evils done by his parents. The a.s.sistance owed to parents is both spiritual and corporal, and children sin when they neglect the religious welfare of their parents (e.g., by not respectfully admonishing them when the parents do not lead a good life, by not obtaining for them the Sacraments, prayers and suffrages they need), or deny them bodily aid (e.g., by refusing them help or comfort when they are poor, persecuted, or suffering). Children who live at home with their parents should contribute from their earnings or individual property to the maintenance of the home, unless the parents do not need this pay and do not wish it. See Catechism of the Council of Trent, on the Fourth Commandment (pages 408 sqq.).
2634. Duties of Near Relatives.--There are similar duties of charity and piety between other near relatives, for example, between brothers and sisters, grandparents and grandchildren uncles and aunts and their nephews and nieces, and between first cousins. The obligation seems, to some authors, to be a grave one as far as the second degree of kinship, but is light in the other degrees. The relationship and duty to kin by marriage is not so strong.
2635. The Duties of Superiors and Subjects: Duties of Superiors.--Superiors both in domestic and civil society need especially prudence and justice in order to fulfill well their special duties of ruling successfully and lawfully (Jerem., xxiii. 5).
(a) Prudence.--If every individual must use wise deliberation, decision and direction to guide himself aright, much more does a ruler, whether of the home or of the State, need these qualities; and hence it is the prudent servant who is placed over his master"s household (Matt., xxiv.
45), whereas the imprudent ruler brings confusion upon his community (Is., iii. 4 sqq). Parents, guardians, executives, lawmakers and magistrates are, therefore, bound to fit themselves by competent knowledge of their duties. At the minimum, they must know what const.i.tutes the welfare of their circle or community, and how it should be promoted. For this, in positions of subordinate importance, common sense with good will often suffices, but from those who are heads of large organizations much more is expected. A chief who has to direct a great mult.i.tude must have unusual ability and unusual knowledge or unusual quickness to learn from study and conference what measures will safeguard the interests of his body and promote the happiness and prosperity of its members (see 1640 sqq.).
(b) Justice.--In their rule superiors must be lovers of the common good; they must decree, judge and govern according to natural justice and the law; in distributions of burdens and favors they must be guided by fairness to all, avoiding partiality, bribery, peculation and every form of political corruption; in discipline they must conscientiously enforce the right; in personal life they must be a model to their subjects, showing themselves moral, religious, truthful, dignified but approachable and patient (not arrogant, stubborn, sensitive, ill-humored or revengeful), given to work and duty rather than to pleasure and display.
2636. Duties of Subjects.--The general duties of subjects to superiors are chiefly honor and obedience (see 2351 sqq.).
(a) Honor.--Honor is owed to superiors on account of their position of authority, which is derived from G.o.d, not on account of their personal character, for personally they may be wicked. It is disrespectful even in a democracy to deny them the honorable address, salutation or courtesy which is customary, or to treat them insultingly by word, manner or writing. But it is not disrespectful to disagree with the personal views of a superior or to seek legitimately his removal from office if he is unfit or less fit.
(b) Obedience.--Obedience is owed to superiors and their laws when they strictly command what is not sinful or illegal or outside their authority (see 375 sqq.). Unemanc.i.p.ated children are obliged to obey their parents in all that falls under the parental authority, namely, in what pertains to good morals (e.g., attendance at religious duties, avoidance of bad companions) or the good order of the home (e.g., the hours for meals, the time of retiring, the visitors to be received).
But parents have no authority to command fraud or other sin; nor are children under subjection in the matter of taking up a state of life, for this demands liking and fitness, and the command of a superior cannot give liking and fitness. It is a serious sin for parents to force a child to take up religious life or the priesthood, or to marry a certain individual; but a child should yield when his parents are reasonably opposed to his choice of a vocation, as when they need his support, or wish him to test his vocation a little, or know that the person selected for wife will disgrace the family.
2637. Taxes.--Citizens owe the government particularly the tribute of taxation, and in war that of military service. Taxes are contributions exacted by the public authority from subjects for the purpose of defraying public expenses or promoting the public welfare.
(a) Thus, they are contributions, and hence a tax is not to be confused with a payment (e.g., fares for pa.s.sage on government railroads), or with a fine (e.g., pecuniary penalty for evasion of customs).
(b) They are exacted from subjects (i.e., from citizens), who are subject on account of their persons as being members of the State, and from aliens, who are subject on account of their goods, as receiving privileges of residence, commerce, pa.s.sage, etc.
2638. Kinds of Taxes.--There are many kinds of taxes, but they can all be reduced to two general categories.
(a) Direct taxes are those collected from the person on whom the burden is ultimately to fall. Examples are poll or personal taxes and property taxes (such as those on general property, incomes or inheritances), for these charges remain an expense of the taxpayer himself.
(b) Indirect taxes are those collected from a person other than the one on whom the burden is ultimately to fall. Examples are duties imposed on outsiders (such as customs or tariffs, duties raised for revenues, protection, etc.), external revenue taxes imposed on certain acts (such as the manufacture or sale of commodities) or occupations (e.g., licenses for trades, sports, etc.). In these the charge falls immediately on the taxpayer, but ultimately on a consumer.
2639. Just Taxes.--Tax laws, like other laws, must be just; that is, they must be made by lawful authority and must promote the common good (see 285). The common good requires that taxes be not imposed except for just reasons, and that there be a fair distribution of the burden.
(a) Just reasons are those of public utility or necessity. A tax would be unjust, if it were levied for unjust or unnecessary purposes.
(b) Fair distribution requires that citizens be a.s.sessed according to their ability to pay (sacrifices for the public good, special benefits from the use of a tax fund, etc.).
2640. Obligation to Pay Taxes.--The obligation in conscience of just tax laws is admitted by all Catholic authorities.
(a) The teaching of Scripture is quite clear, since Our Lord, in answer to the question whether it were lawful to pay tribute to Caesar, replied: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar"s" (Matt., xxii.
17-21); and St. Paul teaches: "Be subject of necessity, not only for wrath, but also for conscience" sake. Render therefore to all men their due, tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom" (Rom., xiii. 5, 6).
(b) Reason too shows the need of obligation in conscience, for, unless these laws oblige thus, the common good will suffer through lack of money needed for public purposes, and some individuals will be unjustly burdened and others unjustly favored.
2641. Quality of the Obligation.--There are various opinions about the quality of the obligation in conscience of taxation laws.
(a) Thus, according to one opinion they oblige in conscience and under sin, that is, as preceptive laws (see 561 sqq.). For the natural law and justice require that the members of society contribute the necessaries to the social body organized for their benefit, or that the people live up to their implicit contract with their government by giving compensation for the services they receive.
(b) According to another opinion tax laws oblige in conscience only under penalty, that is, as penal laws. The arguments for this view are, first, the sufficiency of the penal obligation (i.e., the heavy fines imposed) for the attainment of the laws" purpose, and, secondly, the common opinion of citizens that they commit no sin by merely evading payment of taxes. Furthermore, it is added that, if these laws were preceptive, conscientious citizens would be under a great disadvantage, for they would be placed in the dilemma of either acting against their conscience and committing sin or of paying more than their due on account of the neglect of tax dues by citizens who are not conscientious.
(c) According to a third opinion distinction has to be made between different cases. Thus, some held that laws on direct taxes are preceptive and laws on indirect taxes merely penal, while others say that the kind of obligation depends on the will of the lawgiver, and that tax laws that are preceptive in one country may be only penal in another. If tax laws are merely penal, there is no obligation of rest.i.tution, but there is an obligation of payment and of penalty after sentence.
2642. Obedience to Tax Laws.--Obedience to just laws is owed either from legal justice alone, or also from commutative justice with the burden of rest.i.tution. There are various opinions about the case of tax laws.
(a) According to the traditional opinion, the obligation is one of commutative justice, because there is an implicit contract between the government and the people, in virtue of which the former is bound to provide for the safety of the people at home and abroad and to secure those things that are necessary for the common welfare (such as roads, postal service, etc.), while the latter are bound in return to pay the expenses of the government.
(b) According to a recent opinion, the obligation is one of legal justice only, because the imposition of taxes is an exercise of authority by the government, and taxes themselves have the character of a tribute from the part to the whole rather than of a wage or payment.
Hence, though he who evades taxes is not held to rest.i.tution, he sins against justice, and sins gravely if the matter is considerable.
(c) According to other opinions, tax laws oblige sometimes from legal, sometimes from commutative justice. Thus, some admit that in feudal times there was a contract between the governed and the ruler, and therefore an obligation of commutative justice to give services and taxes; but in modern times they say there is no such contract, and the duties of ruler and subjects rest on natural law and legal justice, not on any compact. Others again distinguish between the obligation before the quota has been determined, which is the duty of legal justice to declare properly the value of one"s property, and the obligation after a.s.sessment, which is a duty of commutative justice to pay just tax bills.
2643. The Duty of Exercising the Electoral Franchise.--(a) There is a grave duty of using the privilege granted to citizens of voting in public elections, and especially primaries; for the welfare of the community and the moral, intellectual and physical good of individuals depend on the kind of men who are nominated or chosen to rule, and on the ticket platforms voted for. Hence, those who neglect to vote coperate negatively with a serious harm (viz., evil in power), or at least with public unconcern about public matters--for example, those who neglect through laziness or indifference to condemn by their vote.
A grave inconvenience (e.g., sickness, ostracism, exile, persecution), but not a slight inconvenience (such as loss of time, trouble, ridicule), excuses from the duty; for an affirmative law has exceptions. Neither is there an obligation to vote when an election is a mere formality, as when there is but one candidate or party.
(b) The duty is not one of commutative justice, as the ballot is either a privilege, or a thing commanded by authority, but not a service to which the citizen has bound himself by contract or office. The obligation is, therefore, one of legal justice, arising from the fact that the common weal is everybody"s business and responsibility, especially in a republic. Hence, representatives of the people who by abstention from voting cause a serious damage which they were bound _ex officio_ to prevent, are guilty of commutative injustice and are held to rest.i.tution; but a citizen who stays away from the polls sins, and perhaps gravely, against legal justice, though there is no duty of rest.i.tution for the damages that result. Moreover, in a general election the vote of one citizen is usually not of decisive influence, and citizens do not make themselves responsible for all the acts of their representatives.
2644. Manner of Voting.--(a) Object.--It is not necessary to vote for the best candidate, provided one votes for a person who is fitted by character, ability, record, experience, etc. for the office, and gives indications, not merely promises, that he will serve the community well. But in certain ecclesiastical elections the voters must take oath beforehand to vote, not only for a worthy candidate, but also for the person whom they honestly think, all things considered, most worthy. In minor offices (such as constable or town clerk) it suffices that the candidate be known as conscientious; but in major offices (such as President, governor, congressman, legislator, or judge) the party principles for which he stands have to be considered chiefly. _Per accidens_, it is lawful to vote for an unworthy candidate when this is necessary to prevent a greater evil, as when the opposing candidate is much worse, or a good ticket cannot be elected unless some less worthy candidates are included.
(b) Purpose.--The end which the voter should have in mind is the good of the public, and hence it is not right to vote for candidates solely or chiefly because they are personal friends, members of one"s own race, organization or religion, or because one wishes to gain favor or escape enmity.
(c) Circ.u.mstances.--The voter must avoid all that is contrary to natural law (e.g., selling of votes, repeating, stuffing ballot boxes) or positive law (e.g., state laws require not only citizenship and a period of previous residence, but also other conditions such as registration and freedom from bribery and other election crimes). The opinion that politics is necessarily corrupt, and that all is fair that helps to win, is a false and pernicious doctrine. The conditions for ecclesiastical elections are given in Canons 160 sqq.
2645. Obligation to Seek Office.--A worthy man should run for office in the following case: (a) when the public good calls for his candidacy (e.g., when his election or candidacy will avert serious evils, and there is no one else so available); and (b) there is no grave impediment to his candidacy (such as supremely important private affairs or ill-health that makes it impossible to run).
2646. Duties of Employers and Employees.--Between employers and their domestic servants or workingmen there are general mutual duties as between superiors and subjects, and special mutual duties as between parties to an explicit and implicit contract. Of these latter duties we shall now speak.
2647. Duties of Employers.--(a) Justice.--The labor a.s.signed must not be excessive (e.g., unduly perilous, exhausting, protracted) or injurious (e.g., harmful to religion or morals, an unreasonable impediment to marriage, to cultural opportunity or amus.e.m.e.nt); the wage paid must be just (i.e., one that will enable the worker to support himself and his family in reasonable comfort) and equitable (i.e., one that rewards special merit and service by pensions or additional compensation); the terms of the contract must be observed (e.g., arbitrary lowering of wages or dismissal are unjust).
(b) Charity.--Liberality should be shown by preference to employees, since they have a special claim on the employ good will. The employer should consider that he is responsible for the spiritual betterment and material improvement of his workers, and should have them in mind when making contributions to religious, educational or special causes, so that his own employees will benefit in particular by his gifts to these worthy causes. Trade schools and insurance against sickness and unemployment are especially deserving of his a.s.sistance.
2648. Duties of Employees.--(a) Justice.--Workers are bound to give a fair return in quant.i.ty and quality of labor for the pay they receive, and to be loyal to their employer as regards his person, reputation, and property. Hence, it is unjust to loaf or come late or leave early, to turn out work too slowly or of an inferior grade, to damage machinery or property, to waste food or provisions, to act as a household spy or informer, to try to extort what is not due. (For a consideration of the worker"s obligation to join unions see "Catholics in Labor Unions" by Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., _American Ecclesiastical Review_, Vol. CXVI, no. 6 June, 1947, pp. 422 ff.)
(b) Charity.--Workers should be willing even at the expense of some right or of some slight loss to help an employer who is in grave necessity; for example, it would be uncharitable for farm hands to stop work promptly on time when this will cause a serious damage to the farmer"s crop, or for a cook to leave on her free day when her mistress is very sick and will be left alone.
2649. Labor Disputes between Employers and Employees.--(a) In themselves these disputes are indifferent, as they are a species of industrial war (see 1380 sqq.) or of industrial self-defense (1826 sqq.). If the end, the means and the circ.u.mstances are not against right reason, the disputes are lawful or even laudable.
(b) In the concrete, the strike is labor"s chief means for enforcing demands. Since organized labor seeks to equalize the bargaining power between employer and employee, the way to counteract refusal to pay fairly is by a concerted refusal to work, i.e., a strike. A strike may be defined as an organized cessation from work by a group of workers to obtain advantages from an employer. Since an organized strike is a kind of war, moral theologians apply the principles of a just war to determine concretely the morality of a strike.
1) There must be a just reason for the strike. Too little pay, too long hours, brutal treatment, unsafe or unsanitary conditions const.i.tute genuine grievances for what may be called a defensive strike, which presupposes injustice in the part of the employer. On the other hand an ameliorative strike does not presuppose an employer"s injustice, but consists essentially in the worker"s attempt to better conditions, e.g., a better salary, shorter working hours, etc. Such a strike seems to be unlawful if it violates a just work contract in effect at the time of the strike. If no such contract has been made, the ameliorative strike can be lawful, granting a proportionately grave cause; but it is never given unqualified approval owing to the fact that such a strike involves many and grave losses both material and moral to the workers, employer, and community. (See Merkelbach, _Summa Theologi Moralis_ II, n.556.)
2) The strike must be the last means. Owing to the fact that a strike is a kind of warfare, all other peaceful means should be tried, e.g., arbitration, governmental inquiry boards, injunctions, fact-finding boards etc. The moral principle involved is; if an evil is avoidable but not avoided, it cannot be considered as merely incidental to a good end.